Robert Davis v. Detroit Pub. Sch. Cmty. Dist. ( 2018 )


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    Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
    File Name: 18a0164p.06
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    ROBERT DAVIS; D. ETTA WILCOXON,                       ┐
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,    │
    │
    │
    v.                                               >      No. 17-1909
    │
    │
    DETROIT PUBLIC SCHOOLS COMMUNITY DISTRICT, et         │
    al.,                                                  │
    Defendants-Appellees,       │
    │
    DETROIT DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, et            │
    al.,                                                  │
    │
    Intervening Defendants-Appellees.
    │
    ┘
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
    No. 2:17-cv-12100—Mark A. Goldsmith, District Judge.
    Argued: March 15, 2018
    Decided and Filed: August 9, 2018
    Before: BOGGS, CLAY, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.
    _________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Andrew A. Paterson, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellants. Kevin J. Campbell,
    THE ALLEN LAW GROUP, P.C., Detroit, Michigan, for Detroit Public Schools Appellees.
    David H. Fink, FINK + ASSOCIATES LAW, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, for Detroit
    Downtown Development Appellees. ON BRIEF: Andrew A. Paterson, Ann Arbor, Michigan,
    for Appellants. Kevin J. Campbell, Floyd E. Allen, Lawrence T. García, Amy M. Robertson,
    THE ALLEN LAW GROUP, P.C., Detroit, Michigan, for Detroit Public Schools Appellees.
    David H. Fink, Darryl Bressack, FINK + ASSOCIATES LAW, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan,
    No. 17-1909            Davis, et al. v. Detroit Pub. Sch. Cmty., et al.                   Page 2
    Jeffrey M. Sangster, Dennis K. Egan, Anthony M. Sciara, Tyler P. Phillips, KOTZ SANGSTER
    WYSOCKI P.C., Detroit, Michigan, for Detroit Downtown Development Appellees.
    CLAY, J., delivered the judgment and opinion of the court, in which BOGGS and
    LARSEN, JJ., joined, except as to the issue discussed in Part II.B. BOGGS, J. (pg. 12),
    delivered the opinion of the court on that issue, in which LARSEN, J., joined.
    _________________
    OPINION
    _________________
    CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs Robert Davis and D. Etta Wilcoxon seek a declaratory
    judgment and mandamus relief against Defendant Detroit Public Schools Community District
    Board of Education, arguing that the school board has the authority and obligation, under Mich.
    Comp. Laws §§ 380.11a(10), 380.1216, 168.312, and 168.641(4), to place on the next Detroit
    election ballot a question asking city voters to approve or disapprove of certain tax expenditures
    by Intervenor-Defendants Detroit Downtown Development Authority (“DDA”) and the Detroit
    Brownfield Redevelopment Authority (“DBRA”). The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims
    and entered judgment under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons
    set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment.
    To the extent that Part II.B of this opinion is inconsistent with the concurring opinion, the
    concurring opinion constitutes the opinion of the Court.
    STATUTORY BACKGROUND
    The DDA and DBRA are tax increment finance entities created by the City of Detroit to
    facilitate economic development and to spur economic growth projects within the City. They
    operate according to the rules set forth in Mich. Comp. Laws § 125 et seq., using property tax
    revenue to finance construction projects in the City of Detroit. As relevant here, in 2016, the
    DDA and DBRA agreed to fund $56.5 million of construction projects related to the relocation
    of the Detroit Pistons professional basketball team from Auburn Hills, Michigan, to Little
    Caesars Arena in downtown Detroit. The construction projects included improvements to Little
    Caesars Arena, construction of a new basketball practice facility, and creation of a Pistons
    corporate headquarters. Plaintiffs oppose the projects and seek a city-wide referendum asking
    No. 17-1909             Davis, et al. v. Detroit Pub. Sch. Cmty., et al.                  Page 3
    voters to approve or disapprove of these tax expenditures. Because Plaintiffs’ claims require an
    understanding of the law governing development authorities, we begin with an overview of the
    relevant Michigan law.
    In Michigan, a municipality may create a “downtown development authority” to “halt
    property value deterioration and increase property tax valuation where possible in its business
    district, to eliminate the causes of that deterioration, and to promote economic growth[.]” Mich.
    Comp. Laws § 125.1653(1). A municipality may also create a “brownfield redevelopment
    authority,” which serves similar functions. See Mich. Comp. Laws § Ch. 125. Both types of
    authorities are funded through tax increment financing (“TIF”). The Michigan Supreme Court
    has explained how tax increment financing works:
    [A] tax increment financing (TIF) plan allows a local government to finance
    public improvements in a designated area by capturing the property taxes levied
    on any increase in property values within the area. Under a TIF plan, a base year
    is established for the project area. In subsequent years, any increase in
    assessments above the base year level is referred to as the captured value. All, or
    a portion, of the property taxes levied on the captured value (SEV) is diverted to
    the area’s development plan.
    Tax increment financing is premised on the theory that, without the
    redevelopment project, property values would not increase, or that increases in
    land values and assessments in the project area are caused by the redevelopment
    authority’s own construction of economic activity in the district.
    In re Request for Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 
    1986 PA 281
    , 
    422 N.W.2d 186
    , 189
    (Mich. 1988) (emphasis in original) (quotation marks, citations, and footnotes omitted).
    In the years since the TIF legislation was passed, numerous Michigan municipalities have
    established development authorities. As relevant here, the City of Detroit created the DDA in
    1978 and the DBRA in 1996.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    This particular dispute has its roots in a Detroit ballot proposal. Specifically, in 2012,
    Detroit residents voted to allow the school district of the City of Detroit to increase the amount
    of property taxes it could collect. The proposal specified that the revenue would be used “to
    provide funds for operating expenses of [the] School District.” (R. 12, complaint, ¶ 111.)
    No. 17-1909                 Davis, et al. v. Detroit Pub. Sch. Cmty., et al.                                Page 4
    Plaintiff Wilcoxon is a Detroit resident who voted on the proposal. Plaintiff Robert Davis is a
    resident of Highland Park, Michigan. Because he is not a Detroit resident, he could not vote on
    the proposal. Nonetheless, as a self-styled “community activist,” he asserts that he maintains a
    keen interest in the City’s affairs.1
    In June 2013, the DDA announced its intent to begin capturing some of the tax revenue
    authorized by the ballot proposal to fund the construction of Little Caesars Arena in downtown
    Detroit. The DDA hoped to build a state of the art home for the Detroit Red Wings professional
    hockey team and predicted that the arena would also host a variety of other sports and
    entertainment events.         In December 2016, the DDA revised its development plan, making
    changes that would allow the Detroit Pistons professional basketball team to relocate to Little
    Caesars Arena.         The revised plan provided for additional improvements to the arena,
    construction of a new basketball practice facility, and creation of a Pistons corporate office and
    headquarters. In June 2017, the DBRA agreed to foot some of the bill. All told, the DDA and
    DBRA estimated that they would spend a combined $56.5 million on the project. Much of this
    money would go towards reimbursing construction costs that private developers had already
    advanced. Indeed, at this point, the development project is largely complete.
    Plaintiffs, however, oppose the Little Caesars Arena project. On June 20, 2017, Plaintiffs
    emailed the school board, the board’s president, Dr. Iris Taylor, and another school official,
    asking the board to place on the November 2017 general election ballot a question asking voters
    to approve or disapprove of the DDA’s and DBRA’s use of tax revenue for the Pistons
    relocation. Plaintiffs noted that the 2012 ballot proposal authorizing the taxes specified that the
    revenue would be used for school operating purposes; it did not mention anything about the
    Pistons. Accordingly, Plaintiffs argued that the DDA and DBRA were attempting to divert tax
    revenue without voters’ consent, in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 380.1216. That statute
    provides that “money raised by tax shall not be used for a purpose other than that for which it
    1
    Plaintiff Davis and his lawyer, Andrew Paterson, “have a prolific history litigating cases in Michigan state
    courts and federal courts. Their filings could be defined, in many instances, as repetitive, vexatious, and frivolous.”
    Davis v. Johnson, 664 F. App’x 446, 450 (6th Cir. 2016).
    No. 17-1909             Davis, et al. v. Detroit Pub. Sch. Cmty., et al.                   Page 5
    was raised without the consent of a majority of the school electors of the district voting on the
    question at a regular or special school election.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 380.1216.
    Three days after receiving Plaintiffs’ email, the board held a special meeting to consider
    Plaintiffs’ request. At the meeting, the board’s attorney said she believed the board lacked
    authority to place the tax question on the ballot. During the public comment portion of the
    meeting, Robert Davis challenged the attorney’s opinion. He cited, among other statutes, Mich.
    Comp. Laws § 380.11a(10), which provides that “[t]he board of a general powers school district
    may submit to the school electors of the school district a question that is within the scope of the
    powers of the school electors[.]”
    Despite Plaintiffs’ efforts, the board did not put the question on the November 2017
    ballot. Plaintiffs responded by filing a lawsuit in the district court against the board, Dr. Taylor,
    the school district, and related entities. Plaintiffs also sued the company managing the Little
    Caesars Arena project (Olympia Entertainment Events Center, LLC), the company that owns the
    Detroit Pistons (Palace Sports and Entertainment, LLC), and the National Basketball
    Association. The DDA and DBRA intervened as defendants. In broad strokes, Plaintiffs raised a
    variety of claims based on the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, the Voting Rights
    Act, and various state statutes. However, only two of their claims are pertinent to this appeal.
    Specifically, in count VIII, Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment stating that the school board
    has authority under state law to place their tax question on the ballot. In count IX, Plaintiffs
    sought a writ of mandamus ordering the board to place their tax question on the ballot.
    In July 2017, the district court either dismissed or granted summary judgment to
    Defendants on all but three of Plaintiffs’ claims. As relevant here, the district court dismissed
    count VIII, ruling that Plaintiffs lacked standing under state law to seek a declaratory judgment.
    Davis v. Detroit Pub. Sch. Cmty. Dist., No. 17-cv-12100, 
    2017 WL 3129838
    , at *2–4 (E.D.
    Mich. July 24, 2017). The district court reasoned that Plaintiffs had raised only a generalized
    grievance, not a special or unique injury, and therefore lacked standing to pursue the relief they
    requested. 
    Id. The district
    court also dismissed count IX, denying Plaintiffs’ request for a writ
    of mandamus. 
    Id. at *4–7.
    The court reasoned that Plaintiffs could have filed this lawsuit in
    2013, when the DDA first publicized its plan to use tax revenue to fund construction of Little
    No. 17-1909                  Davis, et al. v. Detroit Pub. Sch. Cmty., et al.                                Page 6
    Caesars Arena. Accordingly, it found Plaintiffs’ mandamus claim barred by Bigger v. City of
    Pontiac, 
    210 N.W.2d 1
    (Mich. 1973), which requires plaintiffs to act promptly to challenge
    public-financing projects. In a footnote, the court clarified that it did not believe Plaintiffs’
    mandamus claim was barred by Michigan’s state-law standing principles. Davis, 
    2017 WL 3129838
    at *7 n.7. It explained that under Michigan law, as distinct from federal law, standing
    requirements are relaxed when a litigant seeks mandamus relief in an elections matter. 
    Id. After the
    district court’s ruling, Plaintiffs moved the district court to enter partial final
    judgment under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)
    (allowing a district court to “direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than
    all, claims or parties” if the court “expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay”).
    Plaintiffs argued that an immediate appeal was warranted on at least two of their state-law
    claims—counts VIII and IX—because they concerned a time-sensitive issue: whether the school
    board should be required to place their tax question on the November 2017 general election
    ballot.       The district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion and entered a Rule 54(b) partial final
    judgment.2 The claims not dismissed by the district court remain pending.
    Plaintiffs timely appealed the Rule 54(b) judgment, and the case is now fully briefed.
    Among other things, the parties dispute whether Plaintiffs have standing under Article III of the
    United States Constitution; whether Plaintiffs have standing under Michigan state law; and
    whether Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by Bigger.
    DISCUSSION
    We start by identifying what is at issue in this appeal and what is not. First, this appeal
    does not cover any of the federal claims Plaintiffs raised in the district court, such as their claims
    under the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the
    Voting Rights Act. Those claims were either dismissed but were not included in the district
    2
    Because Plaintiffs’ brief focuses only on claims VIII and IX, we need not decide whether the district court
    also entered final judgment on Plaintiffs’ other state-law claims. Compare R. 54, Opinion, PageID# 1684
    (describing Plaintiffs’ motion as seeking “a partial final judgment and certificate of appealability permitting them to
    appeal the dismissal of counts VIII and IX”), with R. 55, Judgment, PageID# 1688 (stating that “a partial final
    judgment is hereby entered relative to the Court’s disposition of Plaintiffs’ claims under state law, as set out in this
    Court’s opinion and order entered on July 24, 2017”).
    No. 17-1909             Davis, et al. v. Detroit Pub. Sch. Cmty., et al.                   Page 7
    court’s Rule 54(b) partial final judgment—and therefore are not at issue in this appeal—or they
    remain pending in the district court. Plaintiffs will have the opportunity to appeal the disposition
    of any or all of those claims once the district court enters final judgment.
    Second, most of Plaintiffs’ state-law claims are also not at issue in this appeal.
    Specifically, Plaintiffs’ brief focuses only on their claims for declaratory relief (count VIII) and
    mandamus relief (count IX) ordering the school board to place their tax question on the next
    election ballot. Consequently, this opinion does not address Plaintiffs’ remaining state-law
    claims, such as their claim that the DDA Act has been violated or their claim that private
    developers cannot be reimbursed for expenses they advanced for renovations to Little Caesars
    Arena.
    Accordingly, our task in this appeal is narrow: we must determine whether the district
    court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for a declaratory judgment (count VIII) and
    mandamus relief (count IX) as to whether the school board has the authority and obligation,
    under Michigan law, to place Plaintiffs’ tax question on the next Detroit election ballot. No
    other issues are currently before us.
    I.       Michigan Law Governing Declaratory Judgments and Mandamus Relief
    Under Michigan’s declaratory judgment rule, a court “may declare the rights and other
    legal relations of an interested party” in any “case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction.”
    Mich. Ct. R. 2.605(A)(1).        As the Michigan Supreme Court has explained, an “actual
    controversy” exists
    where a declaratory judgment or decree is necessary to guide a plaintiff’s future
    conduct in order to preserve his legal rights.
    This requirement of an “actual controversy” prevents a court from deciding
    hypothetical issues. However, a court is not precluded from reaching issues
    before actual injuries or losses have occurred. . . .
    Therefore, what is essential to an “actual controversy” under the Declaratory
    Judgment rule is that plaintiffs plead and prove facts which indicate an adverse
    interest necessitating the sharpening of the issues raised.
    Shavers v. Kelley, 
    267 N.W.2d 72
    , 82 (Mich. 1978) (citations omitted).
    No. 17-1909             Davis, et al. v. Detroit Pub. Sch. Cmty., et al.                   Page 8
    In addition, Michigan law allows a party to request mandamus relief—that is, an order
    compelling the defendant to perform a particular action—in exceptional circumstances.
    Specifically, a writ of mandamus “is an extraordinary remedy that will only be issued if (1) the
    party seeking the writ has a clear legal right to the performance of the specific duty sought,
    (2) the defendant has the clear legal duty to perform the act requested, (3) the act is ministerial,
    and (4) no other remedy exists that might achieve the same result.” Coal. for a Safer Detroit v.
    Detroit City Clerk, 
    820 N.W.2d 208
    , 210 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (quotation marks and citation
    omitted). “The party seeking mandamus has the burden of establishing that the official in
    question has a clear legal duty to perform.” 
    Id. In the
    instant case, Plaintiffs request a declaratory judgment stating that, under Michigan
    law, the school board has authority to place their tax question on the next general election ballot.
    Plaintiffs also request mandamus relief ordering the school board to place their tax question on
    the ballot. Plaintiffs argue that the school board is authorized and required to take such action
    pursuant to Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 380.11a(10), 380.1216, 168.312, and 168.641(4). These
    statutes address how city tax revenue may be spent and describe the school board’s authority to
    place questions on election ballots. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 380.11a(10) (“The board of a
    general powers school district may submit to the school electors of the school district a question
    that is within the scope of the powers of the school electors and that the board considers proper
    for the management of the school system or the advancement of education in the school
    district. . . .”); § 380.1216 (“[M]oney raised by tax shall not be used for a purpose other than that
    for which it was raised without the consent of a majority of the school electors of the district
    voting on the question at a regular or special school election.”); § 168.312(1) (describing timing
    and other requirements for placing questions on ballots); § 168.641(4) (describing timing and
    other requirements for holding special elections).
    II.    Article III Standing
    However, before we address the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, we must first determine
    whether Plaintiffs have Article III standing to raise them. Indeed, whether a plaintiff has Article
    III standing is “the threshold question in every federal case[.]” Warth v. Seldin, 
    422 U.S. 490
    ,
    498 (1975). Accordingly, we must consider whether Plaintiffs have standing under Article III
    No. 17-1909             Davis, et al. v. Detroit Pub. Sch. Cmty., et al.                   Page 9
    before considering whether they have standing under state law. See Campbell v. PMI Food
    Equip. Group, Inc., 
    509 F.3d 776
    , 782 (6th Cir. 2007) (“The district court’s reliance on Ohio law
    in dismissing the Workers’ taxpayer claims for lack of standing is therefore misplaced. It should
    have begun its inquiry into the Workers’ standing with an analysis under Article III of the U.S.
    Constitution.” (citation omitted)); But see Aarti Hospitality, LLC v. City of Grove City, Ohio, 350
    F. App’x 1, 5–7 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that there is no sequencing requirement to deciding
    jurisdictional issues and deciding the state standing question first).
    To establish Article III standing, a party must meet three requirements: (1) “he must
    demonstrate ‘injury in fact’—a harm that is both concrete and actual or imminent, not
    conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) “he must establish causation—a fairly traceable connection
    between the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant”; and (3) “he must
    demonstrate redressability—a substantial likelihood that the requested relief will remedy the
    alleged injury in fact.” Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 
    529 U.S. 765
    ,
    771 (2000) (quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted). “[A] plaintiff must demonstrate
    standing separately for each form of relief sought.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
    Servs. (TOC), Inc., 
    528 U.S. 167
    , 185 (2000).
    A.      Failure to Place Plaintiffs’ Tax Question on the Ballot
    To the extent Plaintiffs’ injury is viewed as the school board’s failure to place their tax
    question on the ballot, it is not sufficiently concrete or particularized to constitute an injury in
    fact. Specifically, “a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government—
    claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution
    and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the
    public at large—does not state an Article III case or controversy.” See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
    
    504 U.S. 555
    , 573–74 (1992). This bar on generalized grievances as a basis for Article III
    standing applies in the instant case for a simple reason: Plaintiffs were not affected by school
    board’s decision in any “personal and individual way.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 
    136 S. Ct. 1540
    ,
    1548 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). On the contrary, the school board’s failure
    to place Plaintiffs’ tax question on the ballot affects all Detroit voters equally. Davis, moreover,
    is not even a Detroit voter.
    No. 17-1909                  Davis, et al. v. Detroit Pub. Sch. Cmty., et al.                              Page 10
    B.       Alleged Misuse of TIF Revenue
    To the extent Plaintiffs’ injury is viewed as the potential misuse of TIF revenue, they lack
    standing for a different reason: their injury (alleged misuse of city tax revenue) would not be
    redressed by their requested relief (a referendum asking Detroit residents to vote on these tax
    expenditures).3 Specifically, TIF authorities exist pursuant to the laws of the State of Michigan.
    See Mich. Comp. Laws § 125 et seq. Those laws, in turn, provide that each municipality “shall
    transmit” all applicable tax increments to the appropriate TIF authority. Mich. Comp. Laws
    § 125.1665(1) (downtown development authorities); § 125.2666(1) (brownfield redevelopment
    authorities). Municipalities have no discretion in the matter. See 1991-1992 Mich. Op. Att’y
    Gen. 60, 
    1991 WL 550653
    (1991) (“[T]he Legislature has plainly commanded that ‘the tax levy
    of all taxing bodies’ on the ‘captured assessed value’ is to be transmitted to the authority. There
    are no statutory exceptions for special millage levies approved by the voters for limited
    purposes.”). Consequently, Detroit city voters cannot, through a public referendum, prevent the
    TIF transfers to the DDA and DBRA, because the City cannot disregard or circumvent the laws
    of the state requiring such transfers. See E. Jackson Pub. Sch. v. State, 
    348 N.W.2d 303
    , 306
    (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (“School districts and other municipal corporations are creations of the
    state. Except as provided by the state, they have no existence, no functions, no rights and no
    powers. They are given no power, nor can any be implied, to defy their creator[.]” (footnote
    omitted)).
    In addition, a city-wide referendum would not affect how the DDA and DBRA spend the
    TIF revenue. Michigan law provides clear instructions on how a TIF plan can be modified.
    Specifically, a downtown development plan may be modified if “the modification is approved by
    the [municipality’s] governing body upon notice and after public hearings and agreements as are
    required for approval of the original plan.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 125.1664(5). Similarly,
    “amendments to an approved brownfield plan must be submitted by the authority to the
    3
    On this view of Plaintiffs’ injury, Plaintiff Wilcoxon may have suffered an injury in fact due to her status
    as a Detroit taxpayer. See Smith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 
    641 F.3d 197
    , 210 (6th Cir. 2011) (en banc)
    (“Plaintiffs seeking to establish municipal-taxpayer standing are required to meet a less rigorous injury standard than
    those seeking standing as federal or state taxpayers. Unlike federal or state taxpayers, municipal taxpayers may
    fulfill the injury requirement by pleading an alleged misuse of municipal funds.”). Plaintiff Davis, by contrast, has
    not suffered such an injury in fact because he is not a Detroit taxpayer.
    No. 17-1909                Davis, et al. v. Detroit Pub. Sch. Cmty., et al.                         Page 11
    governing body for approval or rejection following the same notice necessary for approval or
    rejection of the original plan.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 125.2664(6). These statutes do not give
    Detroit residents the right to void a TIF plan through a public referendum. Therefore, a public
    referendum would have no legal effect and would not redress Plaintiffs’ injury.
    C.       Summary
    For all these reasons, Plaintiffs lack Article III standing. As a result, we do not reach the
    merits of their claims, nor do we consider whether their claims are also barred by the Bigger
    doctrine or by Michigan’s state-law standing requirements. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
    Env’t, 
    523 U.S. 83
    , 94 (1998) (“Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.
    Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining
    to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” (quoting Ex parte
    McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868))). Before concluding, we reiterate that our ruling
    today may not end this litigation. As described earlier in this opinion, Plaintiffs may still appeal
    the disposition of their federal claims once the district court enters final judgment.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.4
    4
    Because we dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for lack of Article III standing, we deny as moot the DDA’s and
    DBRA’s motion to dismiss this appeal due to Plaintiffs’ failure to file a timely brief. We also deny as moot
    Plaintiffs’ motion to file a late response to the motion to dismiss.
    No. 17-1909             Davis, et al. v. Detroit Pub. Sch. Cmty., et al.                   Page 12
    _________________
    OPINION
    _________________
    BOGGS, Circuit Judge, concurring in all parts of the opinion, except section II.B. While
    I fully agree that the Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to pursue their claims, I write briefly to
    explain why the Plaintiffs’ alleged injury cannot be construed as the misuse of TIF revenue.
    Simply put, this conclusion follows from the fact that only Counts VIII and IX are before this
    court. See supra p. 6 n.2. In Count VIII, the Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the
    “Defendant Board of Education Has The Statutory Right . . . To Place The Question on The
    November 2017 General Election Ballot[.]” Amended Compl. 55. In Count IX, the Plaintiffs
    requested a “Writ of Mandamus Compelling Defendant Board of Education To Place On The
    Ballot” the question of whether the DDA and DBRA were authorized to use the TIF revenue as
    planned. 
    Id. at 57
    (emphasis added). The plain language of the complaint therefore leaves little
    doubt that the alleged injury—at least in Counts VIII and IX—is the Defendants’ failure to place
    the requested question on the ballot. Such an understanding is confirmed by the fact that the
    very next claim in the complaint concerns the misuse of TIF revenue. In Count X of the
    amended complaint, the Plaintiffs requested:
    a declaratory judgment . . . that Mich. Comp. Laws § 380.1216 of the Revised
    School Code prevents the use of tax revenue generated from the levy of the 18-
    mills Detroit Public Schools’ Operating Millage for a different purpose . . .
    without first obtaining consent from the majority of the Detroit Public Schools’
    electorate.
    
    Id. at 62
    (¶ 234) (emphasis added).
    To be clear, my objection is not merely a matter of linguistic accuracy. To the extent that
    this court conceives of the injury as the misuse of TIF revenue, then it is adjudicating the
    Plaintiffs’ standing to raise a claim, namely, Count X, on which we have declined to say whether
    the district court had entered final judgment, see supra p. 6 n.2. Accordingly, I believe that we
    need not weigh in on the Plaintiffs’ standing to challenge the use of TIF revenue.