Dodd v. Boies , 88 Ariz. 401 ( 1960 )

BERNSTEIN, Justice.

This is an original petition for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain the release of petitioner from the Maricopa County jail, where he is being held, without bail, for trial.

The principal issue before the Court is whether the evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing justified the magistrate in concluding there was “probable cause” that petitioner was guilty of the offense with which he was charged. Under our statutes, 17 A.R.S. Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 33, and § 13-2012, the magistrate shall hold a defendant for trial if he has no jurisdiction, and if he concludes upon preliminary hearing there is probable cause that defendant is guilty of the offense charged. He is also required to discharge defendant if he finds such probable cause does not exist. This Court recently stated, in discussing the function of the magistrate, that:

“ * * * a magistrate conducting a preliminary hearing should be mindful that his duty is not to determine the ultimate guilt or innocence of a defendant, or determine the degree of the crime charged, but only to determine whether there is probable cause to believe defendant guilty of the offense charged, and leave to the trial tribunal the final determination of the application of the law to the facts and leave to the jury the question as to whether defendant is guilty of the offense charged or of an included offense.” Application of Williams, 85 Ariz. 109, 117-118, 333 P.2d 280, 285-286.

The record discloses that about 1:30 A.M. on the morning of June 11, 1960, petitioner approached Jesse Williams and asked him for a gun. Williams told petitioner that he did not have a gun, but that Leonard Phillips had one. Petitioner then asked Williams to get the gun from Phillips and shortly thereafter, Phillips returned with a gun which he gave to the codefendant, Melvin Dixon. Thereupon the petitioner, Williams, Phillips, and Dixon went beside the fire house where Dixon test-fired the gun. After the gun was test-fired, the group walked over to the Oasis Cafe. Williams testified that a short time later, while he was talking with his cousin in front of the Broadway Cafe, he heard a shot, and as he ran, he saw upon looking into the Broadway Cafe, the victim clutching a chair, the codefendant Melvin Dixon standing up, and petitioner sitting down in a booth.

Petitioner is here charged with first-degree murder under A.R.S. § 13-451, § 13-452, and § 13-453. The State concedes petitioner did not do the actual killing. It is the State’s position, however, that petitioner “aided and abetted” codefendant, thus rendering himself a “principal” to the crime within the meaning of A.R.S. § 13-139, which provides:

“All persons concerned in the commission of a crime whether it is a felony or misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, or, not being present, have advised and encouraged its commission * * * are principals in any crime so committed.”

There is a serious question as to whether the magistrate was justified in deciding there existed probable cause that petitioner aided and abetted, especially in view of this Court’s statement as to what acts are necessary to render one a principal.

“The ‘aiding’ or ‘abetting’ contemplated by the statute is some positive act in aid of the commission of the offense—a force physical or moral joined with that of the perpetrator in producing it. The aider or abettor must stand in the same relation to the crime as the criminal, approach it from the same angle, touch it at the same point. * * ” State v. Martin, 74 Ariz. 145, 151, 245 P.2d 411, 414 citing for the quoted proposition Baumgartner v. State, 20 Ariz. 157, 178 P. 30.

Our cases and statute make it clear that in order to be guilty as a principal, one must possess criminal intent. A.R.S. § 13—131; Acker v. State, 26 Ariz. 372, 379, 226 P. 199, 201.

The crux of the problem depends upon what is meant by the phrase “probable cause”. It has been held in order for a magistrate properly to conclude there is “probable cause” defendant committed the offense for which he is charged, there must be “ * * * more evidence for, (rather) than against”, defendant’s guilt, Davis v. Superior Court, 175 Cal.App.2d 8, 22-23, 345 P.2d 513, 522, and there must exist “such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary caution or prudence to believe, and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.” Davis v. Superior Court, supra (emphasis supplied); People v. Nagle, 25 Cal.2d 216, 222, 153 P.2d 344, 347. Thus, although the State need not, at a preliminary hearing, present as much proof as would be required to sustain a conviction (People v. Nagle, supra), it must do more than create a mere suspicion that defendant is guilty of the offense for which he is charged.

The only evidence to link petitioner with codefendant Dixon is the testimony indicating at about 1:30 A.M. he (petitioner) told the witness Williams, Dixon “would give me $2 for the gun”; that he was present, along with Williams and Leonard Phillips, when Dixon test-fired' the gun behind the fire station, and he was seen at about 2:00 A.M., immediately after the shooting, sitting down in a booth in the Broadway Cafe. There is no evidence showing petitioner had been with codefendant Dixon prior to petitioner’s conversation with the witness Williams, nor is there any evidence demonstrating petitioner accompanied Dixon when the latter entered the Broadway Cafe with gun in hand. Most significant, there is no direct evidence to indicate petitioner was aware of the purpose for which Dixon later used the gun, if such a purpose even existed at the time the request was made.

The basis, therefore, for concluding there is “probable cause” petitioner aided and abetted codefendant Dixon in the murder of Stewart, rests squarely on the inferences that, at the moment petitioner told Williams to get a gun for Dixon who would pay $2 for it, he was fully aware of and acting in concert with Dixon’s criminal intent, and that Dixon harbored such an intent at the time petitioner approached Williams.

It is well established “purely speculative inferences or conclusions do not constitute substantial evidence”, Lemons v. Holland, 205 Or. 163, 199, 284 P.2d 1041, 286 P.2d 656, 657, and “an inference cannot * * * stand in the face * * * of another inference equally reasonable.” Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Gordon’s Transports, 6 Cir., 154 F.2d 390, 394; Stambaugh v. Hayes, 44 N.M. 443, 103 P.2d 640, 645; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333, 339-340, 53 S.Ct. 391, 77 L.Ed. 819; Burdick v. Bongard, 256 Minn. 24, 28, 96 N.W.2d 868, 872. It appears to us the evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing is susceptible of a multitude of inferences, equally as reasonable as the one drawn by the magistrate below, and the choice of the inference drawn by him must have depended upon speculation. For example, we think it reasonable to infer petitioner was unaware of Dixon’s plan (if such existed) when the former asked Williams to get a gun, and petitioner was getting the gun for Dixon because the latter was in fear of Stewart, the eventual victim; or petitioner was getting the gun to protect himself in what is admittedly a rough district. The character of the neighborhood in which the events occurred render several inferences plausible which might not, in a different locale, be at all sound.

Where the evidence is as wholly inconclusive as we see it, it is impossible for us, in good conscience, to agree the magistrate was justified in concluding there existed “probable cause” to believe that petitioner was guilty of the offense for which he was charged. It does not appear that, at the preliminary hearing, there was more evidence for, rather than against, petitioner’s guilt, or that the facts could lead a man of ordinary caution to conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of Dodd’s guilt.

Writ granted.

STRUCKMEYER, C. J., and LESHER, J., concur.