State ex rel. Collins v. Kilbane , 2023 Ohio 1577 ( 2023 )


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  • [Cite as State ex rel. Collins v. Kilbane, 
    2023-Ohio-1577
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    STATE OF OHIO, EX REL., VIRGIL H. :
    COLLINS,
    :
    Relator,
    :                            No. 112667
    v.
    :
    THE HONORABLE JUDGE ASHLEY
    KILBANE,                          :
    Respondent.                             :
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    JUDGMENT: DISMISSED
    DATED: May 5, 2023
    Writ of Mandamus
    Order No. 564149
    Appearances:
    Virgil H. Collins, pro se.
    LISA B. FORBES, J.:
    Relator, Virgil H. Collins, seeks a writ of mandamus, a writ of error
    coram nobis, and a writ of error against respondent, Judge Ashley Kilbane, related
    to a foreclosure action instituted against relator in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Collins,
    Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-18-904354. Relator is not entitled to the relief he seeks in
    this action. Therefore, his complaint is sua sponte dismissed.
    I.   Background
    A foreclosure case was filed in 2018 where relator was named as a
    defendant. The complaint sought to foreclose on property relator owned. Relator
    alleges in the instant complaint that the attorney he retained to represent him in this
    foreclosure action committed legal malpractice that resulted in a foreclosure
    judgment against him. Much of the history of the related foreclosure case has
    previously been recited by this court in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Collins, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 109555, 
    2021-Ohio-508
    .           There, a panel of this court affirmed
    respondent’s denial of relator’s motion for relief from judgment. Id. at ¶ 35. Relator
    appealed this court’s decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio. Wells Fargo Bank,
    N.A. v. Collins, 
    165 Ohio St.3d 1495
    , 
    2021-Ohio-4515
    , 
    178 N.E.3d 531
    , which
    declined to exercise jurisdiction. In addition, relator sought reconsideration and en
    banc consideration of the this court’s decision, which were denied. Collins, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 109555, 
    2021-Ohio-508
    , motion Nos. 544618 and 544619.
    On May 1, 2023, relator filed the instant complaint.1 There, he claims
    that he was left with no other option but to file the instant complaint because he was
    deprived of his due process rights in the absence of certain rules in Ohio law
    analogous to certain federal rules of procedure that allow for rehearing of a case and
    hearing en banc. Relator seeks a writ of error. Relator also seeks to correct errors
    1 Relator has also filed a previous original action in this court seeking a writ of
    prohibition against respondent. State ex rel. Collins v. Kilbane, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
    No. 110552, 
    2021-Ohio-2449
    . This request for relief in prohibition was sua sponte
    denied. Id. at ¶ 1.
    of fact he claims existed through a writ of error corum nobis.2 Relator also requests
    a writ of mandamus because respondent has denied several motions he has filed.
    He now claims that respondent has “failed to exercise her judicial authority to an
    inquiry into those motions, to determine their merits before her denial of each
    motion.” Complaint at ¶ 26.
    II. Law and Analysis
    “Sua sponte dismissal without notice is warranted when a complaint
    is frivolous or the claimant obviously cannot prevail on the facts alleged in the
    complaint.” State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland, 
    112 Ohio St.3d 324
    , 
    2006-Ohio-6573
    ,
    
    859 N.E.2d 923
    , ¶ 14, citing State ex rel. Duran v. Kelsey, 
    106 Ohio St.3d 58
    , 2005-
    Ohio-3674, 
    831 N.E.2d 430
    , ¶ 7. Therefore, a complaint is subject to dismissal, sua
    sponte, when “‘it appears beyond doubt, after presuming the truth of all material
    factual allegations of [relator’s] complaint and making all reasonable inferences in
    its favor,’” that the relator is not entitled to the requested extraordinary relief.
    Wesley v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109930,
    
    2020-Ohio-4921
    , ¶ 15, quoting State ex rel. JobsOhio v. Goodman, 
    133 Ohio St.3d 297
    , 
    2012-Ohio-4425
    , 
    978 N.E.2d 153
    , ¶ 12, citing State ex rel. Johnson v.
    Richardson, 
    131 Ohio St.3d 120
    , 
    2012-Ohio-57
    , 
    961 N.E.2d 187
    , ¶ 12 (mandamus).
    See also State ex rel. Scott at ¶ 14 (prohibition).
    2   This is sometimes referred to as a writ of corum vobis in relator’s complaint.
    A. Writ of Mandamus
    To be entitled to relief in mandamus, relator must show that he has a
    clear legal right to the requested relief, that respondent has a clear legal duty to grant
    such relief, and that relator lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the
    law. State ex rel. Kuczak v. Saffold, 
    67 Ohio St.3d 123
    , 125, 
    616 N.E.2d 230
     (1993),
    citing State ex rel. Harris v. Rhodes, 
    54 Ohio St.2d 41
    , 
    374 N.E.2d 641
     (1978).
    Mandamus may not be used to control judicial discretion. 
    Id.,
     citing State ex rel.
    Tillimon v. Weiher, 
    65 Ohio St.3d 468
    , 
    605 N.E.2d 35
     (1992). See also State ex rel.
    Morganthaler v. Crites, 
    48 Ohio St. 460
    , 465, 
    28 N.E. 178
     (1891). “Thus, mandamus
    does not lie to correct errors and procedural irregularities in the course of a case.”
    State ex rel. Scott v. Gall, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109325, 
    2020-Ohio-929
    , ¶ 7, citing
    State ex rel. Jerninghan v. Gaughan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 67787, 
    1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 6227
     (Sept. 26, 1994). It has also been widely held that mandamus cannot
    be used as a substitute for an appeal. See, e.g., State ex rel. Marshall v. Glavas, 
    98 Ohio St.3d 297
    , 
    2003-Ohio-857
    , 
    784 N.E.2d 97
    , ¶ 6; State ex rel. Daggett v.
    Gessaman, 
    34 Ohio St.2d 55
    , 57, 
    295 N.E.2d 659
     (1973).
    Relator’s request for a writ of mandamus is grounded in his
    disagreement with the trial court’s denial of five motions. The complaint lists these
    motions as (1) a “motion for a quiet title per Ohio Revised Code 5303.01,” (2) a
    “motion to vacate sale, & confirmation of sale due to fraud upon the court, which
    was a [Fed.R.Civ.P.] 60(B) request,” (3) a “motion regarding the falsification of the
    real property value being foreclosed on,” (4) a “motion for a new trial per
    [Fed.R.Civ.P.] 59(B),” and (5) a “motion for deficiency judgment.”3 Relator requests
    a writ of mandamus because he claims that respondent “failed to exercise her
    judicial authority to an inquiry into those motions, to determine their merits before
    her denial of each motion.” Complaint at ¶ 26. However, mandamus may not be
    used to control judicial discretion. State ex rel. Dreamer v. Mason, 
    115 Ohio St.3d 190
    , 
    2007-Ohio-4789
    , 
    874 N.E.2d 510
    , ¶ 12. A writ of mandamus may be used to
    compel a court to act, but it cannot be used to dictate the action the court takes even
    where a court grossly abuses its discretion. 
    Id.,
     citing State ex rel. Rashada v.
    Pianka, 
    112 Ohio St.3d 44
    , 
    2006-Ohio-6366
    , 
    857 N.E.2d 1220
    , ¶ 3; R.C. 2731.03.
    According to relator’s complaint, respondent has ruled on each of the
    listed motions. Each was denied. Therefore, he is not entitled to relief in mandamus
    on this claim.
    Relator also alleges that respondent “never gave him the opportunity
    to respond to the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [in the underlying action]
    because she never rescinded her order to hold the motion in abeyance, and did not
    give notice to respond, before she granted the motion for summary judgment.”
    Complaint at ¶ 28. This is, in essence, a claim that an error in procedure occurred.
    However, “‘[e]xtraordinary remedies * * * [such as] mandamus * * * are available
    only when usual forms of procedure are incapable of affording relief. They may not
    be employed * * * as a substitute for an appeal for the purpose of reviewing mere
    3  As this court noted when deciding relator’s appeal, “While [the Federal Rules of
    Civil Procedure] may provide guidance to state courts, they do not govern civil procedure
    in Ohio state courts and are not binding.” Collins at ¶ 28.
    errors, or irregularities in the proceedings of a court * * *.’” State ex rel. Riverside
    Methodist Hosp. v. Gillie, 
    58 Ohio St.2d 49
    , 51, 
    387 N.E.2d 1378
     (1979), quoting
    State, ex rel. Woodbury, v. Spitler, 
    34 Ohio St.2d 134
    , 137, 
    296 N.E.2d 526
     (1973).
    Here, relator had an adequate remedy at law to address the claimed
    error in procedure by means of an appeal from the decision granting summary
    judgment. Whether or not used, an adequate remedy at law precludes relief in
    mandamus. State ex rel. Nash v. Fuerst, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99027, 2013-Ohio-
    592, ¶ 6, citing State ex rel. Tran v. McGrath, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 45
    , 
    676 N.E.2d 108
    (1997).
    Accordingly, request for writ of mandamus is sua sponte dismissed.
    B. Writs of Error and Error Corum Nobis
    Relator’s first and second claims for relief present matters that are not
    recognized in Ohio. Relator’s first claim for relief in his complaint is labeled as a
    “writ of error.” Relator’s complaint asserts that a writ of error is
    a writ issued from [a] court of appellate jurisdiction, directing the judge
    or judges of a court of record, requiring them to remit to the appellate
    court the action before them. It is [the] commencement of a new suit
    to set aside judgment, and is not [a] continuation of suit [to] which it
    relates.
    Complaint at ¶ 18, citing Winchester v. Winn, 225 Mo.App. 288, 
    29 S.W.2d 188
    (1930).
    In his second request for relief, he seeks a writ of error corum nobis.
    He asserts this as a “procedural tool whose purpose is to correct errors of fact only,
    and its function is to bring before the court rendering the judgment matters of fact
    which, if known at the time of judgment was rendered, would have prevented its
    rendition.” Complaint at ¶ 19, citing Commonwealth v. Mangini, 
    478 Pa. 147
    , 163,
    
    386 A.2d 482
     (1978).
    This court is a court of limited jurisdiction. State v. Payne, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 107825, 
    2020-Ohio-1599
    , ¶ 6. We have original jurisdiction for only
    those writs listed in the Ohio Constitution Article IV, Section 3(B). These are limited
    to quo warranto, mandamus, habeas corpus, procedendo, and in any cause on
    review as may be necessary to its complete determination. 
    Id.
    These two writs relator seeks are not a type of writ over which an
    appellate court has original jurisdiction under the Ohio Constitution. In fact, “[b]oth
    the ancient Writ of Error and Writ of Coram Nobis (limited to civil cases) have been
    abolished in Ohio by the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure, July 1, 1970.”
    Bocock v. Court of Common Pleas, 5th Dist. Coshocton No. CA 85-6, 
    1985 Ohio App. LEXIS 9198
    , 2 (Oct. 30, 1985). See also Levering v. Natl. Bank of Morrow Cty., 
    87 Ohio St. 117
    , 124, 
    100 N.E. 322
     (1912) (noting the abolishment of writs of error based
    on earlier statutory enactments); In re Collier, 
    6 Ohio St. 55
    , 60 (1856); State v. Lee,
    7th Dist. Belmont No. 95-B.A.-58, 
    1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2637
    , 8-13 (June 19, 1997);
    and Perotti v. Stine, 
    113 Ohio St.3d 312
    , 
    2007-Ohio-1957
    , 
    865 N.E.2d 50
    , ¶ 7 (“[T]he
    common-law writs of coram nobis and audita querela are not part of the law of
    Ohio.”).
    Even if we were to review relator’s claims, they fail. Relator claims
    that he was required to file these requests for writs of error because rules that exist
    under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not exist in Ohio law, which violates
    his due process rights. Relator argues that a decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio
    means that there is no meaningful review of a decision reached on summary
    judgment. For this proposition, relator cites to L.A. & D., Inc. v. Bd. of Lake Cty.
    Commrs., 
    67 Ohio St.2d 384
    , 
    423 N.E.2d 1109
     (1981). In L.A. & D., the court held
    that a motion for new trial was not available following a final determination reached
    on summary judgment because summary judgment proceedings are not a trial. Id.
    at 387.   The court noted that the trial court’s summary judgment decision
    constituted a final order capable of review on appeal. Id. Further, a motion for new
    trial is not the only means to bring issues to the trial court’s attention. A motion for
    relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B) is available even if a motion for new
    trial is not. Relator claims he was precluded from appropriate review and his due
    process rights were violated because he was foreclosed the possibility of filing a
    motion for new trial. We disagree. Relator did seek relief under Civ.R. 60(B) and
    also filed an appeal to this court. He was not precluded from review simply because
    a motion for a new trial was not available to him.
    For these reasons, relator’s requests for writ of error and writ of error
    corum nobis are sua sponte dismissed.
    Relator’s complaint for writs of error, error corum nobis, and
    mandamus are sua sponte dismissed. Relator to bear the costs of this action. The
    clerk is directed to serve on the parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry
    upon the journal. Civ.R. 58(B).
    Complaint dismissed.
    LISA B. FORBES, JUDGE
    ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J., and
    MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., CONCUR