Martinez v. United States Department of Energy , 170 F. App'x 517 ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
February 6, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
GEORGE R. MARTINEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 04-2321
(D. N.M.)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT (D.Ct. No. CIV-03-662 WPJ/ACT)
OF ENERGY, Samuel W. Bodman,
Secretary,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
McCONNELL, Circuit Judge.
Appellant George R. Martinez appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Appellee, the Secretary of the United States Department of
Energy, 1 on claims arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
1
Mr. Martinez brought this suit against then Energy Secretary Spencer
Abraham in his official capacity. On February 1, 2005, following the district
court’s November 12, 2004 decision in the case, Samuel W. Bodman officially
(continued...)
amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-631, 633-34. The crux of Mr.
Martinez’s suit is his claim of disparate treatment on the basis of age and race or
national origin, alleging the Department of Energy passed him over for positions
in favor of younger, non-Hispanic employees. 2 We exercise jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
I. Factual Background
The relevant facts are mainly undisputed, with the exception of certain facts
which the district court found immaterial to its summary judgment determination
and which we address hereafter. To begin, Mr. Martinez is a Hispanic male, who
at the time in question was over forty years old, and for twenty-four years worked
for the Department of Energy in the Albuquerque, New Mexico, Operations
Office of the National Nuclear Security Administration, rising to the position of
senior courier. In February 2000, he applied for a position as lead courier when
1
(...continued)
replaced Mr. Abraham as Secretary of the Department of Energy, and therefore,
the caption in this case has been amended to reflect the substitution of Mr.
Bodman.
2
In his complaint, Mr. Martinez also alleged his employer retaliated
against him because of his participation in filing Equal Employment Opportunity
complaints. He later conceded to dismissal of the retaliation claims on the basis
of nonexhaustion; therefore, those claims are not before us on appeal.
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two openings were advertised. A total of seven individuals applied for the two
positions, with four of those applicants being over the age of forty and three of
Hispanic ethnicity. Three panel members in the position of unit commander in
the Albuquerque courier section evaluated the applicants. Another individual,
Philip Griego, a human resources specialist, sat in on the interviews to ensure
panel members conducted them in accordance with all applicable personnel
regulations and asked each applicant the same questions. The panel based its
evaluation and ranking of the applicants on their (1) application packages,
including their answers to the application questions and responses to the
knowledge, skills and abilities (KSA) criteria; 3 (2) on-the-job performance; (3)
leadership ability; and (4) interviews, which involved the same questions posed to
each applicant.
An examination of Mr. Martinez’s application establishes he misdated his
application over one year prior to the vacancy announcement. Under the heading
“Work Experience,” he merely stated, “I have been employed by DOE as a courier
3
The four KSA criteria contained in the vacancy announcement for the
lead courier position included: (1) knowledge of shipment security to include
demonstrated ability in tactical theories and practical application; (2) ability to
deal effectively with team members and a variety of people, interacting to
accomplish defined tasks; (3) ability to perform as a work leader; and (4) ability
to interpret and apply policies and regulations relative to shipment security.
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for my entire career! 24 years,” and provided no other description. Under the
heading “Education,” he wrote, “info is in my personnel file,” without furnishing
any other information, other than listing his 1972-1974 diploma in electronics
technology. In regard to other training or courses taken, he stated only, “I have
on the job experience and training for the past 24 yrs!” and did not list any
specific course or training. While he responded to the KSA criteria, he listed his
responses out of order. 4 A comparison of his responses with those of the
successful applicants clearly shows his responses were not as thorough as the
others, who listed in detail their prior work experience and specific education,
training, and courses.
With respect to the interview, the panel members and Mr. Griego agreed
Mr. Martinez did not present himself as well as the other applicants, who were
asked the same questions. According to them, Mr. Martinez appeared nervous,
slumped in his chair, and, at one point in the interview, put his arms behind his
head and his feet on the table. They discussed his performance and agreed he did
not present himself in a professional manner, gave very brief responses, and did
4
Mr. Martinez’s response to KSA criterion 4 is identified as number 2 on
his application; similarly, his response to KSA criterion 2 is identified as number
3 on his application; and his response to KSA criterion 3 is identified as number 4
on his application.
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not exhibit the leadership skills other applicants demonstrated. Although the
panel thought Mr. Martinez would score higher because of his experience, he did
not score as high as expected or in comparison with the other applicants.
According to Mr. Griego, who observed the panel members’ interviews and
ratings of those interviews, no discussion occurred as to the age, race, or national
origin of any applicant.
The panel submitted their evaluations and rankings to Ben Best, a facility
manager, who selected Anthony Mecca, an Anglo-American male under the age of
forty; and Anthony Chavez, a Hispanic male over the age of forty, for the two
lead courier positions. Approximately two weeks later, when another lead courier
position became open, Mr. Best selected one of the other applicants, David Smith,
an Anglo-American male under the age of forty. The three selected individuals
scored the highest in the applicable evaluations and rankings, while Mr. Martinez
scored the second lowest of the seven applicants. In August 2000, Mr. Martinez
filed an Equal Employment Opportunity complaint, alleging discrimination on the
basis of his age and race or national origin.
In 2001, three vacancies opened for traffic management specialists. A total
of fourteen individuals, including Mr. Martinez, were certified as eligible and
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applied. Instead of conducting interviews, Everett Goodman, Chief of the
Transportation Management Division, reviewed each applicant’s supervisory
appraisals and applications, and assigned a score to each application based on the
completeness and accuracy of each response to the six KSA criteria. 5 In scoring
the applications, Mr. Goodman used a system giving one point for any KSA
response which did not comprehensively address the applicable KSA criterion,
two points for a response which somewhat comprehensively addressed the KSA
criterion, and three points for a response which comprehensively addressed the
KSA criterion, including four or more examples of experience. Under the scoring
system, Mr. Martinez received the third lowest score out of the fourteen
applicants and responded to only five of the six KSA criteria. Mr. Goodman
selected two males of Anglo-American descent and a Hispanic male — all under
the age of forty. With respect to the successful Hispanic applicant, Mr. Goodman
selected him over an Anglo-American applicant, even though they scored the
5
The KSA criteria for the traffic management specialist positions
included: (1) knowledge of DOE, DOD, and DOT safety and security regulations
pertaining to the handling, storage, compatibility and transportation of nuclear
explosives, radioactive material, high explosives and dangerous goods; (2)
knowledge of the TSS classified computer based systems; (3) knowledge of OTS
operations and the ability to analyze OTS programmatic/operational problems and
develop solutions; (4) ability to interact effectively with all levels of AL
management and with mid-level managers for DOE Headquarters, DOD, and all
other federal agencies; (5) ability to perform oral presentations and communicate
technical matters; and (6) ability to prepare written technical documents and
presentation materials.
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same, because he was Hispanic. A comparison of the applicants’ responses to the
KSA criteria shows Mr. Martinez’s responses were not as thorough as the other
successful applicants. 6 In July 2001, Mr. Martinez filed another Equal
Employment Opportunity complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of his
age and race.
Unsuccessful in resolving his Equal Employment Opportunity complaints
within the Department of Energy 7, Mr. Martinez filed suit in federal court under
both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment
6
Mr. Goodman explained one individual received the highest score
because his application was “particularly thorough and well done”; he
“demonstrated specific knowledge of relevant aspects of the position”; he had
experience as a training instructor in areas related to the position; he had
experience in oral presentation directly related to one KSA criterion; and he
thoroughly addressed each of the six KSA criteria, “giving specific examples of
his previous experience and his knowledge of regulations as they relate to the ...
position.” Another individual scored second highest because his application was
thorough; he cited to specific regulations and orders directly related to KSA
criterion 1, and his responses to KSA criteria 2-6 “demonstrated extensive
knowledge of the required KSAs.”
With respect to Mr. Martinez’s application, Mr. Goodman pointed out his
response to KSA criterion 1 was strong, based on his previous experience
examples, but that his other responses were substandard because (1) his response
to KSA criterion 2 did not relate to the criterion; (2) his responses to KSA criteria
3-5 were not comprehensive and listed no specific examples; and (3) he did not
respond to KSA criterion 6.
7
Because Mr. Martinez did not receive an agency decision within 180 days
of filing his Equal Employment Opportunity complaints, he filed a complaint in
federal district court.
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Act on grounds he received disparate treatment on the basis of age and race or
national origin when the Department of Energy selected younger, non-Hispanic
employees for the open positions. Following briefing on the government’s motion
for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the government and against Mr. Martinez for the reasons articulated hereafter.
This appeal followed, in which Mr. Martinez raises the same contentions
comprehensively addressed by the district court in its summary judgment decision.
Namely, as contended in his affidavit opposing summary judgment, he claims a
material dispute of fact exists with respect to the panel and Mr. Griego’s
characterization of his interview and his own perception of his interview
performance. With respect to the position of traffic management specialist, he
claims the government impermissibly used unapproved, subjective scoring in
ranking the applications and that the district court improperly excluded, as
unauthenticated, scoring sheets attached to his affidavit.
II. Discussion
In articulating the standard of review and applicable discrimination law, we
rely largely on our decision in Jaramillo v. Colo. Jud. Dep’t, 427 F.3d 1303 (10th
Cir. 2005) (per curiam). We review de novo the district court’s summary
judgment decision and “consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
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non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences from the available
underlying facts.” Id. at 1307 (citation omitted). Summary judgment is
appropriate if the record shows “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c).
To prevail on a disparate treatment claim under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, the employee must show the employer intentionally discriminated
against him for a reason prohibited by the statute. Jaramillo, 427 F.3d at 1306.
If, as here, the employee relies on circumstantial evidence, “we apply the burden-
shifting framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792(1973).” Id. (citation omitted). Similarly, we analyze age discrimination cases
brought pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act under the
identical analytical framework established in McDonnell Douglas. See Garrett v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2002). Under McDonnell
Douglas, the employee must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by
showing “(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he applied for and was
qualified for the particular position; (3) he was not promoted despite his
qualifications; and (4) the position was filled or remained open after he was
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rejected.” 8 Jaramillo, 427 F.3d at 1306-07 (quotation marks and citations
omitted). If, as the government concedes in this case, the employee establishes a
prima facie case, then “a presumption of discrimination arises,” resulting in the
burden shifting to the employer “to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the adverse employment action.” Id. at 1307. If the employer “carries
its burden of production, the presumption of discrimination drops out of the
case,” and “[t]he burden then shifts back to the [employee], who must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s reasons are a pretext for
unlawful discrimination.” Id.An employee like Mr. Martinez can demonstrate pretext “by producing
evidence of such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or
contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a
reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence
infer that the employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons.”
8
Because the government concedes, for the purpose of summary judgment,
that Mr. Martinez met his prima facie case on both his age and race or national
origin claims, we need not address any inconsistencies in this Circuit’s treatment
of the fourth prong, as referenced in Jaramillo, 427 F.3d at 1307 n.1, other than
to note that the Supreme Court has explicitly held age-discrimination plaintiffs
need not show disparate treatment as compared to co-workers outside the
protected class (i.e., those under forty years of age) in establishing the fourth
prong. See O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312-13
(1996).
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Id. at 1308 (quotation marks and citation omitted). We have said “[e]vidence of
pretext may include prior treatment of [the employee]; the employer’s policy and
practice regarding minority employment (including statistical data); disturbing
procedural irregularities (e.g., falsifying or manipulating ... criteria); and the use
of subjective criteria.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). In so doing,
we have proceeded with caution in considering the relative merits of individual
employees, given this court “may not act as a super personnel department that
second guesses employers’ business judgments.” Id. (quotation marks and
citation omitted). We have explained “minor differences between [an
employee’s] qualifications and those of a successful applicant are not sufficient to
show pretext” and, instead, “the disparity in qualifications must be
‘overwhelming.’” Id. at 1308-09 (citations omitted). Generally, “an employee
must proffer evidence that shows each of the employer’s justifications are
pretextual.” 9 Id. at 1310 (quotation marks and citations omitted). In making a
9
As an exception, we have said that sometimes “a successful attack on part
of the employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation is enough to survive
summary judgment even if one or more of the proffered reasons has not been
discredited.” Jaramillo, 427 F.3d at 1310. Instances sufficient to create a
genuine issue of fact occur when:
(1) the reasons are so intertwined that a showing of pretext as to one
raises a genuine question whether the remaining reason is valid; (2)
the pretextual character of one explanation is so fishy and suspicious
that a jury could find that the employer (or its decisionmaker) lacks
(continued...)
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pretext determination, a court looks at the facts as they appeared to the person
making the employment decision, see Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220
F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir. 2000), because it is the employer’s “perception ... that
is relevant, not [the employee’s] subjective evaluation of his own relative
performance.” Kelley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 220 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th
Cir. 2000) (quoting Furr v. Seagate Tech, Inc., 82 F.3d 980, 988 (10th Cir.
1996)). In addition, we have repeatedly held a nonmovant’s conclusory and self-
serving affidavit, without other supporting evidence, is insufficient for the
purpose of surviving summary judgment. See Salguero v. City of Clovis, 366 F.3d
1168, 1177 n.4 (10th Cir. 2004); Garrett, 305 F.3d at 1213; Murray v. City of
Sapulpa, 45 F.3d 1417, 1422 (10th Cir. 1995).
Having considered the applicable standard of review and discrimination
law, we turn to the district court’s decision, which is extremely thorough, well-
9
(...continued)
all credibility; (3) the employer offers a plethora of reasons, and the
[employee] raises substantial doubt about a number of them; (4) the
[employee] discredits each of the employer’s objective explanations,
leaving only subjective reasons to justify its decision; or (5) the
employer has changed its explanation under circumstances that
suggest dishonesty or bad faith.
Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). None of these circumstances has
been demonstrated in this case.
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articulated, and well-reasoned. For judicial economy, we find it unnecessary to
recount it in its entirety and provide instead a summary sufficient to explain our
affirmance. In ruling in favor of the government, the district court determined it
provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for selection of others over Mr.
Martinez for the lead courier positions when it pointed to his incomplete answers
on his application and his less-than-thorough responses to the KSA criteria,
including numbering his responses out of order. Our own comparison of Mr.
Martinez's application and KSA responses with those of the individuals selected
shows Mr. Martinez’s application was woefully deficient.
The district court also considered the panel and Mr. Griego’s contention
Mr. Martinez did not present himself very well at the interview; i.e., appearing
nervous, slumping in his chair, putting his arms behind his head and his feet on
the table, giving brief responses, and showing a lack of leadership skills. Based
in part on these reasons, the district court noted Mr. Martinez received the second
lowest evaluation out of the seven applicants and determined the government
carried its burden of articulating legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its
selection of the other applicants. We agree.
Having determined the government carried its burden of articulating
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legitimate, facially non-discriminatory reasons for not promoting Mr. Martinez to
the position of lead courier, we arrive at Mr. Martinez’s argument of pretextual
discrimination based on his claim of disputed material facts which prohibited
summary judgment regarding the lead courier positions. Specifically, Mr.
Martinez asserts, as he did in his affidavit, that he performed well in the interview
and denies he slumped in his chair, put his hands behind his head, put his feet on
the table, appeared nervous, provided brief answers, or demonstrated a lack of
leadership skills. First, we find Mr. Martinez’s self-serving affidavit, without
other supporting evidence, unpersuasive. See Salguero, 366 F.3d at 1177 n.4;
Garrett, 305 F.3d at 1213; Murray, 45 F.3d at 1422. Next, as the district court
explained, the panel’s perceptions of Mr. Martinez during his interview did not
create the requisite material dispute of fact because a pretext challenge requires
the court to look at the facts as they appeared to the persons making the
employment decision, not the employee’s subjective evaluation of his own
performance. See Kelley 220 F.3d at 1178; Kendrick , 220 F.3d at 1231; Furr, 82
F.3d at 988. Alternatively, as the district court determined, even if Mr.
Martinez’s contentions did create a dispute of fact, they are immaterial, given the
other shortcomings in his application, including his cursory application answers
and KSA criteria responses. In other words, even without considering the facts
disputed by Mr. Martinez, or viewing them in the light most favorable to him,
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sufficient other legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons existed to select the others
over Mr. Martinez.
With regard to the issue of subjectivity in the interview process, we have
said pretext is typically inferred when “the criteria on which the employers
ultimately rely are entirely subjective in nature.” Green v. New Mexico, 420 F.3d
1189, 1195 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Jones v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 1260, 1267-68
(10th Cir. 2003)). In this case, we agree with the district court that no inference
of pretext exists, because the government did not rely solely on subjective
considerations but based its employment decisions on objective factors such as
Mr. Martinez’s non-responsive and incomplete answers to the application
questions and the KSA criteria, which were lacking in comparison with those of
the successful applicants. Moreover, as the district court pointed out, subjective
factors must play some role in considering individuals for upper level positions
and do not, per se, constitute discrimination. 10 (Relying on Pitre v. W. Elec. Co.,
10
In addition, the district court considered and rejected Mr. Martinez’s
claim certain comments showed the government inferred a discriminatory bent
against employees over forty. Specifically, Mr. Martinez asserted a manager of
the Office of Secure Transportation referred to him and other “senior couriers” as
the “old guys” at a June 2001 meeting, and another person made reference to
“older guys who put in for other positions,” although he could not recall who
made that statement or others who might have heard it. The district court
correctly determined that these comments were not sufficient to carry Mr.
(continued...)
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843 F.2d 1262, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 1988).) For these reasons, we conclude Mr.
Martinez did not carry his burden of showing a pretext of discrimination with
regard to the lead courier positions.
As to the traffic management specialist positions, the district court
determined the government provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
its selection of others over Mr. Martinez when it pointed out he scored third
lowest out of fourteen applicants based on the KSA response scoring system
applied to each application. The district court noted Mr. Goodman, the person
applying the scoring system, sufficiently explained the shortcomings in Mr.
Martinez’s responses to the KSA criteria as compared with those of the three
individuals selected. After reviewing the KSA responses, we agree with the
district court that “even a cursory comparison between [Mr. Martinez’s] responses
to the KSA’s for the Traffic Management Specialist position, and the other
applicants would convince any reasonable fact-finder that [the government’s]
10
(...continued)
Martinez’s burden of showing pretextual discrimination because he failed to show
a connection between them and his non-selection, especially since the identified
2001 comment occurred after the government had already selected others over Mr.
Martinez for the lead courier and traffic management specialist positions and the
statement occurred in front of around 100 people. Mr. Martinez does not contest
the district court’s resolution of this point on appeal; therefore, we need not
address it further, other than to note he has clearly not shown a connection
between these comments and his non-selection.
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reasons for not selecting [him] were legitimate and non-discriminatory.” As a
result, the government carried its burden of articulating legitimate, facially non-
discriminatory reasons for not promoting Mr. Martinez to the position of traffic
management specialist, thereby shifting the burden back to Mr. Martinez to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the government’s reasons are a pretext
for unlawful discrimination. See Jaramillo, 427 F.3d at 1307.
While Mr. Martinez suggests the Energy Department used unauthorized,
impermissible, subjective scoring in assessing the applications of the traffic
management specialist positions, he provides no evidence to overcome his
patently substandard responses to the KSA criteria, including his failure to
address one of the six criteria considered important to the selection decision. In
addition, as the district court pointed out, the KSA criteria reasonably required
each applicant to demonstrate proficiency in responding to those criteria, their
written responses provided a reasonable method to determine their proficiency
and the best qualified applicant for the position, and the use of the three-step
grading option to score each response separately was reasonable, even if it
involved a certain degree of subjectivity. As to Mr. Martinez’s contentions the
human resources department did not preapprove the scoring criteria relied on by
Mr. Goodman, the district court noted the person who would have approved it
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provided an affidavit stating it was consistent with the rating guides or schedules
applied to all applicants.
Finally, as to the documents attached to Mr. Martinez’s affidavit which he
claims the district court improperly failed to consider, we agree he did not properly
authenticate them; therefore, it is unclear whether they are, as he purports, scoring
sheets reflecting Mr. Goodman’s ratings on the KSA criteria responses. However,
as the district court pointed out, even if the scoring sheets are admissible, a review
shows they do not support Mr. Martinez’s position Mr. Goodman based his selection
solely on impermissible, subjective factors. After considering all of the
circumstances presented, it is clear Mr. Martinez has not produced evidence “of such
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions” by
his employer for us to rationally conclude the proffered reasons for its selection of
others over Mr. Martinez are unworthy of credence and that it did not act for the non-
discriminatory reasons asserted. Jaramillo, 427 F.3d at 1308. Consequently, Mr.
Martinez has failed to carry his burden of showing pretextual discrimination
sufficient to overcome summary judgment with respect to the traffic management
specialist positions.
III. Conclusion
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For the reasons cited in the district court’s November 12, 2004 decision and
those articulated herein, we AFFIRM summary judgment in favor of the Secretary
of the Department of Energy.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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