Burns v. Snow , 130 F. App'x 973 ( 2005 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 16 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
SYLVIA BURNS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 04-1349
(D. Colo.)
JOHN W. SNOW, Secretary of the (D.Ct. No. 03-Z-690 (BNB))
United States Department of the
Treasury,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, and PORFILIO and BRORBY, Senior
Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Appellant Sylvia Burns appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Appellee John W. Snow, Secretary of the United States
Department of the Treasury (the Government), regarding her allegations
employees of the United States Mint in Denver, Colorado (the Mint), failed to
accommodate her disability and subjected her to sexual harassment and retaliation
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
through 2000e-17; and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-32, 741,
751, 760-65, 771-76, 780-85, 791-96. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and affirm.
I. Factual Background
“In setting forth the facts, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, as we must when reviewing a grant of summary
judgment.” Baca v. Sklar, 398 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks
and citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “against a party who
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party’s case ....” See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986). Thus, for the purpose of reviewing the district court’s summary judgment
decision, we consider the following facts, which are either undisputed or
uncontested, and/or based on the admissions and testimony of Ms. Burns during
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the course of litigation in support of her claims, and which, even if true, we
determine cannot defeat summary judgment in this case.
A. Production and Attendance
On May 10, 1999, Ms. Burns was hired by the Mint as a probationary
employee in the position of Counting Machine Operator, working the graveyard
shift. The duties of a counting machine operator include using a counting
machine to count and bag a specified number of cents, nickels, dimes and
quarters. At the Mint, probationary employees like Ms. Burns are hired for a one-
year trial period, during which their performance, attendance and compliance with
workplace polices are monitored, and they are required to demonstrate fitness for
permanent hiring. Counting machine operators are required to meet certain
numerical production standards for each type of coin, and performance below
95% of the standard is considered unacceptable. An employee may be terminated
at any time during the probationary period for failure to demonstrate fitness and
qualifications for continued federal employment, and has no right to warnings or
progressive forms of discipline.
During the period of Ms. Burns's probationary employment with the Mint
the demand for new U.S. coins increased. As a result, the Mint operated twenty-
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four hours a day, seven days a week, which resulted in employees generally being
required to work a six-day-per-week schedule. The Mint also gave employees the
option of volunteering to work on the seventh day of each week. Attendance is a
concern for the Mint because employees with unreliable attendance interfere with
its ability to meet demanding production requirements. During Ms. Burns's job
interview, when asked whether she could work overtime, including six days a
week, she said she could. However, according to Ms. Burns, both the individual
who interviewed her and the doctor who performed her pre-employment medical
examination for the Mint told her employees hardly ever worked overtime at the
Mint.
During a period of at least twenty weeks, between June 1999 and March
2000, Ms. Burns volunteered to work overtime on her one scheduled day off. In
addition, for a total of twelve weeks between July 1999 and March 2000, she
voluntarily worked more than forty-eight hours a week. During her probationary
period, Ms. Burns never informed her direct supervisor, Tom Romero, that
working overtime caused any medical problems and never asked him to excuse
her from working scheduled overtime for any reason.
While Ms. Burns volunteered to work overtime, her personnel records are
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replete with performance appraisals evidencing deficiencies in her performance
and attendance. Records show she failed to perform at the 95% required level on
certain coins throughout her probationary period; they also contain entries by Mr.
Romero stating he verbally counseled Ms. Burns about her production
deficiencies, after which, he noted, she continued to perform below the required
level. In addition, due to numerous incidents of tardiness and uses of
unscheduled leave, personnel records show Mr. Romero verbally counseled Ms.
Burns, warning she would be required to bring in medical documentation each
time she called in sick. While Ms. Burns gave sundry reasons for being late and
taking unscheduled leave, one notation shows the reason she gave for missing
work on September 30, 1999, was for a “lupus flare-up.” On December 17, 1999,
Mr. Romero prepared a document which stated Ms. Burns failed to meet
performance standards and had received counseling on her attendance; it also
stated that if she failed to improve her performance, she would be discharged
from her probationary employment for non-production. Ms. Burns signed the
document, indicating it had been discussed with her.
Thereafter, records show Ms. Burns was tardy at least one more time, had
at least ten more unscheduled leave occurrences, and her production on nickels
continued to be below the required 95% level. In total, over the course of her
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eleven-month probationary employment, Ms. Burns was tardy for work at least
seven times and took unscheduled leave at least eighteen times. 1 On April 18,
2000, Ms. Burns took another sick leave absence, and on the same day, the Mint
fired Ms. Burns, effective April 19, 2000, based on “unacceptable” or
“unreliable” attendance and “unacceptable” or “substandard” production output.
Three years after her termination, and two years after an unsuccessful
EEOC agency action, Ms. Burns filed the instant action against the Mint,
asserting its employees failed to accommodate her disability relating to lupus and
subjected her to sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. The record reveals the following
evidence relating to her claims.
B. Disability Claim
In her written application for employment with the Mint, Ms. Burns
represented her prior “job involved using physical strength, standing for long
periods of time, ... walking and so on.” During her job interview, when asked if
1
Other than one entry for a “lupus flare-up,” the other medical reasons
provided by Ms. Burns for unscheduled sick leave included migraines or
headaches, “illness,” “UTI pain,” fevers and/or flu, earache, cut finger, sinus
infection, and urinary tract infection.
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she would have difficulty lifting bags weighing twenty-eight to fifty pounds and
standing for eight hours a shift, she responded, “No. I do it now,” and as
previously mentioned, she indicated she could work overtime, including six days a
week. Ms. Burns claims she told the person interviewing her for the Mint job she
had lupus.
As part of the hiring process, Ms. Burns underwent a physical examination
and filled out an occupational history questionnaire. In response to the question,
“Do you have any problems you would like to discuss with the doctor?” Ms.
Burns wrote, “Kaiser had treated me for lupus for 2 years or so but now I’m
negative. I took quinine pills it helped the rash.” She also completed a “Self-
Identification of Handicap” form on which she indicated she possessed no
disability. Part of her physical examination included an assessment of whether
she could perform the functional requirements of the job, including heavy lifting
and carrying of forty-five pounds or more, and walking and standing for eight
hours. Section A5 of the form asked Ms. Burns whether she had any medical
disorder or physical impairment which could interfere in any way with the full
performance of these functional requirements, to which she answered, “no,” and
signed the form, certifying the information was correct. Following her physical,
the examining physician recommended she be hired with no limitations.
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Ms. Burns now claims she had difficulty walking and standing on three or
four occasions during her eleven months of employment at the Mint. While she
missed work on April 18, 2000, due to lesions on her feet, which her doctor
described as a painful foot condition, she contends she was terminated due to her
“flare up of lupus” on that same date. Although Ms. Burns brought in doctors'
notes on other medical conditions, she never submitted one diagnosing her with
lupus or indicating a need to accommodate her lupus. In fact, while Ms. Burns
claims she was diagnosed with diskoid lupus in March 1997, none of the three
rheumatologists who examined her on at least four occasions from 1998 to 2002
diagnosed or confirmed she had lupus. Furthermore, Ms. Burns submitted no
medical information confirming she had lupus, and admitted that in January 2000
she told Dave Cruz, her second-line supervisor, and other coworkers at the Mint a
doctor told her she did not have lupus. She also acknowledged a doctor told her
she did not suffer from diskoid lupus, but rather experienced “atopic dermatitis,”
she was unsure if she had lupus, and did not recall if any doctor told her that her
condition would affect her ability to work overtime.
C. Harassment
While at work at the Mint, Ms. Burns stated she was shown at least four or
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five sexually-oriented photographs or cartoons, 2 and in one case, approached a
group of male coworkers in order to see a photo of topless women, which she
found “mildly offensive.” When shown these and other sexual images at work,
Ms. Burns acknowledged she sometimes responded by laughing or chuckling, or
making lewd or crude comments which caused her coworkers to laugh. Ms. Burns
claims she behaved this way because she was afraid she would “offend
somebody” or would experience reprisal.
Ms. Burns testified most of the cartoons and jokes she was shown were of
natural acts or bare-breasted women. While she found two of the pictures
“offensive,” she admitted that after she expressed being offended she was never
shown them again. Ms. Burns also acknowledged she discussed sex at work when
questioned about it, and even volunteered intimate information about her first
husband. Even though the Mint maintained a written sexual harassment policy
and Ms. Burns had experience with the Mint’s Equal Employment Opportunity
Office, having contacted it on another issue, she admitted she never “seriously”
informed those around her that she was offended by any of the sexual materials,
2
Specifically, the items about which Ms. Burns complains included a
cartoon of President Bill Clinton engaged in oral sex with a female; a man
groping a woman on a couch; a photograph of a vagina with something “huge”
inserted in it; a photograph of topless large-breasted women on a river boat; and a
photograph of a walrus with a flipper pointing toward its crotch area.
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stating only that she was “afraid to.”
In support of her harassment claim, Ms. Burns also alleged Mr. Cruz
brought in or observed pornographic materials on the workroom floor; discussed
his and his father’s sex lives; twice commented on the size of his penis; said he
was promoted by sleeping with a female supervisor; purchased Ms. Burns two t-
shirts; 3 asked her out or to move in with him; and commented on her cleavage.
However, Ms. Burns admits this same supervisor also gave t-shirts to male crew
members; bought one of the t-shirts at her request, although he declined payment
for it; and left her alone after she told him “he needed therapy,” and that she
“couldn’t date anybody who was like that.” When Mr. Cruz commented on
sleeping with a female supervisor to get promoted, Ms. Burns asked Mr. Romero
if this was true, in response to which he nodded his head, making her feel like
“they were preying on” her. She believes Mr. Cruz made these comments about
sleeping with his supervisor in response to her requests for training, making her
believe he was seeking sexual favors in return for such training. With respect to
Mr. Cruz’s comments about her cleavage, she said it made her feel like “a piece
of meat.”
3
Ms. Burns points out she wore “biker” t-shirts to work, which Mr. Cruz
inappropriately admired, and that he presented her with a black Harley Davidson
shirt he got on a trip.
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With regard to her first-level supervisor, Mr. Romero, Ms. Burns claims he
knew another employee brought pornographic material into the workplace
(including one of the pornographic pictures of which Ms. Burns now complains),
and failed to do anything about it until 1999, when he counseled the employee.
She also suggests Mr. Romero “asked her out” twice. According to Ms. Burns,
the first time he asked her out by saying, “we should get together,” when she told
him he was a good-looking man and his wife must be beautiful. The second time,
he allegedly stated “we should get to know each other better,” to which she
responded by pointing out they had just gone through in-house sexual harassment
training and one of them could get in trouble talking about it; stating, “we can’t
go around behaving like a bunch of idiots.” She admitted Mr. Romero's
comments were “just his sense of humor,” and that his and other coworkers’
“vulgar” senses of humor “kind of rubbed off on [her].” She also admitted she
told Mr. Romero he had a “tight butt,” and requested a copy of “raunchy” jokes
from him which contained sexual innuendo, and which she shared with her
teenage son. In fact, during her 2001 EEOC hearing on the matter, Ms. Burns
acknowledged Mr. Romero did not make sexually advancing or sexually harassing
comments to her.
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D. Retaliation and Failure to Accommodate Claims
In December 1999, Ms. Burns contacted an EEO counselor and filed a
complaint, alleging the Mint had failed to train (or properly train) her on certain
equipment. At the time she met with the EEO counselor, Ms. Burns claims she
told him she was being harassed by both Mr. Cruz and Mr. Romero because she
had moved in with a coworker, Mr. Watts, in late September or early October, and
because she would not give into their “whims.” She now claims she did not
include this on her EEO complaint because she feared retaliation. On January 24,
2000, she unconditionally withdrew her EEO complaint.
Ms. Burns also claims that at her meeting with the EEO counselor she
advised him she had lupus and had applied for a job in the mills because she knew
it would allow her to work “light duty.” In addition, sometime during the first six
months of her job, Ms. Burns says she told her supervisors, Mr. Cruz and Mr.
Romero, her foot hurt, she had lupus, and she had applied for a mill job which she
thought would be easier. Ms. Burns did not get an interview for the mill job;
instead, two other candidates did, including one person who scored higher on a
knowledge and skills assessment, and another who scored higher due to veterans’
preference points. When Ms. Burns found out she was not selected for a position
in the mills, she told a human resources employee she was not feeling well and
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that her lupus was flaring up.
During the period of Ms. Burns's employment, Mr. Cruz dated an employee
at the Mint who had lupus, whose medical condition was accommodated by not
working overtime, and who provided medical documentation in support of her
accommodation. Ms. Burns's other supervisor, Mr. Romero, knew someone with
lupus might require reasonable accommodations at the Mint and an employee
making such a disability claim must provide a doctor’s note, but nevertheless, did
not ask Ms. Burns for any medical documentation. While Ms. Burns told Mr.
Romero she had lupus, she never asked for an accommodation, never brought in
medical documentation confirming her medical condition, and told Mr. Cruz that
a doctor said she did not have lupus.
In January 2000 Ms. Burns contacted someone from the EEO office at the
Mint and told her she was having problems and needed help; a month later, she
was informed she needed to fill out a form. In late March, Ms. Burns received a
form from the EEO office, which required a doctor identify her disease and
restrictions; however, she did not submit the form prior to her termination. In late
April 2000, following her termination, she filed an EEO complaint involving
claims of disability, failure to accommodate, sexual harassment, and retaliation.
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II. Procedural Background
An EEOC hearing was held in November 2001 on Ms. Burns's EEO
complaint. Unsuccessful in her action, Ms. Burns filed her First Amended
Complaint in federal court July 2, 2003, claiming Mint employees failed to
accommodate her disability relating to lupus and subjected her to sexual
harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and
the Rehabilitation Act. Following discovery, the district court held a hearing on
the Government’s motion for summary judgment, at which time it issued a bench
ruling determining Ms. Burns failed to: 1) provide any medical documentation
she was disabled, or rebut the Mint’s expert’s medical opinion and assessment
that she did not have lupus, for the purpose of showing she is a qualified person
within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act as having a disability which
substantially impairs a major life activity or prevents her from performing a wide
range of jobs; 2) establish conduct at the Mint was sufficiently severe or
pervasive enough to support a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim, or otherwise
show conduct that altered the condition of her employment and created an abusive
working environment, or that any impermissible conduct was related to her
gender; or 3) show a sufficient causal link between her complaints and her
termination to support a retaliation claim.
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In addition, the district court held the Mint provided legitimate,
nondiscriminatory, non-retaliatory reasons for terminating Ms. Burns, who was a
probationary employee with unreliable attendance, tardiness and unacceptable
production levels. With respect to the Mint’s reasons not to transfer Ms. Burns to
a mill job, the district court relied on Ms. Burns’s work deficiencies and the fact
the two other people who received interviews for the mill job were more
qualified, to reject her accommodation and retaliation claims. Based on this and
other reasoning, the district court determined Ms. Burns failed to provide a
sufficient showing of triable issues of fact to overcome summary judgment,
granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment, dismissed her amended
complaint with prejudice, and entered judgment in favor of the Government.
III. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, using the
same standards applied by the district court.” Baca, 398 F.3d at 1216. “We view
the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party,” and “grant summary judgment only where ‘the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
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material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). As previously noted, summary
judgment is appropriate “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case ....” Celotex,
477 U.S. at 322. Summary judgment is appropriate “[i]f a reasonable trier of fact
could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party ....” White v. York Int’l Corp.,
45 F.3d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1995). “We may affirm the district court for any
reason supported by the record.” Baca, 398 F.3d at 1216 (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
B. Disability and Failure to Accommodate
On appeal, Ms. Burns asserts the district court erred in granting summary
judgment based solely on her failure to provide a conclusive medical opinion on
her disability; she contends she was only required to advise her employer of her
medically-required restrictions and possible ways to accommodate them. Ms.
Burns claims she sufficiently raised the issue of having lupus and the need for a
reasonable accommodation when she gave “lupus flare-up” as a reason for
missing one day of work; told various other employees, including her two
supervisors, she had lupus; and reported to an EEO counselor she had lupus and
hoped to get a job in the mills. In general, Ms. Burns complains her lupus limited
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her in her ability to stand and walk with respect to the overtime hours required for
her position.
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) provides that “[n]o
covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). “Merely having an impairment does not
make one disabled for purposes of the ADA.” Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195 (2002). To prevail under the ADA, an employee
must establish: “(1) she is a disabled person as defined by the ADA; (2) she is
qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential
functions of the job held or desired; and (3) the employer discriminated against
her because of her disability.” Doyal v. Okla. Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 495
(10th Cir. 2000).
“To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, Plaintiff
must first establish that [she] is ‘disabled’ within the meaning of the statute.”
Lusk v. Ryder Integrated Logistics, 238 F.3d 1237, 1239 (10th Cir. 2001).
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“Disability” is statutorily defined or established by showing: “(A) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities
of [an] individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment.” Id. (relying on 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)) (alteration in
original). A “major life activity” is a “basic activity that the average person in
the general population can perform with little or no difficulty,” and includes
walking, standing, sitting, lifting and working. Doyal, 213 F.3d at 495-96
(quotation marks and citation omitted). In order for the impairment to be
substantially limiting, the individual must be:
(1) [u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person
in the general population can perform; or (2) [s]ignificantly restricted
as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can
perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition,
manner, or duration under which the average person in the general
population can perform that same major life activity.
Id. at 496 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)). Moderate restrictions on the ability
to walk and stand have been determined not to amount to a substantial limitation, 4
and we have held comparative evidence must be produced on the issue of lifting
to show such an activity is substantially limited, unless the impairment appears
4
See Talk v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 165 F.3d 1021, 1025 (5th Cir. 1999)
(walking); Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408, 415 (6th Cir. 1997)
(same); Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 106 (3rd Cir. 1996) (same); 29 C.F.R.
Pt. 1630, App. 1630.2(j) (same). See also Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177
F.3d 180, 186-87 (3rd Cir. 1999) (standing); Gallimore v. Newman Mach. Co.,
301 F. Supp. 2d 431, 445-46 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (same).
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substantially limiting on its face. See Lusk, 238 F.3d at 1240-41. To aid in
assessing whether a major life activity is substantially limited, the evaluator must
consider the type and severity of the impairment, the length of time the
impairment has lasted or is expected to last, and the expected permanent and/or
long-term impact of the impairment, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2), as well as any
mitigating or corrective measures. See Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300,
1305-06 (10th Cir. 1999).
In this case, Ms. Burns has failed to show she has a disability, either
through evidence of a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more of the major life activities; a record of such an impairment; or being
regarded as having such an impairment. Doyal, 213 F.3d at 495. With respect to
a major life activity, Ms. Burns has failed to show any inability or restriction in
lifting, standing, or walking. In fact, during her interview and physical, she
indicated her ability to perform such major life activities at work, and in fact, did
so on numerous occasions while voluntarily performing overtime at the Mint.
Even though she now complains she had difficulty walking and standing on three
or four occasions during her eleven months of employment at the Mint, this is
clearly insufficient to show she cannot perform these activities in the condition,
manner or duration of the average person. Doyal, 213 F.3d at 496. Moreover,
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nothing in the record shows her walking, standing and lifting problems, if any,
were severe, long-term or had a permanent impact.
Second, no record of an impairment exists to show Ms. Burns suffers from
the disability she claims, other than her own self-serving, contradictory,
conversational declarations to other employees she had lupus, and one excuse she
gave for missing work due to a “lupus flare-up.” These representations are
insufficient to create a record of disability sufficient to overcome summary
judgment, especially when considered together with: 1) her statement on the Self-
Identification of Handicap form that she had no disability; 2) an entry on her
physical examination form in which she indicated she no longer suffered from
lupus; 3) her statements to a supervisor and other employees at the Mint she was
not sure she had lupus and that a doctor told her she did not have lupus; 4) her
failure to provide medical documentation she suffered from such a condition,
especially given Mr. Romero told her any future sick leave must be supported by
a doctor’s note; 5) her lack of such a diagnosis by the three rheumatologists who
examined her on at least four occasions from 1998 to 2002; 6) her representations
when applying for the position that she could perform the functions of standing
and walking for eight hours and lifting twenty-eight to fifty pounds; and 7) her
actual performance of those functions, together with her frequent ability to work
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overtime over the course of her eleven-month probationary period. In addition, as
the district court pointed out, Ms. Burns failed to provide medical or other
evidence to counter the Mint’s expert's opinion she did not suffer from lupus,
which is only one more factor in this case which we considered in determining
Ms. Burns fails to show she is a qualified individual with a disability under the
ADA. Thus, contrary to Ms. Burns's contentions, her failure to survive summary
judgment is not based solely on the fact she failed to provide formal medical
documentation of her disability.
Nonetheless, Ms. Burns claims she gave the Mint sufficient notice of her
disability by telling other employees she had lupus; and in support, relies on our
decision in Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999).
However, in that case, this court discussed the interactive process which occurs
after an employee provides notice of the following: 1) the disability; 2) the
resulting limitations of that disability; and 3) the desire for reassignment if no
accommodation is possible in the employee’s existing job. Id. at 1171-72. We
pointed out a plaintiff could only survive summary judgment by showing he or
she is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA and made her or his
limitations and requests for accommodation known to the employer. Id. at 1179.
In this case, Ms. Burns has failed, as previously discussed, to show she is disabled
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under the ADA, or that she sufficiently notified the Mint of any limitations
resulting from a disability, or requested an accommodation. Specifically, Ms.
Burns's request for “light duty” on the mills, based solely on her self-serving,
contradictory verbal declarations as to her lupus condition, without more, was
insufficient to place the Mint on notice of a disability, any limitations resulting
therefrom, or a request for accommodation. In addition, the record shows the two
individuals who were considered over Ms. Burns for the mill position were
considered more qualified based on certain legitimate scoring methods, and that
the woman who was accommodated for lupus had presented the Mint with
medical documentation confirming her disability.
Finally, nothing in the record shows Ms. Burns was ever regarded as having
lupus. For these reasons, the district court did not err in finding Ms. Burns had
not shown she suffered from a disability for the purposes of bringing a Title VII
claim.
C. Sexual Harassment
In asserting the district court erred in rejecting her sexual harassment
claim, Ms. Burns suggests the totality of the circumstances shows a sufficiently
severe or pervasive environment existed to make her case unsuited for summary
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judgment. In support, she reiterates every fact or allegation which in any way
lends support to her contentions, claiming together they show an environment
replete with sexual innuendo, where her supervisors, Mr. Cruz and Mr. Romero,
made it “clear to [her] that tangible job benefits would be rewarded for those who
dated men in management.”
For a hostile environment claim to survive a summary judgment
motion, a plaintiff must show that a rational jury could find that the
workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,
and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working
environment.
O’Shea v. Yellow Tech. Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d 1093, 1097 (10th Cir. 1999)
(quotation marks, alteration, and citations omitted). This requirement is “crucial
... to ensure that courts and juries do not mistake ordinary socializing in the
workplace—such as ... horseplay or ... flirtation—for discriminatory ‘conditions
of employment.’” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81
(1998). “Whether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be determined only
by looking at all the circumstances ..., includ[ing] the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee’s work performance.” O'Shea at 1098 (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
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“The severity and pervasiveness of the conduct must be judged from both
an objective and a subjective perspective,” and “[t]he objective severity of
harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the
plaintiff’s position, considering ‘all the circumstances.’” Id. at 1097-98
(quotation marks and citation omitted). This may include “the social context in
which the particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target,” and
requires “[c]ommon sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context ... to
distinguish between simple teasing ... and conduct which a reasonable person in
the plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile or abusive.” Oncale, 523 U.S.
at 81-82. Thus, our inquiry requires an assessment of the “real social impact of
workplace behavior [based] on a constellation of surrounding circumstances,
expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation
of the words used or the physical acts performed.” Id. at 82.
With regard to quid pro quo sexual harassment, we have said that “[w]hen a
plaintiff proves that a tangible employment action resulted from a refusal to
submit to a supervisor’s sexual demands, he or she establishes that the
employment decision itself constitutes a change in the terms and conditions of
employment that is actionable under Title VII.” See Smith v. Cashland, Inc., 193
F.3d 1158, 1160 (10th Cir. 1999). An employer may refute a quid pro quo
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harassment claim by either proving no negative employment action took place or
establishing it made the termination decision for legitimate business reasons and
not because the employee refused to submit to sexual demands. Id.
We begin with Ms. Burns's claim on appeal that she experienced quid pro
quo sexual harassment because her supervisors made it “clear to [her] that
tangible job benefits would be rewarded for those who dated men in
management.” While we cannot condone any sexually-oriented or coarse
comments Mint supervisors may have made to Ms. Burns, the totality of the
circumstances does not show, as Ms. Burns now contends, that either of her
supervisors made demands which, if she either accepted or refused, would result
in a certain outcome. In other words, she has not shown she was promised
tangible job benefits if she dated them or experienced reprisal when she refused
to have a relationship with them. In fact, while Mr. Cruz and Mr. Romero made
comments Ms. Burns believed meant they were asking her out, she admitted they
left her alone when she made it clear she was not interested in dating them. She
has also acknowledged Mr. Romero did not make sexually advancing or sexually
harassing comments to her.
Moreover, nothing about the t-shirts Mr. Cruz gave Ms. Burns is suggestive
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of any sexually-related expectation, especially given he also gave other crew
members t-shirts. However, the alleged comments he made about sleeping with a
supervisor to get his job when Ms. Burns asked about receiving more training on
certain machines is of concern and, as Ms. Burns contends, could be construed as
quid pro quo sexual harassment. However, in this case, it appears Ms. Burns did
get the training she sought without dating Mr. Cruz, as evidenced by her
withdrawal of her EEO complaint requesting training. In addition, the Mint has
provided substantial evidence Ms. Burns was discharged for performance and
attendance deficiencies, and not for anything involving Mr. Cruz’s behavior,
thereby providing legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination.
While she complains she could have performed her job better if she had timely
received the training she requested, she still has not overcome the deficiencies in
her attendance at a facility where attendance was critical in order to meet national
production standards.
We also view Ms. Burns's supervisors’ behavior in view of her more
general sexual harassment claim in determining whether the circumstances
presented in this case caused Ms. Burns to experience a severely hostile or
abusive work environment. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81-82. The record on appeal
shows Ms. Burns participated, albeit sometimes less than enthusiastically, in the
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sexual banter and innuendo which she now complains detrimentally affected her,
but which she has not shown affected her performance at work. In so doing, Ms.
Burns admits the “vulgar” sense of humor of her co-workers “kind of rubbed off
on [her].” While she complains Mr. Cruz’s comment about her cleavage made her
feel like “a piece of meat,” she similarly told her other supervisor he had a “tight
butt,” evidencing her participation in the same type of sexual banter as her
supervisors. While she complains Mr. Cruz discussed his sex life with her, Ms.
Burns admits she also volunteered information about her own sex life, including
information about her ex-husband. Equally indicative of her acquiescence in such
behavior is her admission she asked Mr. Romero for a copy of raunchy jokes and
then, astonishingly, passed them on to her teenage son. Viewing Ms. Burns's
supervisors’ conduct, together with her own behavior and the entire social context
in which such conduct occurred, we believe the circumstances presented in this
case did not cause Ms. Burns to experience a severely hostile or abusive work
environment. See id. at 81-82.
Similarly, while we do not condone the viewing of pornographic materials
at a government facility, we do not find the circumstances described by Ms. Burns
established an environment “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,
and insult that [was] sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
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[her] employment and create an abusive working environment.” O’Shea, 185 F.3d
at 1097 (quotation marks and citations omitted). While Ms. Burns complains
about the pornographic materials she saw, she actually approached a group of men
to see one of the pictures; admits some of the pictures were not offensive to her;
and acknowledges she participated in their viewing, at times laughing and
chuckling or making lewd and crude comments. Thus, we find Ms. Burns's own
behavior indicative in defining the social context in which the particular
complained-of behavior occurred, and cannot say, with respect to the viewing of
the pornographic photographs, that she has shown she experienced a severely
hostile or abusive work environment, given her own participation in it. See
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81-82.
In addition, with respect to two of the pictures Ms. Burns found offensive,
she acknowledges she was never shown them again once she complained about
them. Even though the Mint maintained a written sexual harassment policy and
Ms. Burns had experience with the Mint’s Equal Employment Opportunity Office,
she admitted she never “seriously” informed anyone she was offended by any of
the sexual materials. Finally, while she complains Mr. Romero was aware another
employee brought pornographic material into the workplace prior to and during
1999, when Ms. Burns was employed at the Mint, Mr. Romero did verbally
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counsel that employee in 1999 about his behavior, including discussion about
bringing in one of the photos about which Ms. Burns now complains. Thus, under
the totality of the circumstances presented in this case, we agree with the district
court’s assessment that insufficient evidence exists to establish conduct
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condition of Ms. Burns's employment
and create an abusive working environment.
D. Retaliation
Weakest of all is Ms. Burns's claim Mint employees took adverse actions
against her in retaliation for her moving in with a co-employee, and her comments
to the EEO counselor that she believed she was being sexually harassed because
she would not give in to Mr. Cruz's or Mr. Romero's “whims,” and instead moved
in with Mr. Watts. Specifically, Ms. Burns claims the Mint’s retaliation against
her began around October, after she moved in with Mr. Watts, as evidenced by
Mr. Romero’s counseling of her in November about her leave issues. After she
went to the EEO counselor in early December, she points out the retaliation
continued because Mr. Romero met with her on December 17, 2000, to place her
on a performance improvement plan, and thereafter, told her she had to bring in
medical documentation for her sick leave. Ultimately, the retaliatory, adverse
action of which she complains is her termination, and she contends the Mint’s
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reasons for discharging her are merely a pretext for discriminatory reasons. She
also complains, however, that she was terminated based on her last sick leave
absence, which was related to lupus, thereby also implicating a retaliation claim
based on her disability.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act the employee must demonstrate: 1) she engaged in a protected
employee action; 2) the employer took an adverse action either after or
contemporaneous with the employee’s protected action; and 3) a causal
connection existed between the employee’s action and the employer’s adverse
action. See Dick v. Phone Directories Co., 397 F.3d 1256, 1267 (10th Cir. 2005)
(considering retaliation claim based, in part, on hostile environment claim);
Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1324 (10th Cir. 1997) (considering
retaliation claim based on disability claim). “[The employee] may maintain an
action for retaliation even though the conduct forming the basis of her underlying
complaint was not adjudged to have violated Title VII.” Dick, 397 F.3d at 1267.
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of ADA discrimination,
the burden shifts to the employer to offer a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. ... If the
defendant articulates such a reason, then the plaintiff may prove that
it is merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination on the basis of her
disability.
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Selenke v. Med. Imaging of Colo., 248 F.3d 1249, 1259 (10th Cir. 2001). “When
assessing a contention of pretext, we examine the facts ‘as they appear to the
person making the decision to terminate [the] plaintiff,’” and “[w]e may not
second guess the business judgment of the employer.” Id. at 1261 (citations
omitted).
In this case, assuming Ms. Burns engaged in a protected employee action,
the record contains substantial evidence she was discharged for performance and
attendance deficiencies at a facility where performance and attendance are critical
in order to meet national production standards, thereby providing a legitimate and
nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. Her attempts to show these reasons
were merely a pretext for unlawful termination are unavailing. While Ms. Burns
complains she was discharged based on her last sick leave absence, which was
related to lupus, the doctor’s note for that absence states it was for lesions on her
feet, and does not mention lupus. Moreover, prior to this absence, Ms. Burns had
already taken unscheduled leave eighteen times, and had failed to meet the 95%
required production level on various coins at different times, thereby setting in
motion the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for her discharge.
The same is true of the disciplinary or counseling actions taken by Mr.
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Romero. While they may have incidently coincided with her moving in with a co-
worker and her comments to the EEO counselor about her supervisors’ behavior,
it is clear that prior to these events, Ms. Burns had already accumulated many
instances of unscheduled leave, been tardy, and consistently failed to meet
production standards. Moreover, she has not shown Mr. Romero was aware of
her comments to the EEO counselor prior to the actions he took.
Consequently, Ms. Burns fails to show a causal link between her comments
to the EEO counselor and the Mint disciplining her, or that her alleged disability
was related to her termination. Under these circumstances, it is clear the Mint’s
articulated reasons for her termination were legitimate, and not mere pretext.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in rejecting Ms. Burns's retaliation
claim.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to the Government.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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