CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Levant , 262 Ga. 313 ( 1992 )

Weltner, Presiding Justice.

The trial court entered judgment for Levant on the jury verdict awarding him $1,000,000 in an action brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 USCA § 51 et seq. A majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. CSX Transp. v. Levant, 200 Ga. App. 856 (410 SE2d 299) (1991).

We granted certiorari to determine whether the judgment of the trial court and the Court of Appeals should be reversed under Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Swindle, 260 Ga. 685 (398 SE2d 365) (1990).

After 17 minutes of deliberation, the jury awarded Levant a verdict of $1,000,000 ($56,000 more than that specifically requested by his counsel), although at trial Levant established lost wages through the date of trial of $46,342.97 and medical expenses of $11,694.79.

1. Presiding Judge Birdsong wrote in dissent:

Viewing [excerpts of Levant’s closing argument] it is apparent that in addition to arguing for legitimate damages, [Levant]’s counsel informed the jury that the railroad was maintaining its tracks with an inadequate number of people and would continue to do so unless the jury made them pay; that the railroad did not care about [Levant]; that the jury should do right by [Levant] whom counsel considered to be a good man and his friend; and, that the jury should stamp out those (the corporate appellant) who would try to have the jury not give [Levant] an award of adequate damages because [Levant] is a “labor man.” Inherent within [Levant’s closing argument is the message that the big railroad needed to be punished for these transgressions. This is precisely the danger condemned in Swindle and which provided the primary support for the court’s conclusion therein. [Dissent in CSX Transp. v. Levant, 200 Ga. App. at 864.]¹

2. As we stated in Swindle, supra:

[W]e find the jury verdict in this case to be a verdict that can only be logically explained as having resulted from a punitive cause, which is an improper cause in FELA cases. . . . “[A] detailed appraisal of the evidence bearing on damages,” [cit.] leads us to believe that the verdict here “raise [s] an irresistible inference that . . . [an] improper cause invaded the trial.” [Swindle, 260 Ga. at 686, 687.]

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Clarke, C. J., Benham and Sears-Collins, JJ., who dissent.

1 We note that here, as in Swindle, the trial court granted the railroad’s motion in limine, which precluded questions and remarks such as these and others found in the record that suggest punishing the railroad.