Hughey v. Cloninger , 297 N.C. 86 ( 1979 )

HUSKINS, Justice.

This appeal challenges the legality of an appropriation made by the Gaston County Board of Commissioners to the Dyslexia School of North Carolina, Inc.

It is axiomatic that a county has no power to appropriate funds unless authorized to do so by the General Assembly. The General Assembly determines the purposes for which a county may appropriate funds, which funds shall be utilized, and the manner in which appropriations are to be made. As Justice Bobbitt, later Chief Justice, states in Harris v. Board of Commissioners, 274 N.C. 343, 163 S.E. 2d 387 (1968):

“Counties are creatures of the General Assembly and constituent parts of the State government. They possess only such powers and delegated authority as the General Assembly may deem fit to confer upon them.” (Citations omitted.)

Thus, the initial and dispositive question in this appeal is whether there was sufficient statutory authority for the appropriation made by the Gaston County Board of Commissioners to the Dyslexia School of North Carolina, Inc.

The Board of Commissioners contends its appropriation is authorized by G.S. 153A-248(a)(2) which provides:

“(a) A county may appropriate revenues not otherwise limited as to use by law:

* * * *

(2) To a sheltered workshop or other private, non-profit, charitable organization offering work or training activities to the physically or mentally handicapped, and may otherwise assist such an organization.”

Does an appropriation to a school for dyslexic children come within the ambit of a statute authorizing appropriations to sheltered workshops and like institutions which provide work or training for the physically and mentally handicapped? We think not. Our studies, summarized below, have led us to conclude that the sheltered workshop is designed to deal with health problems fundamentally different from those presented by dyslexic children. As a consequence the objectives, organizational structure, and therapeutic philosophy of a sheltered workshop are markedly different from those of a school for dyslexic children.

The objective of a sheltered workshop is to help people handicapped by mental illness or physical disability to “achieve the maximum functioning of which they are capable.” I. Zwerling, Aftercare Systems, in 5 American Handbook of Psychiatry 729 (D. Freedman, J. Dyrud eds. 1975). To accomplish this objective the sheltered workshop provides a working environment similar to that in the real world in which the patient works at a job and receives training in vocational and social skills. The therapeutic philosophy of a sheltered workshop is to rehabilitate the handicapped patients rather than to treat the underlying causes of their physical or mental disability. Treatment “represents a direct attack on the disabilities of the patient, while [rehabilitation] represents an effort to identify and exploit the patient’s assets to the end of providing the best possible community role.” Id. Ultimately, it is hoped the rehabilitative program provided by the sheltered workshop will help make “the transition to autonomous community life easier for the patient.” F. Braceland, Rehabilitation, in 5 American Handbook of Psychiatry 695. One of the best known sheltered workshop programs is operated by Goodwill Industries. In 1969 Goodwill Industries “estimated its workshops were servicing about 24,000 people per day and restoring 7000 of them to the labor market.” Id.

“The label ‘dyslexia’ has been overused in recent years. There is, however, a measure of agreement that the term implies the inability to cope with written and printed language in children who have average or better intellectual endowment and whose reading, writing, and spelling performance is considerably below their achievement in non-language-related subjects.” K. de Hirsch, Language Disabilities, in 2 Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry — II 2112-2116 (A. Freedman, H. Kaplan, B. Sadock eds. 1975). The objective of a school for dyslexic children is to help such children, who are of normal and above average intelligence, overcome the linguistic difficulties which hamper their academic progress in the fields of reading and writing. To accomplish this objective schools for dyslexic children provide their pupils with special remedial education designed to help them overcome their severe difficulties with language in an academic setting otherwise comparable to regular schools. Ultimately it is hoped the pupils can overcome their reading and writing difficulties to the point where they can return to regular schools. The therapeutic philosophy of these schools is treatment-oriented. Their goal is to turn hopelessly confused pupils into adequate readers and writers by directly attacking the perceptual difficulties which afflict them.

From this discussion it should be apparent that the sheltered workshop and the school for dyslexic children are fundamentally different institutions. The former seeks to rehabilitate patients who are mentally and physically deficient through work and vocational training, while the latter seeks to treat the linguistic difficulties of children of average and above average intelligence in an academic setting. Our studies have convinced us that G.S. 153A-248(a)(2) cannot be reasonably interpreted to encompass schools for dyslexic children.

Defendants argue that G.S. 153A-248(a)(2) should be liberally construed so as to enable boards of county commissioners to supplement the budgets of private special education facilities when it appears that the public school system cannot adequately provide for the special needs of all its learning disabled children. According to defendants the undisputed and urgent needs of learning disabled children who are not receiving adequate educational opportunities in the public school system amply justify a broad construction of G.S. 153A-248(a)(2).

We recognize that valid and urgent problems are presented in those instances where the public school system cannot adequately provide educational opportunities for all of its learning disabled children. However, since the General Assembly has specifically addressed this problem in other legislation, we find it unnecessary to adopt the broad construction requested by defendant. It is well established that where there are two statutes, one dealing specifically with the matter in issue and the other being in general terms which could conceivably address the matter in question, the specific statute controls. See Utilities Comm. v. Edmisten, Atty. General, 291 N.C. 451, 232 S.E. 2d 184 (1977). G.S. 115-315.7, et seq., in effect at the time the instant appropriation was made, deals specifically with the problems the Gaston County Board of Commissioners sought to remedy through its appropriation to the Dyslexia School of North Carolina.

Following is the statement of legislative policy and purpose declared in G.S. 115-315.7:

“The General Assembly of North Carolina recognizes that in unusual circumstances the public schools of this State cannot provide the necessary training for all of its exceptional children. It is further recognized that, in order for the exceptional child to obtain a proper education, it may become necessary for the child to attend a private or out-of-state institution. So that all of our young children may be trained to be useful citizens, and to provide our children with this opportunity where it may not exist in the public schools, it shall be the policy of this State to make an educational expense grant available to each eligible child as provided under this Article, for the private or out-of-state education of such child.”

The term “exceptional children” encompasses “severely learning disabled” children who suffer from dyslexia. G.S. 115-315.8(1). The tuition grants authorized by G.S. 115-315.7 are to be administered by the State Board of Education in cooperation with local boards of education. G.S. 15-315.11 and G.S. 15-315.12. Moreover, as part of comprehensive new legislation in the field of special education, effective 1 July 1977, the General Assembly specifically authorizes direct subsidies by State and local boards of education to private schools devoted to special education and to regular private schools so as to enable them to provide special education and related services. See G.S. 115-384; G.S. 115-377. Thus while the general terms of G.S. 153A-248(a)(2) could conceivably be construed to address the problem of inadequate educational opportunities for learning disabled children in the school system, it is evident that the specific remedies prescribed in G.S. 115-315.7, et seq., G.S. 115-384, and G.S. 115-377 are controlling.

Finally, we note the General Assembly has consistently delegated specific responsibility for the special education of learning disabled children to the State and local boards of education. See G.S. 115-315.16, et seq. (superseded by G.S. 115-363, et seq.); G.S. 115-315.7, et seq.; G.S. 115-315.23, et seq. Given this pattern of specific and comprehensive legislation in that field it is highly unlikely the General Assembly intended, by enacting G.S. 153A-248(a)(2), to authorize county boards of commissioners to appropriate funds directly to schools for dyslexic children. Such a result would be inconsistent with the broad policy-making and budgetary authority granted the State and local boards of education in the field of special education.

We therefore hold that the appropriation by the Gaston County Board of Commissioners to the Dyslexia School of North Carolina is not authorized by G.S. 153A-248(a)(2).

The Board of Commissioners next contends its appropriation is authorized by both G.S. 153A-149(c)(30) and G.S. 153A-255. In pertinent part, these statutes authorize appropriations respectively for “public assistance programs” or “social service programs” of the type created in Chapters 108 and 111 of the General Statutes. We have analyzed these statutes and reached the conclusion that neither statute, when fairly construed and applied to the facts here, authorizes the appropriation under challenge. A review of the various aid programs established by Chapters 108 and 111 of the General Statutes indicates that the education of dyslexic children is not the type of “social service program” or “public assistance program” contemplated by these chapters. The programs in Chapters 108 and 111 are responsive to the needs of impoverished citizens who are unable to provide for the basic necessities of life. The programs authorized in these chapters provide financial aid to those citizens who are aged and disabled and lack sufficient resources “to provide a reasonable subsistence,” G.S. 108-25(2); to dependent children who have “no adequate means of support,” G.S. 108-38(a)(3); to citizens who cannot afford adequate health care, see G.S. 108-59 through 61.4; to “needy children who are placed in foster homes,” G.S. 108-66; to the needy blind, see G.S. 111-13 et seq. In sum, the programs in Chapters 108 and 111 are addressed exclusively to the problems of poverty; whereas a school for dyslexic children is addressed exclusively to the treatment of a learning disability without regard to the financial status of those afflicted. We therefore hold that the challenged appropriation is not authorized by either G.S. 153A-149(c)(30) or G.S. 153A-255.

Since dyslexia constitutes a learning disability which is remedied through special education, the challenged appropriation might be justified as an exercise of the constitutional duty to “provide ... for a general and uniform system of free public schools.” N.C. Const., Art. IX, § 2(1). Such duty is constitutionally vested in the General Assembly. As Justice Barnhill, later Chief Justice, explains in Coggins v. Board of Education, 223 N.C. 763, 28 S.E. 2d 527 (1944):

“The establishment and operation of the public school system is under the control of the legislative branch of the government, subject only to pertinent constitutional provisions as to uniformity.”

In its discretion the General Assembly may delegate to local administrative units the general supervision and control of schools within their boundaries. See Coggins v. Board of Education, supra. Thus, the validity of this appropriation under the duty to provide “free public schools” depends on whether the General Assembly has delegated to boards of county commissioners the power to initiate and fund their own programs for the public schools. See generally, Harris v. Board of Commissioners, supra.

Pursuant to its duty to establish a general and uniform system of free public education, the General Assembly in Chapter 115 of the General Statutes has delineated the purpose and structure of public education in North Carolina. A review of this legislation leads us to conclude that the General Assembly has not delegated to boards of county commissioners the power to initiate and fund their own programs for the public schools; rather, county commissioners are delegated the power to fund only those school-related programs proposed by the board of education.

In the scheme of public education adopted by the General Assembly, the “general control and supervision of all matters pertaining to the public schools in their respective administrative units” is delegated to the county and city boards of education, subject to any paramount powers vested by law in the State Board of Education or any other authorized agency. G.S. 115-27. The board of education determines in the first instance the needs of its school system and proposes a budget to the board of county commissioners. The role of the county commissioners is to study the request for funds and provide by taxation such funds, and only such funds, as may be needed for economical administration of the schools. See G.S. 115-100.5 through 100.14; Administrative Unit v. Commissioners of Columbus, 251 N.C. 826, 112 S.E. 2d 539 (1960). It is well established that the role of the board of county commissioners in the funding of the school budget is not to interfere with the generab control of the schools vested in the board of education. See Dilday v. Board of Education, 267 N.C. 438, 148 S.E. 2d 513 (1966), and cases cited therein. Thus, under the scheme for public education devised by the General Assembly, the board of commissioners is empowered to appropriate funds only for items that are included by the board of education in its annual school budget. The board of county commissioners, absent statutory authority, cannot on its own initiative devise and fund programs for the school system. The program of aid for the Dyslexia School of North Carolina was devised and funded by the Gaston County Board of Commissioners on its own initiative. It follows, therefore, that the appropriation made directly to the school by that board was not authorized under the statutory scheme for public education adopted by the General Assembly.

In conclusion, we note the Court of Appeals reached the right result but for the wrong reason. It held that the challenged appropriation was prohibited by Article V, section 2(1) of the North Carolina Constitution which requires that all government expenditures be for a public purpose. See generally, Mitchell v. Financing Authority, 273 N.C. 137, 159 S.E. 2d 745 (1968). The court reasoned that direct disbursement of public funds to private entities, such as this school, “could not be the means used to effect a public purpose.” 37 N.C. App. at 112.

The constitutional problem under the public purpose doctrine perceived by the Court of Appeals is no longer present in view of the addition, effective 1 July 1973, of subsection (7) to Article V, section 2 of the North Carolina Constitution. Subsection (7) provides that the General Assembly may enact laws which permit the State, county, city or town, or any other public corporation to “contract with and appropriate money to any person, association, or corporation for the accomplishment of public purposes only.” Thus, under subsection (7) direct disbursement of public funds to private entities is a constitutionally permissible means of accomplishing a public purpose provided there is statutory authority to make such appropriation. Had there been such statutory authority in this case the direct appropriation of funds by Gaston County to the Dyslexia School of North Carolina would have presented no “public purpose” difficulties as it is well established that both appropriations and expenditures of public funds for the education of the citizens of North Carolina are for a public purpose. Education Assistance Authority v. Bank, 276 N.C. 576, 174 S.E. 2d 551 (1970). We note that cases from this Court cited by the Court of Appeals in support of its reasoning were decided on facts arising prior to the effective date of subsection (7).

Since this case is decided on statutory grounds, further discussion of the constitutional questions raised by this appeal is unnecessary. See State v. Blackwell, 246 N.C. 642, 99 S.E. 2d 867 (1957), and cases collected in 1 N.C. Index 3d, Appeal and Error § 3, n. 31.

The sum appropriated by the Gaston County Board of Commissioners to the Dyslexia School of North Carolina totaled $47,068.00. As of the filing of plaintiffs complaint, Gaston County had disbursed to the school approximately $22,068.00 of the sum appropriated. The parties agreed no funds would be disbursed in the future until the legality of the appropriation had been resolved. Thus, there now remains the matter of appropriate relief in regard to the $47,068.00 appropriation. With respect to this question we note the disbursement made prior to the commencement of this action was in good faith, for a commendable public purpose, and that Gaston County received the benefit of such expenditure. Therefore, relief in this case should be confined to restraining any further direct appropriations and disbursements by defendants to the Dyslexia School of North Carolina. See Comrs. of Brunswick v. Inman, 203 N.C. 542, 166 S.E. 519 (1932). See also, Improvement Co. v. Greensboro, 247 N.C. 549, 101 S.E. 2d 336 (1958); Manufacturing Co. v. Charlotte, 242 N.C. 189, 87 S.E. 2d 204 (1955); Hawkins v. Dallas, 229 N.C. 561, 50 S.E. 2d 561 (1948); Realty Co. v. Charlotte, 198 N.C. 564, 152 S.E. 686 (1930); McPhail v. Commissioners, 119 N.C. 330, 25 S.E. 958 (1896). It is so ordered.

For the reasons stated in this opinion the result reached by the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.