State ex rel. Davic v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas , 2023 Ohio 1195 ( 2023 )

[Cite as State ex rel. Davic v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 2023-Ohio-1195.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
State ex rel. Bradford S. Davic, :
Relator, :
v. : No. 22AP-301
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, : (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Respondent. :
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on April 11, 2023
On brief: Bradford S. Davic, pro se.
On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and
Brandon Coy Hendrix, for respondent.
IN PROHIBITION
ON OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE’S DECISION
LELAND, J.
{¶ 1} Relator, Bradford S. Davic, commenced an original action requesting this
court issue a writ of prohibition against respondent, Franklin County Court of Common
Pleas, that finds respondent lacked jurisdiction and usurped its authority by imposing a
sentence based on a non-existent, unenforceable plea deal. Respondent filed a motion to
dismiss and requests this court label relator a vexatious litigator.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On May 24, 2022, relator filed this original action claiming respondent lacked
jurisdiction in imposing sentences for importuning, rape, and gross sexual imposition
arising out of his 2011 conviction. He contended he did not enter the plea deal knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily because there was no meeting of the minds on the essential
terms. Relator identified these essential terms as: (1) the mandatory consecutive sentences
and (2) the lifetime sex offender registration requirement. He now seeks a writ of
prohibition to prevent respondent’s continued exercise of judicial authority over him.
No. 22AP-301 2
{¶ 3} On May 31, 2022, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint,
asserting relator failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) and had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of the law. Further citing
R.C. 2969.25(B), respondent requests this court subject relator’s civil actions filed within
the past 12 months to a “vexatious review” to determine whether such actions were frivolous
or malicious. Relator filed a reply on June 14, 2022 contesting respondent’s motion,
arguing the trial court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction and thus rendered
inapplicable the availability of such adequate remedies.
{¶ 4} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of
Appeals, this matter was referred to a magistrate who issued the appended decision,
including findings of fact and conclusions of law. The magistrate concluded the trial court
possessed jurisdiction over relator and determined he had an adequate remedy to contest
his sentence by way of appeal. Additionally, the magistrate declined to grant respondent’s
vexatious review request but warned relator he could be labeled a vexatious litigator under
R.C. 2323.52 if he continued filing actions not reasonably grounded in fact or warranted by
law. The magistrate recommends this court grant respondent’s motion to dismiss relator’s
complaint for a writ of prohibition.
II. Objections
{¶ 5} Although relator’s objections are no model of clarity, in the interest of justice
we will address them “as gleaned” from his memorandum objecting to the magistrate’s
decision. State ex rel. Navistar, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 16AP-776, 2017-Ohio-
8976, ¶ 25, citing State ex rel. Turner v. Bunting, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-605, 2016-Ohio-1325,
¶ 3. We paraphrase the objections to the magistrate’s decision as follows: (1) relator
contends the magistrate’s fourth finding of fact incorrectly frames as an allegation, rather
than a fact, the claim that he mistakenly believed the trial court had the discretion to impose
concurrent sentences on the four rape charges at the time he agreed to the plea deal,
(2) relator argues the magistrate’s fifth finding of fact incorrectly frames as an allegation,
rather than a fact, the claim that he was not informed of his lifetime requirement to register
as a Tier III sex offender at the time he agreed to the plea deal, and (3) relator claims the
magistrate erred by focusing the decision on whether he entered the plea deal knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily rather than on the issue of whether there was a meeting of the
minds on all of the plea’s essential terms. Relator maintains that without a meeting of the
minds on all essential terms, the trial court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction.
No. 22AP-301 3
{¶ 6} On November 21, 2022, respondent filed a memorandum contra relator’s
objections to the magistrate’s decision, asking this court to overrule the objections because
they do not satisfy the specificity and particularity requirements of Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii).
Alternatively, respondent asked this court to overrule the objections on the merits and
uphold the magistrate’s decision to grant the motion to dismiss.
III. Analysis
{¶ 7} In ruling on these objections, we must perform an independent review to
ensure the magistrate “properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied
the law.” Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d). This court “may adopt or reject a magistrate’s decision in
whole or in part, with or without modification.” Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(b). Having conducted an
independent review of the matters raised in relator’s objections, we find the magistrate
properly determined the writ should be denied.
{¶ 8} This court has original jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition. Ohio
Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(1)(d). The purpose of a writ of prohibition is to
restrain inferior courts from exceeding their jurisdiction. State ex rel. Roush v.
Montgomery, 156 Ohio St.3d 351, 2019-Ohio-932, ¶ 5, citing State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v.
Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 73 (1998). To demonstrate entitlement to a writ of prohibition, a
relator must establish all of the following: (1) respondent has exercised or is about to
exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by
law, and (3) denying the writ will cause injury for which no other adequate remedy exists
in the ordinary course of the law. Roush at ¶ 5. A writ of prohibition is an “ ‘extraordinary
remedy which is customarily granted with caution and restraint, and is issued only in cases
of necessity arising from the inadequacy of other remedies.’ ” Tubbs Jones at 73, quoting
State ex rel. Henry v. Britt, 67 Ohio St.2d 71, 73 (1981). See Loc.R. 13(C) (“In the absence
of extraordinary circumstances, no alternative writ will be issued in an original action, other
than a habeas corpus action.”).
{¶ 9} We find meritless the first two objections that contest the magistrate’s use of
the phrase “relator alleges” in the fourth and fifth findings of fact. The magistrate’s use of
the word “alleges” is not intended to imply relator’s claims are untrue, but simply to
describe what it is relator proposed to be true in his complaint. The magistrate properly
presented the case in the findings of fact and weighed the verity and legal relevance of
relator’s factual allegations in the conclusions of law. Accordingly, we overrule the first two
objections.
No. 22AP-301 4
{¶ 10} We also find meritless the third objection that claims the magistrate erred in
framing the question of whether relator entered the plea deal knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily as his primary argument for a writ of prohibition. Relator’s own complaint twice
asserts the plea deal was invalid because it “was not entered knowingly, intelligently[,] and
voluntarily” and “there was no meeting of the minds.” (Compl. at 11-13.) The magistrate
did not err in addressing arguments relator relied on in his complaint.
{¶ 11} Regardless, the object of relator’s third objection is to prove the trial court
patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over him at the time of his sentencing. As
the magistrate explained, however, a trial court will not patently and unambiguously lack
jurisdiction when it has basic statutory authority to act on the matter at hand. We adopt
the magistrate’s conclusions that the trial court had basic statutory authority to sentence
relator and that it therefore did not lack jurisdiction over him. Because the trial court had
jurisdiction to sentence relator, a writ of prohibition will not issue absent a showing he had
no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law to address the alleged defects
of his plea deal. The magistrate did not err in concluding relator had an adequate remedy
by way of appeal to challenge any defects in his plea, and for that reason no writ of
prohibition may issue. The issues relator raises in his third objection, namely whether there
was a sufficient meeting of the minds on all essential terms of the plea deal and whether he
entered the plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, are therefore irrelevant for the
issuance of a writ of prohibition because he could have raised both issues on direct appeal
from his 2011 sentence. Accordingly, we overrule the third objection.
{¶ 12} Upon review of the magistrate’s decision, an independent review of the
record, and due consideration of relator’s objections, we find the magistrate has properly
determined the facts and applied the law. We therefore overrule relator’s objections and
adopt the magistrate’s decision as our own, including the findings of fact and conclusions
of law contained therein. Accordingly, we grant respondent’s motion to dismiss and
dismiss this action.
Objections overruled;
motion to dismiss granted;
action dismissed.
DORRIAN and BOGGS, JJ., concur.
No. 22AP-301 5
APPENDIX
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
State ex rel. Bradford S. Davic, :
Relator, :
v. : No. 22AP-301
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, : (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Respondent. :
MAGISTRATE'S DECISION
Rendered on October 31, 2022
Bradford S. Davic, pro se.
G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and Brandon Coy
Hendrix, for respondent.
IN PROHIBITION ON
RESPONDENT'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS
{¶ 13} Relator, Bradford S. Davic, has filed this original action seeking a writ of
prohibition against respondent Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, seeking an order
finding that respondent lacked jurisdiction over sentencing and usurped its authority by
imposing sentence on a non-existent, unenforceable plea contract. Respondent has filed a
motion to dismiss and requests that this court find relator a vexatious litigator.
Findings of Fact:
{¶ 14} 1. Respondent is a trial court of general jurisdiction in Ohio with legal
authority over adult felony criminal cases, among other types of cases.
{¶ 15} 2. Relator is a prisoner incarcerated at Trumbull Correctional Institution.
No. 22AP-301 6
{¶ 16} 3. According to our factual summary in State v. Davic, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-
555, 2012-Ohio-952 ("Davic I"), discretionary appeal not allowed in State v. Davic, 132
Ohio St.3d 1482, 2012-Ohio-3334, a Franklin County Grand Jury indicted relator on one
count of importuning, 5 counts of rape, and one count of gross sexual imposition in
Franklin C.P. No. 10CR-6766. Appellant agreed to plead guilty to 4 of the rape counts and
the importuning and gross sexual imposition counts. He signed a guilty plea form
indicating that the defense and prosecution were not recommending a sentence. The form
also explained that he could receive a maximum sentence of 10 years to life in prison for
each rape count, 8 years in prison for the importuning count, and 5 years in prison for the
gross sexual imposition count. In addition, it stated that he could receive a maximum total
sentence of 53 years to life in prison. The court accepted relator's guilty plea and
subsequently sentenced him to 10 years to life in prison on each of the 4 rape counts. The
court ordered him to serve the rape sentences consecutively to each other and concurrently
to the 8 years in prison on the importuning count and 5 years in prison on the gross sexual
imposition count. The total sentence was 40 years to life. Upon relator's appeal in Davic I,
this court found that (1) relator's guilty plea was valid as it was entered in a knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent manner as required by Crim.R. 11(C)(1) and due process
guarantees under the state and federal Constitutions, and (2) the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences on rape charges that involved the same
conduct.
{¶ 17} 4. In his complaint in the present case, relator alleges that, because relator
was subject to mandatory consecutive sentences for the four counts of rape, this would have
been an essential term of the plea agreement contract; yet, nowhere in the record is there
any indication that a meeting of the minds was reached on this essential term of the
contract. Relator alleges there was no mention made of mandatory consecutive sentences
in the written plea agreement and no oral notification provided by the trial court during the
plea hearing. Relator alleges that he mistakenly believed that the court had the discretion
to impose concurrent sentences on the four counts of rape. Thus, alleges relator, the plea
agreement was not entered into knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
{¶ 18} 5. In his complaint, relator further alleges that, an essential term of his plea
contract was the lifetime registration requirements as a Tier III sex offender, pursuant to
R.C. 2950.01(G)(1)(a), resulting from his pleading guilty to rape. However, there was no
notification of registration during relator's plea hearing or in his written plea agreement.
No. 22AP-301 7
Thus, relator alleges, there was no meeting of the minds as to this essential term of the
contract, and the plea was not entered into knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
{¶ 19} 6. In his complaint, relator alleges that, because the plea agreement was not
enforceable, there existed a total lack of jurisdiction for the court to impose any sentence.
{¶ 20} 7. On May 24, 2022, relator filed his complaint in prohibition.
{¶ 21} 8. On May 31, 2022, respondent filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Civ.R. 12(B)(6).
Conclusions of Law:
{¶ 22} For the reasons that follow, it is this magistrate's decision that this court
should grant respondent's motion to dismiss relator's complaint for writ of prohibition.
{¶ 23} "The purpose of a writ of prohibition is to restrain inferior courts from
exceeding their jurisdiction." State ex rel. Roush v. Montgomery, 156 Ohio St.3d 351, 2019-
Ohio-932, ¶ 5, citing State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 73, (1998). To
demonstrate entitlement to a writ of prohibition, a relator must establish that a respondent:
(1) has exercised or is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) that the exercise
of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) that denying the writ will cause injury for
which no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law exists. Roush at ¶ 5. See
State ex rel. McKee v. Cooper, 40 Ohio St.2d 65, 68 (1974) (stating that the "act of holding
a hearing to decide whether one convicted of a crime shall be held in confinement or
granted parole constitutes an exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power").
{¶ 24} "[W]here an inferior court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction
over the cause, prohibition will lie both to prevent the future unauthorized exercise of
jurisdiction and to correct the results of previous jurisdictionally unauthorized actions."
State ex rel. Litty v. Leskovyansky, 77 Ohio St.3d 97, 98 (1996). Accord State ex rel. Sartini
v. Yost, 96 Ohio St.3d 37, 2002-Ohio-3317, ¶ 24 (concluding the fact the judge had already
exercised judicial power by granting a motion, such did not preclude the opposing party
from obtaining a writ of prohibition, as prohibition will lie to correct the results of previous
jurisdictionally unauthorized actions).
{¶ 25} A court may dismiss a complaint seeking a writ of prohibition pursuant to
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) if, after all factual allegations in the complaint are presumed true and all
reasonable inferences are made in relator's favor, it appears beyond doubt that relator could
prove no set of facts entitling him or her to the requested extraordinary writ. State ex rel.
Turner v. Houk, 112 Ohio St.3d 561, 2007-Ohio-814, ¶ 5. "Although factual allegations in
No. 22AP-301 8
the complaint are taken as true, 'unsupported conclusions of a complaint are not considered
admitted * * * and are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.' " Justice v. Jefferson-
Pilot Life Ins., 10th Dist. No. 98AP-177 (Dec. 24, 1998), quoting State ex rel. Hickman v.
Capots, 45 Ohio St.3d 324 (1989).
{¶ 26} The magistrate may take judicial notice of the pleadings and orders in related
cases when these are not subject to reasonable dispute, at least insofar as they affect the
present original action. State ex rel. Nyamusevya v. Hawkins, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-199,
2020-Ohio-2690, ¶ 33, citing Evid.R. 201(B); State ex rel. Ohio Republican Party v.
Fitzgerald, 145 Ohio St.3d 92, 2015-Ohio-5056, ¶ 18; and State ex rel. Womack v. Marsh,
128 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-229, ¶ 8. Furthermore, a court may take judicial notice of
pleadings that are readily accessible on the internet. See Draughon v. Jenkins, 4th Dist. No.
16CA3528, 2016-Ohio-5364, ¶ 26, citing State ex rel. Everhart v. McIntosh, 115 Ohio St.3d
195, 2007-Ohio-4798, ¶ 8, 10 (a court may take judicial notice of appropriate matters,
including judicial opinions and public records accessible from the internet, in determining
a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion); and Giannelli, 1 Baldwin's Ohio Practice Evidence, Section 201.6
(3d Ed.2015) (noting that the rule generally precluding a court from taking judicial notice
of other cases has been relaxed if the record is accessible on the internet). In addition, courts
may take judicial notice of appropriate matters in determining a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion
without converting it to a motion for summary judgment. State ex rel. Findlay Publishing
Co. v. Schroeder, 76 Ohio St.3d 580-81 (1996); Draughon at ¶ 26 (a court may take judicial
notice of appropriate matters, including judicial opinions and public records accessible
from the internet, in determining a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion without converting it to a motion
for summary judgment).
{¶ 27} In State ex rel. Feltner v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 160 Ohio St.3d 359,
2020-Ohio-3080, the Supreme Court of Ohio discussed writs of prohibition, adequate
remedies in the ordinary course of law, and the preventive rather than corrective nature of
such writs, as follows:
To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, a relator ordinarily
must prove that a lower tribunal is about to exercise judicial
or quasi-judicial power without authority and that there is no
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex
rel. Sliwinski v. Burnham Unruh, 118 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-
Ohio-1734, 886 N.E.2d 201, ¶ 7. This standard reflects the
well-established rule that prohibition "is a preventive rather
than a corrective remedy, and issues only to prevent the
commission of a future act, and not to undo an act already
No. 22AP-301 9
performed." High, Treatise on Extraordinary Legal Remedies,
Embracing Mandamus, Quo Warranto and Prohibition,
Section 766, at 606 (2d Ed.1884).
***
[I]n State ex rel. Adams v. Gusweiler, 30 Ohio St.2d 326, 285
N.E.2d 22 (1972), paragraph two of the syllabus, we
recognized an exception to the general rule, holding that a writ
of prohibition may issue correctively to arrest the continuing
effects of an order when there was "a total want of
jurisdiction" on the part of the lower tribunal. A few years
after Gusweiler, we began to associate the exception with the
modifying phrase "patent and unambiguous." See State ex rel.
Gilla v. Fellerhoff, 44 Ohio St.2d 86, 87-88, 338 N.E.2d 522(1975). We also began using that term with respect to a related
exception adopted in Gusweiler at 329[,] namely, that the
availability of an adequate remedy is immaterial when a
tribunal patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction. See,
e.g., State ex rel. Koren v. Grogan, 68 Ohio St.3d 590, 595,
1994-Ohio-327, 629 N.E.2d 446 (1994). Over time, we have
issued writs of prohibition to correct the results of
unauthorized exercises of authority, notwithstanding the
availability of an appeal, if the tribunal patently and
unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment at
issue. See, e.g., State ex rel. V.K.B. v. Smith, 142 Ohio St.3d
469, 2015-Ohio-2004, 32 N.E.3d 452, ¶ 8. * * *
We typically will not hold that a tribunal patently and
unambiguously lacked jurisdiction if the tribunal "had at least
basic statutory jurisdiction to proceed." Gusweiler at 329.
Therefore, in prohibition cases involving statutorily created
tribunals of limited jurisdiction, we ordinarily ask whether the
General Assembly gave the tribunal authority to proceed in
the matter at issue. See, e.g., State ex rel. Goldberg v.
Mahoning Cty. Probate Court, 93 Ohio St.3d 160, 162, 2001-
Ohio-1297, 753 N.E.2d 192 (2001); State ex rel. Natalina
Food Co. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., 55 Ohio St.3d 98, 100,
562 N.E.2d 1383 (1990).
{¶ 28} "The term 'jurisdiction' refers to the court's statutory or constitutional
authority to hear a case." State v. Mbodji, 129 Ohio St.3d 325, 2011-Ohio-2880, ¶ 10. "The
concept encompasses jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case as well as jurisdiction
over the person." Id. Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or statutory
power of a court to adjudicate a case. State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-
2913, ¶ 23. It is the court's power to hear a case and render a sentence. See Tubbs Jones.
No. 22AP-301 10
The General Assembly has given the common pleas courts original jurisdiction over "all
crimes and offenses, except in cases of minor offenses the exclusive jurisdiction of which is
vested in courts inferior to the court of common pleas." R.C. 2931.03. Accordingly,
"[j]urisdiction over all crimes and offenses is vested in the court of common pleas, general
division, unless such jurisdiction specifically and exclusively is vested in other divisions of
the court of common pleas or in the lower courts." State ex rel. McMinn v. Whitfield, 27
Ohio St.3d 4, 5 (1986).
{¶ 29} In the present case, respondent presents two arguments. First, respondent
asserts that the matter must be dismissed because relator has an adequate remedy in the
course of ordinary law by way of appeal. Respondent asserts that relator had the
opportunity to raise his arguments concerning the plea agreement on appeal and, indeed,
raised issues regarding his sentencing in his multitude of appeals, and they were overruled
in each instance. See Davic I (affirming relator's convictions and overruling two assigned
errors, the first contending his guilty plea was invalid as it was not entered in a knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent manner as required by Crim.R. 11(C)(1) and due process
guarantees; and the second contending the trial court abused its discretion in imposing
consecutive sentences on the rape charges); State v. Davic, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-1000, 2016-
Ohio-4883, appeal not accepted 147 Ohio St.3d 1508, 2017-Ohio-261 (affirming trial
court's denial of relator's motion for resentencing); State v. Davic, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-354
(Dec. 26, 2017) (memorandum decision) (affirming trial court's denial of appellant's
motion to correct judgment entry); State v. Davic, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-569, 2019-Ohio-
1320, appeal not accepted, 156 Ohio St.3d 1478, 2019-Ohio-3148 (affirming trial court's
judgment denying appellant's motion to correct sentence); State v. Davic, 10th Dist. No.
19AP-579, 2021-Ohio-131, reconsideration denied, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-579 (Apr. 20, 2021)
(memorandum decision), appeal not accepted, 164 Ohio St.3d 1404, 2021-Ohio-2742(affirming trial court's judgment denying appellant's Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw
guilty plea); State v. Davic, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-555 (Oct. 19, 2021) (memorandum
decision), appeal not accepted, 165 Ohio St.3d 1525, 2022-Ohio-258 (denying appellant's
motion for leave to file a delayed application for reconsideration pursuant to App.R. 26(A));
State v. Davic, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-555 (Mar. 29, 2022) (memorandum decision) (denying
motion for leave to file delayed application for reopening and application for reopening);
Davic v. Warden, Lebanon Corr. Inst., S.D.Ohio No. 2:13-cv-736 (Oct. 17, 2014); objection
overruled by, adopted by, writ of habeas corpus dismissed Davic v. Warden, Trumbull
No. 22AP-301 11
Corr. Inst., S.D.Ohio No. 2:13-cv-736 (Nov. 12, 2014) (dismissing relator's habeas petition
challenging the validity of his guilty plea).
{¶ 30} Here, relator contends that the usual requirement for writs of prohibition
that there exists no adequate remedy at law is not applicable here because the trial court
patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to enter the sentencing judgment due to
his plea not being knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. However, relator presents no
authority for the proposition that a trial court patently and unambiguously lacks
jurisdiction if a plea is entered into unknowingly, unintelligently, and involuntarily. As the
court in Feltner explained, a tribunal will not patently and ambiguously lack jurisdiction if
the tribunal had at least basic statutory jurisdiction to proceed; thus, in prohibition cases
involving statutorily created tribunals of limited jurisdiction, the court must ordinarily ask
whether the General Assembly gave the tribunal authority to proceed in the matter at issue.
{¶ 31} In this case, the common pleas court possessed jurisdiction over relator's case
pursuant to basic statutory authority. Relator was brought before the common pleas court
upon the filing of a valid criminal indictment that alleged that relator had violated several
felony statutes. After appellant plead guilty, the trial court proceeded to sentencing. The
magistrate cannot conclude that the trial court patently and unambiguously lacked
jurisdiction to proceed as it did under these circumstances. Because the trial court did not
patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction and had basic statutory authority to proceed
to sentence relator, the exception to the general rule that writs of prohibition cannot issue
when there exists an adequate remedy at law does not apply. For these reasons, relator had
an adequate remedy at law by way of appeal to contest the voluntariness of his plea
agreement. See, e.g., Birdsall v. Miller, 7th Dist. No. 13 BE 10, 2013-Ohio-2957, ¶ 7
(petitioner could have raised argument that his plea was not entered into knowingly,
intelligently and/or voluntarily in a post-sentence motion to withdraw his no contest plea;
thus, petitioner has or had an adequate remedy at law).
{¶ 32} Given the above determination that relator had an adequate remedy at law
by way of appeal, and the matter may be dismissed on that basis alone, the second ground
raised by respondent in its motion to dismiss, that relator failed to comply with the
requirements of R.C. 2969.25, is moot.
{¶ 33} With regard to respondent's request that relator be found a vexatious
litigator, the magistrate directs relator's attention to R.C. 2323.52, which authorizes a court
to find a party to be a vexatious litigator and impose appropriate sanctions when that party
No. 22AP-301 12
has habitually, persistently, and without reasonable grounds engaged in vexatious conduct
in a civil action or actions, whether in the court of claims or in a court of appeals, court of
common pleas, municipal court, or county court, whether the person or another person
instituted the civil action or actions, and whether the vexatious conduct was against the
same party or against different parties in the civil action or actions. Vexatious conduct
includes conduct of a party in a civil action that is not warranted under existing law and
cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law. The magistrate is mindful that relator has continuously taxed the limited
resources of this court and other courts for over a decade. Further, as discussed generally
above, relator has not been successful in his filings. Relator is warned that his continued
filing of appeals, original actions, and any other actions that are not reasonably grounded
in fact or warranted by law may result in his being declared a vexatious litigator pursuant
to R.C. 2323.52.
{¶ 34} Accordingly, the magistrate recommends that this court grant respondents'
motion to dismiss relator's complaint for writ of prohibition.
/S/ MAGISTRATE
THOMAS W. SCHOLL III
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) provides that a party shall not assign as
error on appeal the court's adoption of any factual finding or
legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a
finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii),
unless the party timely and specifically objects to that factual
finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).