State v. Charpentier , 131 Idaho 649 ( 1998 )

SCHROEDER, Justice.

This case is on appeal from the district court’s order suppressing evidence seized pursuant to a warrantless search of an automobile subsequent to the arrest of the driver. The district court granted the motion to suppress on the basis that Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution provides greater protection against a warrantless search incident to arrest than does the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the district court, and this Court granted review. The case is before the Court upon the State’s petition for rehearing of this Court’s prior opinion affirming thp district court’s decision.

I.

BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

The parties do not dispute the facts as stated by the district court:

On August 31, 1994, Officer J. Mabey of the Lewiston Police Department, at approximately 2:00 p.m., observed a small white vehicle traveling at approximately 53 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. speed zone. When Mabey stopped the car, he discovered that the driver’s, Charpentier, driving privileges were suspended and further determined that her restricted license did not extend to the period during which she was stopped. As a result, Charpentier was arrested for driving without privileges. She was handcuffed and placed in Mabey’s patrol car. Mabey then returned to Charpentier’s vehicle and, relying upon the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement, searched the car and found a small amount of substance resembling marijuana and two plastic straws. He also found and opened a small pouch which in turn contained a plastic baggie in which a yellow-white substance and two plastic straws were found. The latter substance tested positive as Methamphetamine. Charpentier was charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance____

Charpentier moved to suppress use of the methamphetamine as evidence. The issue considered by the district court was “[w]hen a defendant, following a traffic stop, has been removed from a vehicle, handcuffed and placed in a patrol ear, does Idaho Const. Art. I, § 17 permit a search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle, including containers, as an incident of that traffic arrest?” The district court ruled that although the search was permissible under the U.S. Constitution as interpreted in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), a “review of cases satisfies this Court that the issue of state constitutional protection has not been examined at the appellate level.” The district court granted the motion to suppress, holding that protections under Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution prohibited the search. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the Idaho Supreme Court implicitly addressed this issue in State v. Smith, 120 Idaho 77, 813 P.2d 888 (1991), when it stated that “Idaho has adopted the rule in Belton.” Id. at 80, 813 P.2d at 891 (citing State v. Calegar, 104 Idaho 526, 661 P.2d 311 (1983)). This Court granted Charpentier’s petition for review.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When considering a case on review from the Court of Appeals, this Court gives serious consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals; however, this Court reviews the trial court’s decision directly. State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 702, 931 P.2d 1218, 1220 (1997). In other words, this Court is not merely reviewing the correctness of the Court of Appeals’ decision; rather this Court is hearing the matter as if the case were on direct appeal from the trial court’s decision. State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290, 900 P.2d 196, 198 (1995) (citing Valley Bank v. Stecklein, 124 Idaho 694, 696, 864 P.2d 140, 142 (1993)).

The facts in this case are not in dispute. This Court engages in a free review of whether the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts. State v. Peightal, 122 Idaho 5, 7, 830 P.2d 516, 518 (1992); State v. Weber, 116 Idaho 449, 451-52, 776 P.2d 458, 460-61 (1989).

III.

THE EVIDENCE WAS VALIDLY SEIZED PURSUANT TO A SEARCH INCIDENT TO THE ARREST.

In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), the United States Supreme Court dealt with the question of whether, in the course of a search incident to the lawful custodial arrest of the occupants of an automobile, police may search inside the automobile after the arrestees are no longer in it. In Belton, a state policeman stopped a speeding automobile with four occupants. The officer directed the men to get out of the car and placed them under arrest for the unlawful possession of marijuana. The officer then searched the passenger compartment of the automobile where he found a jacket with cocaine inside a zipped pocket. The owner of the jacket, Belton, moved to suppress the cocaine that the officer had seized. The Supreme Court determined that the search was valid, stating that:

[W]e hold that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.

It follows from this conclusion that the police may also examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment, for if the passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in it be within his reach. Such a container may, of course, be searched whether it is open or closed, since the justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have.

Id. at 460-61, 101 S.Ct. 2860 (citations omitted).

The district court found, and Charpentier agrees, that the search in this case was valid under the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. However, the district court determined that Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution provides greater protection to privacy rights and that, consequently, the search of Charpentier’s ear was invalid under the Idaho Constitution. This Court disagrees with the district court and concludes that the rule enunciated in Belton is the proper interpretation of what protections are provided by Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution for the reasons set forth in Belton and additional considerations not articulated in that opinion. Consequently, the search of Charpentier’s ear was valid under the Idaho Constitution.

It is unlikely that there is any area of activity that places the police and public in contact with one another on a recurring basis more than the operation of a motor vehicle. Arrests are certain to occur in a number of cases, and there is a need for clear rules that give both the police and the public an understanding of what the police can and cannot do. The Belton court noted this need:

In short, “[a] single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.”

Id. at 458, 101 S.Ct. 2860 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979)).

The United States Supreme Court also noted that no straightforward rule had developed in either the federal cases or state cases on application of the Fourth Amendment protections respecting the question of the proper scope of a search of the interior of an automobile incident to a lawful custodial arrest of the occupants — specifically, the right to search inside the automobile after the persons under arrest are no longer in the vehicle. The United States Supreme Court noted that “[wjhen a person cannot know how a court will apply a settled principle to a recurring factual situation, that person cannot know the scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope of his authority.” Id. at 459-60, 101 S.Ct. 2860. Along this line, the Belton court made this observation:

“[The] Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by the exclusionary rule, is primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activities and thus ought to be expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police in the context of the law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged. A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they may be ‘literally impossible of application by the officer in the field.’ ”

Id. at 458, 101 S.Ct. 2860 (quoting LaFave, “Case-by-Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup.Ct. Rev. 127,141).

In response to these concerns the United States Supreme Court adopted the rule that a police officer may search the passenger compartment of an automobile as a contemporaneous incident of the arrest, even if the occupant has been removed from the automobile. Further, the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment may be searched, whether open or closed. Finally, the validity of the search is not dependent upon the nature of the container. Id. at 461, 101 S.Ct. 2860. The Court observed that “[a] custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.” Id. (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973)).

The disarray in results noted by the United States Supreme Court and the need for a clear rule understood by both the public and the police are compelling reasons to adopt the rule enunciated in Belton as the proper interpretation of Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. There is nothing in our history or jurisprudence that indicates a contrary result should be reached. There is merit in having the same rule of law applicable within the borders of our state, whether an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment or its counterpart — Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution — is involved. Such consistency makes sense to the police and the public.

Beyond the reasons articulated in Belton, there are other factors worthy of note. The use of the automobile on public roads is extensively regulated. Drivers must be licensed. The roadways belong to the public. There are insurance requirements for operators of automobiles. There are extensive safety requirements for automobiles. In some areas there are emission standards. Inspections are authorized for various purposes, and there are limitations on the window tinting that is allowed that would exclude vision into the vehicle. These rules do not address the issue of the search of an automobile directly. However, they are indicative of the fact that the automobile is not comparable to the home. The expectation of privacy within the automobile falls far short of that accorded the sanctuary of the home. The level of privacy due the automobile is satisfied by the requirement that there must be a lawful arrest of the occupant before a search of the contents may take place.

It is also important to know that when an arrest has been made of the occupant or occupants of an automobile that the automobile can be left untended with the assurance that any weapons, evidence of crime or contraband have been removed from the reach of passersby or confederates in unlawful activity. This is not always a concern, but it is a sufficient concern to address. It is important to have a clear rule that is not subject to the myriad of factual subtleties that engross lawyers and judges but evades practical application and understanding by those who must make decisions on the spot under stress.

Under the rule adopted by this Court, the police know what they can do after they have made a lawful arrest. The public knows the extent of protection afforded from a search while utilizing the automobile. The automobile is not a haven for weapons, contraband or evidence of criminal activity once the threshold requirement that there be a lawful arrest has been reached. It is well that people know that and guide their conduct accordingly. The rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Belton and by this Court is a workable rule that this category of cases requires. It is straightforward, easily applied and predictably enforced.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The order of the district court suppressing the evidence is reversed.

SILAK, J., and SMITH, J. Pro Tem., concur.