Eric Ramon Davilla-Castro v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) , 94 N.E.3d 763 ( 2017 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                                   FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                                Nov 30 2017, 8:48 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                                CLERK
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                         Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                                   and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Ruth Johnson                                                Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Valerie K. Boots                                            Attorney General of Indiana
    Marion County Public Defender Agency
    Henry A. Flores, Jr.
    Appellate Division                                          Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                       Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Eric Ramon Davilla-Castro, 1                                November 30, 2017
    Appellant-Defendant,                                        Court of Appeals Case No.
    49A02-1706-CR-1292
    v.                                                 Appeal from the
    Marion Superior Court
    State of Indiana,                                           The Honorable
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                         Angela Dow Davis, Judge
    The Honorable
    Peggy R. Hart, Magistrate
    Trial Court Cause No.
    49G16-1609-F6-36976
    1
    We note that, although defendant’s name is spelled Davilla-Castro throughout the record, at trial, the
    defendant spelled his name as Davila-Castro, i.e., Davila was spelled with one “l.” Tr. Vol. II at 42.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1706-CR-1292 | November 30, 2017              Page 1 of 8
    Kirsch, Judge.
    [1]   Eric Ramon Davilla-Castro (“Davilla-Castro”) appeals his conviction of Level 6
    felony criminal recklessness,2 claiming that his conviction was not supported by
    sufficient evidence.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [3]   The facts most favorable to the judgment follow. On September 17, 2016,
    Diana Pizarro3 (“Pizarro”) and her fiancé, Ulises Grande (“Grande”), were
    caring for Grande’s three children from his previous relationship with Alejandra
    Tellez (“Tellez”). Around 3:00 a.m., the youngest child, still a baby, was
    crying. This prompted Pizzaro and Grande to ask Tellez, who was living with
    Davilla-Castro, if they could bring the baby to her. Tellez agreed.
    [4]   When Pizarro and Grande arrived at Tellez’s apartment, they saw Tellez
    running into the street. Tellez was crying and said that she was hurt and that
    Davilla-Castro had been strangling her. Pizarro, Grande, and Tellez decided to
    go into the apartment. In the hallway, they found Davilla-Castro, who was
    “very mad” and screaming. Tr. Vol. II at 15. Davilla-Castro threatened to fight
    Grande, took off his belt, and approached Grande while wrapping the belt
    2
    See 
    Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2
    (b).
    3
    In the record before us, Diana Pizarro is also referred to as Diana Ticarro; however, we will use only
    Pizarro. Tr. Vol. II at 4, 34, 40, 56, 57, 59.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1706-CR-1292 | November 30, 2017           Page 2 of 8
    around his right hand. 
    Id. at 15, 25
    . Based on Davilla-Castro’s aggression,
    Grande told Pizarro and Tellez to leave. Tellez called the police.
    [5]   Soon thereafter, Pizarro, who was concerned for Grande’s safety, went back
    into the apartment and found Davilla-Castro and Grande fighting. As she
    entered, Pizarro saw Davilla-Castro with a knife in his right hand, and Grande
    holding Davilla-Castro by the wrists. Grande told Pizarro to take the knife
    from Davilla-Castro, which she did, and in the process cut Davilla-Castro’s
    hand. Pizarro said that she “was very scared” at that moment because Davilla-
    Castro was trying to “stab” Grande. 
    Id. at 17
    . Pizarro was concerned for
    Grande’s life. 
    Id.
     To prevent Davilla-Castro from grabbing another knife,
    Pizarro put the knife she had taken from Davilla-Castro, as well as all the other
    household knives, into her vehicle.
    [6]   Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Mitchell Farnsley (“Officer Farnsley”)
    responded to the call of a domestic disturbance. There, he found four
    individuals in the apartment and separated them for later interview.
    Encountering Davilla-Castro, Officer Farnsley noted that he was agitated with
    Grande. Davilla-Castro appeared heavily intoxicated and had a bleeding cut on
    his hand. It was Officer Farnsley’s opinion that Davilla-Castro had sustained
    that injury “during the struggle with the knife being taken away from him.” 
    Id. at 37
    . Talking with Grande, Officer Farnsley noted that Grande was “a little
    relieved,” “exhausted,” “sweaty,” and “a little nervous.” 
    Id. at 31-32
    . Grande
    had “fresh cuts” on his face that were bleeding. 
    Id. at 32
    . Officer Farnsley
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1706-CR-1292 | November 30, 2017   Page 3 of 8
    testified that he arrested Davilla-Castro for criminal recklessness based on his
    conduct involving the knife. 
    Id. at 38
    .
    [7]   In September 2016, the State charged Davilla-Castro with Level 6 felony
    criminal recklessness.4 At the March 2017 bench trial, Pizarro and Officer
    Farnsley testified for the State, and Davilla-Castro testified in his defense,
    saying that he had not held the knife. Instead, he said that he had only touched
    the blade when he tried to remove the knife from Grande, and that is when he
    cut his hand. Tr. Vol. II at 53, 54. The trial court found Davilla-Castro guilty as
    charged and sentenced him to 365 days with ten days executed in jail and the
    rest suspended to probation. Davilla-Castro now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    [8]   Indiana Code section 35-42-2-2 provides, “A person who recklessly, knowingly,
    or intentionally performs an act that creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to
    another person commits criminal recklessness,” a Class B misdemeanor.
    However, the offense is a Level 6 felony if “it is committed while armed with a
    deadly weapon.” 
    Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2
    (b). Davilla-Castro’s sole claim on
    appeal is that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of Level 6
    felony criminal recklessness.
    4
    The State also charged Davilla-Castro with Level 6 felony criminal confinement, Level 6 felony
    strangulation, Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury, and Class A misdemeanor domestic
    battery; however, those charges were dismissed at the commencement of the bench trial. Tr. Vol. II at 7-8,
    19-20.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1706-CR-1292 | November 30, 2017         Page 4 of 8
    [9]    Sufficiency of evidence claims “face a steep standard of review.” Griffith v.
    State, 
    59 N.E.3d 947
    , 958 (Ind. 2016). When reviewing challenges to the
    sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or assess the
    credibility of witnesses. Bell v. State, 
    31 N.E.3d 495
    , 499 (Ind. 2015). Instead,
    “we look to the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom that
    support the [judgment] and will affirm the conviction if there is probative
    evidence from which a reasonable [fact-finder] could have found the defendant
    guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
    Id.
     A conviction may be sustained on
    appeal on the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness or victim. Lay v.
    State, 
    933 N.E.2d 38
    , 42 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. Moreover, a
    conviction may be sustained on circumstantial evidence alone so long as the
    circumstantial evidence supports a reasonable inference of guilt. Gonzalez v.
    State, 
    908 N.E.2d 338
    , 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
    [10]   Davilla-Castro’s charging information provided, in relevant part, as follows:
    On or about September 17, 2016, [Davilla-Castro] did recklessly,
    with a deadly weapon, to wit: a knife, perform[] an act, that is:
    walking at and toward the person of Ulises Grande and/or Diana
    [Pizarro] with a knife, that created a substantial risk of bodily
    injury to Ulises Grande and/or Diana [Pizarro].
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 19. Thus, to convict Davilla-Castro of Level 6 felony
    criminal recklessness, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1)
    he (2) recklessly, (3) with a knife, (4) walked at or toward the person of Grande
    or Pizarro, (5) thereby, creating a substantial risk of bodily injury to either
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1706-CR-1292 | November 30, 2017   Page 5 of 8
    Grande or Pizarro. Davilla-Castro focuses on the fourth element,5 contending
    that his conviction cannot stand because there was no direct evidence to
    support the element that he walked at or toward Grande or Pizarro with a knife,
    and the circumstantial evidence does not support a reasonable inference of
    such. Appellant’s Br. at 8-10 We disagree.
    [11]   Here, the State presented evidence that Grande and Pizarro were at Davilla-
    Castro’s apartment to drop off Tellez’s baby and were met outside by Tellez
    crying and saying that Davilla-Castro had hurt her. Tr. Vol. II at 10, 11.
    Pizarro, Grande, and Tellez all entered the apartment and found Davilla-Castro
    very mad and screaming. Id. at 15. Davilla-Castro took off his belt and
    wrapped it around his wrist as he approached Grande and threatened to fight
    him. Id. Due to Davilla-Castro’s aggressive actions, Pizarro and Tellez left the
    apartment. Id. Pizarro, concerned for Grande’s safety, returned to the
    apartment and saw Davilla-Castro and Grande fighting. Id. at 16. Davilla-
    Castro had a knife in his right hand, and Grande was holding onto Davilla-
    Castro’s wrists. Id. at 16, 26. Pizarro said that she “was very scared” at that
    moment because Davilla-Castro was trying to “stab” Grande. Id. at 17.
    Pizarro was concerned for Grande’s life. Id. At Grande’s instruction, Pizarro
    took the knife out of Davilla-Castro’s hand, and in the struggle, Davilla-Castro
    5
    To the extent Davilla-Castro argues that he did not have a knife, we are unpersuaded. Pizarro testified at
    trial that Davilla-Castro held a knife. While Davilla-Castro testified at trial that he never held a knife, his
    possession of a knife was a question of fact, which the trial court decided in favor of the State. We cannot
    reweigh that evidence. Krueger v. State, 
    56 N.E.3d 1240
    , 1244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1706-CR-1292 | November 30, 2017              Page 6 of 8
    cut his hand. 
    Id. at 17, 18
    . Responding to the 911 call, Officer Farnsley noted
    that Davilla-Castro was agitated with Grande. 
    Id. at 32
    . It was Officer
    Farnsley’s opinion that Davilla-Castro sustained the cut on his hand “during
    the struggle with the knife being taken away from him.” 
    Id. at 37
    . Grande
    appeared exhausted, sweaty, and a little nervous and relieved. 
    Id. at 31-32
    .
    Officer Farnsley noted that Grande had fresh cuts on his face that were
    bleeding. 
    Id. at 32
    . From this evidence, the finder of fact court could have
    made a reasonable inference that Davilla-Castro, agitated with Grande,
    approached him with a knife in order to engage him in a fight and to attempt to
    stab him, thereby creating a substantial risk of bodily injury.
    [12]   Davilla-Castro contends that the trial court drew an unreasonable inference
    from the above facts. He argues that the evidence showed only that: Davilla-
    Castro and Grande were involved in “a mutual fight”; Pizarro did not see how
    Grande’s injuries occurred; “Grande’s minor injuries to his head were not stab
    wounds, but appear more characteristic of a fist fight”; and the laceration
    Davilla-Castro sustained to the webbing between his thumb and index finger is
    consistent with his attempting to grab the blade of the knife as it was being held
    by someone else. Appellant’s Br. at 11. Davilla-Castro’s alternative version of
    the facts is an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility
    of the witnesses, which we cannot do. Krueger v. State, 
    56 N.E.3d 1240
    , 1244
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. Accordingly, we conclude that the State
    presented sufficient evidence to support Davilla-Castro’s conviction for Level 6
    felony criminal recklessness.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1706-CR-1292 | November 30, 2017   Page 7 of 8
    [13]   Affirmed.
    [14]   Najam, J., and Brown, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1706-CR-1292 | November 30, 2017   Page 8 of 8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 49A02-1706-CR-1292

Citation Numbers: 94 N.E.3d 763

Filed Date: 11/30/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023