United States v. Irvin , 429 F. App'x 182 ( 2011 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 06-3582
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ERIC DESHAWN IRVIN (1)
aka COOKIE E (1),
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(No. 04-cr-00309)
District Judge: Gustave Diamond
Submitted May 11, 2011
Before: SMITH, CHAGARES, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges.
(Filed : May 31, 2011)
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OPINION
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Eric DeShawn Irvin pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. He now appeals from that conviction and the resultant
sentence of 262 months of imprisonment. On appeal, Irvin contends that the District
Court abused its discretion in denying his eve-of-sentencing motion to withdraw his
guilty plea and his day-of-sentencing motion for new counsel. The Government counters
that Irvin‟s appeal is barred by the terms of an appellate waiver, which was a condition of
his plea agreement. We will affirm the conviction, but vacate and remand for
resentencing.
I.
Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we will only briefly recite
the essential facts. Prior to pleading guilty before the District Court, Irvin signed a plea
agreement with the Government, in which he waived his right to take a direct appeal from
his conviction or sentence, subject to the following exceptions:
(a) If the United States appeals from the sentence, Eric DeShawn Irvin may
take a direct appeal from the sentence.
(b) If (1) the sentence exceeds the applicable statutory limits set forth in the
United States Code, or (2) the sentence unreasonably exceeds the guideline range
determined by the Court under the Sentencing Guidelines, Eric DeShawn Irvin
may also take a direct appeal from the sentence.
Appendix (“App.”) 162. Directly above Irvin‟s signature block, the plea agreement
stated:
I have received this letter from my attorney, Mark D. Lancaster, Esquire, have
read it and discussed it with him, and I hereby accept it and acknowledge that it
fully sets forth my agreement with the Office of the United States Attorney for the
Western District of Pennsylvania.
App. 165-66. During the change-of-plea hearing at which Irvin entered his plea of guilty,
the District Court conducted a Rule 11 colloquy with the defendant, in which it ensured
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that Irvin understood (1) the charges to which he was pleading guilty, (2) the right to trial
by jury that he would relinquish by entering the guilty plea, and (3) the statutory
mandatory minimum penalty of ten years to which he would be subject upon pleading
guilty, as well as the maximum possible penalty of life imprisonment that he could face at
sentencing. The District Court also confirmed that Irvin was satisfied with his counsel‟s
representation, ensured that Miller‟s plea was voluntary and not the result of any coercion
or promises, and explained that the court alone would determine the actual sentence to be
imposed, using the United States Sentencing Guidelines as a guide to determine the
proper starting point.
The attorney for the Government then recited, at the District Court‟s request, the
terms of the plea agreement, including the appellate waiver provision. Irvin
acknowledged, under oath, that he had read the plea agreement, that he had discussed it
with his counsel, and that he had not been threatened or coerced into signing it. When
asked whether he had been promised anything in exchange for entering a guilty plea,
Irvin stated only that he had been told by his lawyer that if he went to trial, he “could be
looking at more time.” App. 50. Finally, the Government set forth a factual basis and the
District Court, satisfied that it had been knowingly and voluntarily made, accepted Irvin‟s
guilty plea.
One day before sentencing was to occur and approximately one month after the
District Court issued its tentative findings based on the Pre-sentence Investigation Report
(“PSR”), Irvin filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Irvin alleged that he had
pleaded guilty based on his lawyer‟s representation that “if I took the plea he could get
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me 10 years.” App. 87. He claimed that he was promised that the Government would
cap the quantity of heroin to a certain amount so that his sentence would fall within a
particular advisory Guidelines range, but he did not specify what he anticipated that range
to be. He further alleged that he and his family had made repeated unsuccessful efforts to
contact his lawyer over the five months preceding sentencing and that he no longer
trusted his lawyer to represent him.
Irvin‟s lawyer also received a copy of the pro se motion to withdraw on the day
before sentencing. At sentencing, he brought the issue to the District Court‟s attention,
stating that he thought it would be “difficult, if not impossible, for me to continue to
represent [Irvin].” App. 96. The District Court denied what it construed to be a request
to postpone sentencing in order to obtain substitute counsel, finding that the delay caused
by such action would be onerous relative to any potential prejudice to Irvin‟s rights. The
District Court also denied Irvin‟s pro se motion to withdraw the guilty plea because Irvin
had not asserted his innocence and had not put forth a fair and just reason to support the
withdrawal.
After hearing arguments from the parties, the District Court sentenced Irvin to 262
months of imprisonment, the very bottom of the advisory Guidelines range. This appeal
of the conviction and sentence timely followed.
II.
The District Court properly exercised jurisdiction over this criminal matter
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Despite the presence of an appellate waiver in Irvin‟s plea
agreement with the Government, we retain jurisdiction to review the District Court‟s final
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judgment of conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See United States v.
Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 2007). But “we will not exercise that jurisdiction to
review the merits of Irvin‟s appeal if we conclude that [he] knowingly and voluntarily
waived h[is] right to appeal unless the result would work a miscarriage of justice.” Id.III.
Because the government has invoked the appellate waiver set forth in Irvin‟s plea
agreement, we will decline to “review the merits of [Irvin‟s] appeal if we conclude (1)
that the issues he pursues on appeal fall within the scope of his appellate waiver and (2)
that he knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the appellate waiver, unless (3) enforcing the
waiver would work a miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 927
(3d Cir. 2008). “Generally, our review of the validity and scope of appellate waivers is
plenary.” Id. at 926-27.
The language of Irvin‟s appellate waiver is broad in its scope and clear in its
import: Irvin agreed to waive the right to take a direct appeal from his conviction or
sentence, unless (1) the government appealed from the sentence, (2) the sentence
exceeded the applicable statutory limits set forth in the United States Code, or (3) the
sentence unreasonably exceeded the Guidelines range determined by the District Court.
This case presents none of these three circumstances and, thus, Irvin‟s appeal of his
conviction and sentence falls within the scope of the waiver.
Irvin argues, however, that he did not agree to the appellate waiver knowingly and
voluntarily because his lawyer falsely “promised” him that he would receive the
mandatory minimum sentence of ten years if he signed the plea agreement. Our
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assessment of whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into a plea
agreement that contains an appellate waiver turns on whether “the district court
„inform[ed] the defendant of, and determined[d] that the defendant underst[ood] . . . the
terms of any plea-agreement provisions waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally
attack the sentence‟ as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(N) requires.” United
States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 239 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted; bracketed material
and ellipsis in original). Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N) imposes a duty upon a district
court during a change-of-plea hearing to “address the defendant personally in open court.
During this address, the court must inform the defendant of, and determine that the
defendant understands, . . . the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to
appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence.”
The Government admits that the District Court violated Rule 11(b)(1)(N) in failing
to address Irvin personally regarding the appellate waiver, instead relying on a recitation
of the agreement‟s terms by the Government. Nonetheless, we conclude that this error
does not render Irvin‟s appellate waiver unenforceable.
Because Irvin did not object before the District Court to its Rule 11 error, he “has
the burden to satisfy the plain-error rule, and must show (1) that there was an error, i.e., a
deviation from a legal rule, (2) that the error was „plain,‟ i.e., clear or obvious, and (3)
that the error affected his substantial rights.” Corso, 549 F.3d at 928 (citation omitted).
Moreover, “relief on plain-error review is in the discretion of the reviewing court, and
even if all three conditions are met we will exercise our discretion to correct the
unpreserved error only if [Irvin] persuades us that (4) a miscarriage of justice would
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otherwise result, that is, if the error seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 929 (quotations omitted).
Even assuming that the District Court‟s obvious Rule 11 error affected Irvin‟s
substantial rights, we decline to exercise our discretion to correct the error. The record
before us reveals that, during the Rule 11 colloquy, Irvin confirmed that he had signed
the plea agreement after having an opportunity to read it and discuss it with his lawyer
and that he did so voluntarily. The District Court instructed the Government to recite the
pertinent terms of the plea agreement for the record. Among these pertinent terms was
the appellate waiver provision, which the Government presented in detail. Irvin listened
to this recitation and, on its completion, reasserted his intention to plead guilty. Notably,
he reasserted such an intention after the District Court had thoroughly explained to him
the potential sentencing consequences of his guilty plea. Thus, despite any deficiency in
the Rule 11 colloquy regarding the appellate waiver, the record makes clear that Irvin
understood that, by pleading guilty, he was giving up his right to appeal, except in very
narrow circumstances. And, importantly, he understood that the plea agreement did not
guarantee that he would receive an actual sentence of the statutory mandatory minimum
ten years. On such a record, we must conclude that Irvin has failed to demonstrate that
the District Court‟s error in conducting the Rule 11 colloquy seriously affected the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.
Still, Irvin asks us to refrain from enforcing the waiver. He suggests that to do so
would work a manifest injustice because the District Court abused its discretion in
denying his day-of-sentencing motion for new counsel. We agree.
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We review the District Court‟s denial of Irvin‟s day-of-sentencing request for new
counsel for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 207 n.10 (3d
Cir. 1999). In order to warrant a last minute substitution of counsel, a defendant must
demonstrate “good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in
communication, or an irreconcilable conflict with his attorney.” United States v. Welty,
674 F.2d 185, 188 (3d Cir. 1982). “If the district court denies the request to substitute
counsel and the defendant decides to proceed with unwanted counsel, we will not find a
Sixth Amendment violation unless the district court‟s „good cause‟ determination was
clearly erroneous or the district court made no inquiry into the reason for the defendant‟s
request to substitute counsel.” United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1098 (3d Cir.
1995).
The day before sentencing, the District Court received Irvin‟s pro se motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. In this letter motion, Irvin suggested that he had been unable to
contact his lawyer for five months and that he felt he could no longer trust his lawyer to
vigorously defend him. In light of Irvin‟s letter motion, Irvin‟s lawyer told the District
Court at sentencing that there had been a “complete meltdown of the attorney/client
relationship” and asked to be excused from further representing Irvin because he felt it
would be “difficult, if not impossible” to continue on in that role. App. 96. Without
making any inquiry of Irvin as to why he felt his lawyer could not adequately represent
him at sentencing, the District Court denied the request, finding that the delay caused by
a substitution of counsel would be onerous in relation to the prejudice to Irvin‟s rights
that would result from having his lawyer continue to represent him.
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We have made clear that the District Court may properly weigh its interest in the
efficient administration of criminal justice against the rights of the defendant, in order to
determine whether good cause for a request to substitute counsel exists. Goldberg, 67
F.3d at 1098. But we have made equally clear that the district court must at least inquire
as to the reasons underlying the defendant‟s request before finding that he has failed to
demonstrate good cause. Id.; see also United States v. Rankin, 779 F.2d 956, 960 (3d
Cir.1986) (“[A] rigid insistence on expedition in the face of a justifiable request for delay
can amount to a constitutional violation.”). And we think that the District Court‟s failure
to so inquire of Irvin is not only erroneous, but rises to the level of manifest injustice
sufficient to justify setting aside the appellate waiver to which Irvin assented in his plea
agreement.1 Accordingly, we will vacate Irvin‟s sentence and remand for resentencing
after a thorough inquiry as to whether Irvin has demonstrated good cause for his request
to substitute counsel.
Irvin additionally assigns error to the District Court‟s denial of his pro se eve-of-
sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea. “We review a district court‟s ruling
denying a defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing pursuant to an
abuse of discretion standard.” United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2003)
(citing United States v. Harris, 44 F.3d 1206, 1210 (3d Cir.1995)). We have explained
that “[o]nce a [district] court accepts a defendant's guilty plea, the defendant is not
entitled to withdraw that plea simply at his whim.” Jones, 336 F.3d at 252. Rather, a
1
Despite this conclusion, we sympathize with the District Judge‟s understandable
frustration at the delay interposed by Irvin‟s last minute request to substitute counsel.
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defendant seeking to withdraw his plea bears the substantial burden of demonstrating that
a fair and just reason exists for permitting him to do so. Id.; see also Fed.R.Crim.P.
11(d)(2)(B). In evaluating whether a defendant has shown a “fair and just reason” for the
withdrawal, a district court “must consider three factors ... (1) whether the defendant
asserts his innocence; (2) the strength of the defendant's reasons for withdrawing the plea;
and (3) whether the government would be prejudiced by the withdrawal.” Id. Because
the Government has not asserted that it would be prejudiced by withdrawal, we need only
consider the first two factors.
The first factor — whether the defendant asserts his innocence — is readily
disposed of because Irvin has never asserted any such thing. As to the second factor,
Irvin asks this court to permit him to withdraw his guilty plea because his counsel
allegedly promised him that he would receive a sentence of ten years of imprisonment if
he entered the plea agreement. He claims that this misrepresentation on the part of his
lawyer rendered his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. We disagree.
The record before us reveals that, before accepting the guilty plea, the District
Court ensured that Irvin understood that, upon pleading guilty, he faced a mandatory
minimum penalty of ten years of imprisonment and a maximum penalty of life in prison
and that the actual sentence would be determined by the court alone, using the United
States Sentencing Guidelines as a guide. The District Court also verified that Irvin‟s plea
was voluntary and not the result of coercion or any promises. Notably, when asked if he
had been promised anything other than what was contained in the plea agreement, Irvin
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stated only that he had been told that he “could be looking at more time” if he went to
trial. App. 50.
“The district court retains a great deal of discretion to deny a withdrawal motion.”
United States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 317, 318 (3d Cir.1992), superseded by statute on other
grounds as recognized in United States v. Roberson, 194 F.3d 408, 417 (3d Cir. 1999).
Reviewing the record of the plea colloquy in this case, the District Court found that, even
if Irvin‟s lawyer did in fact misrepresent the sentence that Irvin would receive upon
pleading guilty, Irvin displayed a complete understanding of the actual sentencing
ramifications of his guilty plea at the subsequent plea colloquy.2 Accordingly, the
District Court held that Irvin had not met his substantial burden of demonstrating a fair
and just reason for withdrawing his plea. Under the circumstances presented here, we are
compelled to conclude that the District Court acted within its discretion in so holding. At
its essence, Irvin‟s only reason for moving to withdraw his plea appears to be that he was
dissatisfied with the advisory Guidelines range set forth in the District Court‟s tentative
findings. But, as we have made clear, “[a] shift in defense tactics, a change of mind, or
the fear of punishment are not adequate reasons to impose on the government the
2
We note that the District Court incorrectly noted in its memorandum that it “expressly
informed [Irvin] that he would not later be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea if he was
not satisfied with the advisory guidelines sentencing range as calculated by the court. . .
.” App. 90. The District Court did no such thing. Rather, as described above, the
attorney for the Government detailed, at the District Court‟s instruction, the limited
situations in which Irvin would be permitted to appeal his conviction or sentence. This
factual error on the District Court‟s part does not change the outcome of our analysis,
however, since the record makes clear that Irvin understood the terms of the plea
agreement, as well as the sentencing consequences of his guilty plea, and nonetheless
desired to plead guilty.
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expense, difficulty, and risk of trying a defendant who has already acknowledged his
guilt by pleading guilty.” Jones, 979 F.2d at 318. Accordingly, we find no abuse of
discretion in the District Court‟s denial of Irvin‟s motion to withdraw the guilty plea and
will, therefore, affirm his conviction.
IV.
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm Irvin‟s conviction, but we will
vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing after a thorough inquiry as to whether
Irvin has demonstrated good cause for his request for new counsel.
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