State v. Staples , 2022 Ohio 1161 ( 2022 )

[Cite as State v. Staples, 2022-Ohio-1161.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-200428
TRIAL NOS. B-0902711
Plaintiff-Appellee, : SP-200004
vs. :
O P I N I O N.
SHAWN STAPLES, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: April 6, 2022
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Shawn Staples, pro se.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
MYERS, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Shawn Staples appeals the trial court’s judgment
denying his motion, filed pursuant to R.C. 2950.15, to terminate his duty to comply
with his Tier I sex-offender registration requirements. We affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
Facts and Procedure
{¶2} In 2009, Staples was indicted for importuning and attempted unlawful
sexual conduct with a minor. He pled guilty to importuning on June 29, 2009, and
the state dismissed the attempted-unlawful-sexual-conduct-with-a-minor count. On
September 10, 2009, he was sentenced to two years of community control, classified
as a Tier I sex offender under Ohio’s version of the Adam Walsh Act, and notified of
his duty to register annually for 15 years. He violated his community control and was
sentenced to nine months’ incarceration. According to the state, Staples registered in
Ohio as a Tier I sex offender from September 3, 2009, to January 22, 2014, when he
moved to Texas.
{¶3} On June 8, 2020, Staples filed a motion under R.C. 2950.15 to terminate
his duty to comply with his registration requirements. He filed an amended motion
July 22, 2020. Attached to his motion were the exhibits required to be considered for
termination under R.C. 2950.15(D). He argued that between his registration in Ohio
and the time he registered in Texas, he had registered for the ten years required to be
considered for termination under R.C. 2950.15(C)(1).
{¶4} The state opposed Staples’s motion, arguing that Staples had not met
the ten-year registration requirement in R.C. 2950.15(C)(1) to be eligible for
termination. The state argued that the time Staples had registered in Texas did not
count toward the ten-year requirement. Further, the state argued that even if Staples
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
met the ten-year requirement, the court should not terminate his duty to register
based on the record.
{¶5} The trial court held hearings on September 2, 2020, and October 27,
2020, at which the court heard arguments but did not admit any additional evidence.
At the September 2 hearing, the court discussed an incident that had occurred on
August 27, 2020. According to the court, Staples “was down at the Sheriff’s
Department causing problems.” Staples had been “disruptive” at the sheriff’s office
and then had come into the judge’s courtroom and been “disruptive.” He was “loud,
aggressive and generally disruptive.” He had been asked to leave by the judge’s staff.
The court said, “They said you were very threatening. People felt very frightened of
you. You were running around screaming. I don’t put up with that.” The court held
Staples in contempt and sentenced him to 30 days in the Hamilton County Justice
Center.
{¶6} At the October 27 hearing, the parties argued about whether Staples’s
registration in Texas counted as part of the ten-year registration requirement under
R.C. 2950.15. The court asked Staples whether he had committed any criminal
offenses since the sex offense, and he stated that he had not. The court also questioned
Staples about his mental-health treatment. On December 1, 2020, the trial court
denied Staples’s motion to terminate his duty to register. Staples appealed.
{¶7} Because it was not clear from the trial court’s entry whether the court
denied the motion on the basis that Staples was not an eligible offender because he
had not registered for ten years or based on the evidence and exhibits presented, this
court entered an order on September 24, 2021, remanding the cause for the trial court
to clarify the basis on which it denied the motion. On October 27, 2021, the trial court
docketed an entry on remand denying Staples’s motion to terminate his duty to
register finding it unclear whether Staples had met his ten-year registration
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
requirements, but determining that even if he had, he was not entitled to early
termination. A supplemental transcript of the docket containing the court’s entry was
transmitted to this court.
Assignment of Error
{¶8} Staples’s assignment of error alleges that the trial court erred in denying
Staples’s motion to terminate his duty to register. Staples first argues that he is eligible
for termination of his duty to register because he has fulfilled the ten-year registration
requirement in R.C. 2950.15(C)(1). The state argues that Staples is not an eligible
offender under R.C. 2950.15 because his Texas registration time should not be
included as part of the ten years and he did not present sufficient evidence that he
registered in Texas.
{¶9} R.C. 2950.15 provides that an eligible offender may make a motion to
the common pleas court requesting that the court terminate the offender’s duty to
comply with the registration requirements “upon expiration of ten years after the
eligible offender’s duty to comply * * * begins in relation to the offense for which the
eligible offender is subject to those provisions.” R.C. 2950.15(A), (B) and (C).
{¶10} Assuming for purposes of this appeal that Staples is an eligible offender
under R.C. 2950.15, we turn to whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to
terminate his duty to register based on the evidence presented.
{¶11} Pursuant to R.C. 2950.15(D), Staples had to include with his motion (1)
a certified copy of the judgment entry and any other documentation of his sentence or
disposition, (2) documentation of the date of discharge from supervision or release,
(3) evidence that he completed a sex-offender treatment program certified by the
department of rehabilitation and correction, (4) evidence that he had not been
convicted of, or pleaded guilty to, any subsequent sex offense or other criminal offense
except a minor misdemeanor, and (5) evidence that he paid any financial sanctions.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶12} In accordance with R.C. 2950.15(D), Staples attached (1) a judgment
entry dated September 10, 2009, sentencing him to community control, (2) a
September 3, 2009 explanation of his duties to register as a Tier I offender, (3) an
entry correcting the void portion of his sentence and relieving him from postrelease
control, (4) a certificate of completion of the Volunteers of America Cognitive
Behavioral Intervention for Sexual Offending dated December 4, 2013, (5) the FBI
Identity History Summary dated May 22, 2020, (6) entries for the case numbered B-
0902711 (the importuning case), (7) a Lambda Pi Eta Honor Society certificate, (8) a
letter from a clinical psychologist dated June 1, 2020, and (9) a letter from Complete
Serenity Psychiatry dated June 2, 2020.
{¶13} In its memorandum in opposition to Staples’s motion to terminate his
registration duties, the state argued that Staples had not been able to successfully
complete his two-year term of community control because he failed to comply with the
sex-offender and mental-health components of his community control. The state
attached to its memorandum (1) the original judgment entry, (2) the explanation of
registration duties, (3) the October 15, 2012 community-control violation, (4) the
December 6, 2012 judgment entry revoking community control and imposing
sentence, and (5) the Offender Watch-Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office printout dated
September 1, 2020, and the Hamilton County Sheriff registration audit dated
September 1, 2020. The state argued that based on the information submitted to the
court it was not appropriate to terminate Staple’s duty to register.
{¶14} Under R.C. 2950.15(H), the court may, without a hearing, deny an
eligible offender’s request to terminate his registration requirements. If it does not do
so, it must hold a hearing where the offender has “the burden of going forward with
the evidence and the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” R.C.
2950.15(H)(3). If the court finds that the offender has satisfied the burden of proof,
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
“the court shall issue an order that terminates the eligible offender’s duty” to register.
Id. “If the court finds that the eligible offender has not satisfied the burden of proof,
the court shall issue an order denying the motion.” Id.{¶15} Pursuant to R.C. 2950.15(G), in addition to the evidence submitted with
the motion, the trial court may also consider “any other evidence the court considers
relevant, including, but not limited to, evidence of the following while the eligible
offender has been subject to the duties imposed under sections 2950.04, 2950.041,
2950.05, and 2950.06 of the Revised Code:” whether (1) the offender’s driver’s license
has been suspended; (2) the offender maintained financial responsibility for a motor
vehicle; (3) the offender has paid child support or spousal support; (4) the offender
has paid his taxes; (5) the offender has adequately addressed sex-offending or child-
offending behaviors; (6) the offender has maintained a residence for a substantial
period of time; (7) the offender has maintained employment; and (8) the offender has
adequately addressed any drug or alcohol abuse. The court may also consider letters
of reference and documentation of the offender’s service to the community or specific
individuals in need. R.C. 2950.15(G)(9) and (10).
{¶16} After considering the evidence and arguments, the trial court denied
Staples’s motion to terminate his duty to register. The court noted that Staples had
violated his community control, and the record shows that the violation was based at
least in part on his failure to comply with the mental-health and sex-offender
treatment components of his community control. The court determined that Staples
had not presented evidence that he had adequately addressed his sex-offending
behaviors. The court noted that Staples had provided evidence that indicated he had
started treatment with a new provider in Texas on June 2, 2020, just a few months
before the September and October 2020 hearings in this case. The court was very
concerned that Staples had not demonstrated much of a history of mental-health or
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
sex-offender treatment, especially in light of the fact that Staples’s community-control
violation had been based on his failure to comply with the court ordered mental-health
and sex-offender treatment. The court also found that Staples had not presented
sufficient evidence of a stable residence and employment. The court stated, “There is
no evidence of consistent therapeutic intervention to address his prior sex offending,
no evidence of stable residence or employment.” The court also noted the “disruption”
Staples had caused in the courtroom, which had resulted in Staples being held in
contempt.
{¶17} After reviewing the record, we hold that the weight of the evidence
supports the trial court’s denial of Staples’s motion to terminate his duty to register,
and therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Staples’s motion to terminate his
duty to register. The assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶18} The judgment of the trial court denying Staples’s motion to terminate
his duty to register is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
ZAYAS and CROUSE, JJ., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry this date.
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