Season Jennifer Weeter v. NAPA Ventures Woodbridge, LLC D/B/A Woodbridge Townhomes ( 2018 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-17-00345-CV
SEASON JENNIFER WEETER APPELLANT
V.
NAPA VENTURES WOODBRIDGE, APPELLEE
LLC D/B/A WOODBRIDGE
TOWNHOMES
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FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 2017-004166-1
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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In this forcible-detainer case, Season Jennifer Weeter appeals from the
trial court’s judgment awarding NAPA Ventures Woodbridge, LLC d/b/a
Woodbridge Townhomes possession of real property, court costs, attorney’s
fees, and postjudgment interest. After the trial court signed the judgment, Weeter
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
moved the trial court to set a supersedeas bond. The trial court granted the
motion and set the supersedeas amount at $700 per month. In her brief, Weeter
argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the forcible-detainer
judgment, that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing a witness who
lacked “direct knowledge” to testify for Woodbridge, and that the supersedeas
amount is too high.
After Weeter filed her appellate brief, Woodbridge released her from the
judgment:
WHEREAS on the 25th day of August, 2017, Plaintiff NAPA
Ventures Woodbridge, LLC d/b/a Woodbridge Townhomes
(“Judgment Creditor”), recovered judgment against Season Jennifer
Weeter (“Judgment Debtor”) . . . for possession of the subject
premises, . . . costs of court, and $600 in attorney’s fees, plus 5%
post-judgment interest, compounded annually, and whereas
Woodbridge wishes to release its judgment.
NOW, THEREFORE, NAPA Ventures Woodbridge, LLC
d/b/a Woodbridge Townhomes, the legal holder and owner of said
judgment, has this day canceled, released and discharged, and by
these presents does cancel, release and discharge unto the said
Jennifer Season Weeter [sic], her successors, executors,
administrators, representatives, heirs, or assigns, all the right, title,
interest and estate in and to said judgment, which Woodbridge have
or may have therein.
Because Woodbridge has released its judgment, it contends that a controversy
no longer exists between it and Weeter and has moved to dismiss this appeal
“based on the mootness of the underlying case.” 2
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Woodbridge filed a copy of the “Release of Judgment” with the trial-court
clerk. Woodbridge’s motion has been pending in this court for more than ten
2
The only issue in a forcible-detainer case is the right to actual possession
of the subject property. Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.3(e); Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of San
Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. 2006). A controversy must exist between the
parties at every stage of the legal proceedings, including the appeal. Bd. of
Adjustment of San Antonio v. Wende, 92 S.W.3d 424, 427 (Tex. 2002). “If a
controversy ceases to exist—‘the issues presented are no longer “live” or the
parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome’—the case becomes
moot.” Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001) (quoting Murphy v.
Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481, 102 S. Ct. 1181, 1183 (1982)). A case is moot when a
judgment cannot have a practical effect on an existing controversy. Reule v. RLZ
Invs., 411 S.W.3d 31, 32 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.); see
Meeker v. Tarrant Cty. Coll. Dist., 317 S.W.3d 754, 759 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2010, pet. denied). When a case becomes moot on appeal, we must set aside
the judgment and dismiss the case. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 785; Reule,
411 S.W.3d at 32; Meeker, 317 S.W.3d at 759, 763; see also Tex. R. App. P.
43.2(e) (permitting an appellate court to “vacate the trial court’s judgment and
dismiss the case”).
Woodbridge has expressly canceled, released, and discharged its right to
enforce the judgment from which Weeter appeals. A live controversy therefore no
days, and Weeter has not responded or objected to the motion. See Tex. R. App.
P. 10.3(a).
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longer exists, and the case is rendered moot. 3 See Reule, 411 S.W.3d at 32; see
also Wilhelm v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 349 S.W.3d 766, 769 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (concluding that because appeal was moot,
issue regarding supersedeas-bond amount was also moot); Rapp v. Mandell &
Wright, P.C., 123 S.W.3d 431, 435 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet.
denied) (“An unconditional release of judgment operates as a total
relinquishment of all rights of the judgment creditor in the judgment. It is a
complete discharge of the debt created by the judgment and a complete
surrender of the judgment creditor’s rights in the judgment.”).
We therefore grant Woodbridge’s motion to dismiss, vacate the trial court’s
judgment, and dismiss the case as moot. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(e); Reule,
411 S.W.3d at 33.
3
There are two recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) the
capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception and (2) the collateral-
consequences exception. Gen. Land Office of Tex. v. OXY U.S.A., Inc.,
789 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex. 1990). The former exception is rare, and to invoke it,
a party must establish that the challenged act is of such short duration that the
party cannot obtain review before the issue becomes moot and that there is a
reasonable expectation that the party could be subjected to the same action
again. See Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 184. The latter requires that a party show that
the judgment resulted in a concrete disadvantage that will persist even if the
judgment were vacated. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 789. Neither exception
applies here.
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/s/ Elizabeth Kerr
ELIZABETH KERR
JUSTICE
PANEL: KERR, PITTMAN, and BIRDWELL, JJ.
DELIVERED: August 16, 2018
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