United States v. Wilson , 337 F. App'x 747 ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 30, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 09-8029
LEVI A. WILSON, (D.C. Nos. 2:06-CV-00264-ABJ and
2:05-CR-00078-ABJ-3)
Defendant-Appellant. (D. Wyoming)
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before KELLY, BRISCOE, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Levi A. Wilson, a federal prisoner appearing pro se, 1 seeks a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) in order to challenge the district court’s denial of his 28
U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence. Because Wilson
has failed to satisfy the standards for the issuance of a COA, we deny his request
and dismiss the matter.
I
Wilson and five co-defendants were charged with multiple conspiracy and
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
1
As he is proceeding pro se, we have construed Wilson’s pleadings
liberally. Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1160 (10th Cir. 2004).
crack cocaine offenses. Wilson and three of his co-defendants pled not guilty and
proceeded to trial. After six days of trial, Wilson and two of those co-defendants
entered guilty pleas pursuant to plea agreements with the government. At
Wilson’s change of plea hearing, Wilson stated, under oath, that the government
had accurately outlined the terms of the plea agreement with him, that he
understood that the plea agreement would lead to a 20-year sentence, that he
understood that if the district court accepted his guilty plea, he would not be able
to withdraw the plea, that he understood the presentence report process, that he
understood the minimum and maximum consequences of his guilty plea, that he
understood the constitutional rights he was waving in his plea, that he understood
the charges against him, and that his plea was voluntary and of his own free will
and not induced by threats, coercion, or violence against him or anyone close to
him. Wilson stated that he had no questions about anything that had gone on at
the change of plea hearing, and that he was comfortable that he had done the right
thing by pleading guilty.
Wilson subsequently testified at the trial of the remaining co-defendant.
During his sworn testimony, Wilson admitted that he traveled to Cheyenne,
Wyoming two or more times a month to sell crack cocaine, and that his five co-
defendants were also involved in distributing crack cocaine from the same
location with him. Wilson conceded he was a user and seller of crack cocaine,
and that he sold crack cocaine for the profit, not just to support his personal use.
2
At Wilson’s sentencing hearing, the district court accepted Wilson’s guilty
plea and sentenced Wilson to the agreed-upon sentence of 240 months’
imprisonment, followed by a 10-year term of supervised release. At the
conclusion of the sentencing hearing, Wilson stated that he did not have questions
about what was done, and that he was “pretty pleased.” ROA Vol. 1 at 229.
Wilson did not file a direct appeal.
Wilson, appearing pro se, filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set
aside, or correct sentence. The motion alleged, in pertinent part, that: (1) his
conviction and sentence should be set aside because he is actually innocent of the
drug trafficking charges to which he pled guilty; (2) his guilty plea was not
voluntarily entered due to his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness; and (3) his 20-year
sentence was unconstitutional. The district court denied Wilson’s motion, and his
subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Wilson next filed a timely notice of appeal and a request for COA in the
district court. The district court did not act on the COA issue, and therefore it is
deemed denied by the district court. See 10th Cir. R. 22.1(C) (“Failure of the
district court to issue a certificate of appealability within thirty days of filing the
notice of appeal shall be deemed a denial.”). Wilson has now renewed his request
for COA with this court.
II
The issuance of a COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal from the
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denial of a § 2255 motion. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). A
COA may be issued “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make such a
showing, an applicant must demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could debate
whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in
a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In his briefing before this court, Wilson argues the same bases for a COA
as he did before the district court. Wilson’s first claim is that he is actually
innocent. In consideration of this claim, the district court concluded that the
alleged failure of Wilson’s trial counsel to produce certain exculpatory evidence
at trial was insufficient to overcome Wilson’s guilty plea and inculpatory
testimony at trial, especially in light of the vague character of Wilson’s proffers
of innocence. See United States v. Cervini, 379 F.3d 987, 991 (10th Cir. 2004)
(“In order to meet this standard [for reviewing the merits of an otherwise
defaulted claim of actual innocence], however, the petitioner is required to
establish, by a fair probability, that the trier of facts would have entertained a
reasonable doubt of his guilt.” (internal quotations and alterations omitted)).
In analyzing Wilson’s second claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
district court concluded that Wilson’s allegation that his guilty plea was coerced
4
by his trial counsel was inconsistent with the record of the proceedings, and that
Wilson had therefore failed to establish that his counsel was ineffective or that
Wilson was prejudiced in his defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 691 (1984) (requiring a showing of error and prejudice for ineffective
assistance of counsel claims). The district court also found that Wilson’s
allegations that his trial counsel failed to adequately represent him were also
insufficient to meet the Strickland standard because they were vague, especially
compared to the overwhelming evidence against Wilson. Wilson’s claim that his
trial counsel coerced him to commit perjury at trial was rejected as frivolous,
because the testimony given by Wilson at trial was consistent with other
testimony offered during the trial. In his last ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, Wilson alleged that his trial counsel offered him incorrect sentencing
advice. The district court found that Wilson’s trial counsel’s advice was sensible
and wholly understandable, and that Wilson was not prejudiced by the advice.
And finally, Wilson’s third claim was that his sentence was
unconstitutional because it was derived from illegal sentencing guidelines
(essentially, Wilson made an argument that his sentence was in violation of
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005) (“Any fact (other than a prior
conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum
authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be
admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”)). The
5
district court denied this claim as procedurally barred, but also denied the claim
on the merits, because Wilson’s sentence was not determined based on the
sentencing guidelines, but rather, was based on Wilson’s plea agreement with the
government pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C). See United States v. Graham, 466 F.3d
1234, 1240 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Booker, however, is not implicated where the
district court accepts a stipulated sentence under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea
bargain.”).
In his application for COA, Wilson makes no attempt to argue that the
district court used the wrong standards of law in resolving his claims. Rather,
Wilson makes the same arguments before this court that he did before the district
court. Having examined Wilson’s appellate pleadings and the record on appeal,
we conclude that the arguments forwarded by Wilson in his application for COA
are unpersuasive. Moreover, we conclude the propriety of the district court’s
resolution of the case is not debatable. We therefore conclude that Wilson has
failed to make the requisite showing for the issuance of a COA, for substantially
the same reasons stated by the district court.
III
The application for COA is DENIED and the matter is DISMISSED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
6