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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 17-13737
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-22669-CMA
MARTIN JAY WALTERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
STATE ATTORNEY FOR MIAMI-DADE COUNTY,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(August 9, 2018)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Martin Walters, pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 civil-rights lawsuit. Three days after the complaint was docketed, the court
screened his complaint, dismissed it sua sponte for failure to state a claim, and
instructed the clerk to close the case. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). On appeal, Walters
argues that he supplied the court with sufficient facts to state a claim, even if those
facts were contained within exhibits attached to his complaint. After careful
review, we vacate and remand.
We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal under
28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state claim. Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr.,
254 F.3d
1276, 1278–79 (11th Cir. 2001). Dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) are
governed by the same standard as dismissals under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Mitchell v. Farcass,
112 F.3d 1483, 1390 (11th Cir. 1997). However, pro se
pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys
and will, therefore, be liberally construed.
Id.
In dismissing Walters’s complaint under § 1915(e)(2), the district court
stated that, as best it could tell, Walters brought claims for malicious prosecution
and false imprisonment, among other allegations. The court found, however, that
the complaint did not allege sufficient facts to establish the elements of these
causes of action. While some of the attached exhibits appeared to contain relevant
factual allegations, the court explained, these exhibits did not “comport with the
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Federal Rules.” And his other exhibits did not “have any obvious connection to his
claims,” nor did he bother to explain their significance. The court concluded that
Walters’s filings did not “provide a short and plain statement” of his claim, as
required by Rule 8(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., nor were his claims “limited to a single
set of circumstances,” as required by Rule 10(b), Fed. R. Civ. P. Finding that
Walters failed to state a claim even under “the relaxed pleading standard afforded
to pro se litigants,” the court dismissed the complaint and directed the clerk to
close the case.
Although the district court styled its order as a dismissal for failure to state a
claim, its reasoning extended beyond the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations
in Walters’s complaint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“[A]
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” (quotation marks omitted)). The court faulted
the complaint for violating Rules 8 and 10, and it disregarded factual allegations in
certain exhibits because the exhibits did not “comport with the Federal Rules.”
These statements would be at home in an order deeming the complaint a “shotgun
pleading,” which is another way of saying that a complaint fails to serve one of its
core functions: “to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them
and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Ct.
Sheriff’s Office,
792 F.3d 1313, 1322 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Complaints that violate
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either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both, are often disparagingly referred to as
‘shotgun pleadings.’”).
Of course, the district court also expressly stated that it was dismissing the
complaint for failure to state a claim to relief. And it found that Walters’s
complaint failed to allege any facts to show the elements of the two claims
identified by the court. However, as the court recognized, adequate review was
impeded by the complaint’s “voluminous” nature, its failure to comply with the
federal rules, and Walters’s failure to explain the relevance of numerous exhibits.
In any case, whether the district court’s dismissal was based on the
complaint’s violations of Rules 8 and 10 or on the substantive deficiencies of its
allegations, or some combination of both, we conclude that the court should have
permitted Walters at least one opportunity to replead his complaint before
dismissing the action with prejudice.1
To the extent the district court dismissed Walters’s complaint as a shotgun
pleading, the court ought to have given him the opportunity to replead, with
instructions. See Byrne v. Nezhat,
261 F.3d 1075, 1133 & n.113 (11th Cir. 2001)
(“[I]f, in the face of a shotgun complaint, the defendant does not move the district
1
Although the district court did not expressly say that the dismissal was “with prejudice,”
it operated as such a dismissal because an involuntary dismissal, other than for lack of
jurisdiction, improper venue, or lack of an indispensable party, is with prejudice unless the court
otherwise specifies, which it did not. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Weissinger v. United States,
423
F.2d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 1970) (en banc). Further, a dismissal for failure to state a claim
“unambiguously constitutes a ruling on the merits.” Borden v. Allen,
646 F.3d 785, 812 (11th
Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted).
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court to require a more definite statement, the court, in the exercise of its inherent
power, must intervene sua sponte and order a repleader.”); see also Vibe Micro,
Inc. v. Shabanets,
878 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[A] district court must
sua sponte give [the plaintiff] one chance to replead before dismissing his case
with prejudice on non-merits shotgun pleading grounds . . . [and] should explain
how the offending pleading violates the shotgun pleading rule so that the party may
properly avoid future shotgun pleadings.”); Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321 n.10 (“[T]he
district court ought to take the initiative to dismiss or strike the shotgun pleading
and give the plaintiff an opportunity to replead.”). Plus, the court’s dismissal in
this case operated as a dismissal with prejudice, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), which is
generally not appropriate for a plaintiff’s failure to comply with court rules absent
additional findings that were not made here. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321 n.10.
Similarly, to the extent the district court dismissed the complaint for the
legal insufficiency of its factual allegations, a pro se plaintiff ordinarily must be
given at least one chance to amend the complaint before the district court dismisses
the action with prejudice. Bryant v. Dupree,
252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001).
The court did not provide Walters that opportunity. While leave to amend need not
be granted if amendment would be futile, the court made no finding of futility. See
id. And given the need for repleader in any event, we decline to address the issue
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of futility in the first instance. Accordingly, Walters should be given an
opportunity to amend his complaint on remand.
For the reasons stated, we vacate the dismissal of Walters’s complaint and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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