Adams v. Hercules, Inc. , 245 Ga. 464 ( 1980 )

Per curiam.

We granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Hercules, Inc. v. Adams, 150 Ga. App. 223 (257 SE2d 289) (1979), wherein it was held that a company handbook delivered to a new employee when hired, which furnished incomplete information concerning the company’s voluntary compensation plan contained in a master employment agreement, would bind the company if it did not contain adequate notice that the employee should consult the agreement. The Court of Appeals held that the issue of adequacy of the notice in the handbook of the existence of a master agreement remained in the case as an issue of fact for the jury, and, therefore, summary judgment for the employee should not have been granted.

At the outset, we specially note the following language from the Court of Appeals: "All parties appear to agree that an additional compensation plan offered by an employer and impliedly accepted by an employee, by remaining in employment, constitutes a contract between them, whether the plan is public or private, and whether or not the employee contributes to the plan. [Cits.]” 150 Ga. App. at 224. The Court of Appeals did not hold that the employee handbook was a contract between Adams and Hercules, but that the master agreement was a contract between them. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals noted the cases on point in other jurisdictions. See Gould v. Continental Coffee Co., 304 FSupp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Gallo v. Howard Stores Corp., 145 FSupp. 909 (E.D. Pa. 1956); Davilla v. Court Employment Project, Inc., 383 NYS2d 140 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1976); Gillette v. Heinrich Motors, Inc., 390 NYS2d 330 (S. C. N. Y. 1976); Fields v. Western Equipment Co. of Eugene, 469 P2d 779 (S. C. Ore. 1970); Voigt v. South Side Laundry & Dry Cleaners, Inc., 128 NW2d 411 (S. C. Wis. 1964). The construction of the handbook language in these cases, however, has been a matter of law for the courts to decide.

The question in this case, then, as we view it, is whether as a matter of law this handbook fairly put employees on notice of the master agreement, and that such master agreement should be examined to determine the benefits available under it. We hold that it does.

Under Part III of the handbook where the employee benefit plans are described, the following appears: "In addition to earned wages, Hercules has a liberal array of benefits such as Vacations, Holiday Pay, Insurance, etc. Hercules also has plans and policies designed to promote employee security, to assist in cases of illness, accident or old age, and to help employees provide for their dependents in case of death. These Benefit Plans should be considered as a base from which employees can build a complete protection plan to fit their individual needs.

"These less common Benefit Plans are presented here in a very brief form. Because of the nature of some of these Plans, revisions must occasionally be made. You may obtain the full details of all Benefit Plans from your Foreman, Supervisor or the Personnel Department.” (Emphasis supplied.)

This language, even if standing alone, would put the ordinarily prudent person on notice that the complete details were absent from this presentation, and that at least one other source should be consulted for "full details.” Despite the record’s indication that Adams did not have actual notice of the master agreement,, he should have made himself aware of the durational limitation on the "Voluntary Compensation Plan” simply by asking his foreman, supervisor or personnel office for full details as he was instructed he might do. While the handbook made no mention of a time limitation, had this been done Adams could have ascertained that there was a thirteen-week limitation on the employer’s promise to pay the difference between his wages and the amount of workers’ compensation benefits while absent from work due to an injury sustained in the course of his employment.

Argued November 13, 1979 Decided March 4, 1980 Rehearing denied March 18, 1980. George M. Rountree, for appellant. Wallace E. Harrell, for appellee.

In view of this holding, we reverse Division 1 of the Court of Appeals’ opinion. In Division 2, the Court of Appeals declined deciding the issue of whether the employee was bound to follow the grievance procedures provided in the master agreement. Since we have held that Adams should have been on notice that his voluntary compensation benefits were limited to thirteen weeks, and since Hercules has admitted that it owes Adams for thirteen wéeks of his disability, this question has been rendered moot.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Jordan, P. J., Nichols and Hill, JJ., who dissent.