Tatrai v. Presbyterian University Hospital , 284 Pa. Super. 300 ( 1981 )

VAN der VOORT, Judge:

Appellant was an employee at Presbyterian Hospital, the appellee herein. On the day in question, May 27, 1975, her employment hours were from 7:00 A.M. to 3:30 P.M. Sometime before 10 A.M., she became ill and was directed by her supervisor to go to the emergency room of the hospital to seek medical attention. She reported there. While on the X-ray table, she was injured when the foot stand of the table became loose, causing her to fall.

Appellant filed a complaint in trespass and assumpsit against the hospital alleging negligence and a breach of warranty of the safety of appellee’s equipment and services. Appellee filed an answer alleging as New Matter that at the time of the various incidents appellant was an employee whose exclusive remedy is under the Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act. Appellant’s reply averred that she was a patient at the time of her injury and that she was not acting in the scope of her employment.

Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment was denied by the lower court on the ground that there was perhaps a factual problem as to whether appellant was required to go to the emergency room and thus “to be present on his employer’s premises.” The parties went to trial on the basis of an alleged stipulation of the relevant facts, with a further stipulation that the judge should first decide the “threshold question” of whether appellant’s exclusive remedy was under the Workmen’s Compensation Laws. It was further agreed that if the court ruled in favor of appellant the parties would proceed before a jury; if the court found in favor of appellee then a non-jury verdict was to be entered for appellee. The lower court decided the question in favor of appellee and entered a non-jury verdict in its favor.

Appellant’s exceptions were dismissed. The opinion in support of the verdict was adopted by the court en banc. From the order dismissing exceptions, appellant has filed this appeal.

The opinion of the lower court states that the injury was compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and that plaintiff’s exclusive remedy was with the Workmen’s Compensation Board. The opinion is in part as follows:

“The court concludes that the provisions of § 301(c) of the Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 411, are dispositive of the issue at bar. That section, in its pertinent part, reads as follows:

‘(1) . .. The term ‘injury arising in the course of his employment,’ as used in this article, . . . shall include all other injuries sustained while the employe [sic] is actually engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer, whether upon the employer’s premises or elsewhere, and shall include all injuries caused by the condition of the premises or by the operation of the employer’s business or affairs thereon, sustained by the employe, [sic] who, though not so engaged, is injured upon the premises occupied by or under the control of the employer, or upon which the employer’s business or affairs are being carried on, the employe’s [sic] presence thereon being required by the nature of his employment.’ (Emphasis supplied).

“The parties have stipulated that plaintiff became ill during the course of her employment and that she was directed by her supervisor as to how she should proceed in seeking the medical attention which was rendered by the employer on its premises.

“It is clear to the court that the medical treatment being afforded to plaintiff was not being afforded to her as a member of the general public seeking the medical services of the hospital, but were being afforded to her instead as an employee by her employer in the normal course of her employment, and that her presence in the particular place on the employer’s premises was indeed required. This situation is analogous to that of an employee in a steel mill who might become ill during his work shift. It is not at all uncommon that employers in such industries maintain at least rudimentary health care facilities on the premises to which the employee would report in the normal course to seek first aid or other treatment by other employees of his employer. Surely no one would argue that were such medical services rendered negligently, such negligence would give rise to a common law action of tort against the employer. This court is convinced that in such circumstances, the employee’s remedy would be limited to that provided by the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The situation here is, to all practical intents and purposes, identical.

“That being the case, and the policy of the law as enunciated in. many appellate decisions being to interpret the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act liberally in order to provide the broadest possible coverage for employees, this court has no hesitancy in concluding that the injury suffered by plaintiff in the case at bar is compensable under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. See: Epler v. North American Rockwell Corporation, [482 Pa. 391] 393 A.2d 1163 (Pa.Supreme Ct.1978); Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board v. United States Steel Corporation, 31 Pa.Cmwlth. 329, 376 A.2d 271 (1977). Mackey v. Adamski, No. 3040 October Term, 1979, Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.”

The lower court relied on a number of previous decisions to support its position. In Epler, 482 Pa. 391, 393 A.2d 1163, an employee was struck by an automobile as he crossed a public street which linked the employer’s plant with its parking lot. The Supreme Court found that the injury had arisen in the course of employment within the meaning of subsection 301(c)(1) since the decedent was “on the employer’s premises.” “Our cases have consistently recognized that the phrase ‘court of employment’ is to receive a liberal construction.” Id., 482 Pa. at 397, 393 A.2d 1163. “[T]he critical factor is the fact that [the employer] had caused the area to be used by his employees in performance of their assigned tasks. The basis for the compensation is that the employee was in the area where the injury was sustained directly because of his employment.” Id., 482 Pa. at 399, 393 A.2d 1163.

Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board v. United States Steel Corp., supra, involved a situation in which an employee, whom the employer knew to be inflicted with epilepsy, suffered a seizure while operating his car in the employer’s parking lot. His vehicle struck an abutment. The employee died as a result of the injuries he suffered in the accident. The Commonwealth Court found the death compensable under § 301(c)(1). The court noted that the legislation involved was to be given a liberal construction. “If the condition of the premises or the employer’s operation thereon caused the injuries, they are compensable. Obviously, if they were so caused, his injuries . . . were also related to his employment.” Id. 31 Pa.Cmwlth. at 335, 376 A.2d 271.

“Injuries may be sustained in the course of employment in two distinct situations: (1) where the employee, whether on or off the employer’s premises, is injured while actually engaged in the furtherance of the employer’s business or affairs, or (2) where the employee although not actually engaged in the furtherance of the employer’s business or affairs (a) is on the premises occupied or under the control of the employer, or upon which the employer’s business or affairs are being carried on; (b) is required by the nature of his employment to be present on his employer’s premises; and (c) sustains injuries caused by the condition of the premises or by operation of the employer’s business or affairs thereon. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board v. L. L. Stearns & Sons, 20 Pa.Cmwlth. 244, 341 A.2d 543 (1975).” Id., 31 Pa.Cmwlth. at 329, 376 A.2d 271.

The lower court did not discuss Shaffer v. Somerset Community Hospital, 205 Pa.Super. 419, 211 A.2d 49 (1965) on which the Epler court relied. Shaffer concerned a nurse who slipped on ice in the hospital’s parking lot. The court there found that “[s]he was on the premises of her employer when she was injured. . . . The fact that her actual duties were in the hospital building itself does not affect her right to compensation.” Id., 205 Pa.Super. at 422, 211 A.2d 49.

Our recent opinion in Babich v. Pavich, 270 Pa.Super. 140, 411 A.2d 218 (1979) also supports in principle the decision of the lower court. In Babich, an employee who was required to use the employer’s dispensary was prohibited from suing for the negligence of the company’s doctor.

Appellant, as in the cited cases was injured on her employer’s premises though not at her own working station. Here as in Shaffer, her injuries were a direct result of the conditions in which she encountered the premises.¹ Here, more so than in Shaffer, Epler, Babich or United States Steel, the appellant was acting under the direction of her supervisor.² Accordingly, we find no merit to appellant’s argument.

Order affirmed.

CAVANAUGH, J., files a concurring statement. HOFFMAN, J., files a dissenting opinion.

1 . Babich, Epler, and the United States Steel cases involved situations in which the injuries were indirectly caused by the conditions of the premises: Babich dealt with a doctor’s negligence; Epler involved a public roadway; and United States Steel was concerned with a car hitting an abutment.

2 . The employees in the cited cases were all injured either on their way to or from work.