Medlock v. State , 264 Ga. 697 ( 1994 )

Hunstein, Justice.

Following a hearing conducted pursuant to our remand of this case in Medlock v. State, 263 Ga. 246 (430 SE2d 754) (1993), the trial court ruled that the State had demonstrated that, in questioning two defense character witnesses during Medlock’s trial about earlier criminal charges brought against Medlock, the prosecutor had acted in good faith and that his questioning was based on reliable information that could be supported by admissible evidence. See id. at (2). See also Christenson v. State, 261 Ga. 80 (8) (c) (402 SE2d 41) (1991). Medlock appeals from that ruling. We affirm.

As noted in our earlier opinion, this Court was concerned with the State’s cross-examination regarding two disorderly conduct charges, a criminal trespass charge, a driving too fast for conditions charge, and a DUI. Medlock, supra at 246. As to the DUI charge, the State on remand conceded it had no basis for a question regarding a DUI charge, but noted that the prosecutor, upon mentioning the DUI at trial, immediately withdrew the remark, apologized and explained it was a “misspeak” and stated repeatedly that there was no DUI. Although defense counsel moved for a mistrial when the DUI was first mentioned, after the prosecutor had apologized and reiterated that there was no DUI, defense counsel responded “[a]ll right,” and the trial proceeded without any ruling having been invoked as to the mistrial motion. Given these circumstances, we find no error in the trial court’s holding that appellant waived his objection to the State’s mention of the DUI. See Copeland v. State, 160 Ga. App. 786 (6) (287 SE2d 120) (1982) (failure to invoke ruling on motion for mistrial amounts to a waiver). See also Dover v. State, 250 Ga. 209 (4) (296 SE2d 710) (1982) (failure to invoke ruling as to a motion results in waiver of the issue for purposes of appeal).

As to all but one of the remaining charges,¹ appellant contends the documents introduced by the State on remand were not. sufficient under Christenson, supra, because the documents adduced were only certified copies of criminal charges and were thus inadmissible because the documents did not reflect either appellant’s pleas thereto or his convictions thereon. We do not agree with appellant that Christenson provides that the prosecuting attorney can use only convictions when testing character witnesses’ knowledge of a defendant. As noted in Medlock, supra, “Christenson did not work a change in the law but was a restatement of what has been the law in Georgia for quite some time. [Cits.]” Id. at 247, fn. 2. It is well-established that where the prosecuting attorney “[is] able to show”² that a reliable basis exists, State v. Clark, 258 Ga. 464 (369 SE2d 900) (1988), the prosecuting attorney can inquire whether the character witness has heard about arrests, convictions, and uncharged specific “ ‘bad acts’ ” of the defendant. Dover v. State, 192 Ga. App. 429, 436 (7) (385 SE2d 417) (1989). Accord Wells v. State, 261 Ga. 282 (4) (a) (404 SE2d 106) (1991). See also Lopez v. State, 259 Ga. 39 (2) (376 SE2d 673) (1989) (questioned about specific act of violence and an arrest); Chisholm v. State, 199 Ga. App. 746 (1) (406 SE2d 112) (1991) (questioned about an investigation into arson). See generally Daniel, Georgia Handbook on Criminal Evidence, § 4-19 (2nd ed.). Because the State was able to produce certified copies of appellant’s record which provided the evidentiary basis for the questioning about the various charges, we find no error in the trial court’s ruling.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Fletcher, J., who concurs in the judgment only, and Benham, P. J., who dissents.

1 Appellant does not challenge the trial court’s ruling as to the prosecuting attorney’s questioning about a 1991 disorderly conduct charge regarding which a certified copy of conviction was adduced.

2 While it is the better practice for the prosecuting attorney to be able to demonstrate the required good faith and reliable basis for the questions at the time the character witness is cross-examined, the prosecutor’s inability to so demonstrate at that time does not, contrary to appellant’s argument, mandate reversal. See, e.g., Christenson, supra at (8) (c) (remanding case to trial court for a determination whether district attorney could support his questions as required). By so concluding, however, we intimate no opinion whether, under circumstances not present in the instant case, a prosecutor’s lack of support for such questions at the time of trial may not reflect adversely on the good faith required in propounding the questions.