State v. Hunter , 2023 Ohio 1317 ( 2023 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Hunter, 
    2023-Ohio-1317
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
    BUTLER COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO,                                    :
    Appellee,                                  :         CASE NO. CA2022-05-054
    :              OPINION
    - vs -                                                        4/24/2023
    :
    TROY DEAN HUNTER, JR.,                            :
    Appellant.                                 :
    CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
    Case No. CR2022-03-0421
    Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael Greer, Assistant
    Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
    Michele Temmel, for appellant.
    BYRNE, J.
    {¶1}     Troy Dean Hunter appeals from the sentence imposed by the Butler County
    Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons described below, we affirm the trial court's
    decision to impose consecutive sentences, but reverse and remand for the trial court to
    enter a nunc pro tunc sentencing entry.
    I. Facts and Procedural Background
    {¶2}     In April 2022, in case number CR2022-03-0410 ("Case 410"), a Butler County
    Butler CA2022-05-054
    grand jury indicted Hunter for grand theft of a motor vehicle (a fourth-degree felony). Also
    in April 2022, in case number CR2022-03-0421 ("Case 421"), a Butler County grand jury
    indicted Hunter on three counts: count one, grand theft of a motor vehicle (a fourth-degree
    felony); count two, grand theft of a motor vehicle (a fourth-degree felony); and count three,
    identity fraud (a fifth-degree felony).1
    {¶3}    On May 19, 2022, Hunter, Hunter's attorney, and the prosecutor appeared
    before the trial court to enter into a plea agreement. Hunter agreed to plead guilty to the
    sole count in Case 410 and to count one in Case 421. In return, the state agreed to seek
    dismissal of the remaining counts in Case 421.
    {¶4}    At the plea hearing, the court engaged Hunter in a Crim.R. 11 colloquy to
    ensure that Hunter was entering his plea voluntarily, knowingly, and with an understanding
    of the constitutional rights he was waiving upon entering the plea. During the colloquy, the
    court asked Hunter if he was on probation. Hunter admitted that he was on probation with
    the Fairfield Municipal Court for a falsification offense. Hunter's attorney indicated that he
    had informed Hunter that his pleas may result in Hunter being found to be in violation of the
    terms of his probation on that case, and that Hunter understood.
    {¶5}    The court reviewed with Hunter the maximum prison term he was facing and
    further informed Hunter that the court could impose consecutive sentences.                      Hunter
    acknowledged his understanding of the maximum prison term and the court's ability to
    impose consecutive sentences. Hunter specifically acknowledged that he could be sent to
    prison for 36 months if the court imposed the maximum sentences and ran them
    consecutively.
    1. This appeal concerns only Case 421. The record of Case 410 is not before us and Hunter apparently did
    not appeal that case. As a result, we are relying upon counsel's representations with respect to certain
    information in the opinion about Case 410.
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    {¶6}   After acknowledging his understanding of all the rights he was foregoing by
    pleading guilty, Hunter pleaded guilty to one count each in Case 410 and Case 421, as he
    had agreed to do. The court accepted Hunter's pleas and found him guilty.
    {¶7}   At Hunter's request, the matter proceeded immediately to sentencing. Hunter
    waived a pre-sentence investigation. Hunter's attorney noted that—against his advice—
    Hunter wished to waive any right to be placed on community control and wished to be
    sentenced to prison. Hunter agreed that this was his choice.
    {¶8}   Defense counsel argued on Hunter's behalf in mitigation. He explained that
    his client was 25 years old and had a six-year-old son. Hunter grew up poor and was only
    educated through the seventh grade. He had a drug issue, which he knew he needed to
    address.
    {¶9}   The victim in Case 410 then spoke about the impact of Hunter's theft of the
    victim's vehicle. The victim stated that he was inconvenienced by Hunter's actions but
    asked the court to "take it easy" on Hunter and relayed that he had also had a "drug
    situation" when he was younger.
    {¶10} The victim in Case 421 spoke next. The victim stated that Hunter stole his
    vehicle from Planet Fitness, took his debit card, swiped it at Speedway, and then tried to
    cash the victim's payroll check. Hunter also tried to charge $750 on Amazon. The victim
    stated that Hunter had done "a lot of damage to my life" and that he now has "severe
    anxiety." The victim stated he had installed a security system at his house and that he had
    to sign up for "Lifelock." The victim stated he had found "blow stains" (presumably a
    reference to illegal drugs) and a needle in his vehicle. Finally, the victim stated that he had
    been to several court hearings on Hunter's case and that his boss was getting frustrated
    with him and there was the potential he could lose his job.
    {¶11} After listening to the victims' statements, the court indicated that it had
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    considered the record, the charges, the pleas of guilt, the oral statements presented, and
    the victim impact statements. The court further noted that it had considered the purposes
    and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors
    pursuant to R.C. 2929.12.      The court additionally noted that it had considered the
    appropriateness of community control sanctions pursuant to R.C. 2929.13.
    {¶12} The court sentenced Hunter to 12 months in prison for the grand theft of a
    motor vehicle offense in Case 410 and to 18 months in prison for the grand theft of a motor
    vehicle offense in Case 421. The court then stated it would order the sentences to be
    served consecutively. In explaining its decision to order consecutive sentences, the court
    noted that the presumption of concurrent sentences had been rebutted based upon the
    circumstances and the severity of Hunter's conduct. The court found that consecutive
    sentences were necessary to adequately protect the public from future crime and to
    appropriately punish Hunter.    The court found that consecutive sentences were not
    disproportionate to the seriousness of Hunter's conduct and the danger that Hunter posed
    to the public. The court further found that at least two of the multiple offenses were
    committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and that the harm caused by two or
    more of the multiple offenses was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of
    the offenses committed as part of the courses of conduct adequately reflected the
    seriousness of Hunter's conduct. Finally, the court noted that Hunter had a history of
    criminal conduct that demonstrated that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect
    the public from future crimes. Hunter appealed and assigned one error for our review.
    II. Law and Analysis
    {¶13} Hunter's sole assignment of error states:
    {¶14} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF MR. HUNTER WHEN
    IT SENTENCED HIM TO CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES IN THE OHIO DEPARTMENT OF
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    REHABILITATION AND CORRECTIONS.
    {¶15} Hunter argues that the record fails to support two of the trial court's
    consecutive sentence findings.
    A. Applicable Law
    1. Required Findings for Consecutive Sentences
    {¶16} When imposing consecutive sentences, a sentencing court is required "to
    make the findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and
    incorporate its findings into its sentencing entry * * *." State v. Bonnell, 
    140 Ohio St.3d 209
    ,
    
    2014-Ohio-3177
    , syllabus. That statute states:
    If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for
    convictions of multiple offenses, the court may require the
    offender to serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds
    that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public
    from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive
    sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the
    offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the
    public, and if the court also finds any of the following:
    (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses
    while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a
    sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or
    2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control
    for a prior offense.
    (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part
    of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two
    or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or
    unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses
    committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately
    reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.
    (c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
    consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from
    future crime by the offender.
    R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
    {¶17} Stated more simply, to impose consecutive sentences, a sentencing court
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    must find (1) "that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future
    crime or to punish the offender[,]" (2) "that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate
    to the seriousness of the offender's conduct[,]" and (3) that at least one of the three
    conditions described in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a), (b), or (c) apply. R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
    {¶18} "When imposing consecutive sentences, a trial court must state the required
    findings as part of the sentencing hearing, and by doing so it affords notice to the offender
    and to defense counsel." Bonnell at ¶ 29, citing Crim.R. 32(A)(4). "[A] word-for-word
    recitation of the language of the statute is not required," though, "and as long as the
    reviewing court can discern that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis and can
    determine that the record contains evidence to support the findings, consecutive sentences
    should be upheld." Id.
    2. Standard of Review
    {¶19} R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) defines the standard of review for felony-sentencing
    appeals. State v. Day, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2020-07-042 and CA2020-7-043, 2021-
    Ohio-164, ¶ 6. As applicable here, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides:
    The appellate court may take any action authorized by this
    division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:
    (a) That the record does not support the sentencing court's
    findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division
    (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section
    2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;
    (b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
    (Emphasis added.)
    {¶20} "The consecutive sentence statute, R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), is one of the relevant
    statutes specifically mentioned in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)." State v. Richey, 12th Dist. Clermont
    Nos. CA2022-08-038 thru CA2022-08-041, 
    2023-Ohio-336
    , ¶ 12. "Thus, there are two
    ways that a defendant can challenge consecutive sentences on appeal." State v. Shiveley,
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    12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2022-04-017, 
    2022-Ohio-4036
    , ¶ 7. "The defendant can argue
    either that the imposition of consecutive sentences is contrary to law because the trial court
    failed to make the necessary consecutive sentence findings required by R.C.
    2929.14(C)(4), or that the record does not support the trial court's consecutive sentence
    findings made under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)." Richey at ¶ 12, citing Shiveley at ¶ 7. "These
    are the only two means that the legislature provided to defendants to challenge their
    consecutive sentences on appeal." 
    Id.,
     citing State v. Gwynne, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-
    4607, ¶ 11.
    {¶21} In this appeal, Hunter does not dispute that the trial court made the
    consecutive sentence findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Hunter therefore concedes
    that the trial court's decision to impose consecutive sentences was not clearly and
    convincingly contrary to law under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b). Richey at ¶ 13.
    {¶22} Instead, Hunter argues—pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a)—that the record
    does not support two of the trial court's consecutive sentence findings under R.C.
    2929.14(C)(4). As we explained in Richey, the Ohio Supreme Court recently held that
    "[s]uch a challenge requires this court to review the record de novo and decide whether the
    record clearly and convincingly does not support the trial court's consecutive sentence
    findings." Richey at ¶ 13, citing Gwynne at ¶ 1. In conducting this de novo review, this
    court "essentially functions in the same way as the trial court when imposing consecutive
    sentences in the first instance." Gwynne at ¶ 21.
    {¶23} However, we are constrained "to considering only those consecutive
    sentence findings that the trial court actually made." Richey at ¶ 14, citing Gwynne at ¶ 21.
    "Therefore, upon a de novo review of the record, this court may reverse or modify
    consecutive sentences—including the number of consecutive sentences imposed by the
    trial court[,]" but only if we clearly and convincingly find "that the record does not support
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    the trial court's consecutive sentence findings made under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)." (Emphasis
    added.) Richey at ¶ 14, citing Gwynne at ¶ 12. This means that we may only reverse or
    modify consecutive sentences when we have "a firm belief or conviction that the proposition
    of fact represented by each finding is not true on consideration of the evidence in the
    record." Gwynne at ¶ 21.
    B. Analysis
    {¶24} Hunter does not challenge the trial court's finding under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)
    that consecutive sentences are "necessary to protect the public from future crime or to
    punish the offender * * *." Nor does Hunter challenge the trial court's finding under R.C.
    2929.14(C)(4) that consecutive sentences "are not disproportionate to the seriousness of
    the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public * * *."2
    {¶25} Instead,       Hunter      challenges      the    trial   court's   findings     under     R.C.
    2929.14(C)(4)(b) and (c). First, Hunter challenges the trial court's finding, nearly quoting
    R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b), that "at least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of
    one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by the two or more of the multiple
    offenses so committed was great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the
    offenses committed as part of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness
    of the Defendant's conduct."
    {¶26} Second, Hunter challenges the trial court's finding, nearly quoting R.C.
    2929.14(C)(4)(c), that "the Defendant's criminal conduct—his history of criminal conduct
    demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future
    crime by this Defendant."
    2. Even if Hunter's appellate brief could be interpreted as stating that such findings were being challenged,
    the fact remains that Hunter makes no argument regarding these specific findings. In any event, upon our
    de novo review we do not find that the record clearly and convincingly does not support any of the trial
    court's consecutive sentence findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
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    {¶27} In support of these challenges, Hunter argues that his convictions in Cases
    410 and 421 were his first felony convictions, that he had never been to prison before, and
    that there was no evidence indicating that the public needed to be protected from Hunter.
    He also argues that the two offenses were mere "property crimes" and were not so "great
    or unusual" that consecutive sentences were warranted.
    {¶28} Upon our de novo review of the record, we disagree with Hunter's argument
    regarding the trial court's finding under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b). The record reflects that
    Hunter was on either "probation" or community control sanctions through the Fairfield
    Municipal Court when he was charged with four felonies including grand theft of a motor
    vehicle and identity fraud. He subsequently pleaded guilty to two of those felony counts.
    In both cases Hunter entered a Planet Fitness athletic facility, deceptively stated that he
    needed to use the restroom, then searched the restroom/locker room area until he found
    car keys. He stole the keys, determined which vehicles they belonged to in the parking lot,
    and stole the vehicles. In one case the victim recounted that Hunter not only stole his
    vehicle, but also his debit card, which he tried to use to make a purchase. The victim further
    stated that Hunter also tried to cash the victim's payroll check, tried to charge $750 to
    Amazon, and caused "a lot of damage to my life." The victim explained that Hunter's acts
    left the victim with "severe anxiety," which led him to install a security system and to sign
    up for "Lifelock."   In other words, Hunter engaged in a planned, premeditated—and
    repeated—effort to steal car keys from unsuspecting persons in a public place and to then
    use those keys to steal vehicles (and, necessarily, their contents). At least one of the
    victims was significantly affected by Hunter's acts. Hunter certainly committed the theft of
    motor vehicle offenses in a course of conduct, and the harm caused by the offenses was
    so great that no single prison term reflects the seriousness of his conduct.
    {¶29} We also disagree with Hunter's argument that the offenses in Cases 410 and
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    421 to which he pleaded guilty were mere "property crimes" and were "not unusual at all."
    While the felony theft offenses with which Hunter was charged may not have been
    "unusual," R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) does not require a finding that the offenses were
    "unusual." Rather, it requires a finding that the offenses were so "great or unusual" that no
    single prison term would "reflect[] the seriousness of the offender's conduct." (Emphasis
    added.) That is, "great" and "unusual" are stated as alternatives in the statute. Hunter was
    charged with and convicted of two felony theft offenses. The victim in Case 421 testified to
    the significant negative impact Hunter's criminal actions had caused him. Hunter committed
    the same offense when he stole the vehicle of the victim in Case 410. Hunter's acts caused
    great harm.
    {¶30} For these reasons, we do not find that the record clearly and convincingly
    does    not    support     the   trial   court's   consecutive       sentence      finding   under     R.C.
    2929.14(C)(4)(b).3 Gwynne, 
    2022-Ohio-4607
     at ¶ 12; Richey, 
    2023-Ohio-336
     at ¶ 14.
    {¶31} Because a trial court, in order to impose consecutive sentences, must make
    the two findings in the first paragraph of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) (which findings Hunter does
    not challenge here) and only one of the three findings outlined in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a),
    (b), or (c), our conclusion with regard to the trial court's finding under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b)
    is sufficient for us to affirm the trial court's sentencing decision. We therefore do not need
    to consider the trial court's finding under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c), which concerns Hunter's
    history of criminal conduct.
    {¶32} However, although not presented as assigned error by Hunter or raised by
    the state, a review of the record does reveal a sentencing error. Our review of the judgment
    entry of conviction revealed that the trial court erred by failing to incorporate all R.C.
    3. We are aware that our conclusion is awkwardly stated in the negative, or in the double negative. But this
    is what is required under Gwynne.
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    2929.14(C)(4) findings made at the hearing in the judgment entry of conviction. Specifically,
    while the court recorded its findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c), it neglected to incorporate
    its findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b).
    {¶33} The Ohio Supreme Court has held, "[a] trial court's inadvertent failure to
    incorporate the statutory findings in the sentencing entry after properly making those
    findings at the sentencing hearing does not render the sentence contrary to law * * *."
    Bonnell, 
    2014-Ohio-3177
     at ¶ 30. Instead, "such a clerical mistake may be corrected by
    the court through a nunc pro tunc entry to reflect what actually occurred in open court." 
    Id.
    {¶34} To that end, although we find no error in the trial court's decision to impose
    consecutive sentences in this matter, we sustain Hunter's assignment of error as it relates
    to the trial court's failure to incorporate the consecutive sentence findings it made at the
    sentencing hearing into its sentencing entry. Therefore, we remand this matter to the trial
    court for the limited purpose of issuing a nunc pro tunc sentencing entry to reflect the trial
    court's statutory findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). "'Such an administrative correction
    does not necessitate a new sentencing hearing.'" State v. Fridley, 12th Dist. Clermont No.
    CA2016-05-030, 
    2017-Ohio-4368
    , ¶ 52, quoting State v. Lung, 12th Dist. Clermont No.
    CA2014-12-081, 
    2015-Ohio-3833
    , ¶ 20. The trial court's decision to impose consecutive
    sentences in all other respects is affirmed.
    III. Conclusion
    {¶35} Upon our de novo review of the record, we do not find that the record clearly
    and convincingly does not support the trial court's consecutive sentence findings under R.C.
    2929.14(C)(4). However, we remand as described above for the issuance of a nunc pro
    tunc sentencing entry.
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    {¶36} Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for the limited
    purposes of issuing a nunc pro tunc entry.
    S. POWELL, P.J., and HENDRICKSON, J., concur.
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