Alvin Tucker v. Sejong Alabama, LLC , 519 F. App'x 579 ( 2013 )


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  •                 Case: 12-13685    Date Filed: 05/23/2013   Page: 1 of 3
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 12-13685
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cv-00268-MEF-WC
    ALVIN TUCKER,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    SEJONG ALABAMA, LLC,
    SEJONG GEORGIA, LLC,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Alabama
    ________________________
    (May 23, 2013)
    Before MARCUS, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Alvin Tucker, an African-American citizen of the United States, appeals pro
    se the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Sejong Alabama,
    Case: 12-13685     Date Filed: 05/23/2013     Page: 2 of 3
    LLC and Sejong Georgia, LLC (collectively “Sejong”) in Tucker’s employment
    discrimination action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
    1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a); and several Alabama
    torts. On appeal, Tucker argues that the district court erred in granting Sejong’s
    motion for summary judgment on Tucker’s discriminatory and retaliatory
    termination claims under § 1981 and Title VII, as well as on his state law claims.
    Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
    The only federal claims that Tucker has preserved for appeal are his claims
    of discriminatory and retaliatory termination. Tucker argues that the district court
    erred in finding that he had offered no direct evidence of discrimination. This
    argument is without merit. Tucker has failed to identify any statements by
    Sejong’s managers that show a discriminatory intent without inference. See
    Hinson v. Clinch Cnty., Ga. Bd. of Educ., 
    231 F.3d 821
    , 827 (11th Cir. 2000).
    Tucker has likewise not established sufficient circumstantial evidence of a prima
    facie case of discrimination or retaliation with regard to his termination.
    Nonetheless, even assuming arguendo that Tucker established a prima facie case
    for his discrimination and retaliation claims, the district court did not err in
    granting Sejong’s motion for summary judgment because Tucker did not show that
    Sejong’s reason for firing him was pretextual. See Chapman v. AI Transp., 
    229 F.3d 1012
    , 1024–25 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
    2
    Case: 12-13685     Date Filed: 05/23/2013   Page: 3 of 3
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-13685

Citation Numbers: 519 F. App'x 579

Judges: Kravitch, Marcus, Per Curiam, Wilson

Filed Date: 5/23/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/6/2023