Clark v. Olsen , 110 Idaho 323 ( 1986 )

The Previous Opinion Issued February 14, 1985, is Hereby Withdrawn and this Opinion is Substituted Therefor.

ON REHEARING

DONALDSON, Chief Justice.

On June 13, 1967, plaintiff-appellant, Ross Clark appeared at a Montpelier City Council meeting. Clark owned several undeveloped lots on “M” Hill in Montpelier, and he sought to have an access road constructed to these lots. It was agreed that Clark would grade the proposed access road and that the city would apply the gravel.

On January 16, 1968, the Montpelier City Council passed Ordinance No. 428. The ordinance authorized the conveyance of a parcel of undeveloped property formerly dedicated as a public street, in exchange for an air compressor owned by Ivan Phelps. The property was subsequently conveyed to Donald Kunz, who was a city councilman at the time the ordinance was passed. Kunz then constructed a home on the property.

The property conveyed pursuant to Ordinance No. 428 overlapped the property which was to be used as an access road to Clark’s undeveloped lots. In fact, the home which Kunz constructed had an open-ended carport extending out from the east end of the house onto a portion of the proposed access road.

After learning of the passage of Ordinance No. 428, Clark protested and offered to purchase the property for $3,000. The offer was refused. Because relocation of the access route may be economically unfeasible, Clark claims that he has been unable to develop the lots which he owns on “M” Hill.

In June of 1971, Clark filed a complaint against the City Councilmen of Montpelier. The complaint prays that the court,

“declare the rights and duties of the Defendants in the controversy stated in this Complaint, and determine that the Defendants cannot and could not properly enter into the contract of the nature as described in this Complaint, that the City of Montpelier could not properly vacate a portion of the dedicated public street for the purposes as alleged in this Complaint, and that such Ordinance as attempted to vacate the street for such purpose is void, and that the contract of exchange as herein alleged is void, and that the Court grant all further and other declaratory judgment and relief as may be lawful and proper.”

In July of 1974, Clark moved for partial summary judgment. He sought a determination that the ordinance and subsequent conveyance of the property were void as a matter of law. Thereafter, the defendants moved for summary judgment based on Clark’s failure to join the city of Montpelier as an indispensable party. The defendants also alleged that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

In a Memorandum Decision dated January 4, 1978, the court held the ordinance void by reason of the defendants’ failure to comply with I.C. § 50-311, and granted Clark’s motion for partial summary judgment. (I.C. § 50-311 provides that streets which are vacated shall revert to the owner of the adjacent real estate.) A formal order in conformance with that decision was issued March 2, 1978.

A trial on all the remaining issues was set for November 30, 1979. On November 16, 1979, the defendants again moved for summary judgment, claiming that all issues in the case had been resolved by the court’s earlier order. In response, Clark moved to amend his complaint to more specifically detail the relief sought. By Memorandum Decision and Order dated May 9, 1980, the district court denied Clark’s motion to amend the complaint and granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment holding that the relief sought in Clark’s complaint was fully granted by the court’s earlier order on Clark’s motion for partial summary judgment.

Clark then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(e). In an order dated September 7, 1983, the district court denied Clark’s motion. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Clark asserts that the March 2, 1978, order did not grant all the relief requested in his original complaint. He further asserts that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to amend the complaint to further detail the relief sought. We will address each assertion in the order stated.

I

We begin our discussion by noting that technical rules of pleading have long been abandoned in this state. Rauh v. Oliver, 10 Idaho 3, 9, 77 P. 20, 21-22 (1904). The general policy behind the current rules of civil procedure is to provide every litigant with his or her day in court. Sines v. Blaser, 98 Idaho 435, 437, 566 P.2d 758, 760 (1977). The rules are to be construed to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. I.R.C.P. 1(a). The purpose of a complaint is to inform the defendant of the material facts upon which the plaintiff bases his action. Fox v. Cosgriff, 64 Idaho 448, 454, 133 P.2d 930, 932-33 (1943). A complaint need only contain a concise statement of the facts constituting the cause of action and a demand for relief. I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1); Stone v. Bradshaw, 64 Idaho 152, 157, 128 P.2d 844, 846 (1942).

With these considerations in mind, we turn to the complaint at issue. Clark’s complaint, as quoted above, asked the court to declare Ordinance No. 428 and the subsequent conveyance void, to resolve the controversy between the litigants, to declare the duties of the defendant concerning the controversy, to order the defendants to carry out their respective duties, and to grant all other relief to which Clark was found to be legally entitled. The district court’s order of March 2, 1978 provided the following relief:

“[Pjlaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be, and hereby is granted in the following respects:

“(a) IT IS ORDERED that Montpelier City Ordinance #428 be, and hereby is declared void and of no force and effect. “(b) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the attempted transfer of title from the City of Montpelier to one Ivan Phelps of the following described real property through Montpelier City Ordinance # 428 is declared invalid and is hereby set aside....”

It is clear that the order did not grant all the relief prayed for in the complaint. Clark’s complaint did not iherely seek a determination that the ordinance and subsequent conveyance were void. It sought to have the controversy resolved. The complaint specifically asks the court to declare the duties of the defendants with respect to their improper conduct and to provide Clark with whatever relief he is legally entitled to. As it now stands, the district court’s decision has left Clark with a bundle of rights and no legal remedies to secure those rights. It appears from the record and arguments before this Court that nothing has been done to ultimately resolve this controversy. Although the ordinance and conveyance have been held invalid, Kunz’ carport is still encroaching onto a dedicated public street and Clark is still without access to his property. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that Clark has received all the relief prayed for, or, in fact, any relief at all. We therefore hold that the district court erred in determining that Clark had received all the relief prayed for and in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

II

Approximately two weeks prior to the scheduled trial date, the defendants moved for summary judgment asserting that Clark had already received all the relief prayed for in his complaint. In response to this motion, Clark sought to amend his complaint to specify the precise relief he was requesting. The proposed amendment added three paragraphs to the body of the complaint and one to the prayer for relief.

The first paragraph merely recites the nature of the court’s determination on Clark’s motion for partial summary judgment. The second details the relief requested and seeks to hold the defendants responsible in their individual capacity as well as in their official capacity. The third references the court to two drawings attached to the complaint for illustrative purposes, and the fourth prays for the relief requested in the above paragraphs.

I.R.C.P. 15(a) provides that leave of court to amend a pleading “shall be freely given when justice so requires.’’ (Our emphasis.) See, e.g., Smith v. Shinn, 82 Idaho 141, 350 P.2d 348 (1960); Markstaller v. Markstaller, 80 Idaho 129, 326 P.2d 994 (1958). Professors Wright and Miller in discussing Federal Rule 15 — an identical counterpart to our I.R.C.P. 15 — state that the purpose of the rule is two-fold: First, to allow the best chance for each claim to be determined on its merits rather than on some procedural technicality; and, second, to relegate pleadings to the limited role of providing parties with notice of the nature of the pleader’s claim and the facts that have been called into question. Issue formulation is to be left to the discovery process and pleadings are not to be viewed as carrying the burden of fact revelation or of controlling the trial phase of the action. C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1471 (1971).

The United States Supreme Court in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962), explained the operation of Rule 15(a) as follows:

“Rule 15(a) declares that leave to amend ‘shall be freely given where justice so requires’; this mandate is to be heeded. See generally, 3 Moore, Federal Practice (2nd ed. 1948), Hf 15.08, 15.10. If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reason — such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated- failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. —the leave sought should, as the rules require, ‘be freely given.’ Of course, the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court, but outright refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules.”

In Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 272-73, 561 P.2d 1299, 1305-06 (1977), this Court expressly adopted Fo-man’s language and, in addition, placed the burden of showing why a court should not grant leave to amend a complaint on the parties opposed to the amendment. Id. As Foman and Smith declare, a district court’s refusal to grant leave to amend without any justifying reason is, per se, an abuse of discretion.

In the instant case, it appears that the district court viewed the action as one solely for declaratory judgment and denied Clark’s motion to amend because it did not believe the relief requested therein was appropriate in such an action. It is clear, however, that declaratory relief may be sought in conjunction with other types of relief in the same action. C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, supra at § 2768. See, e.g., Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 681 P.2d 988 (1984) (wherein the plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive and mandamus relief in the same action). As was discussed in Part I, Clark did not merely seek a declaration that the ordinance and the subsequent conveyance were void. He sought resolution of the controversy and appropriate relief. The district court’s orders left the controversy unresolved and Clark without any relief whatsoever.

The district court noted that Clark might have standing to bring a separate action to compel the city and Kunz to clear title to the property at issue. Given the policy of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to provide a “just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action,” it appears manifestly unreasonable to dismiss a pending action and force the plaintiff to file a whole new lawsuit. This is particularly true when one considers that Clark may well be barred from bringing a new action by the applicable statute of limitations. Accordingly, we hold that the district court abused its discretion in denying Clark’s motion to amend his complaint.

The order denying Clark’s motion to alter or amend the previously entered judgment is reversed an the case remanded for further proceedings on Clark’s amended complaint consistent with this opinion.

Costs to appellant.

No attorney fees on appeal.

BISTLINE, J., and WALTERS and SWANSTROM, JJ., Pro Tern., concur. SHEPARD, J., dissents without opinion.