Johnson v. State , 816 P.2d 220 ( 1991 )

MANNHEIMER, Judge.

Herbert D. Johnson, Sr. was convicted, based upon his plea of no contest, of misconduct involving a controlled substance in the fourth degree, a class C felony. AS 11.71.040(a)(3)(F). Superior Court Judge Beverly W. Cutler suspended imposition of sentence for three years, conditioned on Johnson’s payment of $500 court costs and his performance of 240 hours community work service.

Johnson now appeals his sentence, contending that it is excessive. The State of Alaska responds that Johnson has no right to appeal his sentence because he did not receive a sentence of at least 45 days’ imprisonment. See Appellate Rule 215(a).

Appellate review of sentences has a tortuous history in Alaska. In Bear v. State, 439 P.2d 432, 436 (Alaska 1968), the Alaska Supreme Court held that it lacked the authority to review a criminal sentence when the defendant claimed no illegality of the sentence but only that the sentence was excessive. Following the decision in Bear, the legislature enacted AS 12.55.120, a law giving the supreme court the authority to hear sentence appeals. However, under the terms of the statute, the court’s authority extended only to cases in which the defendant had received one year or more of imprisonment.

Seven years later, the supreme court enacted former Appellate Rule 21(a). This rule extended the right of sentence appeal to any defendant receiving a term of imprisonment of 45 days or more. The language of former Appellate Rule 21(a) has survived, with no pertinent changes, in current Appellate Rule 215(a):

At the time of imposition of any sentence of imprisonment of 45 days or more, the [sentencing] judge shall inform the defendant ... [t]hat the sentence may be appealed on the ground that it is excessive[.]

In Wharton v. State, 590 P.2d 427, 429 (Alaska 1979), the supreme court interpreted this language from former Appellate. Rule 21(a) as allowing a sentence appeal to any criminal defendant who had received a “sentence of imprisonment of 45 days or more”.

The scope of this court’s jurisdiction to entertain sentence appeals is clouded because, in 1980, the Alaska legislature responded to the Wharton decision by passing chapter 12 SLA 1980. Sections 8, 15, 29, and 31 of this law enacted new versions of AS 22.10.020, AS 22.15.240, and AS 12.-55.120 that limited sentence appeals to district court cases in which the defendant had received a sentence of imprisonment of at least 90 days and to superior court cases in which the defendant had received a sentence of imprisonment of at least one year. Sections 37 and 38 of the new law expressly stated that the legislature intended to amend Appellate Rule 21(a), and the legislature passed chapter 12 SLA 1980 by the two-thirds’ majority required by Article IV, Section 15 of the Alaska Constitution. See 1980 House Journal 540 and 1980 Senate Journal 467.

Matters are further complicated by the supreme court’s adoption, three months later, of a revised version of the Appellate Rules. The rules were reorganized and renumbered; as noted above, former Appellate Rule 21(a) became current Appellate Rule 215(a). According to the revisor’s commentary to proposed Rule 215, the new rule was intended to re-enact former Rule 21 in all pertinent aspects. The revisor then discussed the recent action of the legislature:

The legislature changed the introductory provisions of this rule by sections 8, 15, 29, 31, 37, and 38 of Chapter 12, SLA 1980, to provide that certain sentences of short duration cannot be appealed as excessive. Wharton v. State, 590 P.2d 427 (Alaska 1979), indicates that the legislature does not have the authority to do so.

Memorandum of June 13, 1980, from Robert D. Bacon, Clerk of the Appellate Courts. The revisor’s use of the word “indicates” rather than “holds” appears to have been prudent, since it is unclear whether the decision in Wharton was premised upon the supreme court’s rule-making power granted by Article IV, Section 15, or whether Wharton was actually a pronouncement that the Alaska constitution vested the supreme court with exclusive power to determine the scope of its jurisdiction over sentence appeals, in spite of any contrary action taken by the Alaska legislature under Article IV, Section 1.

This court need not enter the thorny thicket lying in the path of anyone attempting to reconcile the language of Appellate Rule 215(a), the supreme court’s decision in Wharton,, and the legislature’s passage of chapter 12 SLA 1980. Even if this court were to adopt the view of the law most favorable to Johnson, this appeal must still be dismissed.

As interpreted in Wharton, Appellate Rule 215(a) limits sentence appeals to defendants who have received a “sentence of imprisonment of 45 days or more”. Johnson has not received such a sentence.

It is conceivable that the requirement of a 45-day sentence specified in Appellate Rule 215(a) might be relaxed under Appellate Rule 521:

These rules are designed to facilitate business and advance justice. They may be relaxed or dispensed with by the appellate courts where a strict adherence to them will work surprise or injustice.

But Johnson has failed to make a convincing showing that our adherence to the language of Appellate Rule 215(a) will work either surprise or injustice in his case.

Johnson argues that, because Appellate Rule 215(a) speaks only of when a defendant must be notified of his right of sentence appeal, the right of sentence appeal might actually extend to any criminal defendant, even the ones who need not be notified. We reject this interpretation for two reasons. First, Johnson’s interpretation appears to be inconsistent with the way the supreme court interpreted former Rule 21(a) in Wharton. Second, it does not make sense that the Alaska Supreme Court, in promulgating former Rule 21(a) and current Appellate Rule 215(a), would have proceeded under the assumption that all criminal defendants had a right to file a sentence appeal but only some of them should be told about it.

Thus, under the most expansive view that this court might take of its sentence appeal jurisdiction, Johnson still fails to qualify for sentence review. This appeal is DISMISSED.