Mefford v. Champion , 2021 Ohio 2813 ( 2021 )

[Cite as Mefford v. Champion, 2021-Ohio-2813.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
WARREN COUNTY
TRACEY G. MEFFORD, et al., : CASE NOS. CA2020-12-084
CA2020-12-092
Appellees/Cross-Appellants, :
OPINION
: 8/16/2021
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:
JAMES E. CHAMPION, et al., :
Appellants/Cross-Appellees. :
CIVIL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. 18CV091572
Lindhorst & Dreidame Co., LPA, and Bradley D. McPeek and Elizabeth M. Mahon, for
appellees/cross-appellants.
Tate & Tate Attorneys, LLC, and Charles L. Tate, for appellants/cross-appellees.
M. POWELL, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellants, James Champion and Danuta Turowska (collectively
"Champions"), appeal from the decision of the Warren County Court of Common Pleas
granting declaratory judgment in favor of Tracey Mefford and Charles Memoli (collectively
"Meffords") in a dispute involving a driveway easement. The Meffords cross-appeal from
that same decision denying their motion for sanctions against the Champions. For the
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reasons detailed below, we affirm the trial court's decision.
{¶ 2} The Meffords and the Champions are next-door neighbors who share a
common driveway. The driveway begins at the street and extends northward between the
Meffords' and the Champions' respective residences. Some portions of the driveway are
on the Meffords' property, whereas other portions of the driveway are on the Champions'
property. Both the Meffords' and the Champions' properties have detached garages, which
the parties access via the shared driveway.
{¶ 3} In February 2018, the Champions removed a tree that was located behind
their garage and installed a concrete parking pad. To access the parking pad, the
Champions enter the shared driveway and travel north past their garage. The Meffords
allege that this requires the Champions to drive beyond the driveway easement and onto
their property, resulting in a trespass.
{¶ 4} When the Meffords objected, the Champions claimed that a 1918 deed
established a right-of-way over the entire driveway extending to their newly constructed
parking pad. The Meffords assert that the easement does not include the entire driveway
based upon a 1997 "Perpetual Easement and Maintenance Agreement" ("1997 Easement
Agreement"), executed by the predecessors in interest for the parties' respective properties.
{¶ 5} On October 12, 2018, the Meffords filed this action against the Champions
seeking declaratory judgment regarding the parties' rights and responsibilities concerning
the driveway easement and trespassing damages. The Champions answered the
complaint and filed a counterclaim seeking to quiet title. The Champions also sought a
declaratory judgment requesting the trial court find they have a vested property right to use
the easement to travel to their parking pad. Both parties ultimately moved for summary
judgment on their respective claims.
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{¶ 6} On April 1, 2020, the trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of the
Meffords and denied the Champions' motion for summary judgment. In so doing, the trial
court rejected claims by the Champions concerning the 1918 right-of-way. The trial court
instead found the 1997 Easement Agreement was the controlling document. Specifically,
the trial court found:
Upon review, the Court finds the [1997] Easement Agreement
is the binding document regarding the two parcels in this case.
The Agreement was created by two former owners of the
Mefford and Champion properties who owned * * * the
properties at the time the Agreement was signed and recorded.
The Agreement specifically grants an easement of ingress and
egress from the Mefford's [sic] property to the Champion's [sic]
property and vice versa. Attached to the Agreement and
referenced therein as "Exhibit C" is a map depicting the "strip of
land" that the homeowners identified as the easement. Exhibit
C does not show the easement running over the entire property
line of the two parcels but, rather, running from the roadway to
the detached garages on the property and well before the now-
existing Parking Pad. The language of the Agreement is clear
and unambiguous in its terms and in the depictions of the
easement's start and end.
As the 1997 Easement Agreement shows the easement ending
well before the Champion's [sic] Parking Pad, the Court find the
Champions have violated the express terms of the Agreement
by trespassing upon the Mefford's [sic] property. * * *
The trial court enjoined the Champions from accessing their newly constructed parking pad
through the Meffords' property. The Meffords then sought sanctions against the Champions
alleging they had engaged in frivolous conduct.
{¶ 7} The Champions appealed the trial court's decision, which this court dismissed
for lack of a final appealable order upon finding the trial court had not yet resolved the issue
of damages. Mefford v. Champion, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2020-04-028 (June 18, 2020)
(Entry Granting Motion to Dismiss). Following this court's dismissal, the trial court
considered the issue of damages and awarded the Meffords trespassing damages of
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$25,000 and an additional $2,500 for damage the Champions caused to the Meffords' yard.
The trial court denied the Meffords' request for punitive damages and sanctions against the
Champions.
{¶ 8} The Champions now appeal, raising four assignments of error. The Meffords
cross-appeal, raising one assignment of error. For ease of discussion, and because they
are interrelated, we will address the Champions' first three assignments of error together.
{¶ 9} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 10} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF DEFENDANTS-
APPELLANTS BY NULLIFYING THEIR EXPRESS, VESTED, APPURTENANT
EASEMENT IN USE OF THE SHARED DRIVEWAY.
{¶ 11} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 12} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF DEFENDANTS-
APPELLANTS BY AWARDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF[S]-APPELLEES
WHEN THERE WERE MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE.
{¶ 13} Assignment of Error No. 3:
{¶ 14} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF DEFENDANTS-
APPELLANTS BY RELYING UPON A LEGALLY INVALID AND AMBIGUOUS SKETCH
TO REFORM THE PARTIES' EASEMENTS AND USE OF A SHARED DRIVEWAY.
{¶ 15} In their first three assignments of error, the Champions allege the trial court
erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the Meffords. To support this claim, the
Champions argue that the trial court nullified the 1918 right-of-way and relied on the 1997
Easement Agreement. The Champions also argue the trial court erred by granting summary
judgment to the Meffords because there were genuine issues of material fact that preclude
summary judgment. We find the Champions' arguments are without merit.
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{¶ 16} This court reviews summary judgment decisions de novo, which means we
review the trial court's judgment independently and without deference to the trial court's
determinations, using the same standard in our review that the trial court should have
employed. Ludwigsen v. Lakeside Plaza, L.L.C., 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2014-03-008,
2014-Ohio-5493, ¶ 8. Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is appropriate when
(1) there is no genuine issue of any material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law, and (3) the evidence submitted can only lead reasonable minds to a
conclusion which is adverse to the nonmoving party. Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 82
Ohio St.3d 367, 369-370 (1998).
{¶ 17} The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis
for the motion and demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Robinson
v. Cameron, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2014-09-191, 2015-Ohio-1486, ¶ 9. Once this burden
is met, the nonmoving party has a reciprocal burden to set forth specific facts showing there
is some genuine issue of material fact yet remaining for the trier of fact to resolve. Id. In
determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the evidence must be construed
in favor of the nonmoving party. Vanderbilt v. Pier 27, L.L.C., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2013-
02-029, 2013-Ohio-5205, ¶ 8.
{¶ 18} An easement is a property interest in the land of another that allows the owner
of the easement a limited use of the land in which the interest exists. Bavis v. Deimling,
12th Dist. Clermont Nos. CA2017-05-024 and CA2017-06-026, 2018-Ohio-2259, ¶ 13. "An
easement has also been defined as a right that the owner of one estate, referred to as the
'dominant estate,' may exercise for his benefit in or over another's estate, referred to as the
'servient estate.'" McCumbers v. Puckett, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2008-11-038, 2009-
Ohio-4465, ¶ 14, quoting 1st Natl. Bank v. Mountain Agency, L.L.C., 12th Dist. Clermont
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No. CA2008-05-056, 2009-Ohio-2202, ¶ 14. The burden of proving an easement is on the
party claiming the easement. Gateway Park, L.L.C. v. Ferrous Realty, Ltd., 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 91082, 2008-Ohio-6161, ¶ 27.
{¶ 19} When an easement exists by an express grant, the extent and limitations upon
the dominant estate's use of the land depend upon the language in the grant. Esteph v.
Grumm, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 07CA6, 2008-Ohio-1121, ¶ 10, citing Alban v. R.K. Co., 15
Ohio St.2d 229, 232 (1968). "When the language granting an easement is clear and the
delineation of the easement is unambiguous, we presume that the deed expresses the
intent of the parties, and we need not go beyond that language in determining the scope of
the easement." Id., citing Shifrin v. Forest City Ent., Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d 635, 638 (1992)
("courts presume that the intent of the parties to a contract resides in the language they
chose to employ in the agreement"). See also Johnson v. Keith, 12th Dist. Clermont No.
CA2012-04-032, 2013-Ohio-451, ¶ 35 ("A written easement that contains an express grant
will be interpreted based upon the language contained in that grant.").
{¶ 20} The record reflects that there are two potential controlling documents – the
1918 right-of-way and the 1997 Easement Agreement. The 1918 right-of-way was created
by George Rebold, a prior owner of the land now comprising the Mefford and Champion
properties. After Rebold subdivided the land, he conveyed the eastern property, i.e., the
Champions' property, including a right of ingress and egress. The only description of the
easement is set forth in the deed from Rebold to the purchaser of the eastern property,
which states:
There is herewith granted a right of way over that part of the
driveway lying along the West line of above described lot, which
lies on the lot retained by Geo Rebold and his successors, a
right of way over that part of said driveway which lies on the
above described.
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{¶ 21} Since the 1918 right-of-way does not contain a termination date, the
Champions argue that it is the binding document at issue in the present case. The
Champions further claim that, because the 1918 right-of-way does not specify otherwise,
the "driveway" must run the length of the two parcels, including where the parking pad now
exists.
{¶ 22} The Meffords argue that the 1997 Easement Agreement, not the 1918 right-
of-way, controls the parties' respective rights and responsibilities. The Meffords presented
evidence that the prior homeowners, recognizing ambiguity in the 1918 right-of-way,
entered into an agreement to clarify their respective rights and obligations regarding their
shared drive. To that end, the 1997 Easement Agreement conveyed two express
easements of ingress and egress: one burdens the Champions' property while the other
burdens the Meffords' property. The agreement is signed by the prior owners and states,
in pertinent part:
Whereas, there is a strip of land the property described in
Exhibit "C" which is part of the property described in Exhibit "A"
and part of the property described in Exhibit "B."
For valuable and mutual agreements the undersigned
REINHARD does hereby bargain, grant and convey to
FREEMAN, their heirs and assigns, an easement for ingress
and egress, and the use, construction and maintenance of a
driveway across the property described in Exhibit "C" that is part
of the property described in Exhibit "A."
For valuable and mutual agreements the undersigned
FREEMAN does hereby bargain, grant and convey to
REINHARD, their heirs and assigns, an easement for ingress
and egress, and the use, construction and maintenance of a
driveway across the property described in Exhibit "C" that is part
of the property described in Exhibit "B."
Exhibit C depicts the easement as a series of diagonal lines beginning at the roadway with
a definitive endpoint.
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{¶ 23} The trial court found that the 1997 Easement Agreement was the controlling
document. Therefore, according to the trial court, since the 1997 Easement Agreement
shows the easement ending well before the Champions' parking pad, the Champions were
in violation of the express terms of the 1997 Easement Agreement and were trespassing
on the Meffords' property. Following review, we agree with the trial court.
{¶ 24} The 1918 right-of-way refers to an existing driveway and grants a right of
ingress and egress over a part of that driveway. However, there is no evidence as to the
extent of that existing driveway or that it extended past the Champions garage to the parking
pad – an area that, as noted above, once contained a large tree. The Champions concede
that there is no way of knowing if "the driveway" that existed in 1918 is the same gravel
driveway that exists today. See, e.g., Skaggs v. Miller, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 95CA2381,
1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 1988, at *11-12 (May 17, 1996) (affirming the denial of relief to the
proponent of an easement because competent, credible evidence supported the trial court's
finding that the exact location of the easement cannot be accurately determined). The 1997
Easement Agreement was signed by the prior homeowners, burdening both of their
properties with rights to ingress and egress. Exhibit C, which was attached to the 1997
Easement Agreement and recorded, clearly depicts the easement extending north from the
roadway, but ending shortly after passing the Mefford residence – an area well-short of the
now-present parking pad.1
{¶ 25} Contrary to the Champions' claim that the trial court effectively nullified 1918
right-of-way, it merely recognized that the 1997 Easement Agreement is the only instrument
identifying the parameters of the driveway easement with any precision. The 1997
1. The document was recorded at book 1398 page 150 in the Warren County Recorder's Office.
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Easement Agreement, which the Champions claim is invalid for a variety of reasons, does
not exhibit any defect in the chain of title, nor in the validity of the document or the
transaction itself.2 Nor do we find the 1997 Easement Agreement lacked consideration.
Despite the absence of money, the parties' mutual promises burdening their lands with the
easement and maintenance responsibilities was sufficient. Williams v. Ormsby, 131 Ohio
St.3d 427, 2012-Ohio-690, ¶ 16 (consideration may consist of either a detriment to the
promisee or a benefit to the promisor).
{¶ 26} The Champions also complain of various deficiencies with Exhibit C, which,
as noted above, depicts the easement as a series of diagonal lines beginning at the
roadway with a definitive endpoint. This endpoint is well short of the now-existing parking
pad. Therefore, despite the Champions' claims otherwise, the trial court appropriately found
that the Champions were trespassing on the Mefford property when making their way to the
parking pad. Any claim by the Champions that the easement is coextensive with the entire
driveway is belied by the record. That is to say, the summary judgment evidence presented
below makes clear that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the easement ends
well before the parking pad begins.3 Therefore, for the reasons outlined above, we find the
Champions' first, second, and third assignments of error are without merit and they are
hereby overruled.
{¶ 27} Assignment of Error No. 4:
{¶ 28} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANTS BY
2. The record reflects that the Reinhards (predecessor of the Mefford property) and the Freemans
(predecessor of the Champion property) executed the document.
3. The Champions also briefly mention that the trial court "erroneously stated" that they had an alternative
means of accessing the parking pad. However, whether the Champions have an alternative path to access
the parking pad is irrelevant to the outcome of this case. The Champions chose to construct the parking pad,
thus creating their own hardship.
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AWARDING DAMAGES TO APPELLEES AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE.
{¶ 29} In their fourth assignment of error, the Champions argue the trial court's award
of damages is not supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 30} A reviewing court may not reverse a damage award unless it is against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Classic Healthcare Sys. L.L.C. v. Miracle, 12th Dist.
Warren No. CA2018-10-123, 2019-Ohio-2676, ¶ 13. A judgment will not be reversed as
being against the manifest weight of the evidence if it is supported by competent, credible
evidence. C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 280 (1978).
{¶ 31} In the present case, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on
damages. During this hearing, Tracey Mefford testified that the Champions trespassed on
the property multiple times per day. Because of the location of her sitting room, Tracey
could not avoid witnessing the repeated trespasses. Tracey explained that the repeated
incursion on the property caused her serious aggravation and anxiety. Tracey also testified
about damage that the Champions' vehicle caused while driving past the easement to the
parking pad. Despite attempts to resolve the disagreement amicably, the Champions
continually trespassed over the Meffords' property for approximately 18 months.
{¶ 32} Following this hearing, the trial court awarded the Meffords $25,000 for
trespass plus $2,500 for damages to their property for a total damage award of $27,500.
After a thorough review of the record, find the trial court's damage award was supported by
the evidence. Tracey presented competent and credible evidence concerning the frequent,
repeated incursion on the property and the resulting impact those trespasses had on her.
Accettola v. Big Sky Energy, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2017-A-0055, 2018-Ohio-5076, ¶ 38
(damages for inconvenience, aggravation, and frustration are appropriate in a trespass
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action). Despite attempts to amicably resolve the situation, the Champions continued to
trespass on the Meffords' property, compounding the damages.
{¶ 33} The Champions argue for the first time on appeal that the Meffords did not
plead non-economic damages. However, we are aware of no such pleading requirement.
Moreover, it is well-settled that a party may not raise for the first time on appeal any issue
or error that the party could have called to the trial court's attention at a time when the trial
court could have ruled on the issue, or corrected the error, or avoided the error altogether.
Whitson v. One Stop Rental Tool & Party, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2016-03-004, 2017-
Ohio-418, ¶ 17. The Champions also raise an affirmative defense that they believed they
were authorized to be on the Meffords' property. However, the Champions' argument
regarding authorization was an affirmative defense to the underlying trespass claim. By
finding that the Champions violated the bounds of the easement, the trial court rejected
their authorization defense and concluded that the Champions were, in fact, trespassing on
the Meffords' property. At the same time, the trial court concluded that the Champions did
not act with malice as to justify an award of punitive damages or attorney fees. The trial
court described their conduct as a "spirit of ignorance." There was competent and credible
evidence to support this award and, therefore, for the reasons outlined above, the
Champions' fourth assignment of error lacks merit and is overruled.
{¶ 34} Cross-Assignment of Error:
{¶ 35} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING CROSS-APPELLANTS' R.C.
§2323.51 MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
{¶ 36} In their cross-assignment of error, the Meffords argue the trial court erred by
denying their motion for sanctions against the Champions in which they alleged the
Champions engaged in frivolous conduct.
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{¶ 37} R.C. 2323.51(B)(1) provides that a court may award costs, reasonable
attorney fees, and other reasonable expenses incurred in connection with a civil action to a
party adversely affected by frivolous conduct. As relevant here, "frivolous conduct" includes
conduct that satisfies the following:
(iii) The conduct consists of allegations or other factual
contentions that have no evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, are not likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.
(iv) The conduct consists of denials or factual contentions that
are not warranted by the evidence or, if specifically so identified,
are not reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(iii)-(iv).
{¶ 38} Review of a trial court's decision regarding frivolous conduct involves mixed
questions of law and fact. In re A.D.B., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-10-180, 2016-Ohio-
7186, ¶ 35. The trial court's factual determinations are accorded a degree of deference and
will not be disturbed on appeal if there is competent, credible evidence in the record to
support them. Judd v. Meszaroz, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-1189, 2011-Ohio-4983, ¶
18. "However, we review legal questions de novo, such as whether a party's conduct
satisfies the statutory definition of frivolous conduct." In re A.D.B. at ¶ 35. "When an inquiry
is purely a question of law, an appellate court need not defer to the judgment of the trial
court." Slye v. London Police Dept., 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2009-12-027, 2010-Ohio-
2824, ¶ 25
{¶ 39} To support their cross-appeal, the Meffords claim the Champions engaged in
frivolous conduct because they relied upon the 1918 right-of-way even though they failed
to present any evidence as to where the "driveway" was situated and ignored the
unambiguous language of the 1997 Easement Agreement. Given this argument, the trial
court refused to impose sanctions against the Champions under R.C. 2323.51 and instead
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found:
With regard to this case, while Defendants' arguments were
frustrating and ultimately unsuccessful, the Court cannot say the
arguments were merely to harass, were not warranted under
existing law, or had no evidentiary support. Defendants raised
valid arguments regarding the 1918 right-of-way that they
claimed was more applicable to this case than the 1997
easement. Defendants also presented valid arguments that the
1997 easement was invalid. The Court found these arguments
lacked merit, but it cannot say they amounted to egregious,
overzealous, unjustifiable, frivolous action. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs' motion for damages pursuant to R.C. 2323.51 is
denied.
{¶ 40} We agree with the trial court that sanctions in this matter are not warranted.
Though they were unsuccessful, the Champions provided some evidentiary support for their
allegations and factual contentions as to the validity of the 1918 right-of-way. See, e.g.,
Carasalina, L.L.C. v. Bennett, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-74, 2014-Ohio-5665, ¶ 36 (a
party only needs minimal evidentiary support for its allegations or factual contentions in
order to avoid a frivolous conduct finding). Therefore, contrary to the Meffords' claim, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Champions' reliance on the
1918 right-of-way did not constitute frivolous conduct. Accordingly, for the reasons outlined
above, the Meffords' cross-assignment of error lacks merit and is overruled.
{¶ 41} Judgment affirmed.
HENDRICKSON and BYRNE, JJ., concur.
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