United States v. Meza-Hernandez , 135 F. App'x 139 ( 2005 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 25, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 04-4295
v. (D.C. No. 2:04-CV-797-DAK)
(Utah)
FELIPE MEZA-HERNANDEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER
Before SEYMOUR, HARTZ, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
Felipe Meza-Hernandez, a federal prisoner appearing pro se, filed a motion
for a reduction of his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court
refused to grant the motion or a certificate of appealability (COA). Because Mr.
Meza-Hernandez has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right, we deny a COA and dismiss the appeal.
Issuance of a COA is jurisdictional. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 332,
335-36 (2003). To be entitled to a COA, Mr. Meza-Hernandez must make “a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). To make the requisite showing, Mr. Meza-Hernandez must
demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter,
agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the
issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”
Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336 (quotations omitted). In deciding whether Mr. Meza-
Hernandez has carried his burden, this court undertakes “a preliminary, though
not definitive, consideration of the [legal] framework” applicable to each of his
claims. Id. at 338. Although Mr. Meza-Hernandez need not demonstrate that his
appeal will succeed to be entitled to COA, he must “prove something more than
the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith.” Id. (quotations
omitted).
Mr. Meza-Hernandez pled guilty to illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. §
1326. Pursuant to the guidelines, his base level offense was eight. See U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.2(a) (2003). Mr. Meza-Hernandez’s offense level was enhanced sixteen
levels due to the district court’s finding that he was previously deported
subsequent to a conviction for an aggravated felony. Id. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). The
district court also applied a three level decrease because Mr. Meza-Hernandez
accepted responsibility for his actions, yielding a total base offense level of
twenty-one. Id. § 3E1.1. Based on that offense level and a criminal history
category of IV, Mr. Meza-Hernandez’s sentencing range was 57 to 71 months.
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The district court sentenced him at the bottom of that range to 57 months
imprisonment followed by 36 months of supervised release. Mr. Meza-Hernandez
timely filed for habeas relief. The district court dismissed his petition and this
appeal followed.
Mr. Meza-Hernandez first argues that his sentence was unconstitutional
because it was enhanced based on a prior aggravated felony conviction that was
not pled in his indictment. Mr. Meza-Hernandez’s indictment charged him with
one count of reentry by a previously removed felon in violation of 8 U.S.C. §
1326. If a defendant has a previous aggravated felony conviction, § 1326(b),
which carries a maximum sentence of twenty years, applies. The district court
determined § 1326(b) applied and enhanced Mr. Meza-Hernandez’s sentence
sixteen levels due to its finding that he had a prior felony drug trafficking
conviction. Although an indictment must set forth each element of the crime it
charges, the Supreme Court has explicitly held that the constitution does not
require Congress to treat recidivism as an element of the offense. Almendarez-
Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998). Therefore, the government’s
failure to plead Mr. Meza-Hernandez’s drug trafficking conviction in his
indictment does not constitute constitutional error.
Relying primarily on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and
Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), Mr. Meza-Hernandez also argues
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that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are unconstitutional insofar as they
allowed the district court to enhance his sentence based on prior convictions that
were neither admitted nor proven to the jury. The Supreme Court’s intervening
decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), applying the rule of
Blakely to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, bears directly on Mr. Meza-
Hernandez’s argument. New rules of criminal procedure, however, are applied
retroactively only to cases pending on direct review or cases that are not yet final.
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987). Mr. Meza-Hernandez exhausted
his direct appeal and his case was “final” prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Blakely and Booker. See id. at 321 n.6 (a case is final when “a judgment of
conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time
for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally denied”).
Thus, Blakely and the Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Booker have no
applicability to Mr. Meza-Hernandez’s sentence. See United States v. Price, 400
F.3d 844, 849 (10th Cir. 2005) (Blakely is not retroactively applicable to a case in
which conviction was final before Blakely was decided); United States v. Mora,
293 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2002) (Apprendi is not retroactively applicable to
initial habeas petitions).
Mr. Meza-Hernandez’s final contention is that his attorney was
constitutionally ineffective for failing to advise him of his right to attack his
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sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In order to prevail on an ineffective
assistance claim, a petitioner must demonstrate both that his attorney’s
performance was deficient and the deficiencies prejudiced his defense. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 687 (1984). A showing of prejudice requires a
demonstration of “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. As
Mr. Meza-Hernandez has raised no meritorious § 2255 claim, his allegations are
simply insufficient to meet the prejudice prong of Strickland. See Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (ruling that even pro se plaintiffs
must allege sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim can be based, and
that conclusory allegations will not suffice).
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Mr. Meza-Hernandez’s application
for a COA and dismiss the appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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