State v. Moncrief , 2022 Ohio 1261 ( 2022 )

[Cite as State v. Moncrief, 2022-Ohio-1261.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : Appellate Case No. 29221
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. TRD2102557
:
MARY MONCRIEF : (Criminal Appeal from Municipal Court)
:
Defendant-Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the 15th day of April, 2022.
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ERIK R. BLAINE, Atty. Reg. No. 0080726, Assistant City of Vandalia Prosecuting
Attorney, 245 James E. Bohanan Memorial Drive, Vandalia, Ohio 45377
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
WILLIAM O. CASS, JR. Atty. Reg. No. 0034517, 1250 West Dorothy Lane, Suite 203,
Kettering, Ohio 45409
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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TUCKER, P.J.
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{¶ 1} Mary Moncrief appeals from her conviction following a bench trial on one
count of leaving the scene of an accident in violation of Vandalia Ordinance No. 436.12,
a first-degree misdemeanor.
{¶ 2} Moncrief challenges the legal sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence
to sustain her conviction. She contends the evidence did not support a finding that she
backed her mini-van into another vehicle in a parking lot and drove away without informing
anyone.
{¶ 3} We conclude that Moncrief’s conviction was supported by legally sufficient
evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the trial court’s
judgment will be affirmed.
I. Factual Background
{¶ 4} The State’s primary witness at trial was Cerah Dugan. On the morning of
April 30, 2021, Dugan was sitting in the parking lot of a Vandalia doctor’s office with her
mother-in-law. They had arrived early for a doctor’s appointment. While waiting in their
vehicle, Dugan saw a silver Chevy mini-van pull into the lot and park. After a few minutes,
the mini-van started backing up. Dugan heard a “crunch noise” and determined that the
mini-van had hit a parked black car. She described the driver of the mini-van as a female
with shoulder-length hair. At trial, Dugan identified Moncrief as the driver of the mini-van
with 100 percent certainty. She testified that the mini-van had pulled away and left the
parking lot after hitting the black car. Dugan was able to take a picture of the rear of the
mini-van, including its license plate, before it exited the parking lot. Dugan also
photographed the car that had been hit.
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{¶ 5} The State’s next witness was Wendy Wilson. She testified that she had
driven her black Chevy Impala to the same doctor’s office on the morning in question.
When she parked her car and entered the doctor’s office, her bumper was not scratched
or dented. When she finished her appointment and returned to the parking lot, she saw
scratches and dents on her car’s bumper. They appeared to her to be gray or white, or
“just a lighter color than [her] black bumper.”
{¶ 6} Police officer David Craine also testified for the prosecution. He was called
to the scene after the incident and spoke with Dugan and Wilson. Craine observed the
damage to Wilson’s bumper and viewed Dugan’s photograph showing the license plate
of the suspect mini-van. Craine tracked the plate number and discovered that the mini-
van was registered to Moncrief. Following Craine’s testimony, the State rested.
{¶ 7} Moncrief then testified in her own defense. She denied being in the parking
lot where the incident occurred. At the time of the accident, she claimed to have driven to
her own medical appointment at a nearby location in Vandalia. Moncrief also denied
hitting another vehicle, testifying that she would have known and would have stopped if
a collision had occurred. On cross-examination, however, she acknowledged that the
mini-van shown in the picture taken by Dugan appeared to be her mini-van.
{¶ 8} Based on the evidence presented, the trial court found Moncrief guilty. It
credited the testimony of eyewitness Dugan while discounting Moncrief’s testimony as
self-serving. This appeal followed.
II. Analysis
{¶ 9} In her sole assignment of error, Moncrief challenges the legal sufficiency and
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manifest weight of the evidence to sustain her conviction. She reasons that conflicts
between her testimony and Dugan’s testimony “created at least reasonable doubt.” She
questions the accuracy of Dugan’s eyewitness identification and whether an accident
actually occurred. In addition, Moncrief stresses her testimony that her medical
appointment that morning was at a different location in Vandalia and that she did not hit
another car.
{¶ 10} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to
determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 11} Our analysis is different when reviewing a manifest-weight argument. When
a conviction is challenged on appeal as being against the weight of the evidence, an
appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, consider witness credibility, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in
the evidence, the trier of fact “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage
of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v.
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). A judgment should be
reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence “only in the exceptional
case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” State v. Martin, 20
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Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
{¶ 12} With the foregoing standards in mind, we conclude that Moncrief’s
conviction was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the
evidence. She was convicted of violating Vandalia Ordinance 436.12, which addresses
stopping after an accident on other than public roads. It provides:
(a)(1) In the case of a motor vehicle accident or collision resulting in injury
or damage to persons or property on any public or private property other
than a public road or highway, the operator of the motor vehicle, having
knowledge of the accident or collision, shall stop at the scene of the accident
or collision. Upon request of any person who is injured or damaged, or any
other person, the operator shall give that person the operator’s name and
address, and, if the operator is not the owner, the name and address of the
owner of that motor vehicle, together with the registered number of that
motor vehicle, and, if available, exhibit the operator’s driver’s or commercial
driver’s license.
***
(3) If the accident or collision is with an unoccupied or unattended motor
vehicle, the operator who collides with the motor vehicle shall securely
attach the information required under division (a)(1) of this section, in
writing, to a conspicuous place in or on the unoccupied or unattended motor
vehicle.
(Emphasis added.)
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{¶ 13} Here the prosecution’s evidence, if believed, was legally sufficient to
support a finding that Moncrief violated Ordinance 436.12 by backing into Wilson’s car in
the parking lot and immediately leaving the scene without providing the required
information. Eyewitness Dugan testified that she heard a “crunch noise” as Moncrief’s
mini-van struck Wilson’s car. Dugan observed damage to Wilson’s bumper and positively
identified Moncrief as the driver of the mini-van. She also photographed Moncrief’s
license plate and watched as Moncrief drove away without providing any information.
Dugan’s testimony alone was legally sufficient to support Moncrief’s conviction.
{¶ 14} The conviction also was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. In
addition to Dugan’s testimony, officer Craine confirmed that the mini-van was registered
to Moncrief. Wilson testified that her vehicle’s bumper was not scratched and dented
when she parked and that the bumper was scratched and dented when she returned to
the parking lot after her appointment. Although Moncrief denied being in the parking lot
where the incident occurred, we find it notable that she admitted driving to a medical
appointment at a nearby location around the time in question. Moreover, Dugan’s
photograph established that Moncrief’s vehicle in fact was in the parking lot where the
accident occurred.
{¶ 15} In light of the evidence presented, it appears that Moncrief arrived early for
her own doctor’s appointment at the wrong location. After realizing her mistake, she
backed out of her parking space, struck Wilson’s car, and proceeded to the correct
location without stopping to provide the information required by the ordinance. But
regardless of where Moncrief was headed when she left, the manifest weight of the
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evidence strongly supported a finding that she hit Wilson’s car and left the scene in
violation of Vandalia Ordinance 436.12. This is not an exceptional case in which the
evidence weighed heavily against the conviction.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 16} Moncrief’s assignment of error is overruled, and the judgment of the
Vandalia Municipal Court is affirmed.
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WELBAUM, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Erik R. Blaine
William O. Cass, Jr.
Hon. Cynthia M. Heck