In re Adoption of W.M. , 2023 Ohio 1365 ( 2023 )


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  • [Cite as In re Adoption of W.M., 
    2023-Ohio-1365
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    IN RE ADOPTION OF W.M.                              :
    No. 111580
    A Minor Child                                       :
    [Appeal by Stepfather]                              :
    :
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 27, 2023
    Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Probate Division
    Case No. 2021ADP09927
    Appearances:
    Steven J. Trapp, for appellant.
    MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:
    Stepfather-appellant, J.M. (“stepfather”), appeals the trial court’s
    dismissal of his petition for adoption. After a thorough review of the facts and the
    applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
    Procedural History and Facts
    W.M. (“child” or “son”) was born on February 5, 2013. At the time, the
    child’s mother was in a relationship with the child’s father, W.G. (“father”).1 When
    the child was three years old, mother and stepfather married. On October 15, 2021,
    stepfather filed a petition for adoption alleging that father’s consent was not
    required because father had failed, without justifiable-cause, to provide more than
    de minimis contact with the minor child and failed to provide for the maintenance
    and support of the minor. Father objected to the application. In April 2022, the
    trial court held a consent hearing at which the mother and father testified.
    Father testified to the following. He moved away from Cleveland when
    the child was four or five years old. He was homeless for a time and lived between
    Cleveland, Pennsylvania, and Columbus. At the time of the hearing, father lived and
    worked in Columbus, which he testified was an “emotionally stable environment.”
    Father and mother initially had an informal system of visitation and
    child support but that ended when a neighbor reported him to children protective
    services (“CPS”) for allegedly abusing the child when the child was “about four years
    old.” After mother received notice of the report, she refused to allow father to have
    contact with the child until a judge ordered her to do so. After this occurred, mother
    let him see their son twice and then they had “another falling out.” Since the falling
    1  Father established paternity by executing a voluntary acknowledgment of
    paternity with the Central Paternity Registry.
    out, father had not tried to contact the child because “[mother] told me that I
    couldn’t contact him * * *.”
    In 2018, father went to juvenile court to try and establish a child
    support order, but he did not have the money for an attorney. On September 23,
    2020, he filed an application to determine custody, shared parenting, and parenting
    time (hereinafter “application for parenting time”) in Cuyahoga County Juvenile
    Court. The matter proceeded through juvenile court and after several delays, father
    had his first visitation with the child via Zoom on November 9, 2021. Since that
    time, he has had two supervised visits and one therapy visit with his son.2
    According to father, he did not try to contact his son because mother
    told him he would not be able to see him. When asked if he paid child support or
    otherwise supported his son, father testified, “No, not since she told me that she does
    not want anything from me. And I can’t see him up until the court says that I’m
    allowed to.” Father also testified that he did not send the child a birthday card or
    otherwise try to wish him happy birthday because he did not believe mother would
    give the child anything he sent.
    Mother testified to the following. Father was invited to their son’s
    fourth birthday party in February 2017, but did not show up. The last contact she
    had with father was in April 2017. Since that time, father has made no effort to call,
    mail, visit, or otherwise reach out to the child. Mother lived at the same address
    2   The case in juvenile court is still pending.
    from November 2015 until July 2020, and father knew where they lived because he
    was there in 2016 for trick-or-treating. Mother testified that when she moved with
    stepfather and the child in July 2020, father knew the new address through his
    attorney. Mother has had the same phone number for the last seven years and the
    same email address for the last ten years. Mother denied telling father that he could
    not see their son until a judge ordered her to let him visit, but acknowledged that
    she told the father that he had to get the “issue” with CPS resolved.3
    In a journal entry dated April 28, 2022, the probate court found that
    stepfather failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the father’s
    consent was not required to proceed with the adoption petition; therefore, absent
    father’s consent, the adoption petition could not proceed. Specifically, the trial court
    found that father had supervised visits with the child in the year leading up to the
    filing of the adoption petition, mother interfered with father’s access to the child,
    and father attempted to establish a support order prior to stepfather’s filing of the
    adoption petition.
    The trial court dismissed the petition for adoption. Stepfather filed a
    timely notice of appeal and raises four assignments of error for our review:
    I. The trial court erred in finding that (father) was having court ordered
    contact with the minor child prior to the filing of the petition.
    II. The trial court erred in finding that “Through the juvenile court
    process, [father] has been able to have supervised visits with the child
    in the year leading up to the filing of the petition.”
    3 Neither party introduced additional evidence regarding an investigation or case
    with a child protective services agency.
    III. The trial court erred in finding that within the one-year period
    prior to the filing of the adoption petition (father) was participating in
    court ordered visitation with the minor child as a result of an action he
    initiated long before the filing of the petition.
    IV. The trial court erred in finding that Petitioner has failed to establish
    by clear and convincing evidence that (father) failed without justifiable-
    cause to have more than de minimis contact with the child.
    Failure to Comply with Appellate Rules
    As an initial matter, we note that appellant has failed to comply with
    Loc.App.R. 3, App.R. 12 and App.R. 16. Loc.App.R. 3(B)(1) provides:
    The notice of appeal must individually name each party taking the
    appeal and must have attached to it a copy of the judgment or order
    appealed from (journal entry) signed by the trial judge and time-
    stamped with the date of receipt by the clerk. The subject attachments
    are not jurisdictional but their omission may be the basis for a
    dismissal.
    The original notice of appeal stepfather filed in this case was stricken
    from the record for failure to comply with Loc.App.R. 13.2 because certain filings
    contained the father’s and child’s name. Stepfather refiled his notice of appeal
    redacting those names in accordance with Loc.App.R. 13.2, but stepfather failed to
    attach the judgment from which he was appealing. However, as stated in Loc.App.R.
    3(B)(1), the attachments are not jurisdictional; therefore, we will consider the
    appeal.
    App.R. 12(A)(2) provides that this court may disregard an assignment
    of error presented for review if the party raising it fails to identify in the record the
    error on which the assignment of error is based or fails to argue the assignment
    separately in the brief, as required under App.R. 16(A). Stepfather lists four separate
    assignments of error, yet applies one argument to all four assignments of error. It
    is not the reviewing court’s obligation to search the record for evidence to support
    an appellant’s argument as to any alleged error, let alone four alleged errors lumped
    into a single argument. However, because cases are best decided on their merits,
    this court will employ its discretion to address stepfather’s assignments of error in a
    consolidated fashion. See SHJ Co. v. Avani Hosp. & Fin., L.L.C., 
    2022-Ohio-1173
    ,
    
    187 N.E.3d 1121
    , ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).4
    We now turn to the assigned errors.
    Law and Analysis
    A parent has a fundamental right to care for and have custody of his
    or her child and those rights are terminated when a child is adopted. In re Adoption
    of F.D.H., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29562, 
    2023-Ohio-730
    , ¶ 6, citing In
    re Adoption of M.M.R., 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2017-CA-12, 
    2017-Ohio-7222
    , ¶
    5. However, R.C. 3107.07(A) provides that consent to adoption is not required of a
    parent of a minor child
    when it is alleged in the adoption petition and the court, after proper
    service of notice and hearing, finds by clear and convincing evidence
    that the parent has failed without justifiable-cause to provide more
    than de minimis contact with the minor or to provide for the
    maintenance and support of the minor * * * for a period of at least one
    year immediately preceding * * * the filing of the adoption[.]
    4 Counsel is admonished that future failure to comply withthe appellate rules could
    result in striking of the brief or further sanctions. See SHJ Co. v. Avani Hosp. & Fin.,
    L.L.C., at 
    id.
    When applying R.C. 3107.07(A), the trial court considers the
    following: (1) whether the parent has failed to communicate with or failed to support
    a child for a minimum of one year preceding the filing of the adoption petition, and,
    if so, (2) whether there was justifiable-cause for that failure. In re Adoption of M.B.,
    
    131 Ohio St.3d 186
    , 
    2012-Ohio-236
    , 
    963 N.E.2d 142
    , ¶ 23.
    The probate court may examine any preceding events that may have
    a bearing on the noncustodial parent’s failure to communicate with the child; the
    court is not restricted to focusing solely on events occurring during the statutory
    one-year period preceding the filing of the adoption petition. In re Adoption of
    S.T.M., 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2022 AP 09 0028, 
    2023-Ohio-38
    , ¶ 26, citing In
    re: Adoption of Lauck, 
    82 Ohio App.3d 348
    , 
    612 N.E.2d 459
     (9th Dist.1992); see
    also In re Adoption of Hedrick, 
    110 Ohio App.3d 622
    , 627, 
    674 N.E.2d 1256
     (8th
    Dist.1996).
    The stepfather, as petitioner for adoption, had the burden of proving
    by clear and convincing evidence that father failed to have more than de minimis
    contact with the child for at least one year preceding the filing of the adoption
    petition and the lack of contact was without justifiable-cause. In re Adoption of
    Bovett, 
    33 Ohio St.3d 102
    , 104, 
    515 N.E.2d 919
     (1987). The probate court, as the
    finder of fact, determines if justifiable-cause exists. In re Adoption of Holcomb, 
    18 Ohio St.3d 361
    , 367, 
    481 N.E.2d 613
     (1985), citing In re Adoption of McDermitt, 
    63 Ohio St.2d 301
    , 
    408 N.E.2d 680
     (1980). “The probate court is in the best position to
    observe the demeanor of the parties, to assess their credibility, and to determine the
    accuracy of their testimony.” In re Adoption of Holcomb at 
    id.,
     citing In re Adoption
    of McDermitt at 
    id.
     Therefore, a probate court’s justifiable-cause decision will not
    be disturbed on appeal unless that determination is against the manifest weight of
    the evidence. In re Adoption of D.W.-E.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110705, 2022-
    Ohio-528, ¶ 26, citing In re Adoption of M.B. To determine whether a judgment is
    against the manifest weight of the evidence, this court reviews the entire record,
    weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers witness credibility, and
    determines whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact “clearly
    lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice” that there must be a
    reversal of the judgment. In re Adoption of F.D.H., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29562,
    
    2023-Ohio-730
    , at ¶ 8, citing In re Adoption of B.A.H., 2d Dist. Greene No. 2012-
    CA-44, 
    2012-Ohio-4441
    .
    In its judgment entry dismissing the petition for adoption, the trial
    court determined that father had more than de minimis contact with his son in the
    year prior to the filing of the adoption petition. Specifically, the court found that
    father had court-ordered supervised visits with the child in the prior year and court-
    ordered contact with the child immediately prior to the petition’s filing. The court’s
    findings are not supported by the record.
    Stepfather filed the petition for adoption on October 15, 2021. The
    record reflects that father’s first visitation with the child since before February 2017,5
    5 Neither party testified when father’s last contact was with the child, but mother
    testified that father did not appear at their son’s fourth birthday party, which was held in
    February 2017, and she had little to no contact with father after the birthday party.
    occurred on November 9, 2021, after the adoption petition was filed. Thus, father
    failed to have any contact with his son, let alone more than de minimis contact,
    within one year prior to the filing of the adoption petition.
    Next, we consider whether father had justifiable-cause for his failure
    to provide more than de minimis contact with the child in the year preceding the
    filing of the adoption petition. The trial court considered father’s previous attempts
    to establish child support orders and visitation. Specifically, the court considered
    father’s 2018 attempt to file for parenting time, but found that father was unable to
    file paperwork because he was homeless and did not have mother’s then-current
    address and his pending application for parenting time in juvenile court.
    Mother testified that she and their son lived at the same address from
    November 2015 to July 2020 and father knew the address because he was there in
    October 2016 for trick-or-treating. Father testified that he went to juvenile court in
    2018 to establish a child support order and visitation with the child, but was told he
    “could not file on himself.” He further testified he did not have the money to hire an
    attorney. Father provided no documentation to support his claim. Presumably
    father filed in Cuyahoga County, where the child resides. If he had tried to file in
    our county’s juvenile court, he would have been directed to the court’s pro se clinic,
    where he would have been advised to file an application to establish parental rights
    and responsibilities, just as he did in September 2020.
    The trial court found that mother “admitted to interfering with
    [father’s] access to the child,” and “prohibited [father] from seeing the child.” The
    trial court acknowledged that “no evidence of any involvement by children’s services
    was presented to the court.”
    Father testified that mother would not allow him to see the child until
    a judge “tells her to.” Mother admitted that she told father he had to resolve the
    “CPS issue” before he could see his son, but denied telling father he could not see
    their son until he had a court order allowing visitation. Mother also testified that
    she allowed father to see their son twice after the CPS issue arose, and he was invited
    to their son’s fourth birthday party, but he did not come. After father failed to appear
    at the birthday party, mother heard from him once more, in April 2017, and did not
    hear from him again until she received papers from juvenile court in September
    2020, “except for him asking for my new address.”
    In In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d at 367, 
    481 N.E.2d 613
    ,
    the Ohio Supreme Court held that a parent could establish justifiable-cause for
    noncommunication if the other parent has created substantial impediments to that
    communication. But to establish justifiable-cause, “significant interference by a
    custodial parent with communication between the non-custodial parent and the
    child, or significant discouragement of such communication, is required * * *.”
    (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 367-368.
    In one of two cases the court considered in In re Adoption of
    Holcomb, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the appellate court’s decision reversing
    the probate court’s decision granting a stepmother’s petition for adoption as being
    unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 369. In the underlying case,
    the father, unbeknownst to the mother, moved out of state with stepmother and the
    children and refused to provide mother with his new address or phone number.
    Mother tried numerous ways to contact her children including sending presents and
    letters to the children’s grandmother to give to them and letters to an acquaintance
    to give to the children at their school. Mother went as far as to travel out of state to
    where she thought father and the children lived and drove around neighborhoods
    looking for her children. Id. at 362-363. The court determined that father and
    stepmother “significantly interfered with and discouraged respondent’s numerous
    and varied attempts to establish communication with her children.” Id. at 369.
    In this case, we are not persuaded by father’s repeated excuse that his
    lack of contact with his son was based on mother’s refusal to allow him contact until
    a court ordered visitation. The trial court found that mother’s “reference” to a child
    protective service case was “acknowledging that she prohibited [father] from seeing
    the child.” However, as the trial court also acknowledged, the parties presented no
    evidence of involvement by children services.        Moreover, father presented no
    evidence that a court of competent jurisdiction ever issued an order prohibiting him
    from visiting his son.
    Further, even if there had been a court order denying visitation, such
    an order is not justifiable-cause for failing to contact one’s child in another manner,
    such as phone call, email, letter, cards, or social media, unless the court order
    specifically prohibits all contact. See In re Adoption of T.R.S., 7th Dist. Belmont No.
    13 BE 43, 
    2014-Ohio-3808
    , ¶ 21 (Since the no-contact order did not prohibit all
    forms of contact between the parent and child, the order is not justification for the
    parent to fail to communicate with his child by another means.); but see In re A.K.,
    
    168 Ohio St.3d 225
    , 
    2022-Ohio-350
    , 
    198 N.E.3d 47
    , ¶ 21 (a parent’s right to consent
    to adoption is not extinguished when the parent did not have more than de minimis
    contact with the child during the statutory period because the parent was acting in
    compliance with a no-contact order prohibiting all communication and contact with
    the child).
    In In re Adoption of F.D.H., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29562, 2023-
    Ohio-730, the Second District Court of Appeals found that the trial court’s judgment
    that father had had no contact with the child in the year preceding the filing of the
    adoption petition was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. During most
    of the year preceding the filing of the adoption petition, the father was either in jail
    or a treatment facility and had limited ability to see or call his child. The court noted
    that the father made daily calls to his own mother while incarcerated, but made no
    “purposeful effort” to contact his child. Id. at ¶ 13. Father also failed to show that
    the mother interfered in any attempts he may have made to contact the child. Id. at
    ¶ 17. The court determined that father’s incarceration or stay at a treatment center
    was not justifiable-cause to not contact his child. Id. at ¶ 13.
    In this case, father testified that he was currently living and working
    in Columbus in an “emotionally stable environment.” In the year preceding the
    filing of the adoption petition, and for several years prior to the filing, father failed
    to have any contact with his son. He made no attempt to call, email, write, send a
    gift or card, or otherwise communicate with his child. Other than stating that he
    believed he could not see his child because mother told him he could not until a court
    ordered visitation, father presented no evidence that mother prevented him from
    contacting his son. Simply put, there is not competent and credible evidence in the
    record that mother significantly interfered or discouraged communication between
    father and son. From February 2017, (the child’s fourth birthday), to November
    2021, (father’s first visit via Zoom), father could have called, emailed, sent a card or
    gift, mailed a letter, or sent a note through a family member, but he chose not to do
    so.
    That said, we recognize that father has tried to establish a relationship
    with his son by filing an application for parenting time, and the numerous delays in
    that case appear to be through no fault of his own. The fact that father’s consent will
    not be required for the adoption does not automatically mean he approves of the
    adoption or that his input does not matter. Father continues to be the child’s
    biological father, and he is entitled to an opportunity to participate in the
    proceedings to show that the adoption is not in the child’s best interest.
    [U]ntil the hearing on the merits of the petition and the best interest of
    the minor child has been determined the [biological] parent not only
    retains parental rights and responsibilities but retains an overriding
    interest in being heard relevantly on the issue of whether the proposed
    adoption would be in the best interest of the child. It is not difficult to
    imagine a scenario where a [biological] parent, even though he or she
    could not bar the adoption by withholding consent, could offer
    evidence of probative value that the adoption proposed would not be in
    his or her child’s best interest.
    In re Adoption of Jorgensen, 
    33 Ohio App.3d 207
    , 209-210, 
    515 N.E.2d 622
    (3d Dist.1986).
    Having reviewed the entire record, we conclude that the manifest
    weight of the evidence does not support the trial court’s determination that
    stepfather failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that father failed
    without justifiable-cause to have more than de minimis contact with the child.
    The assignments of error are sustained.
    Judgment reversed and case remanded for proceedings consistent
    with this opinion.
    It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment
    into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
    27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE
    EILEEN A. GALLGHER, P.J., and
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR