United States v. Adams , 375 F.3d 108 ( 2004 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 03-2010
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
DELON J. ADAMS,
a/k/a JOSEPH DELEON ADAMS,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Howard, Circuit Judge.
David J. Van Dyke, by appointment of the court, with whom
Berman & Simmons, P.A. was on brief for appellant.
F. Mark Terison, Senior Litigation Counsel, with whom Paula D.
Silsby, United States Attorney, was on brief for appellee.
July 14, 2004
BOUDIN, Chief Judge. By a superceding indictment, a
federal grand jury charged Delon J. Adams with three crimes: one
count charged that as a felon he had unlawfully possessed a firearm
on March 18, 2002, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000)
(count I); the other two counts charged him with using and carrying
a firearm in relation to drug trafficking crimes committed on two
different dates, February 6 and 12, 2002, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2000) (counts II and III). Several motions to
suppress evidence were denied and a jury trial began on December 4,
2002.
The parties stipulated to Adams’ prior felony conviction.
At trial, the government presented evidence that Adams had moved to
Maine and in June 2001 married a woman named Laurie; and that in
June 2001 she had purchased a handgun (a Sturm Ruger pistol) and in
October 2001 another (a Kel Tec). Her attempted purchase of a
third gun, two days after the second, alerted the police who
stopped Adams driving away with Laurie and who, under his seat,
found both previously purchased guns.
After this incident, Adams and Laurie separated and in
February 2002 Adams began to stay at least intermittently with a
woman named Amanda Whitmore and her boyfriend Christopher Wright at
their apartment in Biddeford, Maine. Two witnesses testified that
Adams, 33 years old, sometimes slept in the bed of Amanda’s 15-
year-old sister, Chrissy, and that sometimes Adams and Chrissy
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shared a bed. Chrissy testified that Adams had slept in the same
bed with her and, over a defense objection, that he had a sexual
relationship with her.
In February 2002, Adams began a set of robberies with
Wright, aimed at relieving drug dealers of cash or drugs. The
first robbery, of Jaime Morales, took place on February 6, 2002.
Wright testified that Adams had taken a gun into Morales’ motel
room, returned with marijuana and cash, and to Wright admitted
hitting Morales with a pistol. Morales (and his girlfriend who was
present) confirmed this story, adding that the pistol had a laser
sight (the Sturm Ruger had such a sight).
There was also testimony from several witnesses including
Wright that on February 12, 2002, Adams, armed with a gun, had
robbed money and drugs from James Frazier. Wright and still other
witnesses testified to a third, similar robbery in February 2002 in
which Adams took money but not drugs; this third incident was not
charged in the indictment, presumably because there were no drugs
and therefore nothing in which to ground a federal charge.
On March 8, 2002, Wright was arrested for an unrelated
offense and offered up Adams. Based on Wright’s disclosures and
other evidence, the police secured a warrant for the apartment
where Adams had been staying from time to time with Wright, Amanda
and Chrissy. In the living room the police found the Kel Tec
pistol in a box, along with a plastic bag containing ammunition.
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In Chrissy’s bedroom, they found a gun magazine on a television top
and, under Chrissy’s bed, a lockbox containing both ammunition and
a Sturm Ruger with a laser sight.
At trial, Adams himself admitted to the robberies
including the theft of drugs from Morales but denied that he had at
any time possessed the handgun. His story, partly corroborated by
testimony from Adams’ girlfriend Sarah Blake, was that Laurie had
given the two guns to Sarah rather than Adams, and that he had told
her where to take them. By this tactic, Adams’ asserted aim, naive
if true, was to avoid possessing or appearing to possess a weapon.1
The jury convicted Adams of having had the Sturm Ruger in
his possession on March 18, 2002, when the police found it in the
apartment. He was also convicted of using a firearm during and in
relation to the Morales robbery on February 6, 2002. On the third
count, relating to the Frazier robbery on February 12, 2002, the
jury acquitted Adams. Adams was thereafter sentenced to 120 months
for firearms possession and 84 months (to be served consecutively)
for using the gun during the Morales drug robbery. Adams now
appeals.
1
Apparently hoping to counter testimony that the box with the
Sturm Ruger was under his bed in the apartment, Adams also
testified that he could not get at the gun because (according to
Adams) Laurie alone had the key to the lockbox and (again according
to Adams), the alternative means of entry--a type of combination
lock--was broken.
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Adams’ first argument on appeal is that the district
court committed error by allowing Chrissy to testify that she and
Adams had a sexual relationship. He points out that he, a 33-year-
old African American male, was said to have an interracial
relationship with a girl who was 15 at the time, and that a jury
might also have conceived that he was guilty of statutory rape.
The potential for prejudice, he says, substantially outweighed
whatever slight relevance the sexual relationship testimony might
have had.
Evidence must be excluded where its relevance is
"substantially outweighed" by its prejudicial effect, that is, by
its tendency to encourage the jury to decide the case on improper
grounds. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 and advisory committee note; Old
Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997). Probative value
and prejudicial effect are both matters of degree, United States v.
Li, 206 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2000), and whether the government has
alternative means of effectively proving the same thing without the
prejudicial evidence is also pertinent. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at
184; United States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113, 122 (1st Cir.
2000).
Trial judges enjoy great latitude in making these
balancing decisions (often under time pressure) and are normally
overturned only where their judgment is egregiously wrong. See
United States v. Rodriguez, 162 F.3d 135, 142 (1st Cir. 1998).
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Many such decisions are simply close calls on which able judges may
differ. The trial judge had the advantage in being on the spot and
having a better sense than the appellate court of the courtroom
dynamics in the case. See Udemba v. Nicoli, 237 F.3d 8, 15-16 (1st
Cir. 2001); United States v. Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 156
(1st Cir. 1989).
Generalities about deference carry us only to the
starting line. Here, the government says that the evidence of the
sexual relationship was relevant for two reasons. The first is to
support a link in the chain of evidence connecting Adams with the
Sturm Ruger so as to prove his possession of the weapon pursuant to
count I. Because the gun was in a lockbox under Chrissy’s bed, the
fact that Adams had a sexual relationship with Chrissy tended to
increase the likelihood that he spent time in that bed, supporting
the inference that he put the lockbox there and controlled it.
There is one glitch. Several witnesses testified without
objection that Adams slept in Chrissy's bed, so the added
information that they had a sexual relationship was of peculiarly
limited value. The sexual relationship arguably made the same-bed
story more credible and perhaps increased the likelihood that he
viewed the bed as his own, but these reinforcing inferences–-
although making the evidence technically relevant--are hardly of
great value.
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The second argument for relevance, and apparently the one
that prompted the ruling admitting the evidence (although we can
affirm the admission of evidence on any valid basis, see United
States v. Meserve, 271 F.3d 314, 327 (1st Cir. 2001)), requires
more background. When Adams testified he gave a (in some measure)
more benign version of his encounter with Morales charged in count
II. Adams said that he had gone to beat up Morales because
Morales, who worked in the same restaurant as Chrissy, had been
trying to give her drugs in order to seduce her and that he, Adams,
had been seeking to protect her. Other defense cross-examination
sought to support this supposed motive for the assault.
Arguing that the defense had sought to cast Adams as a
gentleman-protector of the innocent, the government then sought
leave to bring out through Wright (who had been cross-examined
about Adams’ aspersions on Morales) that Adams had a sexual
relationship with Chrissy. Thereafter, the government also got
confirming testimony as to the sexual relationship from Chrissy
herself. In both cases, the defense objected to the testimony but
did not seek a limiting instruction as to the use of the testimony.
Of course, the government was entitled to discredit
Adams’ story since he was denying that he had gone with the
intention of robbing Morales of drugs;2 but it is not clear why
2
Adams himself admitted taking drugs from Morales after the
assault (in which Adams denied carrying or using a gun); but Adams’
intent in advance to steal drugs, rather than taking them as an
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Adams’ sexual relationship with Chrissy would make it less likely
that he would be interested in attacking Morales as a would-be
seducer. Perhaps the evidence had a slight tendency to counter
Adams’ insinuation that he had attacked Morales for high-minded
motives (he called himself her “guardian”) and so discredit further
Adams’ denial of a plan to steal drugs.
Thus, we have two arguments for relevance; both may work
and can be treated as cumulative justification, but in neither is
the added information necessary or even very useful. As for
prejudice, there was obviously some potential for prejudicing the
jury by telling them that Adams had seduced a 15-year-old girl, but
it should not be overstated. The jury already knew from other
testimony that Adams slept in Chrissy’s bed and that they had
sometimes slept in the bed at the same time. How much explicit
confirmation of the sexual relationship added may be open to
doubt.3
afterthought, was useful to the government’s effort to show that
the gun was employed "in relation to" a drug crime, namely, the
acquisition of drugs. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223,
238 (1993) (declaring that "in relation to" requires that the
firearm "have some purpose or effect with respect to the drug
trafficking crime" and that mere coincidental "presence or
involvement" is insufficient).
3
"Where the prejudicial fact has already come before the jury
through other proof, the cumulative impact of the proffered
evidence may be so slight as not to warrant exclusion." 22 Wright
& Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure § 5215 (1978 & Supp. 2004).
See, e.g., United States v. Sassanelli, 118 F.3d 495, 498 (6th Cir.
1997).
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This is a perfect example of why district judges have
latitude. Viewed in the cold light of post-trial reflection, the
judges on this panel might well have excluded the sexual
relationship evidence. But we have the advantage not only of ample
time to reflect but also of all of the trial testimony. It is much
easier now to put together all the pieces, see the full strength of
the government’s case, and reflect on just how little the disputed
testimony added. In this case, the trial judge’s call, although
debatable, was not an egregious error.
Even if we found a violation of Rule 403, we would regard
any error as harmless because this evidentiary ruling could not
have affected the outcome. See United States v. McCann, 366 F.3d
46, 55-56 (1st Cir. 2004). At least eight different witnesses
testified that they had seen Adams in possession of a gun, usually
one with a laser sight. This made almost beside the point Adams’
already thin story that his wife and Sarah Blake alone controlled
the weapon while it resided in the lockbox under Chrissy’s bed.
The idea that the jury would ever have acquitted Adams on the
felon-in-possession charge is hard to take seriously.
As for Adams using the gun during the drug robbery of
Morales, two witnesses (Morales and his girlfriend) testified to
seeing him use it and a third (Wright) testified to Adams’
admission that he used it. And a bullet, shown by expert evidence
to have been earlier loaded in the Sturm Ruger, was found in the
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motel room–-supporting Morales’ claim that he had been hit with the
gun by Adams. Three separate witnesses, the bullet, and Adams’
prior control of the gun made the conviction almost inevitable.
Adams relies heavily upon United States v. Aguilar-
Aranceta, 58 F.3d 796 (1st Cir. 1995), and Gov't of the Virgin
Islands v. Archibald, 987 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1993). Both decisions
reversed district court convictions where prejudicial evidence of
slight probative value was admitted. But in both cases the
incremental prejudicial effect of the disputed evidence was
stronger and in neither case does it appear that untainted evidence
of guilt virtually assured a conviction.
Adams makes two further and quite separate claims on
appeal. One is that the felon-in-possession statute that underpins
his conviction on count I is unconstitutional. Adams says that
because the statute applies only where the weapon traveled in
interstate commerce, he would have been safe in Maryland where the
gun was manufactured and was convicted here only because of the
“fortuity” that he lives in Maine. This, he says, makes the
statute irrational under equal protection standards.
In accord with several other circuits, see United States
v. Walker, 930 F.2d 789, 795 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Wynde, 579 F.2d 1088, 1092-93 (8th Cir. 1978), we reject this
argument. The statute is not keyed to the defendant’s residence in
one state rather than another; it applies wherever the gun traveled
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in interstate commerce. Adams could also have been convicted if he
lived in the state of manufacture so long as the gun had been
shipped out of the state and then brought back in. About all one
can say is that a felon who lives in a gun manufacturing state has
a better chance of avoiding violation.
Admittedly, odd results are possible: a felon who brought
a Sturm Ruger in Maryland and kept it there is not intrinsically
less dangerous than Adams. But travel of the gun in interstate
commerce was the jurisdictional hook available to Congress and the
prohibition on felons having guns is rational. See Lewis v. United
States, 445 U.S. 55, 65-66 (1980) (discussing 18 U.S.C. App. §
1202(a)). That Congress left unremedied like problems beyond its
ready grasp does not make the statute irrational under equal
protection standards. See Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110
(1932) (Brandeis, J.); Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 753
(5th Cir. 1983).
Adams’ other argument is that the fruits of the search of
the Whitmore-Wright apartment should have been suppressed for lack
of probable cause for the warrant. Wright’s statements to the
officer, recounted in the warrant affidavit, described Adams’ role
in the set of robberies recounted above and identified just where
Adams’ Sturm Ruger was hidden in the apartment. The affidavit also
noted Adams’ prior criminal record, a report by Laurie to the
police that the guns had been taken, and information tending to
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confirm Adams’ participation in drug dealings (a police report) and
a drug-related robbery (a witness interviewed by the officer).
This assemblage supplies several times over probable
cause to believe that evidence of a felony (the gun) would be found
in the apartment. Adams’ attacks on details and small
discrepancies are not worth discussion. See United States v.
Schaefer, 87 F.3d 562, 567 (1st Cir. 1996). He has received
vigorous and thorough assistance of counsel on this appeal, and no
judge should begrudge the time needed to consider arguments by a
man now serving a sentence of 204 months. That does not mean that
proportionate time is needed to explain why the weakest of the
arguments fails.
Affirmed.
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