In re I.B. , 2019 Ohio 4489 ( 2019 )

[Cite as In re I.B., 2019-Ohio-4489.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
IN RE: I.B., a minor child. : APPEAL NO. C-180558
TRIAL NO. 13-4231X
:
: O P I N I O N.
Appeal From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Vacated and Cause Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: November 1, 2019
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee State of Ohio,
Law Office of Angela Glaser and Angela Glaser, for Appellant I.B.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
ZAYAS, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} On May 8, 2013, a complaint was filed in the Hamilton County
Juvenile Court alleging that appellant I.B. had committed an act which, if committed
by an adult, would have constituted rape. I.B. admitted to a reduced charge of gross
sexual imposition on September 26, 2013. I.B., who was 14 years old at the time of
the offense, had placed his penis into the vagina of his three-year-old niece “for a
second or so” before the girl’s mother had walked in. Both I.B. and the victim tested
positive for chlamydia.
{¶2} On December 12, 2013, I.B. was classified as a Tier I juvenile sex-
offender registrant under Ohio’s version of the Adam Walsh Act. He was committed
to the custody of the Ohio Department of Youth Services until the age of 21. The
commitment was suspended, and I.B. was placed on probation with the condition
that he complete the Altercrest program.
{¶3} I.B. completed the Altercrest program, and that placement was
terminated on March 25, 2015. At that time, the juvenile court ordered probation
with electronic monitoring. On August 20, 2015, the court ordered I.B. “released
from official probation and placed on non-reporting probation with Monitored Time
as defined in ORC 2929.01(Z).”
{¶4} I.B. filed a “Motion to Declassify Sex Offender Status” on November 17,
2017. The motion purported to be filed pursuant to R.C. 2152.85, the statutory
provision entitled “Petition requesting reclassification or declassification.” At some
point, the prosecutor became aware that I.B. had not had his mandatory R.C.
2152.84 completion-of-disposition hearing. At the hearing before the magistrate, the
prosecutor stated, “So, I’m assuming we should just treat it as an end of disposition
under 2152.85 - - or 84, I mean.” I.B. objected, arguing that the court had no
jurisdiction to hold an end-of-disposition hearing because that hearing should have
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
been held when I.B. completed treatment and “official probation.” The magistrate
overruled I.B.’s objection, stating that because I.B. was not yet 21 and was on
nonreporting probation with monitored time, the hearing could proceed. The
magistrate’s decision stated, “After a hearing conducted according to ORC 2152.85 *
* * the classification as a juvenile offender registrant continues as does the prior
order that the youth is a Tier I sex offender.”
{¶5} I.B. objected to the magistrate’s decision. After a hearing, the juvenile
court judge denied I.B.’s objections and adopted the magistrate’s decision as the
judgment of the court. The court’s order stated, “After hearing conducted according
to ORC 2152.85 * * * the classification as a juvenile offender registrant continues as
does the prior order that the youth is a Tier I sex offender.” I.B. has appealed.
{¶6} I.B.’s sole assignment of error alleges, “The trial court erred when it
continued the Tier I registration without an end of disposition hearing.” I.B. argues
that the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to hear the motion for declassification
under R.C. 2152.85 without having held the mandatory completion-of-disposition
hearing under R.C. 2152.84.
{¶7} Both the magistrate’s decision and the juvenile court’s judgment state
that the hearings were conducted under R.C. 2152.85, the statute under which I.B.
purported to file his declassification motion. But R.C. 2152.85(B)(1) states that a
juvenile sex-offender registrant may file a petition requesting reclassification or
declassification “initially * * * not earlier than three years after the entry of
the juvenile court judge’s order after the mandatory hearing conducted
under section 2152.84.” (Emphasis ours.) R.C. 2152.84 is the mandatory
completion-of-disposition hearing section, which provides
When a juvenile court judge issues an order under section * * *
2152.83 of the Revised Code * * * that classifies a delinquent child a
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
juvenile offender registrant * * * upon completion of the disposition of
that child made for the sexually oriented offense * * * on which the
juvenile offender registrant order was based, the judge * * * shall
conduct a hearing to review the effectiveness of the disposition and of
any treatment provided for the child, to determine the risks that the
child might re-offend, to determine whether the prior classification of
the child as a juvenile offender registrant should be continued or
terminated * * * and to determine whether the prior determination * *
* as to whether the child is a tier I sex offender * * * a tier II sex
offender * * * or a tier III sex offender * * * should be continued or
modified * * *.
R.C. 2152.84(A)(1). R.C. 2152.84(D) states that an order issued under R.C. 2152.84
“shall remain in effect for the period of time specified in section 2950.07 of the
Revised Code, subject to a modification or termination of the order under R.C.
2152.85 of the Revised Code * * *.”
{¶8} The magistrate’s decision as adopted by the juvenile court and the
court’s judgment state that the hearings were held pursuant to R.C. 2152.85. But
that statute authorized I.B. to file a declassification motion at the earliest three years
after the court’s entry after the mandatory R.C. 2152.84 completion-of-disposition
hearing. I.B. had not had a completion-of-disposition hearing at the time the
declassification petition was filed; therefore, the petition was premature. The
juvenile court erred in entertaining I.B.’s motion and in holding a hearing under R.C.
2152.85, because it had no authority to do so. The court should have dismissed I.B.’s
“Motion to Declassify Sex Offender Status” as premature. I.B.’s assignment of error
is sustained solely for the reasons set forth in this opinion.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶9} The judgment of the juvenile court continuing I.B.’s classification as a
Tier I juvenile sex-offender registrant under R.C. 2152.85 is vacated, because the
court had no authority to hold a hearing or enter an order under that statute. The
cause is remanded with instructions to the juvenile court to dismiss I.B.’s motion for
declassification as premature.
Judgment vacated and cause remanded.
BERGERON and WINKLER, JJ., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry this date.
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