Johnson v. Toledo City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. , 2023 Ohio 1306 ( 2023 )

[Cite as Johnson v. Toledo City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2023-Ohio-1306.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
David D. Johnson Court of Appeals No. L-22-1094
Appellant Trial Court No. CI020203646
v.
Toledo Board of Education of
Toledo City School District
and
Toledo Federation of DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Teachers
Decided: April 21, 2023
Appellees
*****
Meghan Anderson Roth, Shawn Nelson, Esq., and Amy M. Natyshak attorneys for
appellee, Toledo Board of Education,
Gregg A. Peppel and Dawn T. Christen, attorneys for appellee, Toledo Federation
of Teachers,
David D. Johnson, Pro se.
*****
DUHART, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, David Johnson, filed a pro se notice of appeal from the March 31,
2022 judgments of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, each granting summary
judgment to appellees the Toledo Board of Education (“TPS”) and Toledo Federation of
Teachers (TFT) on Johnson’s employment discrimination complaints. Based upon our
review of the record, we find that Johnson failed to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination against TPS or TFT, and we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
Factual & Procedural Background
Johnson’s History with TPS
{¶ 2} While the instant appeal relates largely to Johnson’s September 2019
termination by TPS, Johnson’s previous TPS and employment history in Georgia are
relevant to our discussion and analysis in this case. Johnson first worked for TPS in the
1990s. During that time, he had various disciplinary issues. He ultimately resigned from
his position without notice and brought various lawsuits against TPS related to his
employment and subsequent job applications he submitted after his resignation.
{¶ 3} Johnson’s employment file and prior court rulings describe the facts related
to this history. According to a review of Johnson’s personnel file, there are notations
from the 1990s that he had to consistently be reminded of his duties in the cafeteria.
Frequently he was not in the cafeteria area or failed to maintain order when he was there.
Bus duty created problems too for Johnson. He seemed unable to line the children up or
walk them out quietly. He missed a Conflict Mediation Training, and was not available
for assemblies. The file also notes several incidents of inappropriate behavior. He was
absent from a monthly staff meeting. He was removed as a coach from Waite High
School. He failed to report to work on the first teacher workday, failed to provide proper
FMLA paperwork when taking a leave of absence and had related-disciplinary issues.
2.
{¶ 4} For example, in August of 1999, without informing TPS, Johnson began
working as an assistant principal at a school in Tifton, Georgia. He then failed to appear
for his teaching assignment in Toledo and submitted a resignation letter, which was
effective immediately. Halfway through the school year, Johnson was suspended from his
administrative position in Georgia. He then applied to return to a teaching position in
Toledo, but TPS did not accept his application for various reasons.
{¶ 5} TPS also learned of a suspension imposed by the Dougherty County Georgia
Board of Education (DCBE). The DCBE suspended Johnson for 60 days for failing to
submit lesson plans, failing to perform bus monitoring duties, failing to obtain permission
to leave school early, and failing to set up parent-teacher conferences. In 2003, the DCBE
terminated Johnson from his teaching position due to an allegation that he had physically
abused his sons by whipping them with a belt buckle and hitting them with a closed fist.
Johnson appealed both decisions to the Georgia State Board of Education, and the Board
upheld these decisions. See Johnson v. Toledo Bd. of Educ., No. 3:02CV7509, 2003 WL
22436127, *1 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 2003).
{¶ 6} Beginning in May 2000, Johnson attempted to apply for additional
administrative jobs at TPS. He was rejected for those positions, in part because he was
not qualified, and, in part, because of his history with TPS. He sued the district for
failure to hire in both state and federal court, alleging that TPS failed to hire him in
retaliation for filing an OCRC charge in 1998 related to his prior employment with TPS.
3.
{¶ 7} The Federal District Court ultimately granted TPS’s motion for summary
judgment in that case and held that TPS had legitimate, nondiscriminatory and
nonretaliatory reasons for not hiring Johnson- namely, all the disciplinary issues
described above related to his prior employment with the district and his resignation
without notice. Johnson at *2. Johnson then moved back to Georgia and was hired as a
teacher there. Subsequently, the events described above regarding his discipline,
termination, and license suspension in Georgia occurred. Johnson continued to submit
applications to TPS.
{¶ 8} Johnson then applied for a teaching certificate in Ohio, and was rejected
because he had failed to disclose the issues in Georgia to the Ohio Department of
Education (ODE). The ODE found that he was ineligible for a license for a period of
three years. Johnson appealed ODE’s decision in the Lucas County Court of Common
Pleas, which, in turn, upheld ODE’s decision. See Johnson v. Ohio Dept. of Ed., Lucas
County Court of Common Pleas case No. CI-200701313.
TPS Hires Johnson as a Substitute in 2018 & Terminates him Fall 2019
{¶ 9} In 2018, James Hopkins, the Assistant Director of Talent Acquisition and
Management at TPS, processed an application, interviewed Johnson, and hired him as a
substitute teacher. Johnson did not disclose his issues in Georgia with either Romules
Durant, TPS Superintendent, (“Dr. Durant), or with Hopkins. If he had, that would have
disqualified him from employment.
4.
{¶ 10} TPS hired Johnson as a substitute teacher in December 2018, and he began
working in January 2019. After serving as a substitute teacher through the end of the
2019 school year, TPS offered him a contract teaching position at Martin Luther King Jr.
Academy for Boys (“King”). He served as a contract teacher through his termination,
which was final on September 20, 2019.
{¶ 11} TPS terminated Johnson after the Human Resources Department learned
that he had falsified his job application with material misrepresentations. Specifically,
Johnson failed to disclose that in 2002, the DCBE suspended him for 60 days for failing
to submit lesson plans, failing to perform bus monitoring duties, failing to obtain
permission to leave school early, and failing to set up parent-teacher conferences. Also,
as noted, in 2003, the DCBE terminated Johnson from his teaching position due to an
allegation that he had physically abused his sons by whipping them with a belt buckle
and hitting them with a closed fist. Again, both decisions were upheld by the Georgia
State Board of Education.
{¶ 12} Johnson did not disclose any of the above-mentioned licensing issues with
either Ohio or the DCBE on his job application, and TPS was unaware of these issues
when it hired him as a substitute in December of 2018. The TPS job application that
Johnson submitted specifically asked the following questions “Have you ever had a
teaching certificate or teaching license revoked or suspended?” “Have you ever failed to
be rehired, been asked to resign a position, resigned to avoid termination, or terminated
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from employment?” (Emphasis added.) Johnson answered these questions in the
negative.
{¶ 13} Johnson was required to answer these questions truthfully. If he had
answered these questions, “yes”, he would not have been hired. Further, if Johnson
answered “yes” to the questions, he was also obligated by the application to disclose the
licensing and disciplinary details surrounding the “yes” answers. Johnson did not offer
any details regarding his prior licensing or disciplinary issues in Georgia or Ohio.
{¶ 14} After TPS terminated Johnson in September 2019, he filed a charge of
discrimination with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission “OCRC” against TPS. The
OCRC issued a no probable cause finding.
Johnson & TFT
{¶ 15} TFT is an Ohio, private, non-profit labor organization that represents the
teachers employed by TPS, a public-school employer. As the certified representative, the
Federation negotiated a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with TPS, effective
July 1, 2017, through June 30, 2020, which was the CBA in effect during Johnson’s
employment with TPS. TFT does not hire, suspend, discipline, or discharge TPS
employees, or participate in any such decisions. Among other terms and conditions of
employment, the CBA sets forth teachers’ due process rights in event of discipline,
including a hearing for the record (“HFR”) in the Human Resources Office before such
discipline occurs. The CBA also delineates the teacher’s rights after the hearing in event
the hearing officer recommends termination of the teacher’s contract.
6.
{¶ 16} In August 2019, TPS offered Johnson a full-time teaching contract. There
was nothing offered in the record to show that Johnson was an employee or officer of
TFT, that Johnson had any other business with, or had an express trust relationship with
TFT. Johnson was an employee of TPS, not TFT. In September 2019, TPS notified
Johnson that he was scheduled for a disciplinary hearing with the Human Resources
Department. Johnson was granted his due process rights under the CBA - he had a
hearing in the Human Resources Office before he was terminated.
{¶ 17} TFT represented Johnson at the disciplinary hearing whereafter discharge
was recommended. TFT filed a grievance on Johnson’s behalf protesting his termination.
TFT represented Johnson in the grievance, and represented Johnson at an arbitration
hearing, which was final and binding under the CBA. Johnson did not file any
administrative claims or charges against TFT with the OCRC.
Johnson’s Complaint Against TPS & TFT
{¶ 18} On December 1, 2020, Johnson filed a pro se complaint against TPS
alleging race, age, and gender discrimination claims under Title VII and Ohio law, and 42
U.S.C. 1981 and 1983. Johnson later filed a similar complaint against TFT. TPS filed a
motion for summary judgment. Johnson eventually filed his own summary judgment
motion. TFT filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was converted by the trial court to a
motion for summary judgment. The parties filed several other motions.
{¶ 19} On March 14, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on pending motions
before a visiting judge where all parties were afforded the opportunity to present their
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respective positions on the pending motions. Subsequently, the trial court granted TPS
and TFT summary judgment.
{¶ 20} Johnson filed a timely notice of appeal from the March 31 judgments, and
asserts a single assignment of error on appeal, “the [trial] court erred in ordering
Summary Judgment in favor of defendants-appellees[.]”
Law and Analysis
{¶ 21} We review the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo,
applying the same standard as the trial court. Lorain Natl. Bank v. Saratoga Apts., 61
Ohio App.3d 127, 129, 572 N.E.2d 198 (9th Dist.1989); Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77
Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). Under Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is
appropriate where (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact exists; (2) the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one
conclusion, and viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that
conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co.,
54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66, 375 N.E.2d 46 (1978). If the moving party satisfies its initial
burden, then the nonmoving party has a reciprocal burden pursuant to Civ.R. 56(E) to set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial; if the nonmoving party
does not so respond, then summary judgment, if appropriate, must be entered against it.
Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996).
8.
The McDonnel Douglas Paradigm
{¶ 22} In Williams v. Akron, 107 Ohio St.3d 203, 2005-Ohio-6268, 837 N.E.2d
1169, the Ohio Supreme Court outlined the process for courts to apply in analyzing
discrimination claims:
Because of the difficulty of proving a discrimination claim, especially
where there is no direct evidence of discriminatory motive, the Supreme
Court created an analytical framework to address "the order and allocation
of proof" in such cases. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973), 411
U.S. 792, 800, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668.
The Prima Facie Case
The initial step in the paradigm requires the plaintiff to "carry the initial
burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial
discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial
minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he
was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93
S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668. However, the elements of the prima facie case
must remain flexible so that they can conform to the facts of the case. Id. at
fn. 13.
Establishing a prima facie case "creates a presumption that the employer
unlawfully discriminated against the employee." Texas Dept. of Community
Affairs v. Burdine (1981), 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d
207. "If the trier of fact believes plaintiff's evidence, and if the employer is
silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the
plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case." Id.; see, also, St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks (1993), 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125
L.Ed.2d 407, quoting 1 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence (1977)
536, Section 67 ("To establish a 206*206 'presumption' is to say that a
finding of the predicate fact (here, the prima facie case) produces 'a
required conclusion in the absence of an explanation' (here, the finding of
unlawful discrimination).")
9.
The Employer’s Burden of Production
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then the burden of production
shifts to the employer to present evidence of “a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason” for the employer’s rejection of the
employee. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207. If the
employer submits admissible evidence that “taken as true, would permit the
conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
action,” then the employer has met its burden of production. (Emphasis
sic.) St. Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 509, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407. At this
point, the presumption created by the prima facie case drops from the case
because the employer’s evidence has rebutted the presumption of
discrimination. Id. at 510, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407.
However, If the employer fails to meet its burden of production and
“reasonable minds could differ as to whether a preponderance of the
evidence establishes the facts of a prima facie case,” then the question of
whether the employer discriminated must be decided by the fact finder.
(Emphasis sic.) Id., 509 U.S. at 509-510, 113 S.Ct. at 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d
407.
Pretext
If the employer meets its burden of production, “the plaintiff must then
have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but
were a pretext for discrimination.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct.
1089, 67 L.E.2d 207, citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct.
1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668. “But a reason cannot be proved to be 'a pretext for
discrimination’ unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that
discrimination was the real reason.” (Emphasis sic.) St. Mary’s, 509 U.S. at
515, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407. A case that reaches this point is
decided by the trier of fact on the ultimate issue of whether the defendant
discriminated against the plaintiff.
Willliams at ¶ 9-14. (Emphasis sic.)
{¶ 23} We can resolve this appeal applying the McDonnel Douglas Paradigm to
the trial court record. At the center of this appeal is Johnson’s teaching applications and
his answers, or lack thereof, regarding the following questions “Have you ever had a
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teaching certificate or teaching license revoked or suspended?” “Have you ever failed to
be rehired, been asked to resign a position, resigned to avoid termination, or terminated
from employment?”
{¶ 24} In Johnson’s most recent job applications of December 2016, Johnson did
not list on his application his Georgia employment which had been terminated. He
circled “no”, when asked on the application if he had ever been discharged from a job.
On his on-line applications, when asked if he had ever been terminated or had his
“license suspended”, he answered “no.”
Johnson’s Claims Against TPS
Failure to hire claims
{¶ 25} Johnson states he applied for over 80 jobs from 1998 to time of his hire in
2018 as a substitute teacher, but did not submit a claim to the EEOC until 2019, which, as
noted by the trial court was well-beyond the 300-day limitations. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-
5(e)(1). Similarly, any claims before December 1, 2014, are barred by Ohio’s six-year
statute of limitations.
{¶ 26} As noted, in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Johnson
must establish that he satisfies all of the following: (1) Johnson belonged to a protected
class; (2) Johnson applied and was rejected; (3) he was qualified for the position; and (4)
a similarly situated person who was not in Johnson’s class received the job. See
Williams, 107 Ohio St.3d 203, 2005-Ohio-6268, 837 N.E. 1169, at ¶ 9-14.
11.
{¶ 27} We find that based upon his past disciplinary and licensing issues, Johnson
has not established that he was qualified for the positions which he applied. There is no
dispute that there was documentation in his file of significant disciplinary history,
including a prior resignation from TPS without notice. Johnson’s history, including his
licensing issues in Georgia, and his prior license denial from ODE for dishonesty, would
also have disqualified him from TPS employment, had he disclosed it. Johnson fails to
acknowledge the significance of these misrepresentations in connection with the
applications.
{¶ 28} Johnson has also not demonstrated that any similarly situated individuals
outside of his protected class were treated more favorably. Johnson would need to
establish and point to Caucasian employees, or female, or younger, employed by TPS
with similar qualifications and disciplinary histories who were hired while Johnson, who
is African American, was not.
{¶ 29} Johnson also summarily claims that “Caucasians continue to get positions
that African Americans are denied.” The mere observation of a numerical disparity is not
enough to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact. We concur with the trial
court – Johnson has not produced any “substantial probative evidence” as to any material
fact. Moreover, the record as presented contains a wealth of evidence showing that TPS
had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not hiring Johnson in 2016, including his
significant disciplinary history and resignation without notice.
12.
Johnson’s 2019 Termination
{¶ 30} With respect to his September 2019 termination, Johnson was also not
qualified for the position because he falsified his job application. He failed to disclose to
anyone at TPS that his license had been previously suspended. Johnson’s extensive
disciplinary history in Georgia would have disqualified him from the position at TPS had
TPS known about it.
{¶ 31} Johnson has not identified any employee from outside of his protected class
that was found to have falsified a job application, but was thereafter not terminated, and
therefore cannot establish the fourth element of his claim. Furthermore, TPS has
identified a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Johnson’s termination – he falsified
his job application. The burden then shifted back to Johnson to establish that TPS’s
reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason. Johnson has failed in that
burden.
{¶ 32} Johnson appears to argue that he initially marked “yes” to the question on
his application asking, “have you ever been terminated from a job?” and “have you ever
had your license suspended?” but that someone at TPS must have at changed his answer
from “yes” to “no” in support of its discriminatory practices. However, Johnson has
offered only allegations in support of this theory, and has offered no Civ.R. 56(E)
evidence in support of this claim.
{¶ 33} Johnson also did not fill in the follow-up questions asking him to explain
the circumstances of any job termination and/or license suspension, and he did not list his
13.
employment with Dougherty County Georgia in the job history section. TPS had a
termination hearing and a union grievance arbitration where the arbitrator found that TPS
had just cause to terminate Johnson. Reasonable minds could only conclude that Johnson
falsely answered the job applications and failed to disclose the requisite circumstances
relating to his teaching license suspensions and denials. The trial court correctly granted
TPS’s motion for summary judgment on the Title VII and Ohio law discrimination claims
as it relates to his termination.
Retaliation claims against TPS
{¶ 34} To prove a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that retaliation was the
determinative factor, not just the motivating factor – in the employer’s decision to take
the adverse employment action.
{¶ 35} Johnson has not established that there is any causal connection between his
filing of OCRC and EEOC charges in 1998 and 2001 and any employment decisions TPS
made more than 15 years later. The record establishes as a matter of law that TPS’s
decisions were made for legitimate non-retaliatory reasons, and Johnson has not met his
burden to establish that those decisions were a pretext for retaliation.
{¶ 36} Johnson also assumes that a “no hire” was placed in his file as a direct
result of his previous filed EEOC and OCRC charges. As previously noted, these charges
were found without merit. In Johnson v. Toledo Bd. of Ed., N.D. Ohio No. 3:02CV7509,
2003 WL 22436127, the court determined that Johnson’s failure to timely resign and
disciplinary history were legitimate non-retaliatory reasons not to rehire Johnson. As the
14.
trial court noted, if Johnson would have been honest on his job application, he would
have been disqualified for the job based upon his termination and license suspension in
Georgia.
{¶ 37} Based upon the record before us, reasonable minds can only conclude that
TPS was entitled to summary judgment on Johnson’s retaliation claim.
Disparate Treatment and Retaliation Against TFT under Ohio law
{¶ 38} As to Johnson’s claims against TFT for disparate treatment and retaliation,
TFT was not Johnson’s employer, rather TFT is a labor union. TPS, not TFT was
Johnson’s employer, and thus a matter of law, TFT was cannot be held liable for any
alleged violation of R.C. 4112.02(A) or (I). See Warnsley v. Toledo Bd. of Ed., 6th Dist.
Lucas No. L-10-1219, 2011-Ohio-3134. Similarly, Johnson also failed to file a charge
with the OCRC which is a statutory prerequisite for filing a civil lawsuit against TFT for
an alleged violation of R.C. 41112.02.
{¶ 39} Counts 3 and 4 allege disparate treatment and retaliation under Title VII.
Johnson did not file a charge with the EEOC against TFT prior to commencing this civil
action alleging disparate treatment and retaliation in violation of Title VII. Since Johnson
failed to meet the statutory prerequisite for filing a civil action against TFT, the trial court
properly granted summary judgment to TFT on these counts. See Mitchell v. Chapman,
343 F.3d 811, 821 (6th Cir. 2003).
{¶ 40} With respect to Johnson’s 1981 and 1983 claims, Johnson is required to
prove that he was injured by either a state actor or a private party acting under color of
15.
state law. TFT is not a state actor nor does it participate in TPS’s hiring, discipline or
discharge decisions. See Albano v. Columbus Bd. of Ed., No. 2:14-CV-0379, 2015 WL
1221347, * 9 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 17, 2015).
{¶ 41} Notwithstanding our de novo review, the trial court performed a thorough
review of the record and summary judgment evidence, and properly applied the
McDonnel Douglas test. Johnson failed in his McDonnel Douglas burden and his
reciprocal summary judgment burden - reasonable minds can only conclude that TPS and
TFT are entitled to summary judgment. Johnson’s assignment of error is found not well-
taken and is denied. Johnson is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R.
24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See, also, 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J. Osowik, J. ____________________________
JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, J. ____________________________
JUDGE
Myron C. Duhart, P.J. ____________________________
CONCUR. JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
16.