Iowa Department of Transportation v. Iowa District Court for Scott County , 587 N.W.2d 781 ( 1998 )

TERNUS, Justice.

The consolidated cases before the court present a slight variation on the facts presented in another case we decide today, Iowa Department of Transportation v. Iowa District Court for Buchanan County, 587 N.W.2d 774 (Iowa 1998). All three cases involve the impact of the repeal of Iowa Code section 321J.4(3)(b) (1995), which provided an opportunity for criminal defendants who suffered a six-year license revocation to have their eligibility for a driver’s license restored after two years. The factual distinction between the two cases before us and the Buchanan County case is the timing of the expiration of the two-year waiting period required before a defendant may apply for restoration of license eligibility. In the Buchanan County case the two-year’ period expired after the repeal of section 321J.4(3)(b) became effective; here, the two-year period expired before the effective date of the repeal. Despite this factual distinction, we think our decision in the Buchanan County case is controlling. Therefore, we sustain the writs.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Both defendants in the underlying criminal actions, Martin Garlock and William Einfeldt, were convicted of operating while intoxicated, third offense. See Iowa Code § 321J.2. As a result of these convictions, their driver’s licenses were revoked for six years. See id. § 321J.4(3)(a). Garlock’s revocation period commenced on October 12, 1993, and Ein-feldt’s revocation began on June 15, 1995.

At the time these revocation periods commenced, Iowa Code section 321J.4(3)(b) provided a means to reduce the period of revocation after two years of the six-year period had expired. Section 321J.4(3)(b) provided:

After two years from the date of the order for revocation, the defendant may apply to the court for restoration of the defendant’s eligibility for a motor vehicle license. The application may be granted only if all of the following are shown by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence ....

The four statutory prerequisites to the restoration of license eligibility were (1) the completion of an evaluation for chemical dependency and treatment for such dependency, if recommended, (2) the absence of any operating-while-intoxicated convictions and of any chemical test showing an alcohol concentration over the legal limit, (3) the defendant’s abstention from excessive alcohol consumption and the use of controlled substances, and (4) the absence of any suspension or revocation for any other reason. See Iowa Code § 321J.4(3)(b)(l)-(4). This statute was repealed effective July 1, 1997. See 1997 Iowa Acts ch. 177, § 9; Iowa Code § 3.7(1).

Although the two-year waiting period required by section 321J.4(3)(b) expired for each defendant prior to July 1, 1997, they both filed applications to have their eligibility for a driver’s license restored after the effective date of the repeal. Garlock’s application was filed on July 25,1997; Einfeldt’s application was filed on July 31, 1997. The district court granted both applications and restored the defendants’ eligibility for a driver’s license.

We granted the petitions for writ of certio-rari filed by the Department of Transportation (DOT) and consolidated the cases. The DOT claims on appeal that the district court had no authority to restore the defendants’ license eligibility because the statute providing such authority had been repealed prior to the district court’s orders. The defendants, who are defending the district court in this certiorari action, rely on the general savings statute, section 4.13. They first assert that they had an accrued right to a hearing to seek restoration of their driving privileges and that this right is saved by section 4.13(2). Alternatively, they argue that Iowa Code section 4.13(4) prevents the repeal of section 321 J.4(3)(b) from affecting the “remedy” provided by the repealed statute. We consider the applicability of each statute separately.

II. Scope of Review.

Our scope of review is for correction of errors of law. See Hewitt v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 538 N.W.2d 291, 292 (Iowa 1995). “We will sustain a writ of certiorari where the district court acted beyond its authority or jurisdiction.” Iowa Dep’t of Transp. v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Bremer County, 534 N.W.2d 457, 459 (Iowa 1995).

III. Applicability of Section 1.18(2).

Iowa Code section 4.13(2) provides that “[t]he ... repeal of a statute does not affect ... [a]ny ... right [or] privilege ... previously acquired, accrued, [or] accorded ... thereunder....” We held in the Buchanan County case that this statute protected “only (1) a right or privilege (2) that was acquired, accrued, or accorded under the repealed statute before the effective date of the repeal.” 587 N.W.2d at 776. We concluded that the defendant in that case, who had filed his application for restoration of license eligibility after the repeal of section 321J.4(3)(b), had no accrued right to license eligibility, nor had such eligibility been acquired or accorded prior to the repeal of section 321J.4(3)(b). Id. at 777. Therefore, we held that section 4.13(2) did not apply.

The same reasoning applies to the two cases before us here. In both cases, the defendants filed their applications after the repeal of section 321 J.4(3)(b). They had not acquired nor been accorded license eligibility prior to the statute’s repeal. In addition, for the reasons explained in Buchanan County, the defendants had no accrued right or privilege to have their eligibility for a license restored prior to the repeal of section 321 J.4(3)(b).

Although our discussion of section 4.13(2) might end here, the defendants in the present case are in a slightly different situation from the defendant in Buchanan County in that in the cases before us the two-year waiting period expired before July 1, 1997. Thus, the defendants here claim that as of July 1, 1997, they had an accrued right to a hearing to seek restoration of their eligibility for a driver’s license.

We reject the argument that the “right” upon which we should focus for purposes of applying section 4.13(2) is the evidentiary hearing triggered by a section 321J.4(3)(b) application. A hearing on an application for restoration of license eligibility is meaningless unless the court has the authority to grant the application. In other words, the hearing is merely a procedural mechanism to obtain the ultimate goal of having one’s eligibility for a driver’s license restored. Thus, it is the latter that must be saved by section 4.13(2) — the defendants’ eligibility for a driver’s license — if they are to successfully defend the district court’s action restoring their eligibility.

Even if we assume the hearing to be the proper subject of our analysis, section 4.13(2) is of no assistance to the defendants. That is because a litigant’s interest in a certain procedure is not an accrued right or privilege in the context of a savings statute. See State ex rel. Buechler v. Vinsand, 318 N.W.2d 208, 209-10 (Iowa 1982) (stating that savings statutes do not apply to procedural statutes; procedural statutes do not “create or take away vested rights”); Denton v. Moser, 241 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Iowa 1976) (“No one can claim to have a vested right in any particular mode of procediere for an enforcement or defense of his rights.”); Bascom v. District Ct, 231 Iowa 360, 362-63, 1 N.W.2d 220, 221 (1941) (same); see also 14 Uniform Laws Annotated Model Statutory Construction Act § 14 commentary at 405 (1990) (In commenting on prospective versus retrospective application of a statute, the commissioners state, “If a procedural statute is amended, the rule is that the amendment applies to pending proceedings as well as those instituted after the amendment.”). Consequently, savings statutes do not apply to changes made in the procedure accorded a litigant. See Buechler, 318 N.W.2d at 209-10. Accordingly, section 4.13(2) does not apply to the hearing provided an applicant under section 321J.4(3)(b). We now consider the defendant’s alternative argument.

IV. Applicability of Section 1.13 (k).

Section 4.13(4) provides that the repeal of a statute does not affect

[a]ny investigation, proceeding or remedy in respect of any privilege, obligation, [or] liability ...; and the investigation, proceeding, or remedy may be instituted, continued, or enforced ... as if the statute had not been repealed....

(Emphasis added.) The defendants argue that section 321J.4(3)(b) provided a remedy for the restoration of a defendant’s driving privileges, and therefore section 4.13(4) saves that remedy. We think our decisions in Eldridge City Utilities v. Iowa State Commerce Commission, 303 N.W.2d 167 (Iowa 1981), and Janda v. Iowa Industrial Hydraulics, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1982), provide guidance in evaluating the validity of the defendants’ arguments here.

The plaintiff in Eldridge claimed its suit was saved because the suit was a “proceeding” pursuant to the repealed statute within the meaning of section 4,13(4). 303 N.W.2d at 170. This court rejected the plaintiffs argument, concluding there was no “proceeding” to be saved by section 4.13(4) because “no steps required by the statute were taken by any party toward any decision by a court [or] agency ... until after the statute was repealed.” Id.; accord Sams v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., 10 Ohio App.3d 204, 461 N.E.2d 309, 311-12 (Ohio Ct.App.1983) (holding that Ohio statute identical to section 4.13(4) did not save former statute governing administrative appeals because the appellant’s right to appeal, as well as the appeal itself, did not arise until after the effective date of the amendment to the statute). Stated differently, the mere ability to commence a proceeding in the future was not sufficient to trigger the savings statute.

If we analogize this reasoning to the present case, we must conclude that defendants had no “remedy” to be saved at the time section 321J.4(3)(b) was repealed. That is because they were not entitled to any remedy at that time; they merely had the expectation that in the future they would meet the prerequisites to obtain that remedy. Paraphrasing Eldridge, there was no “remedy” to be saved by section 4.13(4) because the “steps required by the statute [were not accomplished] until after the statute was repealed.” Eldridge, 303 N.W.2d at 170.

The Janda case focused on the second part of the first phrase in section 4.13(4) — in respect of any ... obligation [or] liability. 326 N.W.2d at 345. The dispute in Janda involved the appropriate interest computation on a judgment in a contract action. Id. at 341. The statute providing for interest on judgments was repealed after the plaintiff filed suit and replaced by a statute providing a more generous interest computation. Id. at 343. The trial court awarded interest under the statute in existence at the time the judgment was entered. Id. The defendant argued interest should be awarded under the statute that was in effect at the time the plaintiffs action was commenced. Id. The defendant relied, in part, on the language in section 4.13(4) that the repeal of a statute does not affect “[a]ny proceeding ... in respect of any ... obligation [or] liability.” Id. at 345. We held the statute did not apply because, as of the date of the repeal, the defendant had no “obligation” or “liability” to pay judgment interest since a judgment had not yet been entered. Id.

The position of the defendants here is defective for the same reason. As of July 1, 1997, they had no driving privileges, nor had any privilege of license eligibility yet accrued. See Buchanan County, 587 N.W.2d at 777. Therefore, they had no remedy “with respect to any privilege” within the meaning of section 4.13(4). Consequently, that statute cannot save the purported “remedy” provided by section 321J.4(3)(b).

An interpretation of section 4.13(4) other than the one we adopt here would render repeals a nullity. If the statute literally saves any remedy with respect to any privilege regardless of whether the party even had the privilege or was entitled to the remedy at the time of the repeal, then no repeal could effectively eliminate a remedy. That result certainly was not the legislature’s intent in enacting section 4.13(4).

V. Disposition.

Iowa’s savings statute, Iowa Code section 4.13, does not apply under the facts before us. Therefore, the repeal of section 321J.4(3)(b) prior to the defendants’ applying for restoration of their license eligibility deprived the district court of authority to grant their applications. Consequently, the DOT is entitled to the relief requested.

WRITS SUSTAINED.

All justices concur except CARTER and SNELL, JJ., who dissent separately.