State v. Palmer , 2023 Ohio 1232 ( 2023 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Palmer, 
    2023-Ohio-1232
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    CLARK COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO                                     :
    :
    Appellee                                    :   C.A. No. 2022-CA-65
    :
    v.                                                :   Trial Court Case No. 21-CR-0267
    :
    THOMAS E. PALMER                                  :   (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
    :   Court)
    Appellant                                   :
    :
    ...........
    OPINION
    Rendered on April 14, 2023
    ...........
    ANDREW PICKERING, Attorney for Appellee
    GARY C. SCHAENGOLD & GHASSAN J. DEEK, Attorneys for Appellant
    .............
    HUFFMAN, J.
    {¶ 1} Thomas E. Palmer appeals from his convictions, following pleas of guilty, to
    vehicular assault, a felony of the fourth degree; possession of cocaine, a felony of the fifth
    degree; and operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol (“OVI”), a
    misdemeanor of the first degree. The court imposed consecutive prison sentences for
    the felonies and a consecutive jail term for the misdemeanor. Palmer argues that the court
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    erred in sentencing him to consecutive maximum sentences.
    {¶ 2} We conclude that the trial court made the findings necessary under R.C.
    2929.14(C)(4) in imposing consecutive sentences for vehicular assault and possession
    of cocaine.        We cannot conclude that the court’s finding pursuant to R.C.
    2929.14(C)(4)(c), namely that Palmer’s history of criminal conduct demonstrated that
    consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crime by him,
    was not supported by the record under the clear-and-convincing standard provided by
    R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). However, the trial court erred in concluding that Palmer’s six-month
    jail sentence for OVI was required to be served consecutively to the prison sentence for
    vehicular assault and also in ordering Palmer to serve his jail term prior to his consecutive
    prison terms. The trial court also erred in failing to properly impose jail-time credit.
    Accordingly, Palmer’s convictions are affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for
    resentencing.
    I.      Factual and Procedural History
    {¶ 3} On April 27, 2021, Palmer was indicted for aggravated vehicular assault, a
    felony of the second degree, with a specification for driving while under suspension, and
    for OVI and possession of cocaine.       On July 25, 2022, Palmer entered into a plea
    agreement with the State. The aggravated vehicular assault was amended to vehicular
    assault, the specification was dismissed, and Palmer pled guilty to vehicular assault, a
    fourth-degree felony; he also pled guilty to possession and OVI. The court ordered a
    presentence investigation report (“PSI”).     On August 18, 2022, the court sentenced
    Palmer to prison terms of 18 months for vehicular assault and 12 months for possession,
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    and it sentenced him to 6 months in jail for OVI, all of which it ordered to be served
    consecutively. The court ordered that Palmer serve the jail sentence prior to serving the
    prison terms. The court also imposed a fine of $1,075 and suspended Palmer’s driver’s
    license.
    II.    Arguments and Analysis
    {¶ 4} Palmer asserts the following assignment of error:
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING APPELLANT TO
    CONSECUTIVE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE SENTENCES UPON THE THREE
    CHARGES TO WHICH HE PLED GUILTY.
    {¶ 5} Palmer argues that the court erred in the following three ways: 1) in finding
    that Palmer’s history of criminal conduct supported consecutive sentences; 2) in holding
    that it was required to impose the OVI sentence consecutively to the vehicular assault
    sentence; and 3) in ordering Palmer to serve his misdemeanor jail term prior to his felony
    terms.
    {¶ 6} The State responds that the “serious physical harm to the victim and
    [Palmer’s] repeated OVIs” supported the imposition of consecutive sentences and that
    the consecutive sentences should not be disturbed on appeal. The State concedes that
    Palmer’s OVI sentence must be served after his prison terms.
    {¶ 7} We note that in imposing sentence, it was significant to the court that the
    facts of the case were egregious.        The court noted that Palmer was “traveling at
    excessive speeds, running other vehicles off the roadway, and swerving all over the road,”
    and that he “crashed into the rear of the victim’s pickup truck so hard that the rear axle
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    was displaced from the vehicle.” The court indicated the victim’s back was broken. It
    was also significant to the court that Palmer had two prior OVI convictions, and that he
    was driving under suspension and in possession of cocaine.          The court noted that
    Palmer was originally indicted for a second-degree felony with a maximum penalty of 8
    to 12 years in prison.
    {¶ 8} At the sentencing hearing and in its judgment entry, the court stated that it
    was mandatory that the OVI sentence be served consecutively to the sentence for
    vehicular assault. The court found that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect
    the public from future crime and punish Palmer. It found that consecutive sentences were
    not disproportionate to the seriousness of Palmer’s conduct and to the danger that he
    posed to the public, and that his history of criminal conduct demonstrated that consecutive
    sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crime by him. The court
    noted that Palmer lacked a felony record, and that his only convictions were for traffic
    offenses and two prior OVI convictions, but due to the nature of the instant OVI offense,
    it gave “great weight” to the prior OVIs. The court found that Palmer’s criminal history
    “calls for consecutive sentences.” In its judgment entry, the court found it had discretion
    to impose a prison term for the possession offense, pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b)(ii),
    because Palmer had caused serious physical harm to the victim. The court advised
    Palmer that he would receive credit for time spent in the Clark County Jail but did not
    specify an amount.
    {¶ 9} The judgment entry provided: “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, for the OVI
    offense, the defendant serve six (6) months in the Clark County Jail prior to serving the
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    prison terms with jail-time credit from November 23, 2021 to December 16, 2021.” The
    court “remanded [Palmer] to the custody of the Clark County Sheriff’s Office” and ordered
    that he be “conveyed to ODRC, c/o Orient Correctional Facility, Orient, Ohio after serving
    the six (6) month jail sentence.”
    {¶ 10} We initially note:
    We have said that “a trial court may rely on ‘a broad range of
    information’ at sentencing.” State v. Bodkins, 2d Dist. Clark No. 10-CA-38,
    
    2011-Ohio-1274
    , ¶ 43, quoting State v. Bowser, 
    186 Ohio App.3d 162
    ,
    
    2010-Ohio-951
    , 
    926 N.E.2d 714
    , ¶ 13 (2d Dist.). “The evidence the court
    may consider is not confined to the evidence that strictly relates to the
    conviction offense because the court is no longer concerned * * * with the
    narrow issue of guilt.” (Citation omitted.) Bowser at ¶ 14. “Among other
    things, a court may consider hearsay evidence, prior arrests, facts
    supporting a charge that resulted in an acquittal, and facts related to a
    charge that was dismissed under a plea agreement.” (Citation omitted.)
    Bodkins at ¶ 43. Even “ ‘[u]nindicted acts * * * can be considered in
    sentencing without resulting in error when they are not the sole basis for the
    sentence.’ ” State v. Cook, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87265, 
    2007-Ohio-625
    ,
    ¶ 69, quoting State v. Bundy, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 02 CA 211, 2005-
    Ohio-3310, ¶ 86.
    State v. McNichols, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2021-CA-52, 
    2022-Ohio-3076
    , ¶ 10.
    {¶ 11} The Ohio Supreme Court recently discussed consecutive felony sentencing
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    at length in State v. Gwynne, Ohio Slip Opinion No. 
    2022-Ohio-4607
    , __ N.E.3d __, noting
    that “[w]hen a person is sentenced for having committed multiple offenses, the
    presumption is that those sentences will be imposed concurrently, not consecutively.
    See R.C. 2929.41(A),” but that there are exceptions. Id. at ¶ 10. “For the exception
    under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) to apply and before the court imposes consecutive sentences,
    it must make specific findings which are delineated in the statute.” Id. The trial court
    must find that “the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime
    or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the
    seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public.”
    R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Finally, the court must find at least one of the following: “* * * (c)
    The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are
    necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.” Id. Gwynne noted
    that defendants may appeal consecutive sentences, and that “R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a)
    states that an appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence or
    that it may vacate the sentence and remand the case for resentencing when it clearly and
    convincingly finds that the record does not support the sentencing court's findings under
    R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).” Id. at ¶ 11.
    {¶ 12} Gwynne set forth “practical guidance” for consecutive-sentence review,
    noting that the first step “is to ensure that the findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) have
    been made” as to “necessity and proportionality, as well as the third required finding under
    R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a), (b), or (c).” Id. at ¶ 25. In the absence of these findings, “the
    appellate court must hold that the order of consecutive sentences is contrary to law and
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    either modify the sentence or vacate it and remand the case for resentencing. * * *.” Id.
    If the court determines that the necessary consecutive-sentence findings were made, it
    “may then determine whether the record clearly and convincingly supports those findings.
    * * *.” Id. at ¶ 26. If “one of the consecutive-sentence findings is found not to be
    supported by the record under the clear-and-convincing standard provided by R.C.
    2953.08(G)(2), then the trial court's order of consecutive sentences must be either
    modified or vacated by the appellate court. See R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).” Id.
    {¶ 13} According to Gwynne, an appellate court’s review of the findings and record
    “is de novo with the ultimate inquiry being whether it clearly and convincingly finds—in
    other words, has a firm conviction or belief—that the evidence in the record does not
    support the consecutive-sentence findings that the trial court made.” Id. at ¶ 27. The
    court noted that “the first core requirement is that there be some evidentiary support in
    the record for the consecutive-sentence findings that the trial court made.” Id. at ¶ 28.
    “The second requirement is that whatever evidentiary basis there is, that it be adequate
    to fully support the trial court's consecutive-sentence findings.         This requires the
    appellate court to focus on both the quantity and quality of the evidence in the record that
    either supports or contradicts the consecutive-sentence findings.” Id. at ¶ 29. Under
    the de novo standard, an appellate court is “authorized to substitute its judgment for the
    trial court's judgment if the appellate court has a firm conviction or belief, after reviewing
    the entire record, that the evidence does not support the specific findings made by the
    trial court to impose consecutive sentences.” Id.
    {¶ 14} The Supreme Court concluded that “R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires trial courts
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    to consider the overall number of consecutive sentences and the aggregate sentence to
    be imposed when making the necessity and proportionality findings required for the
    imposition of consecutive sentences.” Id. at ¶ 31. Finally, Gwynne held that “appellate
    review of consecutive sentences under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not require deference
    to the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).” Id.
    {¶ 15} Pursuant to our de novo review of Palmer’s sentences for the felonies, we
    conclude that the trial court made the necessary consecutive-sentence findings under
    R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). We cannot conclude that the record clearly and convincingly does
    not support the findings as they pertain to the court’s order on each count. There was
    evidentiary support for the court’s finding that Palmer’s history of criminal conduct
    demonstrated that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from
    future crime by him. As the trial court noted, and as reflected in the PSI, Palmer had two
    prior OVI convictions, one in 2018 and one in 1999. The PSI stated that he also had
    almost 20 prior traffic convictions, including speeding, driving under suspension, and
    assured clear distance.
    {¶ 16} Further, Palmer was initially charged with a felony of the second degree,
    with a specification for driving under suspension. The PSI stated that the victim’s back
    was “broken in several different places,” that Palmer reported abusing alcohol, marijuana,
    and cocaine, and that he had last used those substances on January 23, 2022, the date
    of the collision. The PSI stated that at the time of the collision, Palmer and the victim
    were both northbound on State Route 571, and Palmer “drove directly into the rear of the
    other vehicle” at high rate of speed, displacing the axle.     The PSI listed additional
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    offenses for which Palmer had been cited, including test refusal with prior OVI, driving
    without a valid license, driving under a 12-point license suspension, and assured clear
    distance. After reviewing the entire record, and in the absence of a firm conviction or
    belief that the evidence did not support the court’s specific finding, pursuant to R.C.
    2929.14(C)(4)(c), to impose consecutive sentences, we agree with the State that the
    court’s imposition of consecutive sentences for the felonies was appropriate.               The
    sentences were also within the statutory range.
    {¶ 17} Regarding Palmer’s six-month consecutive sentence for OVI, we note that
    R.C. 2929.24 governs misdemeanor jail terms and provides that “the court shall impose
    a definite jail term that shall be one of the following: (1) For a misdemeanor of the first
    degree, not more than one hundred eighty days.”
    {¶ 18} R.C. 2929.41 governs multiple sentences. It provides:
    (A) * * * Except as provided in division (B)(3) of this section, a jail term or
    sentence of imprisonment for misdemeanor shall be served concurrently
    with a prison term or sentence of imprisonment for felony served in a state
    or federal correctional institution.
    (B) * * *
    ***
    (3) A jail term or sentence of imprisonment imposed for a misdemeanor
    violation of section * * * 4511.19 of the Revised Code shall be served
    consecutively to a prison term that is imposed for a felony violation of
    section * * * 2903.08 * * * when the trial court specifies that it is to be served
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    consecutively.
    When consecutive jail terms or sentences of imprisonment and
    prison terms are imposed for one or more misdemeanors and one or more
    felonies under this division, the term to be served is the aggregate of the
    consecutive terms imposed, and the offender shall serve all terms imposed
    for a felony before serving any term imposed for a misdemeanor.
    (Emphasis added.)
    {¶ 19} In State v. Schidecker, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26334, 
    2015-Ohio-1400
    ,
    ¶ 46, this Court found that the statute “gives the trial court discretion to determine whether
    the misdemeanor term should be served consecutively,” and that R.C. 2929.41(B)(3)
    “permits, but does not require the trial court to impose consecutive sentences.” 
    Id.
    {¶ 20} We conclude that the trial court erred in ordering Palmer to serve his jail
    term prior to his felony sentences and also in determining, pursuant to R.C.
    2929.41(B)(3), that it was required to impose the OVI sentence consecutively to the
    vehicular assault sentence. The trial court must reconsider whether the misdemeanor
    sentence should run concurrently or consecutively, exercising its discretion in making this
    determination.
    {¶ 21} Although not raised by the parties, we further note that the trial court failed
    to “specify the total number of days” of jail time credit awarded to Palmer, and he was not
    given the opportunity to be heard on the issue of jail-time credit. R.C. 2949.08(B); R.C.
    2967.191; Ohio Adm.Code 5120-2-04.            The court is ordered to give Palmer an
    opportunity to be heard on this issue and to file a new judgment entry properly imposing
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    the number of days of jail-time credit.
    III.   Conclusion
    {¶ 22} Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part,
    reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing. With respect to the OVI, the trial court
    is ordered to determine whether the jail sentence for that offense should be served
    concurrently with or consecutively to the prison sentences imposed on the other offenses.
    The trial court is also instructed to give Palmer an opportunity to be heard on the issue of
    jail-time credit and to file a judgment entry that reflects the correct number of days of jail
    time credit.
    .............
    WELBAUM, P.J. and EPLEY, J., concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2022-CA-65

Citation Numbers: 2023 Ohio 1232

Judges: Huffman

Filed Date: 4/14/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/14/2023