State v. Belt , 269 Ga. 763 ( 1998 )

Thompson, Justice.

We granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in Belt v. State, 227 Ga. App. 425 (489 SE2d 157) (1997), to answer this question: ‘Whether it is reversible error for a trial court, absent a request, to fail to instruct a jury that similar transaction evidence admitted for a limited purpose must be considered only for the limited purpose for which it was admitted.” We answer this question in the negative, and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Defendant was indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Following a USCR 31.3 (B) hearing, the trial court ruled that evidence regarding defendant’s conviction for two previous cocaine sales was admissible for the limited purposes of showing identity, intent and state of mind.

The similar transaction evidence was admitted at trial. Defense counsel made no oral or written request for a limiting instruction and no limiting instruction was given.

On appeal, defendant asserted that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the similar transaction evidence was admitted for limited purposes and was to be considered only for those limited purposes. The Court of Appeals agreed and reversed defendant’s conviction, holding that in cases where the trial court has determined that similar transaction evidence will be admitted at trial for a specified limited purpose, it is incumbent on the trial court to give a limiting instruction to the jury, even in the absence of a request. In so holding, the Court of Appeals erred.¹

It has long been the rule in this State that

[W]hen evidence is admitted for one purpose, as it was in the instant case, it is not error for the court to fail to instruct the jury to limit its consideration to the one purpose for which it is admissible, in the absence of a request to so instruct the jury. Patterson v. State, 233 Ga. 724 (6) (213 SE2d 612) (1975); Ivy v. State, 220 Ga. 699 (4) (141 SE2d 541) (1965); Jackson v. State, 204 Ga. 47 (3) (48 SE2d 864) (1943).

Harrell v. State, 241 Ga. 181, 186 (2) (243 SE2d 890) (1978). It follows that, having failed to request a limiting instruction, defendant cannot assert that the trial court erred because it did not give such an instruction.

Nothing in Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 641 (2) (409 SE2d 649) (1991), or Stephens v. State, 261 Ga. 467 (405 SE2d 483) (1991), compels us to reach a different result. Those cases simply set forth rules to ensure that, if similar transaction evidence is to be admitted, it is to be admitted properly. They do not imply that, when similar transaction evidence is admitted, the trial judge must give a limiting instruction even in the absence of a request.

Cases involving the admission of evidence of prior difficulties do not aid defendant’s cause. Neither Wall v. State, 269 Ga. 506 (2) (500 SE2d 904) (1998), nor Spearman v. State, 267 Ga. 600 (4) (481 SE2d 814) (1997), nor Kettman v. State, 257 Ga. 603 (7) (362 SE2d 342) (1987), can be read to require a trial court to give a limiting charge, in the absence of a request, when evidence of prior difficulties is admitted.

In passing, we note that, although a trial judge is not required in the absence of a request to give a limiting instruction when similar transaction evidence is admitted, it would be better for the trial judge to do so.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Benham, C. J., Fletcher, P. J., and Sears, J., who dissent.

1 In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals pointed out that there had been a split of authority in that court regarding the question in issue. One line of cases, typified by Bell v. State, 219 Ga. App. 553 (466 SE2d 68) (1995), and Sloan v. State, 214 Ga. App. 784 (449 SE2d 328) (1994), correctly held that, in the absence of a request, a limiting instruction was not required upon the introduction of similar transaction evidence. Another line, exemplified by Prickett v. State, 220 Ga. App. 244 (469 SE2d 371) (1996), and Moore v. State, 202 Ga. App. 476 (414 SE2d 705) (1992), took the position that it is error to fail to give a limiting instruction when similar transaction evidence is admitted, even in the absence of a request. To the extent that Prickett and Moore conflict with our decision in this case, they are overruled.