Mayor of Detroit v. State , 228 Mich. App. 386 ( 1998 )

McDonald, J.

These cases present three challenges to 1996 PA 374.¹ Plaintiffs first contend that Act 374 violates Const 1963, art 9, §§ 25 and 29 (the Headlee Amendments). ² Plaintiffs next contend that Act 374 violates Const 1963, art 3, § 2 (the Separation of Powers Clause). Finally, plaintiffs contend that Act 374 violates the public employment relations act (pera), MCL 423.201 et seq.] MSA 17.455(1) el seq. The circuit court held that Act 374 violated both the Headlee Amendment and the Separation of Powers Clause, Const 1963, art 3, § 2, but that it did not violate the pera. We affirm in part and reverse in part.³

Docket No. 201850 presents the city of Detroit’s challenge to the requirement of Act 374 that the city fully fund the 36th District Court. Plaintiffs, the mayor of Detroit and the city of Detroit, commenced this action for a declaratory ruling that the provisions of Act 374 pertaining to the transfer of funding responsibility for the 36th District Court to the city of Detroit violate the Headlee Amendment, Const 1963, art 9, § 29, and the notice requirements contained in MCL 21.238(2); MSA 5.3194(608)(2) and MCL 21.235(2); MSA 5.3194(605)(2)⁴ because the Legislature did not make an appropriation sufficient to pay for the increase in an activity or service required of the city. The circuit court granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary disposition. Defendants, state of Michigan and the Department of Management and Budget (collectively the state), appeal as of right the trial court’s grant of plaintiffs’ motion for summary disposition.

Docket No. 201852 presents challenges by defendants/cross-plaintiffs Wayne County and the Wayne County Board of Commissioners and by plaintiffs the Judicial Attorneys Association (jaa) and Government Administrators Association (gaa) (the collective bargaining representatives of the employees of the Wayne Circuit Court and the Detroit Recorder’s Court) to the dissolution of the Detroit Recorder’s Court and its consequent merger with the Wayne Circuit Court (Third Circuit Court). The circuit court declared that the provisions of Act 374 pertaining to the Recorder’s Court, including those making Wayne County the employer of employees working in the Recorder’s Court and those transferring funding obligations to Wayne County, violate the Headlee Amendments, Const 1963, art 9, §§ 25 and 29. Defendants/cross-defendants state of Michigan, the Governor, and the Attorney General (collectively the state) appeal as of right an order granting summary disposition to cross-plaintiffs Wayne County and Wayne County Board of Commissioners (collectively Wayne County).

In Docket No. 201852, the circuit court also enjoined the state from enforcing Act 374 to the extent that it makes Wayne County a coemployer of JAA and GAA members, finding that a sharing of authority over employment matters by two branches of government violates the Separation of Powers Clause, Const 1963, art 3, § 2. The state appeals this order as of right. The JAA and the GAA also cross appeal as of right, challenging the court’s determination that the coemployment provisions of Act 374 did not violate the pera. The appeals were consolidated.

Regarding the two constitutional challenges, we are mindful that “under established rules of statutory construction, statutes are presumed constitutional, and courts have a duty to construe a statute as constitutional unless unconstitutionality is clearly apparent.” Mahaffey v Attorney General, 222 Mich App 325, 344; 564 NW2d 104 (1997). To make a successful facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, as plaintiffs attempt here, the challenger must establish that “ ‘no set of circumstances exists under which the [a]ct would be valid.’ ” Council of Organizations & Others for Ed About Parochiaid v Governor, 455 Mich 557, 568, 602; 566 NW2d 208 (1997), quoting United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 745; 107 S Ct 2095; 95 L Ed 2d 697 (1987). “The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.” Blank v Dep’t of Corrections, 222 Mich App 385, 392; 564 NW2d 130 (1997). Whether Act 374 violates the PERA, a question of statutory interpretation, is also a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. In re Lafayette Towers, 200 Mich App 269, 273; 503 NW2d 740 (1993).

I

We begin our analysis with the Headlee Amendment challenge. The principal Headlee Amendment provision at issue is Const 1963, art 9, § 29, which states:

The state is hereby prohibited from reducing the state financed proportion of the necessary costs of any existing activity or service required of units of Local Government by state law. A new activity or service or an increase in the level of any activity or service beyond that required by existing law shall not be required by the legislature or any state agency of units of Local Government, unless a state appropriation is made and disbursed to pay the unit of Local Government for any necessary increased costs. The provision of this section shall not apply to costs incurred pursuant to Article VI, Section 18.

The first sentence of this provision prohibits reduction of the state proportion of necessary costs with respect to the continuation of state-mandated activities or services. The second sentence requires the state to fund any additional necessary costs of newly mandated activities or services and increases in the level of such activities or services from the 1978 base year. This language does not guarantee that local units’ spending levels will not increase from the 1978 level. Rather, the Headlee Amendment only guarantees that the state will not reduce its proportion of the necessary costs of existing activities or services, and that the state will pay entirely for necessary costs when it mandates new activities or services or to the extent the state increases the level of an existing activity or service. Increased levels of local spending attributable to other causes, e.g., inflation or the greater utilization of a program by the public, are not addressed by this provision of the Headlee Amendment.

The Michigan Supreme Court has interpreted § 29 to “ ‘reflect an effort on the part of the voters to forestall any attempt by the Legislature to shift [fiscal] responsibilities to the local government . . . Schmidt v Dep’t of Ed, 441 Mich 236, 250; 490 NW2d 584 (1992), quoting Durant v State Bd of Ed, 424 Mich 364, 379; 381 NW2d 662 (1985). The two sentences of § 29 “must be read together ‘[b]ecause they were aimed at alleviation of two possible manifestations of the same voter concern ....’” Schmidt, supra at 251, quoting Durant, supra at 379. To make the necessary comparison between state aid provided during the Headlee Amendment base year (1978) and a later year at issue, the Schmidt Court considered, at length, three possible formulations: the “state-to-state” formulation, the “local-to-local” formulation, and the “state-to-local” formulation.⁵ It ultimately adopted the “state-to-local” formulation.⁶ This method involves comparing “the ratio of total state aid for a required activity to total necessary costs for the required activity in the base year . . . with the ratio of state aid to an individual local unit of government for the activity to the necessary costs of that unit for the activity in the year of challenged funding.” Schmidt, supra at 249. Under this formulation, “[t]he state is obligated to afford each unit providing the activity or service the same proportion of funding that the state provided on a statewide basis in the year that the Headlee Amendment was ratified.” Id. at 250; see also Durant v Michigan, 456 Mich 175, 187; 566 NW2d 272 (1997).⁷

In Schmidt, supra at 252, the Court discussed the voters’ intent in ratifying the Headlee Amendment:

The state-to-local formulation satisfies the voters’ intent in enacting the Headlee Amendment. When the voters ratified the Headlee Amendment, they sought to ensure that when the state mandates a program, funds are provided to the local government to pay for that program. The state-to-local method of calculating the state’s obligation achieves the voters’ desire to secure a minimum level of funding for the local government unit for mandatory programs and to link the mandating of programs with the necessity for taxing to pay for those programs. This approach also creates the appropriate balance between the state’s desire for discretion in allocating funds and the desire of the local units of government for minimum funding. The state-to-local ratio provides a uniform allocation of resources for mandatory programs. The state is free to supplement that minimum funding on the basis of its perception of need, but the local government is guaranteed its proportionate share.

To analyze the Headlee Amendment challenge, we must first determine what the relevant “activity or service” is here. The Legislature has defined these terms as follows:⁸

“Activity” means a specific and identifiable administrative action of a local unit of government. The provision of a benefit for, or the protection of, public employees of a local unit of government is not an administrative action. [MCL 21.232(1); MSA 5.3194(602)(1).]

“Service” means a specific and identifiable program of a local unit of government which is available to the general public or is provided for the citizens of the local unit of government. The provision of a benefit for, or the protection of, public employees of a local unit of government is not a program. [MCL 21.234(1); MSA 5.3194(604)(1).]

If an “activity or service” is defined too narrowly, any minute programmatic change might appear to be a “new” activity or service requiring state appropriation of the entire cost.⁹ However, if an “activity or service” is defined too broadly, even a substantial shift in burden from the state to local units might appear to be merely the continuation of an existing activity or service.¹⁰

Const 1963, art 6, § 1 states:

The judicial power of the state is vested exclusively in one court of justice which shall be divided into one supreme court, one court of appeals, one trial court of general jurisdiction known as the circuit court, one probate court, and courts of limited jurisdiction that the legislature may establish by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to and serving in each house.

This provision suggests that the “one court of justice” is the basic, organic unit of the judicial branch of state government; therefore, the operation of this unit would appear to be the appropriate “activity or service” (hereinafter activity) for purposes of Headlee Amendment analysis.¹¹ However, only the trial-level courts are subject to local funding as discussed below. Because the Headlee Amendment focuses on state-mandated activities requiring local funding, only the trial-level courts of the “one court of justice” raise potential § 29 violations. To include the entire “one court of justice” as the relevant activity would be over-inclusive because the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, unlike the trial-level courts, are not locally funded. Further, such a broad description of the relevant activity would permit the state to mandate that local units begin funding the appellate-level courts without it appearing to be a “new” activity because the local units funded other portions of the “one court of justice” in 1978 — an illogical result. Accordingly, we believe that the best accommodation of the “one court of justice” provision of the constitution and the Headlee Amendment is to describe the relevant activity as the operation of trial courts.

A comparison of the operation of trial courts under Act 374 and as mandated in 1978 (the Headlee Amendment base year) is necessary to determine whether Act 374 mandates new activities, increases existing activities, or merely continues existing activities. “[T]he term ‘state law,’ as used in Const 1963, art 9, § 29, means state statutes and state agency rules.” Durant, supra, 424 Mich 387. Act 374, § 9931 abolishes the Recorder’s Court¹² and merges it with the Third Circuit Court effective October 1, 1997. Act 374, § 591 requires the county board of commissioners in each county to annually appropriate funds for the operation of the circuit court in that county. Act 374, § 555 requires the state to pay the salary of circuit judges and to reimburse the county if it pays an additional salary within prescribed limitations. Act 374, § 8271 requires the governing body of each district funding unit to annually appropriate funds for the operation of the district court in that district. Act 374, § 8104 also requires district funding units to finance and operate the district courts. Act 374, § 8202 requires the state to pay the salary of district judges and to reimburse the local unit if it pays an additional salary within prescribed limitations. Accordingly, under Act 374, the state mandates that counties pay for the operation of the circuit courts, that district units pay for the operation of the district courts, and that the state pay circuit court and district court judicial salaries.

A Headlee Amendment analysis next requires that we compare this with the operation of trial courts in 1978 — the Headlee Amendment base year. In Grand Traverse Co v Michigan, 450 Mich 457, 473-474; 538 NW2d 1 (1995), the Michigan Supreme Court stated:

Despite the fact that the courts have always been regarded as part of state government, they have operated historically on local funds and resources. An unbroken line of cases stretching back 130 years recognizes the practice of imposing the costs of operating the courts on local funding units.

It stated, “[t]he widespread acceptance of the principle of funding most trial court expenses through local funding units has continued until today.” Id. at 476. See also Wayne Circuit Judges v Wayne Co, 15 Mich App 713, 722, n 10; 167 NW2d 337 (1969), rev’d 383 Mich 10, 24; 172 NW2d 436 (1969) (“the county is the proper arm of state government upon which the necessary expense of operating the circuit court devolves”), opinion of the Court superseded and the opinion by Dethmers and Black adopted as the opinion of the Court on rehearing, and the opinion of the Court of Appeals affirmed 386 Mich 1; 190 NW2d 228 (1971). In Frederick v Presque Isle Co Circuit Judge, 439 Mich 1, 6; 476 NW2d 142 (1991), the Court stated:

Traditionally, the county has been the primary unit in directing Michigan’s criminal justice system.

“[Jjudicial circuits are drawn along county lines and counties are required by statute to bear the expenses of certain courtroom facilities QMCL 600.551] MSA 27A.551), [repealed] circuit court commissioner salaries QMCL 600.1067] MSA 27A.1067), stenographer’s salaries QMCL 600.1114] MSA 27A.1114), juror’s compensation ([MCL 600.1231] MSA 27A.1231), and fees for attorneys appointed by the court to defend persons who cannot procure counsel for themselves ([MCL 775.16] MSA 28.1253).” [OAG, 1967-1968, No 4,588, pp 49, 50 (June 12, 1967).]

See also the versions of the following statutes applicable in 1978: MCL 600.555; MSA 27A.555 (allowing counties to pay circuit judges an additional salary), and MCL 600.1471; MSA 27A.1471 (mandating that judges fix the compensation of law clerks within the sum appropriated by the local funding unit). Regarding the district courts, the version of MCL 600.8104; MSA 27A.8104 applicable in 1978 required district units to finance and operate the district courts. In Employees & Judge of the Second Judicial Dist Court v Hillsdale Co, 423 Mich 705, 713; 378 NW2d 744 (1985), the Court stated that MCL 600.9947; MSA 27A.9947, added by 1980 PA 438, was an attempt by the state to eliminate local funding of state judicial functions. Second Dist Court thus clearly recognizes that, before that 1980 act, the state effectively mandated local funding of trial court operations.

Before Act 374 there was no particular statute that explicitly stated that local units were responsible for funding trial courts. Rather, as set forth above, a number of statutes addressing particular aspects of trial court operations clearly implied that local units were to fund trial courts. The mosaic of these various statutes, and the strong tradition of local funding of trial courts recognized in case law, demonstrates that state law effectively mandated that local units fund trial courts in 1978.¹³ Accordingly, we conclude that in 1978 state law mandated that local units fund trial courts. If one were to ignore the clear implication of these statutes, the only alternative would be to conclude that “state law” did not mandate local funding of trial courts in 1978; as a result, the entire operation of the trial courts would be a “new” activity for which the state must now provide one hundred percent financing. None of the parties suggested this to be the case and we do not believe it to be so.

The state contends that complete financial records from the pre-Headlee Amendment period are not available; however, it is apparently undisputed that the state’s only contribution to trial court operations in 1978 was with respect to a portion of judicial salaries. Accordingly, in 1978 local units financed and operated the circuit and district courts and the state subsidized a portion of judicial salaries.

During oral argument, the state analogized the operation of trial courts to a pie and described the comparison of trial court operations in 1978 to that mandated under Act 374 as adjustments among the local units in the slices for which they are responsible, with the state taking a bigger piece of the pie. This analogy, in our judgment, accurately describes the comparison. Nothing in Act 374 mandates new activities for local units vis-a-vis the state in comparison with 1978. Nor does Act 374 increase the level of any activity required of local units. Particular local units, however, may be financing activities previously financed by other local units (e.g., Wayne County’s being required to finance the Recorder’s Court, formerly financed in part by the city of Detroit). Also, particular local units may be financing activities that, after 1978, were financed by the state. The Headlee Amendment does not directly address state mandates that result in shifts among local units or reductions in post-1978 state subsidies for particular local units; it only guarantees that each local unit will receive the same proportion of state funding provided on a statewide basis in the base year of 1978.¹⁴ Act 374 accordingly continues existing activities, as opposed to mandating new activities or increasing the level of existing activities. Therefore, the only remaining issue is whether Act 374 reduces the state-financed proportion of the necessary costs of trial court operations to the units at issue from that provided on a statewide basis in 1978. In 1978, the state’s only contribution to trial court operations was financing a portion of judicial salaries. Thus, the state-financed proportion in 1978 may be expressed as:

sfpi = dollar amount of state portion of judicial salames on a statewide basis total necessary costs of trial court operations on a statewide basis

The state-financed proportion under Act 374 may be expressed as:

SFP2 = dollar amount of one hundred percent of judicial salaries in the unit at issue¹⁵ total necessary costs of trial court operations in the unit at issue

The remaining issue therefore becomes whether, under Act 374, the state is still providing at least that same proportion of the total necessary costs of trial court operations to the units at issue as it provided on a statewide basis in 1978 — that is, whether SFP2 with regard to the local units at issue, Wayne County and the city of Detroit, is at least equal to SFPl. The parties have not provided the numbers needed to precisely calculate SFPl or, with respect to these two units, SFP2. However, they have provided information regarding the numerators of SFPl and SFP2. Regarding judicial salaries, the one item of trial court operations to which the state contributed in 1978, Act 374 requires the state to finance one hundred percent of judicial salaries to all local units, whereas the state financed only some “portion” of those salaries in 1978. Thus, the state has clearly increased its funding proportion of the only item of trial court operations to which it contributes. If we assume a relatively stable relationship between judicial salaries and the total necessary costs of trial court operations, SPF2 must be at least equal to SPFl because the state has increased its proportionate contribution to judicial salaries by Act 374.¹⁶ Accordingly, we conclude that Act 374 does not reduce the state-financed proportion of necessary costs of trial court operations to either of the units at issue from that provided on a statewide basis in 1978. For these reasons, we find no Headlee Amendment violation in Act 374.¹⁷

n

Next, we address the separation of powers issue. The state argues the trial court erred in determining that the coemployment relationship between local funding units and the courts created by Act 374 violates the Separation of Powers Clause, Const 1963, art 3, § 2. The trial court found that the provisions of Act 374, § 593a for the sharing of authority over court employees violate the Separation of Powers Clause because this relationship “disrupts the delicate balance between the judiciary’s right to control its employees and the county’s responsibility to fund the court” and “creates the potential for overreaching by the County.”¹⁸ We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the relationship violates the Separation of Powers Clause.¹⁹

Const 1963, art 3, § 2 provides:

The powers of government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.

This separation of powers among the three branches of government is designed to preserve the independence of each branch. In re 1976 PA 267, 400 Mich 660, 662; 255 NW2d 635 (1977).

In Second Dist Court, supra at 717, the Michigan Supreme Court explained:

Each branch of government has inherent power to preserve its constitutional authority.

“It was certainly never intended that any one department, through the exercise of its acknowledged powers, should be able to prevent another department from fulfilling its responsibilities to the people under the Constitution.” [O’Coin’s, Inc v Worcester Co Treasurer, 362 Mass 507, 511; 287 NE2d 608 (1972).]

However, an indispensable ingredient of the concept of coequal branches of government is that “each branch must recognize and respect the limits on its own authority and the boundaries of the authority delegated to the other branches.” United States v Will, 449 US 200, 228; 101 S Ct 471; 66 L Ed 2d 392 (1980).

The doctrine of separation of powers “has never been interpreted in Michigan as meaning there can never be any overlapping of functions between branches or no control by one branch over the acts of another.” People v Trinity, 189 Mich App 19, 22-23; 471 NW2d 626 (1991), citing Soap & Detergent Ass’n v Natural Resources Comm, 415 Mich 728, 752; 330 NW2d 346 (1982). Instead, Michigan has adopted the view of the separation of powers doctrine that James Madison expressed in The Federalist No. 47: “ ‘[W]here the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.’ ” Soap & Detergent Ass’n, supra at 752 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, some overlap of the three branches of government is permitted, but only where the area of one branch’s exercise of another branch’s power is very limited and specific. Trinity, supra at 23.

At issue in this case is the relationship between the legislative branch (the county) and the judicial branch (the trial court). In order to determine whether the challenged provisions of Act 374 violate the Separation of Powers Clause by allowing the legislative branch to invade the powers of the judiciary, it is necessary to examine the powers of the judicial branch. The judicial power of the state is vested exclusively in “one court of justice . . . .” Const 1963, art 6, § 1. Included within the judicial power is the authority to determine what the law is and apply it to decide the rights of parties. Johnson v Kramer Bros Freight Lines, Inc, 357 Mich 254, 257; 98 NW2d 586 (1959). In addition to such traditional adjudicative powers, the Michigan Supreme Court has long recognized that the judiciary possesses “all the authority necessary to exercise its powers as a coordinate branch of government.” In re 1976 PA 267, supra at 663; Gray v Clerk of Common Pleas Court, 366 Mich 588, 595; 115 NW2d 411 (1962). This inherent power of the judiciary has been recognized as essential to preserving the independence of the judicial branch. Wayne Circuit Judges, supra, 386 Mich 9-10; Gray, supra at 595. In her dissent in Second Dist Court, supra at 734, Justice Riley described the inherent power of the judiciary as authority that “does not deal with judicial matters [but instead] relates to the administration of the business of the court.” In In re 1976 PA 267, supra at 663, the Court included administrative powers when describing the nature of the judicial powers, stating:

The judicial powers derived from the Constitution include rulemaking, supervisory and other administrative powers as well as traditional adjudicative ones. They have been exclusively entrusted to the judiciary by the Constitution and may not be diminished, exercised by, nor interfered with by the other branches of government without constitutional authorization.

Administrative powers are managerial in nature. In order to carry out its stated adjudicative powers, the judiciary, and likewise the legislative and executive branches, must have the inherent authority to manage operations of its branch. An apt description of the need for this power is found in the superseded original opinion of the Court in Wayne Circuit Judges, supra, 383 Mich 20-21. There, the Court stated:

It is the imperfection of human institutions which gives rise to our notion of inherent power. It is simply impossible for a judge to do nothing but judge; a legislator to do nothing but legislate; a governor to do nothing but execute the laws. The proper exercise of each of these three great powers of government necessarily includes some ancillary inherent capacity to do things which are normally done by the other departments.

Thus, both the legislative department and the judicial department have certain housekeeping chores which are prerequisite to the exercise of legislative and judicial power. And, to accomplish these housekeeping chores both departments have inherently a measure of administrative authority not unlike that primarily and exclusively vested in the executive department.

Finally, we note that the Supreme Court’s recent Administrative Order No. 1997-6, which commented on the separation of power implications of Act 374 and set forth guidelines for its implementation, is consistent with our recognition that the judiciary possesses such managerial powers:

The principle of separation of powers requires that the fundamental and ultimate responsibility for all aspects of trial comí; operations, including personnel matters, resides within the judicial branch. Practical principles of modem management similarly advise that the primary responsibility for trial court operations, including personnel matters, should reside at the local level, with the chief judge of the trial court. Effective management of the operation of a trial court, however, also requires a positive working relationship between chief judges and the local funding units of their courts in the exercise of shared responsibility to the public. In addition to protecting the managerial responsibilities of the judiciary over its branch of government, the principle of separation of powers protects local funding units in their own area of fundamental responsibility: the appropriation of public dollars. Given the separate responsibilities of the judiciary and the court’s funding units, the application of the principle of separation of powers to the operation of trial courts requires a practical reconciliation of the separate constitutional spheres of the legislative and judicial branches where those spheres intersect.

For all these reasons, we hold that the circuit court, as a division of Michigan’s “one court of justice,” possesses the inherent and exclusive power to manage all its operations. Accordingly, in determining whether the provisions of Act 374 allow an impermissible intrusion into the powers of the judiciary by the legislative branch, we must consider the effect of its provisions on this inherent power of the court to administer its business.

In § 593a of Act 374, the Legislature envisioned that either the Wayne County Judicial Council, if timely created by the Wayne County Board of Commissioners, or Wayne County would be the “employer” of the employees at issue. See subsections 593a(2) and (3).²⁰ Because a judicial council was not created,²¹ the term “employer” as used in § 593a refers by default to Wayne County. Subsection 593a(4) grants the “employer,” i.e., Wayne County, certain authority that is to be exercised in concurrence with the chief judge, including, but not limited to, the ability to enter into collective bargaining agreements with the court employees’ representatives. Subsection 593a(5) sets forth the division of authority in the event of an impasse between the chief judge and the county. The pertinent portions of the statute provide:

(3) If the Wayne county judicial council is not created pursuant to subsection (1), the employees of the former state judicial council serving in the circuit court in the third judicial circuit or in the recorder’s court of the city of Detroit shall become employees of the county of Wayne, effective October 1, 1996.

(4) The employer designated under subsection (2) or (3) [Wayne County], in concurrence with the chief judge of the appropriate court, has the following authority:

(a) To establish personnel policies and procedures, including, but not limited to, policies and procedures relating to compensation, fringe benefits, pensions, holidays, leave, work schedules, discipline, grievances, personnel records, probation, and hiring and termination practices.

(b) To make and enter into collective bargaining agreements with representatives of those employees.

(5) If the employer [Wayne County] and the appropriate chief judge are not able to' concur on the exercise of their authority as to any matter described in subsection (4)(a), that authority shall be exercised by either the employer or the chief judge as follows:

(a) The employer has the authority to establish policies and procedures relating to compensation, fringe benefits, pensions, holidays, and leave.

(b) The chief judge has the authority to establish policies and procedures relating to work schedules, discipline, grievances, personnel records, probation, hiring and termination practices, and other personnel matters not included in subdivision (a). [MCL 600.593a(3), (4), and (5); MSA 27A.593a (3), (4), and (5).]

In our view, the statute creates a relationship between the legislative branch (the county) and the judicial branch (the court) that violates the Separation of Powers Clause. The statute simply allows too much interference with the judiciary’s inherent authority to manage its internal operations. Although the grant of authority to the legislative branch may be specific, i.e. it concerns personnel matters, it is certainly not limited.

Subsection 593a(3) is an outright takeover of the court’s employees, making them employees of the county. From a separation of powers standpoint, it is troubling that persons working solely within one branch be regarded as employees of another branch of government.²² Employing and managing personnel to carry out day-to-day operations is one of the most basic administrative functions of any branch of government. This Court has already suggested that, pursuant to the doctrine of separation of powers, one branch of government should not be subject to oversight by another branch in personnel matters. In Beadling v Governor, 106 Mich App 530, 536; 308 NW2d 269 (1981), this Court held that it would be a violation of the separation of powers doctrine “if the executive branch was allowed to judge the competency of a discharged employee of the legislative branch and order reinstatement.” There, this Court observed that the employee at issue in Beadling held a position that “was one of some sensitivity within the legislative process” and that if executive oversight were allowed it would “allow a dangerous incursion into the legislative realm.” Id. Surely a usurpation of all the court’s employees can be viewed as an equally dangerous incursion into the judicial realm. Accordingly, we view subsection 593a(3) as a violation of the Separation of Powers Clause.

We find subsection 593a(4) to be equally offensive to the doctrine of separation of powers. This provision grants equal authority to the county and the court in establishing all personnel policies and procedures. Thus, subsection 593a(4) goes beyond giving the county input concerning economic issues or collective bargaining agreements, issues that are arguably related to the county’s exclusive power to appropriate public dollars for the operation of the trial court.²³ See Const 1963, art 4, §§ 1, 30-31. The Michigan Supreme Court and this Court have invoked the inherent power of the court in cases involving the judiciary’s ability to determine who its employees are and to determine the salaries of its employees. Gray, supra at 595 (holding that “[t]o remove bailiffs and other court personnel for cause is an inherent power of the judiciary); Judges of the 74th Judicial Dist v Bay Co, 385 Mich 710, 727; 190 NW2d 219 (1971) (holding that its finding that the district courts rather than the local units have authority to set salaries was “wholly consonant” with the inherent judicial power doctrine); Livingston Co v Livingston Circuit Judge, 393 Mich 265; 225 NW2d 352 (1975) (extending the Bay Co holding to employees serving in the circuit and probate courts); Ottawa Co Controller v Ottawa Probate Judge, 156 Mich App 594, 603; 401 NW2d 869 (1986) (holding that the probate court has the inherent authority to set “reasonable salaries for its necessary employees in the first instance, as long as it remains within its total budget appropriation”). We now hold that the court’s inherent administrative powers include the authority to manage all personnel matters affecting employees working within its branch. The effect of subsection 593a(4) is that the judicial branch is forced to share this inherent authority to manage its employees with the legislative branch. This power-sharing relationship is too much of an intrusion into the internal operations of the court and is inconsistent with the Separation of Powers Clause.

While subsection 593a(4) offends the constitution by allowing the county to share the court’s inherent and exclusive authority over all personnel matters, subsection 593a(5) is inconsistent with the constitution because it divides the inherent managerial powers of the judiciary between the court and the county. This provision gives the county ultimate authority concerning all economic issues relating to the employees working within the court. Once again, we view this as too great of an intrusion into the internal operations of the court to be consistent with the Separation of Powers Clause. Amongst the powers designated to the county under this section is the power to “establish policies and procedures relating to compensation . . . .” MCL 600.593a(5)(a); MSA 27A.593a(5)(a). This Court and the Michigan Supreme Court have already ruled that as long as the court does not exceed its total budget appropriation, it has inherent authority to determine the salaries of its personnel. Bay Co, supra at 726-727; Livingston Co, supra at 272-273; Ottawa Co, supra at 603-604. We realize that at the time the Court decided Bay Co and Livingston Co there was express statutory authority for the circuit and district courts to set their employees’ salaries. However, in Bay Co, supra at 727, the Court cited the doctrine of inherent powers of the courts as an independent basis for its decision. Moreover, in Ottawa Co, supra at 603-604, this Court decided that the probate court had the authority to set the salaries despite the existence of statutes that, on their face, granted the authority to set the salaries of certain employees to the county. In light of this authority, we conclude that the provision of subsection 593a(5) granting the county ultimate control over salaries of court personnel is an unconstitutional delegation of the court’s inherent power to the legislative branch. Moreover, economic issues are sensitive personnel matters that can greatly affect the functioning of the trial court. Not only does the level of compensation affect who is available to the court as an employee, but it also can affect the morale of the work force. Likewise, other economic matters such as fringe benefits, pensions, holidays, and leave are sensitive and important issues affecting court personnel. Allowing one branch to have control over these aspects of the internal operations of another branch cannot be characterized as a limited intrusion.

For all these reasons, we hold that subsections 593a(3)-(5) violate the Separation of Powers Clause and must be stricken.²⁴ When a statutory provision is found to be unconstitutional, a determination regarding its severability from the rest of the statute is required. The question is whether the invalidity of parts of an act require that the entire act be declared unconstitutional. Pletz v Secretary of State, 125 Mich App 335, 374; 336 NW2d 789 (1983). The statute governing severability, MCL 8.5; MSA 2.216, provides:

In the construction of the statutes of this state the following rules shall be observed, unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature, that is to say:

If any portion of an act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances shall be found to be invalid by a court, such invalidity shall not affect the remaining portions or applications of the act which can be given effect without the invalid portion or application, provided such remaining portions are not determined by the court to be inoperable, and to this end acts are declared to be severable.

In order “[t]o be capable of separate enforcement, the valid portion of the statute must be independent of the invalid sections, forming a complete act within itself.” Pletz, supra at 375. The law enforced after an invalid portion of an act is severed must be “reasonable in view of the act as originally drafted.” Citizens for Logical Alternatives & Responsible Environment v Clare Co Bd of Comm’rs, 211 Mich App 494, 498; 536 NW2d 286 (1995). One test to determine whether the law enforced is reasonable in light of the original act is “whether the law-making body would have passed the statute had it been aware that portions therein would be declared to be invalid, and, consequently, excised from the act.” Pletz, supra at 375.

First we turn to the other provisions within § 593ato determine whether they may be read and enforced independently of the stricken provisions. Subsections 593a(7) and (9) are not affected by our striking of subsections 593a(3), (4), and (5) because these provisions, which address the chief judge’s option not to participate in collective bargaining and the liability of the state, can be read and enforced independently of the stricken provisions. However, subsections 593a(6) and (8) expressly depend on the unconstitutional relationship created between the county and the court in subsections 593a(4) and (5). Accordingly, these provisions must be stricken. Subsections 593a(10), (11), (12), and (13) refer to the appropriate employer designated under subsection (2) or (3). As we have already explained, the only provision relevant to our analysis is subsection 3 because the Wayne County Judicial Council provided for in subsection 2 was not timely created. We have ruled that the designation in subsection 3 of the county as the employer of persons working within the court is a violation of the Separation of Powers Clause. At first glance, these provisions may appear too dependent upon the stricken subsection 593a(3) to stand. However, the clear intent of these provisions is to provide a continuity of benefits to the employees who are no longer employed by the former State Judicial Council and to protect the rights of these employees vis-a-vis their new employer. This intent can still be effectuated by merely deleting references to subsection 3 in these provisions. The provisions would then ensure that the employees would not lose benefits acquired under their former employer, the State Judicial Council.

Next we turn to the remainder of Act 374. The act is comprehensive with numerous aims besides those addressed in the stricken portions of § 593a. See footnote 1, supra. We see no indication that the Legislature would not have adopted Act 374 had it known that this Court would excise portions of § 593a from the act. Accordingly, we find that the stricken provisions of § 593a are severable from Act 374 and see no reason to strike down the entire act. If the Legislature disagrees with our conclusion, it can repeal the remaining provisions of the act.

Our opinion would not be complete without discussing the position our colleague expresses in his dissent. First, we address our dissenting colleague’s comments regarding our striking of the provisions at issue as facially unconstitutional. We agree a successful facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the act would be valid. Council of Organizations, supra at 568. Although the dissent suggests there are several ways Act 374 could be implemented that would not run afoul of the constitution, he does not give any examples of such circumstances. In our view, no set of circumstances exists under which the act would be valid. On its face the act makes employees who were once employees of the court employees of the county, forces the judiciary to share its inherent power of managing its internal operations with the county, and then grants ultimate authority concerning all economic personnel issues to the county.²⁵ We cannot envision a way such an act could be implemented that would not invade the domain of the judiciary.²⁶

Our dissenting colleague also argues the issues before us are not ripe for review.²⁷ We note that the parties did not raise or argue the ripeness doctrine. We also note that if we were to refuse to decide this issue under the doctrine of ripeness, we believe we would be inviting litigation, resulting in a needless waste of judicial and legislative resources.²⁸ Moreover, in our view, these issues are ripe because the persons represented by plaintiffs jaa and GAA are presently in need of direction regarding the identity of their employer. Subsection 593a(4) divides the loyalty of former State Judicial Counsel employees between two masters and forces them to negotiate with two masters. We do not find such circumstances to be hypothetical or abstract questions that are not ripe for our review.

Finally, we comment regarding the implication throughout the dissent that our decision is somehow thwarting the intent of the Legislature to create a cooperative relationship between the county and the court.²⁹ We recognize that cooperation between the branches of government is essential to the process of determining a reasonable appropriation for the judiciary’s expenditures. The amount appropriated must be determined by good-faith negotiation between the judiciary and the legislative branch. This process has worked very well on a federal and state level for over two hundred years, and its success is due to the fact that each branch has recognized and respected the limits on its own authority and the boundaries of the authority delegated to the other branches. Disagreement and impasse between the branches has been the exception rather than the rule. There is no doubt this harmony is due to each branch of government approaching the bargaining table on a level playing field as an equal. However, the “experimental” legislation under consideration creates an imbalance in the bargaining positions of the judiciary and the legislative branch, making good-faith negotiations more difficult. It is disingenuous to argue that one branch of government’s taking over sole economic control of another branch’s employees would improve their relationship and status as equal branches of government. To hold the stricken provisions of § 593a of Act 374 constitutional would seriously undermine the trial court’s ability to carry out its judicial function and encourage the Legislature to take over the employees of the appellate branch of the judiciary and the executive branch under the guise of fiscal efficiency. Such legislation would destroy the judicial and executive branches of government’s inherent power to preserve their constitutional authority. We expect no chaos will result from our decision because our holding merely reinstates the practice of this state since our first constitution.

m

Finally, the JAA and the GAA contend that the trial court erred in finding that Act 374, § 593a did not violate the pera. First the jaa and the gaa argue that the party designated by Act 374 as their employer, Wayne County, has no control over some of the mandatory subjects of bargaining. As concluded above, this provision is unconstitutional, and we have remedied this by providing that the employees at issue are employees of the court. Accordingly, this argument is now moot. The remaining PERA issues are also moot now that we have stricken the coemployer relationship created by subsections 593a(4) and (5) of Act 374.

For these reasons, in Docket No. 201850 we reverse the order determining that Act 374 violates the Headlee Amendment. In Docket No. 201852, we reverse the portion of the order determining that Act 374 violates the Headlee Amendment and affirm the determination that provisions of Act 374 creating a coemployer relationship between the county and the court violate the Separation of Powers Clause.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Fitzgerald, J., concurred.

1 Significant features of Act 374 for the purposes of these appeals are that it abolishes the Detroit Recorder’s Court and merges it with the Wayne Circuit Court (Third Circuit Court); that it mandates local unit funding for the district and circuit courts, including the newly merged Third Circuit Court and the 36th District Court; and that it outlines a relationship between local funding units and the courts with respect to employees serving in the court. According to its preamble, Act 374 is designed to revise the organization and jurisdiction of the courts. House Legislative Analysis, HB 5158, July 29, 1996, states that Act 374 is inter alia a response to “perceived inequity of the state funding of trial courts” and an effort at “standardizing the state court system.”

2 Section 29 specifically effects a provision set forth generally in § 25.

3 We are aware that other challenges have been raised regarding Act 374, including those relating to the federal Voting Rights Act and the constitutionality of the procedures by which Wayne Circuit Court judges are designated. We do not address these issues, but only those appealed in the instant matter.

4 Of course, if 1996 PA 374 is inconsistent with this or any previously enacted statute, then Act 374 is not, on that account alone, invalid. Rather, Act 374 would effect a repeal of such other statute by implication. Washtenaw Co Rd Comm’rs v Public Service Comm, 349 Mich 663, 680; 85 NW2d 134 (1957); Antrim Co Social Welfare Bd v Lapeer Co Social Welfare Bd, 332 Mich 224, 228; 50 NW2d 769 (1952). This notion is a corollary to the principle that one Legislature cannot enact irrepealable legislation or restrict its own power or that of its successors concerning the repeal or amendment of statutes. Atlas v Wayne Co Bd of Auditors, 281 Mich 596, 599; 275 NW 507 (1937). Accordingly, any contention based on another statute is rejected.

5 These methods differ regarding whether total state aid or state aid to a particular local unit is used in comparing state aid for an activity in 1978 to state aid for the activity in the year at issue. Under the “state-to-state” method, the total state aid in 1978 is compared with the total state aid in the year at issue; under the “local-to-local” method, state aid to a particular unit in 1978 is compared with state aid to the particular local unit in the year at issue; and under the “state-to-local” method, total state aid in 1978 is compared with state aid to the particular unit in the year at issue. Schmidt, supra at 248-249. Chief Justice Cavanagh apparently adopted the “state-to-state” approach in his dissent, id. at 264-283, while Justice Levin (with Justice Riley concurring) apparently adopted the “local-to-local” approach in his dissent, id. at 284-314.

6 The Schmidt Court’s discussion of the two methods it rejected — the “state-to-state” and the “local-to-local” methods — are, because of the complexity of the analysis, sometimes inadvertently quoted out of context, leaving an erroneous impression regarding its holding. For example, in Docket No. 201852, the circuit court quoted from the Schmidt Court’s rejection of the “state-to-state” method and erroneously concluded from this language that a funding shift from one local unit (the city of Detroit) to another local unit (Wayne County) implicated the Headlee Amendment. The circuit court incorrectly, in our judgment, focused on whether the state was “making up,” or compensating for, the loss of funding previously provided by the city of Detroit. This was not the correct test to determine whether there was a Headlee Amendment violation here. Rather, as stated above, the Headlee Amendment guarantees only that the state will not reduce its proportion of the necessary costs of existing activities from that provided on a statewide basis in 1978 and that the state will pay for increased necessary costs when it mandates new activities or increases the level of an existing activity. While there may be significant political implications in any decision by the Legislature to redirect funds from one local unit of government to another, we do not believe that such decisions are properly within the contemplation of the Headlee Amendment because they do not result in the state’s attempting to circumvent its own spending constraints by shifting aggregate amounts of spending to other units of government. Section 29 of the Headlee Amendment was not designed generally to substitute for the political processes of government, by which there are sometimes factions, interests, or entities that can be characterized as “winners” or “losers,” but merely to secure against one obvious means by which the state could avoid the fiscal limitations placed upon it by other provisions of the amendment.

7 The Headlee Amendment thus is not averse to the idea that the state might choose to provide uniform amounts of assistance to local units, even though during the Headlee Amendment base year or a later year one or more local units might have received a greater proportion of assistance than other units. Consider, for example, a situation in which the state provided a special subsidy for a particular local unit in 1978 so that it received one hundred percent state financing (while all other units received fifty percent funding.) Under Schmidt, the local unit would not be guaranteed one hundred percent state financing by the Headlee Amendment, rather it would be guaranteed only the state funding proportion provided on a statewide basis in 1978 (i.e., an amount greater than fifty percent and less than one hundred percent depending upon the size of the local unit receiving the special subsidy). We do not agree with plaintiffs city of Detroit and Wayne County that the Headlee Amendment requires that a state preference, once extended to a local unit, be forever maintained.

8 We are cognizant that such statutory definitions of constitutional language, although entitled to respectful consideration, are not binding unless and only to the extent that the legislative definitions are consistent with the result achieved by applying established principles of constitutional law to the same interpretive task. Durant, supra, 424 Mich 392. We conclude that these particular statutes are correct in their construction of the constitutional language at issue.

9 For example, during oral argument, one counsel for plaintiffs suggested that a state law provision substituting an obligation that local units maintain photocopies of some recordkeeping matter for a previous obligation that it maintain carbon copies, might weE require Headlee Amendment compensation as a “new” activity.

10 For example, joining together, for purposes of Headlee Amendment analysis, state assistance to local units for court services, poEce services, and jail services as part of the “law enforcement” function would appear to undermine the Headlee Amendment by defining “activity or service” in an excessively broad manner.

11 This constitutional provision dictating that the various courts be viewed as “one court of justice” distinguishes the operation of the court system from, for example, operation of the educational system. See Durant, supra, 424 Mich 388, which concludes that education, as a whole, is not an “activity or service” for Headlee Amendment purposes. We consider this constitutional provision only to determine the scope of the relevant activity here, not to determine what the existing “state law” is for purposes of the Headlee Amendment.

12 The Recorder’s Court is a court unique to Detroit. It is “a court of limited jurisdiction and has jurisdiction for the prosecution of crimes committed within the City of Detroit only.” People v Young (On Remand), 220 Mich App 420, 433; 559 NW2d 670 (1996). In every other county in Michigan, crimes committed within a city are prosecuted in the circuit court.

13 We note that in determining “state law,” the Durant Court considered the well-established tradition of local control over school operation. Durant, 424 Mich 385, n 14.

14 Although not dispositive, we note that the Headlee Amendment was designated to be incorporated exclusively in art IX of the 1963 constitution. Art IX is entitled “Finance and Taxation.” However, art VII, “Local Government,” is the article that limits legislative authority to regulate, command, or otherwise intrude into the municipal affairs of counties, cities, villages, and metropolitan governments and authorities. If the Headlee Amendments were intended to directly and explicitly delimit the power of the Legislature over municipal affairs, then the Secretary of State was obligated to apprise voters that parts of art VH might be “altered or abrogated.” Const 1963, art 12, § 2; Ferency v Secretary of State, 409 Mich 569, 592-595; 297 NW2d 544 (1980). To date, the Headlee Amendment has only been construed as erecting a financial barrier against legislative creation of new municipal obligations in terms of activities or services and against the legislature’s shifting the financial responsibility for existing activities or services from the state to local government. Nothing in the Headlee Amendment addresses the entirely separate issue of transfers of financial responsibility between or among local governments, as long as the state’s pro-rata share of such costs to each local unit is not thereby reduced or diminished. Further, when a Headlee Amendment violation occurs, the remedy is not judicial abrogation of the statute; rather, the matter properly returns to the Legislature, which must decide whether to finance the mandate with state funding or instead to forgo the mandate. Durant, supra, 456 Mich 203-206 (holding that the usual remedy for a Headlee Amendment violation will be declaratory relief, after which the Legislature must either abolish the mandate, fund the activity in accordance with the Headlee Amendment’s dictates, or create a state liability for continued underfunding).

15 For purposes of this discussion, we will not consider the funds provided by the Court Equity Fund and the Hold Harmless Fund. Even without consideration of these funds, we are convinced that sfp2 is at least equal to sfpi with respect to the local units at issue.

16 We recognize that if judicial salaries constituted a large proportion of the necessary costs of overall trial court operation expenses in 1978 and presently constituted only a small proportion of those necessary costs, the state could conceivably be reducing its proportion of the necessary costs of trial court operations despite the fact that it has increased its contribution to judicial salaries. However, we have no reason to believe this to be the case; and plaintiffs, who have the burden of proof with regard to this issue, have failed to provide evidence demonstrating such a situation. Specifically, we are unaware of any dramatic structural change in the ratio of support personnel or infrastructure costs for each judge during this period that might result in a decrease in the state proportion of “necessary” trial court expenses despite the increase in the state’s contribution to judicial salaries.

17 We recognize that the financial burdens on the city of Detroit and Wayne County for trial court operations are substantially heavier than they were in the Headlee Amendment base year of 1978 or in 1982 when the state undertook to subsidize a greater portion of the funding for local courts in Detroit and Wayne County. However, the same is true for all local units across the state. Again, as already noted, with respect to continuing activities, as long as any increased burden on a local unit is not a function of the state’s reducing its proportion of funding from that provided on a statewide basis in 1978, the Headlee Amendment is not implicated. Plaintiffs are afforded no greater insulation than any other local unit from the rising costs of providing public services merely because the state undertook to provide them with funding subsidies for a period during which costs were generally rising for everyone.

18 The trial court relied in large part on Berrien Co Probate Judges v Michigan AFSCME Council 25, AFL-CIO, 217 Mich App 205; 550 NW2d 859 (1996); however, the Michigan Supreme Court subsequently ordered that this opinion shall “have no precedential force or effect.” 454 Mich 906 (1997).

19 We note that below plaintiffs jaa and gaa also challenged the constitutionality of Act 374, § 591(1), which provides that a local funding unit shall annually appropriate funds for operation of its circuit court “by line-item or lump-sum budget.” This issue has not been raised on appeal. However, we note that the validity of this provision is questionable in light of decisions holding that the Separation of Powers Clause prohibits the use of line-item appropriations by the legislative branch for operation of the courts. See Ottawa Co Controller v Ottawa Probate Judge, 156 Mich App 594, 604-606; 401 NW2d 869 (1986); Judges of the 74th Judicial Dist v Bay Co, 385 Mich 710, 726-727; 190 NW2d 219 (1971).

20 Section 593 of Act 374 achieves this same purpose. It provides:

Effective October 1, 1996, each employee of the former state judicial council serving in the circuit court in the third judicial circuit shall become an employee of the Wayne county judicial council if that council is created pursuant to section 593a, or, if that council is not created, shall become an employee of the county of Wayne.

21 We express no opinion regarding the constitutionality of designating the Wayne County Judicial Council (if it had been timely created) as employer of the employees at issue.

22 We note that House Legislative Analysis, HB 5158, July 29, 1996, articulated concerns regarding this precise issue, stating:

Having the legislative branch of government provide employees for the judicial branch appears to violate the separation of powers established by the constitution. The legislative branch of state government doesn’t provide the executive branch with its employees, nor does the executive branch provide the legislature with its employees. Why should this be so with the judiciary? Judicial accountability requires that the judiciary have control over its employees.

23 By recognizing that these issues may be related to the county’s power to appropriate funds we do not mean to suggest that they are any more of an appropriate subject for legislative interference with the court’s internal operations. We merely point out that subsection 593a(4) encompasses more than these economic issues because of the dissent’s comment, post at 447, that finances are “the legitimate legislative concern of the local unit.”

24 We note that § 593a is constructed similarly to provisions of Act 374 that are not at issue in the instant litigation, specifically §§ 591(4), 8271(6), and 8274(5).

25 The dissent, post at 448, n 19, mischaracterizes our striking down several provisions of Act 374 as violative of the constitutional separation of powers on the basis of a potential for overreaching by the local funding unit. On the contrary, we hold the provisions represent overreaching by the local funding unit.

26 The dissent cites the former State Judicial Council as an example of sharing of control over judicial employees by all three branches of government and wonders why these employees now challenge the similar arrangement under Act 374 as being a violation of the separation of powers provision of our constitution. The mere fact the arrangement was successful is no evidence it was constitutional. See Blank, supra. We suggest the lack of constitutional objections to the creation of the State Judicial Council was due to the state fully funding the operations of the participating courts, relieving local government of a sizable financial burden. 1980 PA 438; 1980 PA 440. When Act 374 shifted the financial burden back to local government, the present constitutional challenge was filed.

27 It is interesting to note that although our dissenting colleague claims the issues are not ripe for our review, he nonetheless concludes subsection 593a(3) facially does not violate the constitutional separation of powers and there is nothing on the face of Act 374 or the particular provisions struck down by us that makes it certain, or even more likely than not, that any discrete judicial function of the trial court will be impaired.

28 The dissent notes that neither the local units nor the trial courts have challenged the statute on separation of powers grounds. We take judicial notice that at least one funding unit has passed a resolution objecting to Administrative Order No. 1997-6.

Whereas, the Legislature of the State of Michigan adopted Act 374 of the Public Acts of 1996, an Act intended, in relevant part, to re-define and re-order the relationship between the trial courts of the State of Michigan and the local governmental units primarily responsible for funding those trial courts; and

Whereas, Act 374 had the effect of establishing local governmental unit “employer” status for non-judicial employees of the trial courts and line item budgeting authority, among other necessary and beneficial changes; and

Whereas, on August 18, 1997, the Honorable Conrad L. Mallet, Jr., Chief Justice of the Michigan Supreme Court, issued Administrative Order No. 1997-6, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit “A.” Administrative Order No. 1997-6 postulated the unconstitutionality of Act 374, and arbitrarily and capriciously overturned the substance of the “employer status” reforms and the “line-item budgeting” reforms which constituted the heart of the reforms adopted in Act 374; and

Whereas, the implementation of Administrative Order No. 1997-6 will frustrate the efforts of the Michigan legislature and the local governmental units to bring order, accountability, and efficient administration to the trial court system;

NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED:

1) That the Tuscola County Board of Commissioners indicates its support for efforts to mediate and negotiate an end to the dispute occasioned by the issuance of Administrative Order No. 1997-6 with the goal of having that Order withdrawn in its entirety and having Act 374 of the Public Acts of 1996 given immediate and full effect; and

2) That the Tuscola County Board of Commissioners indicate [sic] its willingness to participate in these efforts, through its authorized representatives; and

3) That, simultaneous with such efforts, the Tuscola County Board of Commissioners supports the drafting and adoption of an amendment to the 1963 Constitution of the State of Michigan, which will implement the operative provision of Act 374, and thereby assure its implementation without interference by the Michigan Supreme Court; and

4) That simultaneous with such efforts, the Tuscola County Board of Commissioners will support and encourage other appropriate Constitutional and statutory changes which will assume [sic] the efficient, orderly, and cost effective administration of the trial courts, with a system of local control; and

5) That copies of this Resolution be sent to Senator Joel Gougeon, representative Michael Green, Governor Engler, the County of Ottawa, and the Michigan Association of Counties; and

Be it further resolved that all resolutions and parts of resolutions insofar as they conflict with this Resolution are hereby repealed.

I, Margie A. White, Tuscola Count [sic] Clerk, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of a Resolution adopted by the Tuscola County Board of Commissioners at a regular meeting on January 13, 1998.

29 The dissent, post 451, n 22, suggests we partially rewrite certain provisions of § 593a and insert the words “the circuit court” anytime there is a reference to “employer.” We believe any rewrite of legislation is within the province of the Legislature and not the judiciary. The dissent further claims our striking certain provisions of Act 374 renders all collective bargaining agreements hortatory unless the county independently decides to fund the agreement. What is new? Courts have been entering into collective bargaining agreements with their employees for years and both parties have known the agreement must be within the total appropriation allotted by the funding unit.