Gray v. State , 368 Md. 529 ( 2002 )

CATHELL, Judge.

James Melvin Gray, petitioner, after a trial in the Circuit Court for Charles County, was convicted of first-degree murder in the death of his wife, Bonnie Gray. On June 17, 1998, petitioner was sentenced to be incarcerated for life. Petitioner filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court for Charles County in Gray v. State, 137 Md.App. 460, 769 A.2d 192 (2001).

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this Court, which we granted. Gray v. State, 364 Md. 461, 773 A.2d 513 (2001). In his petition, petitioner presents four questions for our review:

“1. Where a defendant asserts that another individual committed the offense for which he is on trial, that assertion possesses evidentiary support, and the alternative suspect invokes his Fifth Amendment privilege concerning the matter, is the defendant entitled to question the alternative suspect in the presence of the jury?

2. Where in the context of Question I the trial court refuses to permit the defense to question the alternative suspect in the jury’s presence, is the trial court obligated to propound an instruction to the jury explaining why the defense has apparently chosen not to question that person?

3. Did the trial court err in excluding from evidence the proffered statements of the alternative suspect indicating that he had committed the offense, and did the courts below err in holding that the trial court in ruling upon this issue may determine that such statements were never made, rather than leaving that determination for the jury?

4. Did the trial court err in admitting the extrajudicial statements of the murder victim indicating her intention to inform Petitioner that she was planning to end their marriage?”

We shall respond to question three first, and hold that the trial court erred in refusing to permit, under the declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule, the admission in evidence of the statement of the alternative suspect that indicated the alternative suspect had committed the offense for which the petitioner was on trial. For guidance purposes, we will later address questions one and two.

I. Relevant Facts

On November 30, 1995, Bonnie Gray was reported missing by petitioner. Her partially nude body was discovered in the trunk of her car on December 6, 1995. Mrs. Gray had suffered ten lacerations to the head, three gunshot wounds to the head, and a stab wound to the left chest. Mrs. Gray also had five of her fingers severed.

A jury trial was held in the Circuit Court for Charles County from March 17, 1998 to May 4, 1998. During the trial, petitioner’s defense was that his wife was murdered by Brian Gatton (Gatton). There was witness testimony about a relationship between Gatton and Mrs. Gray. Testimony was also presented about Gatton’s drug use, his “obsession” with knives, and his being in possession of jewelry after Mrs. Gray’s murder that it was asserted was similar to that owned and worn by Bonnie Gray but was not found when her body was discovered.

At trial, petitioner subpoenaed Gatton to testify. The Circuit Court was made aware that Gatton intended to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Gatton was therefore first called to testify by the petitioner out of the jury’s presence,¹ and he was questioned about his role in the murder, to which Gatton invoked his Fifth Amendment right. The Circuit Court determined that Gatton could invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege. The trial court, however, refused to permit the petitioner to question Gatton, and thus to have Gatton invoke his rights under the Fifth Amendment, in the jury’s presence. The trial court also declined to instruct the jury that Gatton had exercised his right to remain silent. Gatton was called to the stand in the jury’s presence and asked only his name and birth date. Gatton was then instructed to stand next to petitioner and the witness was then excused. No questions about Gatton’s exercise of the privilege were permitted. Petitioner then requested that the Circuit Court give a jury instruction that the witness had invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege. The Circuit Court declined to give that instruction to the jury.

During pretrial proceedings, the State filed a Motion in Limine to exclude statements made by Gatton to Evelyn Johnson (Evelyn). Petitioner wanted Evelyn to testify as to statements made to her and other statements made in her presence by Mr. Gatton as an exception to the hearsay rule, statements against Gatton’s penal interests. These statements were to the effect that he, Gatton, had killed the victim, Bonnie Gray.

It was proffered that Evelyn would testify that Gatton was an occasional visitor in her home, and that on one or more occasions he had been accompanied by Bonnie Gray, the deceased, whom he identified as his girlfriend. Evelyn alleged at one point in her testimony that on one occasion she heard Gatton and Bonnie arguing with Gatton repeatedly telling Bonnie that “he was never going to let her go no matter what she did.” On that occasion Bonnie left the Johnson residence before Gatton, and Gatton subsequently stated: “[T]hat bitch pissed me off’ and “if he couldn’t have her no one would.”² After Bonnie’s disappearance, but before the discovery of her body, he told Evelyn that “I took care of her,” ³ meaning Bonnie.

It was further proffered that Evelyn would have testified that on a subsequent occasion Gatton came to her house when her husband was away and raped her. Several days after-wards, she testified that he threatened her, saying, “[I]f I told [anyone about the rape] he would take care of me just like he had took care of Bonnie.” Evelyn would have testified that on that occasion he pulled a small handgun from his boot and also a hunting knife from a “case” on his belt, showing them to Evelyn, and saying, “[T]his is what I killed her with.” There was also testimony that Evelyn had not initially proffered this information to investigators because she was afraid to get involved. She “didn’t want to be the next one dead.”

On March 17, 1998, at the end of the hearing on the Motion in Limine, the Circuit Court held that the hearsay testimony of Evelyn should not be admitted as a statement against interest made by Gatton under an exception to the hearsay rule.⁴ The Circuit Court stated:

“Now, we also had testimony on the other motion that was filed on March the 6th where the State wishes to exclude statements allegedly made against penal interest by Mr. Gatton. As I mentioned yesterday I asked counsel what the specific statements were because quite frankly the witness we heard from appeared to be rather confused. I did go through part of the transcript last night and I think there are 2 basic statements[⁵] that we are concerned with.

The first is quote, Mr. Gatton saying quote, I took care of her and the second one was quote, if you tell anyone I will take care of you just like I took care of Bonnie Gray.

Now, unfortunately I did not have enough time to go in detail and render a detailed opinion this morning. However, I will give you the bottom line. I am reserving the right to supplement that which I hope to do so tomorrow.

In any event at the time the first statement was made according to Ms. Johnson Mr. Gatton was high on drugs and drunk and we were just talking. The second one apparently was made in response, it was proceeded by question if you tell anyone this is what I am going to do.

I find that each of those declarations under the facts given would not be made by a reasonable man understanding that he was making a statement against penal interest.

Additionally I find that each of the statements is not trustworthy and I will go through the lack of reliability factors when I give my detailed opinion.

However, for the sake of opening argument I will grant that motion also.” .

The Circuit Court subsequently filed a Memorandum to supplement and clarify its finding from the March 17, 1998 hearing. At the end of the trial, petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to incarceration for life. Petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Special Appeals which affirmed the decisions of the Circuit Court.

II. Discussion

We hold that the Circuit Court erred by not admitting the hearsay statements of Gatton into evidence under the declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule. We also provide guidance to questions one and two as presented by petitioner. As we will state, infra, the trial court has the discretion to determine whether to allow a defendant to call a witness to testify, who the defendant alleges committed the crime, for the purpose of having the witness invoke his Fifth Amendment right in the presence of the jury.

A. Statement Against Interest

It is argued before this Court that at the pretrial hearing⁶ the State took the position that the evidence relating to the statements aforesaid allegedly made by Gatton should not be admitted as declarations against penal interest (Gatton was unavailable because he had exercised his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and had declined to testify), because Evelyn was not a credible witness, and, therefore, the trial court should find that the statements of Gatton were, in fact, not made.

The seeds for the error that would grow out of the preliminary hearing began when the State, in argument, stated, “Well, if the Court would look to the Matusky decision which is really the decision we have to go by because that is the ... most recent Maryland decision on this type of issue.” State v. Matusky, 343 Md. 467, 682 A.2d 694 (1996), is substantially different factually, and, in some respects, legally, than the present case.

In Matusky, the declaration against penal interest was sought to be introduced by the State, and the statement was alleged to be against the defendant’s penal interest, not against the penal interest of an alternate suspect. It was an inculpatory statement as to the defendant; however, the statement was not made by Matusky, but was made by a codefend-ant who was being tried separately. The declarant in Ma-tusky, who was also unavailable, would have been, if present to testify, a witness whom Matusky would have had a constitutional right to confront. Here, the declaration was sought to be introduced by the defendant, and thus the defendant’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him is not implicated. Judge Raker, for the Court, noted in Ma-tusky that when a declaration against interest of a defendant is at issue, the confrontation clause requires additional assurances of reliability before such declarations against interest should be admitted. The statement in this case was exculpatory as to petitioner but inculpatory as to Gatton, the person petitioner alleged committed the crime.

In Matusky, the Court of Special Appeals held that only the parts of the statement against penal interest that were incul-patory against the declarant were admissible. The portions of the statement that were inculpatory against Matusky, who was not the declarant, should have been redacted from the statement. We noted, in affirming the Court of Special Appeals’ reversal of the trial court’s admission of the statement, that:

“Writing for the court, Judge Joseph Murphy, Jr.,[⁷] reasoned that:

Applying Simmons, Wilson, and Williamson:[⁸] to the facts of this case, we conclude that the trial judge should have excluded the statements in White’s declaration that identified appellant as the killer and supplied appellant’s motive for the murders. Those statements were simply not self-inculpatory as to White.... With respect to those portions of the declaration in which White described his role, cross-examination of White would have been of marginal utility to appellant. The same cannot be said, however, about other statements in the declaration. It is obvious that appellant had an important interest in cross-examining White [the unavailable out-of-court declarant] with respect to those portions of the declaration in which White (1) identified appellant as the killer and (2) discussed appellant’s motive for the murders. Those statements should have been redacted from White’s declaration against interest.”

Id. at 475-76, 682 A.2d at 698 (quoting Matusky v. State, 105 Md.App. 389, 403, 660 A.2d 935, 941 (1995)).

We then examined portions of the parties’ arguments relating to redaction cases, cases where collateral portions of statements are redacted (or should have been redacted) from admitted declarations against interest of the declarant. We présented an extensive discussion of the redaction issue. (Redaction issues are not present in the instant case.) It was in that general context that we, in Matusky, discussed State v. Standifur, 310 Md. 3, 526 A.2d 955 (1987), although portions of that discussion would apply in other contexts as well. We stated in Matusky:

“In State v. Standifur, 310 Md. 3, 5, 526 A.2d 955, 956 (1987), we considered the question of whether a declaration against the penal interest of an unavailable declarant, offered by the State against the accused in a criminal trial, was sufficiently reliable to qualify under the common law exception to the hearsay rule.... We articulated a test for trial judges to apply in deciding whether ... to admit a statement against interest. First, the proponent of the declaration must demonstrate that the declarant is unavailable.”

Matusky, 343 Md. at 479, 682 A.2d at 699-700 (emphasis added).

We then discussed the second part of the test enunciated in Standifur, that the trial court must examine the reasonableness of the statement at the time it was made, formulating an opinion whether the statement was truly against the declar-ant’s penal interest, and whether a reasonable person-declar-ant would have perceived the declaration to be against his penal interest. Quoting from Standifur, we then noted the next test that the trial court must use to assess the. admissibility of the declaration:

“[Wjhether there are present any other facts or circumstances, including those indicating a motive to falsify on the part of the declarant, that so cut against the presumption of reliability normally attending a declaration against interest that the statements should not be admitted.”

Matusky, 343 Md. at 480, 682 A.2d at 700 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Standifur, 310 Md. 3, 17, 526 A.2d 955, 962 (1987)).

We then noted that, under Standifur, there remains a “final inquiry.”

“A statement against interest that survives this analysis, and those related statements so closely connected with it as to be equally trustworthy, are admissible as declarations against interest.”

Id. at 482, 682 A.2d at 701 (quoting Standifur, 310 Md. at 17, 526 A.2d at 962).

In Matusky, we next focused that part of our opinion on the requirements, and the reasons for them, to be used in dealing with collateral non-inculpatory (as to the declarant) statements contained in declarations where those (collateral) statements are not against the interest of the declarant, but are damaging to a defendant and are proffered into evidence by the State. In doing so, we noted that in Standifur when the reliability issue was addressed, it was being discussed in the context of the declarant making the statement while he was in police custody, being interrogated in circumstances where he feared a revocation of his parole. We noted our statement in Standifur that he “apparently wished to curry favor with the authorities” and noted that for that reason the declaration was not sufficiently reliable. Matusky, 343 Md. at 483, 682 A.2d at 701 (quoting Standifur, 310 Md. at 20, 526 A.2d at 963). Because the Standifur Court held that the declaration was not sufficiently reliable due to the declarant’s circumstances and motive to fabricate, it did not consider “separate issues that are possibly generated by the Confrontation Clause.” Ma-tusky, 343 Md. at 483, 682 A.2d at 701-02 (quoting Standifur, 310 Md. at 20, 526 A.2d at 963).

We then discussed in Matusky several Supreme Court cases interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence in respect to the declarations against penal interest exception to the hearsay evidence rule,⁹ including Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994). Our discussion in that respect related only to the issue of collateral declarations. Other than restating the standards discussed in Standifur, Matusky has little, if any relevance to the issues before the trial court, and before this Court, in this case.

One area of key importance in our resolution of the third question involves the Standifur case, that predates our adoption of the Rules of Evidence, and the contrary interpretations of that case to which the parties ascribe. To an extent, those contrary interpretations relate to whether, and what part of, the Fifth Circuit case of United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir.1978), we may or may not have adopted in Standifur.

In discussing Standifur, we note initially that we recognized-in that case that we were then concerned only with the circumstances in which the State sought the admission of statements by an unavailable declarant that inculpated the defendant. We said in Standifur, “This case requires consideration of a specific class of declarations against penal interest — those offered by the State to inculpate a defendant in a criminal case.” State v. Standifur, 310 Md. 3, 10, 526 A.2d 955, 958 (1987). A substantial part of the balance of our discussion in Standifur was almost exclusively limited to the attempts of the prosecution to have admitted in evidence statements of codefendants, that tend to inculpate the other defendants and exculpate the codefendant declarant. We stated:

“In determining the probable state of mind of a reasonable person in the position of the declarant, it is perhaps as important to consider the totality of circumstances under which the statement was made as to consider the contents of the statement. If experience tells us that we may presume trustworthiness when one is recounting symptoms to a physician who is to treat him, it also tells us that we must treat as ‘inevitably suspect’ a statement made to persons in authority and implicating a codefendant, even though the statement also contains an admission of the declarant’s culpability. A defendant implicating his confederate may do so to curry favor with the authorities, to achieve a plea bargain, to shift the blame by showing that another was more culpable, or simply to have another with whom to share the blame. In Lee v. Illinois,[¹⁰] Justice Brennan said for the Court:

As we have consistently recognized, a codefendant’s confession is presumptively unreliable as to the passages detailing the defendant’s conduct or culpability because those passages may well be the product of the codefend-ant’s desire to shift or spread blame, curry favor, avenge himself, or divert attention to another.”

Id. at 13-14, 526 A.2d at 960 (citations omitted). We then discussed several other instances in which the Lee Court referred to cases standing for the proposition that declarations against penal interest, where the declarants are codefendants and the declarations tend to inculpate the defendant, are presumptively untrustworthy.

We discussed the necessity for a trustworthiness assessment when the admissibility of these types of statements are being considered. The context of that discussion concerned the trustworthiness of the statement made by the unavailable declarant, not the trustworthiness (i.e., credibility) of the in-court witness relator of the out-of-court declaration. We said in pertinent part:

“The circumstances surrounding the making of the statement [the out-of-court declaration] must be carefully analyzed to determine the likelihood that the statement was truthful. Critical to this analysis is the state of mind of the [out-of-court] declarant at the time the statement was made. Unless the [out-of-court] declarant then believed the statement to be against his penal interest, there is no basis for presumed reliability. However, because of the unavailability of the declarant and other problems of proof, the party urging this exception is not required to prove the actual state of mind of the declarant but must prove sufficient surrounding facts from which the trial judge may inferentially determine what the state of mind of a reasonable person would have been under the same or similar circumstances ....

... The more important criterion is that a reasonable person in the situation of the [out-of-court] declarant would have perceived the statement as deserving at the time he made it....

In summary, a trial judge considering the admission of a hearsay statement offered as a declaration against penal interest must carefully consider the content of the statement in the light .of all known and relevant circumstances surrounding the making of the statement and all relevant information concerning the declarant, and determine whether the statement was in fact against the declarant’s penal interest and whether a reasonable person in the situation of the declarant would have perceived that it was against his penal interest at the time it was made. The trial judge should then consider whether there are present any other facts or circumstances, including those indicating a motive to falsify on the part of the [out-of-court] declarant, that so cut against, the presumption of the .reliability normally attending a declaration against interest that the statements should not be admitted. A statement against interest that survives this analysis, and those related statements so closely connected with it as to be equally trustworthy, are admissible as declarations against interest.”

Standifur, 310 Md. at 12-17, 526 A.2d at 959-62 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).

The holding in Standifur (and in the cases generally) is concerned with assessing the trustworthiness of the out-of-court statement that inculpates, not exculpates, a defendant.¹¹ There is nothing in Standifur, or in any of our cases of which we are aware, that in a jury trial specifically permits a trial court to make a factual assessment of the trustworthiness of the in-court relator of the out-of-court declaration that exculpates a defendant. The credibility of the witness in such cases is normally to be assessed as witness credibility is generally determined-by the trier of fact.¹² An in-court relator of what she has heard outside the courtroom is, normally, as to whether she actually heard the declaration, in the same witness situation as an in-court relator of what they have seen outside the courtroom. Generally, credibility is tested by examining the witness, especially by cross-examination of the witness by the opposing party, which in the present case at the pre-trial hearing was vigorous and extensive. In a jury trial, it is, generally, not the court’s function to assess that type of credibility.

The State and the trial court also considered the issue of whether Gatton had a motive not to be truthful when he made his post-rape comments to Evelyn, because he was attempting to intimidate her to be silent about the rape. In other words, did he, in fact, fabricate it. First, some of his statements against his interests pre-dated the rape and occurred at a time when he was not trying to intimidate Evelyn. Those pre-rape statements included “he was never going to let her go no matter what she [the victim] did,” “that bitch pissed me off,” “if he couldn’t have her [the victim] no one would,” and “I took care of her.” The pre-intimidation statements substantially corroborate the post-rape declarations.

Other evidence was also proffered to corroborate Evelyn’s testimony about Gatton’s statements against interest. There was evidence proffered that Gatton was involved with Mrs. Gray in a love triangle and became upset when she would leave him to go home to Mr. Gray; there was testimony corroborating his presence in the Johnson home when some of the statements were allegedly made within the hearing of both Evelyn and her husband, Mr. Johnson. Testimony was also presented that Gatton was a confidant of Mr. Johnson (whose wife he would later rape); there was also testimony that he had been in possession of jewelry similar to that worn by the murder victim and had Evelyn pawn some of it at her brother’s pawn shop.

The jewelry she attempted to pawn included a watch similar to the watch that the victim wore. More importantly, the jewelry Evelyn attempted to pawn included two or three rings similar to rings worn by the victim. When the victim’s body was found it was missing the jewelry and also missing five fingers. Additionally, Evelyn testified that Gatton displayed a small handgun and a hunting knife to her when the statements were made. Mrs. Gray was killed by three gunshots to the head by a .22 caliber gun and was also stabbed. Finally, while there was evidence that Evelyn and her husband had a relationship with Gatton prior, and even after, Evelyn’s rape and Mrs. Gray’s murder, there was little, or no evidence, that Mr. Johnson or Evelyn had any relationship with the petitioner.

Moreover, the fact that Gatton may have been attempting to intimidate Evelyn does not detract from the fact that he, and indeed any reasonable person, would know that the statements he was making about his lover, the petitioner’s murdered wife and the woman Gatton was declaring he had killed, however it was used by him, was a statement against his penal interest. It was not just a statement that he had murdered somebody; it was a statement that he had murdered a specific person with whom he had a relationship. His statement was corroborated by the circumstance that the specific person had, in fact, been murdered.

Under the circumstances here present, petitioner was entitled to present his defense, i.e., that Gatton killed Bonnie Gray. When Gatton, through the invocation of his right to remain silent became unavailable, petitioner was, under the facts of this case, entitled to present to the jury Gatton’s declarations against penal interest through the person that allegedly heard the declarations, Evelyn Johnson. Under the circumstances here present, it was error to deny their admission. Moreover, when Gatton declined to testify, and the trial court refused to permit petitioner to require Gatton to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in the presence of the jury, addressed infra, the error was compounded and clearly prejudicial. The trial court’s evidentiary rulings effectively blocked petitioner’s ability to present a defense that, under the facts of this case, he was entitled to present. We shall reverse.

Because we are reversing on the third question presented, it is not necessary to resolve the remaining issues. Nevertheless, because of the importance of the issues contained in questions one and two, we shall address them for guidance purposes.

B. Fifth Amendment Right

In discussing questions one and two, we note that courts should be mindful that a defendant, within evidentiary and procedural restraints, is always entitled to present his full defense to the trier of fact.

At trial, petitioner subpoenaed Gatton to testify. The Circuit Court was made aware that Gatton intended to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Gatton was therefore initially called out of the jury’s presence¹³ and he was questioned about his role in the murder, to which Gatton invoked his Fifth Amendment right. The Circuit Court determined that Gatton could properly invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege. Petitioner wanted the Circuit Court to make Gatton invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in the presence of the jury. Petitioner contended that it would be unfair to not allow petitioner to put on a witness that petitioner alleges committed the murder and have that witness invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in front of the jury because the very invocation of the privilege contains relevant evidentiary inferences supporting the theory of the defense. The Circuit Court, relying on the factually distinguishable cases of Adkins v. State, 316 Md. 1, 557 A.2d 203 (1989) and Bhagwat v. State, 338 Md. 263, 658 A.2d 244 (1995), stated:

“THE COURT: As I’ve said before, under Adkins and, I think it’s Bhagwat, they say if the court is aware someone is going to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination, it’s supposed to be out of the range of the jury and if there is a case subsequent to that, I think it’s '95 in Bhagwat, I would be happy to look at it. That’s the current status of the law as far as I know.

THE COURT: Well, I haven’t had a chance to read the law review article, but I think at this stage dealing with circuit court, I am pretty well limited on this issue because the last two cases the Court of Appeals are very specific on, who was there when the witness takes the Fifth Amendment. So, I will follow Adkins and Bhagwat and not allow Mr. Gatton to invoke his privilege before the jury.”

Gatton was then called to the stand and asked his name and birth date. Gatton was then instructed to stand next to petitioner and the witness was then excused. No questions about Gatton’s exercise of the privilege were permitted. Petitioner subsequently requested that the Circuit Court give a jury instruction in respect to the Fifth Amendment as follows: “A witness has a right under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights to testify or not to testify fully when called to the witness stand.” The Circuit Court declined to instruct the jury.

Petitioner states that it was his defense at trial that Gatton killed Bonnie Gray and that ample evidence in support of this proposition was produced. The trial court relied on case law that was not applicable to the case sub judice when it declined to allow petitioner to question Gatton and have him invoke his Fifth Amendment right in the presence of the jury, believing in the first instance, that it had no discretion at all to do so, and then it also declined to give the requested instruction. Petitioner contends that the trial court’s decision was prejudicial to his defense because the jury might have been skeptical as to why petitioner would not question Gatton about the murder, if, as alleged to the jury, he thought that Gatton committed the murder. This might, according to petitioner, lead the jury to believe that petitioner had chosen not to ask Gatton any questions about the murder out of a lack of confidence in his defense. Petitioner contends that he was, at least, entitled to have the trial court give a jury instruction concerning a witness’s right to invoke the Fifth Amendment to overcome the prejudice to petitioner of not being allowed to question Gatton about the murder in the presence of the jury. Thus, petitioner contends, the jury was not permitted any evidence relating to the reason Gatton was not produced as a witness, even though the jury knew he was in the courtroom and physically available.

The privilege against self-incrimination can be traced back to the English common law, when the privilege was expressed as Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum (No one should be required to betray himself). Black’s Law Dictionary 1662 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed., West 1999). Currently, the privilege against self-incrimination is guaranteed by Maryland and federal law. Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Self incrimination) states “[t]hat no man ought to be compelled to give evidence against himself in a criminal case.” The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Rights of Accused in Criminal Proceedings) states, in relevant part, that “[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself....” In Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1491, 12 L.Ed.2d 653, 656 (1964), the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment was extended to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights has generally been recognized as being in pari materia with its federal counterparts. Richardson v. State, 285 Md. 261, 265, 401 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1979).¹⁴

In Richardson, supra, a case where the State wanted to have one of its witnesses invoke the privilege before a jury, this Court examined the procedure a court should generally follow when determining if a State’s witness can invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege. We stated:

“Our predecessors clearly set forth in numerous cases the procedures to be followed in determining when a witness may refuse to testify on grounds that the evidence adduced may incriminate him. The witness should first be called to the stand and sworn. Midgett v. State, 223 Md. 282, 289, 164 A.2d 526, 529 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 853, 81 S.Ct. 819, 5 L.Ed.2d 817 (1961). Interrogation of the witness should then proceed to the point where he asserts his privilege against self-incrimination as a ground for not answering a question. Shifflett v. State, 245 Md. 169, 173-74, 225 A.2d 440, 443 (1967). If it is a jury case, the jury should then be dismissed and the trial judge should attempt to ‘determine whether the claim of pi'ivilege is in good faith or lacks any reasonable basis.’ Midgett v. State, supra, 223 Md. at 289, 164 A.2d 526. If further interrogation is pursued, then the witness should either answer the questions asked or assert his privilege, making this decision on a question by question basis. Royal v. State, 236 Md. 443, 447, 204 A.2d 500, 502 (1964).

However, the standards for determining whether a witness’ refusal to testify is justified on fifth amendment grounds were set out in Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951). In Hoffman, the petitioner had been called to testify before a federal grand jury investigating racketeering. When asked questions concerning the whereabouts of a man who was a fugitive witness, Hoffman refused to respond on the ground that his answers might tend to incriminate him. This claim of privilege was challenged by the government, and a federal district court ordered Hoffman to return to the grand jury and answer the questions that had been asked of him. Hoffman was cited for contempt when he stated in open court that he would not obey the order. The Supreme Court held:

The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction under a ... criminal statute but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a ... crime.... But this protection must be confined to instances where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.... The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself — his say — so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified, ... and to require him to answer if ‘it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken.’ ... However, if the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, he would be compelled, to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer ,to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because, injurious disclosure could result. The trial judge in appraising the claim ‘must be governed as much by his personal perception of the peculiarities of the case as by the facts actually in evidence.’ ... [341 U.S. at 486-87, 71 S.Ct. 814 (citations omitted)].

The Court reviewed the circumstances surrounding Hoffman’s appearance before the grand jury, and pointed out that the questions were designed to elicit information concerning his association with a fugitive witness, more particularly associations during the time that the witness was eluding the grand jury. Because their questions might have forced Hoffman to reveal that he had engaged in criminal activity by helping the witness to avoid an appearance before the grand jury, the court held that it was not ‘ “perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answerfs] cannot possibly have such tendency” to incriminate.’ 341 U.S. at 488, 71 S.Ct. 814 [emphasis in original]. Hoffman’s contempt conviction was reversed.

Although Hoffman was decided nearly three decades ago, its continued vitality has been recognized both by the Supreme Court of the United States, e.g., Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 461, 95 S.Ct. 584, 42 L.Ed.2d 574 (1975); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11-12, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964), and the courts of this State. See Smith v. State, 283 Md. 187, 193, 388 A.2d 539, 542 (1978); Payne v. Payne, 33 Md.App. 707, 714-15, 366 A.2d 405, 410 (1976).”

Richardson, 285 Md. at 265-67, 401 A.2d at 1024-25 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted). Likewise, in Bhagwat v. State, 338 Md. 263, 272-73, 658 A.2d 244, 248 (1995), Chief Judge Bell, then Judge Bell, stated for the Court that:

“The test of the witness’s entitlement to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination — (1) whether there is a reasonable basis for the invocation of.the privilege; and (2) whether the privilege is invoked in good faith, see Adkins v. State, supra, 316 Md. at 6-7, 557 A.2d at 205-06; Richardson v. State, supra, 285 Md. at 265, 401 A.2d at 1024; Midgett v. State, 223 Md. at 288-92, 164 A.2d at 529-31; McLain, Maryland Evidence, supra, § 514.1, at 605 was well stated in Choi v. State, 316 Md. 529, 560 A.2d 1108 (1989). It is whether ‘the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer,’ id. at 536, 560 A.2d at 1111, and whether it is ‘evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.’ Id. at 537, 560 A.2d at 1111.”

Bhagwat was thus also primarily concerned with whether, not how, the privilege could be exercised.

In Vandegrift v. State, 237 Md. 305, 206 A.2d 250 (1965), we adopted five requirements for a court’s finding of prejudicial error when a witness was called by the State and invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. We stated:

“While, fortunately, we have not previously been called upon to consider the situation here complained of, courts in other jurisdictions have had occasion to deal with it. The case most heavily relied on by the appellant is DeGesualdo v. People, 147 Colo. 426, 364 P.2d 374 (1961). In that case the Supreme Court of Colorado held that the calling of an accomplice or coconspirator as a witness under circumstances quite similar to those involved here was prejudicial error. The court stated (at p. 376): ‘It is apparent that the district attorney could not have possibly entertained a good faith belief that * * * [the witness] would testify if called and thus the inference is that this was a studied attempt to bring to the attention of the jury his refusal to testify and his claim of the “Fifth Amendment.” ’ This case is annotated in 86 A.L.R.2d 1443, where the commentator in summarizing the decisions on this question lists five requirements for a court’s finding of prejudicial error (pp. 1444-1445):

T. that the witness appears to have been so closely implicated in the defendant’s alleged criminal activities that the invocation by the witness of a claim of privilege when asked a relevant question tending to establish the offense charged will create an inference of the witness’ complicity, which will, in turn, prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the jury;

‘2. that the prosecutor knew in advance or had reason to anticipate that the witness would claim his privilege, or had no reasonable basis for expecting him to waive it, and therefore, called him in bad faith and for an improper purpose;

‘3. that the witness had a right to invoke his privilege;

‘4. that defense counsel made timely objection and took exception to the prosecutor’s misconduct; and

‘5. that the trial court refused or failed to cure the error by an appropriate instruction or admonition to the jury.’ ”[¹⁵]

Id. at 308-09, 206 A.2d at 252 (alteration in original).

We have not heretofore opined on an appropriate procedure when a defendant presents a defense that another person committed the offense, but that person who is physically present invokes his privilege to remain silent. Our prior cases have, generally, involved State witnesses whose testimony, if given, would inculpate a defendant, unlike the present .case, where the proffered testimony, or the invocation of the privilege to remain silent, might provide exculpatory evidentiary inferences.

In the case at bar, where it is the defendant, not the State, desiring to call the witness, the trial court, in deciding against allowing the witness to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in front of the jury, relied on the holdings and procedures enunciated in our decisions in Bhagwat, supra, and Adkins v. State, 316 Md. 1, 557 A.2d 203 (1989). In its brief to this Court, the State also relies upon these two cases as well as citing our cases of Vandegrift, supra, and Allen v. State, 318 Md. 166, 567 A.2d 118 (1989).¹⁶

In Vandegrift, the State’s Attorney called to the witness stand several of Vandegrift’s codefendants who had not yet been tried, knowing that the codefendants would refuse to testify based on their right against self-incrimination. In fact, the codefendants did invoke their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Inculpatory inferences as to the defendant on trial resulted from the invocation of the privilege in that case. This Court reversed Vandegrift’s guilty verdict, holding that “the actions of the prosecutor in the case before us were prejudicial.” Vandegrift, 237 Md. 305, 309, 206 A.2d 250, 253 (1965).

The same situation existed in Adkins. There, the defendant, David Cleveland Adkins, was convicted of felony-murder and robbery. The issue that this Court had to decide on appeal involved “the propriety of calling an accomplice as a state’s witness in the jury’s presence when it is known by the court and counsel that the witness will invoke the privilege against compelled self-incrimination.” Adkins, 316 Md. 1, 2, 557 A.2d 203, 203 (1989). Adkins and Darryl Troxell were the last people to be seen with the victim, Joseph Michael Teal, when the three men had been drinking together. The next day, Teal was found floating face down in a creek. By the time of Adkins’s trial, Troxell had been convicted and sentenced for the murder of Teal, although he was in the process of appealing.

During the trial, a hearing was held on a Motion in Limine filed by Adkins to exclude a conversation that Troxell had with a brother-in-law of Adkins. At the hearing, Troxell invoked his Fifth Amendment right. The trial court stated that the Fifth Amendment right was not available- to Troxell because he had already been convicted, even though his appeal was pending. Troxell still invoked his Fifth Amendment right and stated that he would invoke it if called at trial. The trial court allowed the State, in the presence of the jury, to call Troxell at trial. Troxell once again invoked his Fifth Amendment right on a question by question basis, stating that he was afraid of compromising his pending appeal. The trial court, in the presence of the jury, instructed Troxell to answer and then found him in contempt of court.

This Court applied the five factor test stated in Vandegrift and found that four of the five factors had been satisfied. Therefore, the Court held that Adkins had been prejudiced, stating:

“In viewing all of the circumstances of the invocation of the privilege by Troxell, we hold that it was prejudicial error for the trial judge to conduct the second inquiry as to unavailability in the presence of the jury. Here, both the court and counsel were aware that the accomplice intended to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination as a result of the prior Motion in Limine testimony of Troxell. He clearly indicated that he would continue to refuse to testify if recalled before the jury, notwithstanding the earlier finding of contempt. Under these facts, the court should not have allowed the accomplice to be recalled before the jury for the purpose of direct examination. The trial judge should have ruled on Troxell’s availability during the Motion in Limine procedure, making a factual finding on the record, out of the presence of the jury.

Under the circumstances presented, because of our holding that it was prejudicial error for the trial court to require the accomplice to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in the presence of the jury, we shall reverse Adkins’ conviction and remand the case for a new trial.”

Adkins at 14-16, 557 A.2d at 209-10 (footnotes omitted).

In Allen, the defendant, Lloyd Allen, was convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon. Prior to his trial, Allen’s counsel proffered that one of the proposed witnesses, Antonio Buie, intended to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. At a hearing prior to trial, Buie’s counsel informed the court that Buie insisted upon asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege. The State indicated that it intended to have Buie called as a court’s witness because the State had prosecuted Buie in the past and could not vouch for Buie’s credibility. The court did not rule at the hearing.

At trial, Buie was called by the trial court to testify over his counsel’s objection. Buie invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege. The court then excused the jury and found Buie in contempt of court. The next day, outside of the presence of the jury, the court determined that it would call Buie as its witness because the court could protect Buie from future prosecution and, therefore, Buie did not have a basis for asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege. The trial court determined that the questions and answers could occur in the presence of the jury despite the fact that Buie intended to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege. Buie was called to testify and he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege in response to several questions asked by the prosecutor in the presence of the jury. Applying the test enunciated in Vande-grift, this Court determined that Allen was unfairly prejudiced when the court called Buie, who invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege, as its own witness. We held that the court calling Buie to testify was the same as if he was called by the State.

The issue presented in the case sub judice is a case of first impression for this Court as the facts are distinguishable from Allen, Adkins, and Vandegrift. All three of those cases concerned a witness being called to testify by the prosecution or by the court, when they knew or should have known that the witness was going to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege. Those cases all concerned the prejudicial effect — the inculpatory effect — that this would have on a defendant, then at trial, because the witnesses in all of the cases were alleged to be complicit in the crime for which the defendant was on trial. The -witnesses invoking their Fifth Amendment privilege in the presence of the jury would have the prejudicial effect of an adverse inference that would implicate the defendant in the crime. The case at bar involves a defendant (petitioner) who wants to call a witness (Gatton), who was not an accomplice, but rather the person the defendant claims committed the crime, to testify or invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in the presence of the jury. The witness was being called for exculpatory purposes. Petitioner contends that he was prejudiced by not being able to have Gatton invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in the presence of the jury because he had built his entire defense on the concept that Gatton committed the crime. Petitioner further contends that Gatton invoking his privilege outside of the presence of the jury provides the jury with an incorrect inference that petitioner’s defense was frivolous or insincere because he did not question Gatton about the crime.

Because we are reversing on other grounds, it is not necessary that we determine in this case what the proper procedure should be when a defendant desires to present a witness whom a defendant asserts is the perpetrator of the crime for which a defendant is charged, and that witness desires to exercise his right to remain silent. We note again, however, that the line of Maryland cases that address the subject do so, generally, in contrary factual circumstances to the case at bar.

We believe that a trial court has some discretion to consider permitting a defendant in a criminal case to call a witness to the stand to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in the presence of the jury if the trial court first determines whether sufficient evidence has been presented, believable by any trier of fact, of the possible guilt of the witness the defendant wants to cause to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege before the jury. The court, in the exercise of that discretion, must consider, as well, the prejudice to the defense of not allowing the potentially exculpatory witness to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in the presence of the jury. In opining that such discretion exists, we note that such testimony, if permitted, might be subject to the same restraints that a trial judge normally may exercise as to relevancy, repetitiveness, and the like.

In the case mb judice, addressing the discretion of the trial court, the Court of Special Appeals stated:

“In Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976), the Supreme Court held that ‘the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them.’ In Kramer v. Levitt, 79 Md.App. 575, 558 A.2d 760 (1989), we addressed the evidentiary significance of a party’s invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege in a civil case, in response to discovery requests. We read Baxter to mean that three criteria must be met before an inference may be drawn against a person exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege: 1) the action must be a civil case; 2) the party seeking to draw the inference must have made out a prima fama case, so that he is not relying on the adverse inference to establish an element of his cause of action; and 3) the person invoking the privilege must be a party, not a witness. Id. at 586, 558 A.2d 760. On that basis, we held that party who had asserted the privilege in response to discovery could not testify on the same topic at trial and that the opposing party was entitled to an instruction telling the jurors that they could, but need not, draw an inference from the party’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege that his answers to the discovery requests would have been adverse to his interests. Id. at 56-89 [586-89].

Given that when it is asserted in a civil case, by a party, the Fifth Amendment privilege may take on evidentiary significance, we disagree with the courts that take the sweeping view that there can never be probative value to a witness’s assertion of the privilege in a criminal case and, therefore, trial courts lack discretion to permit a witness to take the stand when it is known that the witness will invoke the privilege. The question is not whether a witness’s assertion of the privilege is devoid of evidentiary value in a criminal case but whether, as a matter of policy, a trier of fact in a criminal case should be permitted to give that act evidentiary value and, if so, under what circumstances. We agree with the courts that, mindful that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights[¹⁷] may be implicated, recognize discretion in the trial court to decide the issue based on considerations of relevancy and probative value versus potential prejudicial effect. Thus, in Maryland, the question whether, upon request of a criminal defendant, a witness may be questioned in front of the'jury when it is known that he will reasonably and in good faith assert the testimonial privilege must be determined by application of Md. Rules 5-401 and 5-403.”[¹⁸]

Gray v. State, 137 Md.App. 460, 516-17, 769 A.2d 192, 224-25 (2001). While we are reversing the Court of Special Appeals’s affirmance of the trial court, we do not disagree with its statement above.

While we agree with that part of the Court of Special Appeals’s holding, we disagree with their approval of the trial court’s failure to use its discretion in the case sub judice. The Court of Special Appeals stated that “whether the trial court exercised its discretion in this regard matters not.” Id. at 517, 769 A.2d at 225. As we indicate, in some circumstances, including these circumstances, it matters. We conclude that just as a trial court must determine whether a witness is properly invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege, the trial court must exercise its discretion and determine if a defendant will be unfairly prejudiced by the court not allowing the defendant to call a potentially exculpatory witness that the defendant and the trial court know will invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in the presence of the jury. We are not holding in the case sub judice that sufficient evidence has been presented that would entitle the defendant to have Gatton take the stand in the presence of the jury and invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege. That is for the trial court to determine upon any retrial. In the exercise of discretion, it should always be remembered that such a defendant is entitled to have his defense fully presented to the jury.

While trial courts are exercising their discretion in determining if a potentially exculpatory witness called by a defendant should be allowed to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in the presence of the jury, the trial courts need to make sure that “sufficient” evidence has been presented to make the matter relevant. “Sufficient” is defined as “[ajde-quate; of such quality, number, force, or value as is necessary for a given purpose.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1447 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed., West 1999). Sufficient evidence must be presented so that any trier of fact might possibly and reasonably believe that the proposed witness might have committed the crime instead of the defendant. If sufficient evidence is proffered, then the trial court may proceed with an analysis of whether the defendant would be unfairly prejudiced by prohibiting this witness from invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege in the presence of the jury.

Other courts have also held that the determination of whether a witness should be allowed to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in the presence of the jury is in the trial court’s discretion (in some instances, even where the prosecutor calls the witness). United States v. Kaplan, 832 F.2d 676, 684 (1st Cir.1987) (if a witness intends to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege, it is in the discretion of the court whether to allow him to take the stand); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1211 (1st Cir.1973) (“If it appears that a witness intends to claim the privilege as to essentially all questions, the court may, in its discretion, refuse to allow him to take the stand.”); United States v. Bowman, 636 F.2d 1003, 1013 (5th Cir.1981) (“The general rule is that once the trial court has satisfied itself as to the validity of the witness’s Fifth Amendment claim, it may, in its discretion, decline to place the witness on the stand for the purpose of eliciting a claim of privilege.”); United States v. Vandetti, 623 F.2d 1144, 1147 (6th Cir.1980) (the trial court can allow a prosecutor to call a witness who will assert his Fifth Amendment privilege if the prosecutor’s case would be seriously prejudiced by not offering him as a witness); United States v. Martin, 526 F.2d 485, 487 (10th Cir.1975) (“In such circumstance it was well within the discretion of the trial court to refuse to allow the informant to be called to the witness stand and be compelled to thereafter invoke his Fifth Amendment right in the presence of the jury....”); Ex parte Reeves, 463 So.2d 177, 178 (Ala. 1984) (“Trehern should have been required to take the stand in the presence of the jury and invoked his privilege in response to any question asked by the defendant which would have elicited incriminating evidence if answered.”); State v. McDaniel, 136 Ariz. 188, 194, 665 P.2d 70, 76 (1983) (“In light of these decisions, we must modify our prior holdings ... insofar as they suggest an absolute right to call witnesses regardless of the fact that they may properly choose to invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege in response to all relevant questions.”); State v. Berry, 658 S.W.2d 476, 479 (Mo.App. 1983) (“The refusal to permit a witness to testify lies within the discretion of the trial judge when it is claimed ... that the witness will invoke his claim of privilege.”); People v. Thomas, 51 N.Y.2d 466, 472, 415 N.E.2d 931, 934, 434 N.Y.S.2d 941, 944 (1980) (“[T]he decision whether to permit defense counsel to call a particular witness solely ‘to put him to his claim of privilege against self incrimination in the presence of the jury’ rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.”); People v. Patrk, 191 A.D.2d 718, 718, 595 N.Y.S.2d 798, 799 (1993) (“It is well-settled that the trial court has broad discretion to determine whether or not to allow a defendant to call a witness for the purpose of having the witness invoke his privilege against self-incrimination before a jury.”); State v. Stanfield, 134 N.C.App. 685, 692-93, 518 S.E.2d 541, 545-46 (1999) (the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not allowing the defendant to call a witness who would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in the presence of the jury); Porth v. State, 868 P.2d 236, 240 (Wyo.1994) (“We hold that the trial court has discretion to allow or disallow the defendant to call a witness to the stand who the court knows will invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in the presence of the jury.”).¹⁹

When a defendant proffers a defense that the crime was committed by another person and the defendant wants to call as a witness that person only to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege agáinst self-incrimination on the witness.stand in the presence of the jury, the trial court, on the record, should make a determination of whether sufficient other evidence has been proffered that, if believed by any trier of fact, might link the accused witness to the commission of the crime. If the trial court finds that such sufficient evidence, linking the accused witness to the crime and believable by any trier of fact, exists that could possibly cause any trier of fact to infer that the witness might have committed the crime for which the defendant is being tried, then the trial court has the discretion to permit, and limit as normally may be appropriate, the defendant to question the witness, generally, about his involvement in the offense and have him invoke his Fifth Amendment right in the jury’s presence.

Where the trial court fails to permit a “Gatton-type” of witness to invoke the Fifth Amendment in the presence of the jury, the trial court, upon appropriate request, should give a full instruction to the jury, that the witness, under the circumstances described above, has invoked his right against self-incrimination, and, therefore, is unavailable to the defendant. Even if a “Gatton-type” of witness is permitted to invoke a Fifth Amendment privilege, in the presence of the jury, either party, in some circumstances, might still be entitled to have an appropriate instruction given to the jury.

In the present case, the trial court believed it did not have any discretion to permit defendant to call Gatton to the stand for the purpose of having him invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in the presence of the jury. Accordingly, the trial court exercised no discretion. Because we are reversing on another grounds, we do not have to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion on this issue, although, we note, that our cases hold that the actual failure to exercise discretion is an abuse of discretion.

III. Conclusion

We hold that it was prejudicial error for the trial court to refuse to admit in evidence through the testimony of Ms. Johnson, the declaration against Gatton’s penal interest.

In light of our holding, we decline to address further the remaining issues.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR CHARLES COUNTY AND TO REMAND THE CASE TO THAT COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY CHARLES COUNTY.

RAKER, J., concurred and filed opinion joined by WILNER and HARRELL, JJ. WILNER, J., concurred and filed opinion joined by RAKER and HARRELL, JJ. BATTAGLIA, J., dissented and filed opinion.

1 . As we will state, infra, the trial court must determine whether the claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege is in good faith or lacks any reasonable basis.

2 . At one point in the trial phase, the court permitted this statement but not as a statement against penal interest, rather, under a state of mind exception. This exchange occurred:

"That if he couldn’t have her no one would.

THE COURT: . . . Members of the jury .. . that testimony to be used by you solely as to the then existing state of mind of Bryan Gatton and you will use it for no other purpose.”

3 . At one point during the trial phase, counsel asked a question, precipitating this exchange:

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: In this statement did you say that Bryan Gatton admitted that he killed Bonnie Gray?

[Objection by the State.]

THE COURT: Why did you do that?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Because it is in the statement.

THE COURT: Sir, I gave specific rulings that was not to come in.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Sir.

THE COURT: I will decide if you will be held in contempt. I am sending the jury out now for lunch.”

The judge later said he was referring defense counsel to "bar counsel for disciplinary practices.”

Thereafter, the judge individually brought each juror back into the courtroom and directed them to make no inferences from the question.

We have found no further references in the trial transcript to any of these statements being permitted in the presence of the jury.

4 . Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(3) states:

"Rule 5-804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable.

(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:

(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, so tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or so tended to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless the person believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to'exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.”

5 . We presume the trial judge was referring to two types of statements, those occurring before the victim’s disappearance and those afterwards. There were actually several such statements discussed during the State’s Motion in Limine hearing.

6 . This hearing took place when the trial phase was imminent. The jury had already been selected, but had not been sworn.

7 . Now Chief Judge of the Court of Special Appeals.

8 . Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994); Wilson v. State, 334 Md. 313, 639 A.2d 125 (1994); Simmons v. State, 333 Md. 547, 636 A.2d 463 (1994).

9 . The statement against interest exception to the hearsay evidence rule is the same in the Federal Rules of Evidence as the Maryland Rule. See footnote 2.

10 . Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 545, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 2064, 90 L.Ed.2d 514, 529(1986).

11 . When we adopted the Rules of Evidence, we incorporal ed a provision that a declarant's inculpatory statement that exculpates an accused needed corroboration. However, in Standifur, that was not the holding.

12 . The confusion of ihe witness on the witness stand, created by skillful, persistent, and repetitive cross-examination of the witness, such as occurred in this case, is not sufficient evidence of fabrication, although it may put in issue ihe witnesses' memory based credibility. That type of credibility issue, however, in a jury trial is for the jury to determine, not for the court. At one point in the argument at the pretrial hearing the State referred to the in-court relator as “paid for.” The only evidence of any possible financial benefit to the in-court relator was that defense investigators arranged for her to live in an apartment on a temporary basis because of threats she had received in her prior residence. We have found nothing else in the record on this matter. What we have found is not enough for a reasonable conclusion that she was a “paid for” fabricator.

13 . As stated, supra and infra, the trial court must determine whether the claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege is in good faith or lacks any reasonable basis.

14 . As we indicate, infra, Richardson involved a prosecution witness. Midgett v. State, 223 Md. 282, 164 A.2d 526 (1960), cited in Richardson, involved an attempt by a defendant to cause a witness to testify in spite of the witness’s assertion of the privilege. In other words it was a case challenging the exercise of the privilege not the manner in which the privilege was exercised. The issue of the assertion of the privilege before a jury was not raised in the case. Shifflett v. State, 245 Md. 169, 225 A.2d 440 (1967), also cited in Richardson, also involved a State’s witness. In Royal v. State, 236 Md. 443, 204 A.2d 500 (1964), the defendant was permitted to call codefendants to the stand in the presence of the jury, whereupon they claimed the privilege. On appeal, the issue was whether the codefendants could properly invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege in the first instance. We held that the trial court was correct in allowing the codefendants to invoke the privilege. The defendant did not request an instruction below on the Fifth Amendment privilege but on appeal he claimed “plain error.” We declined to decide the issue. Each of the cases relied on in Richardson is distinguishable from the present case.

15 . This Court does not require the satisfaction of all five factors in order to support a reversal of a defendant’s conviction. Adkins v. State, 316 Md. 1, 13, 557 A.2d 203, 209 (1989).

16 . We discuss, infra, the holdings of this Court in Adkins, Allen, and Vandegrift, which all concerned the prejudice to a defendant by a witness, who was called by the State or the trial court, invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege in the presence of the jury.

17 . The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Right to Speedy Trial, Witnesses, etc.) states:

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”

18 . Maryland Rules 5-401 and 5-403 state:

"Rule 5-401. Definition of ‘relevant evidence’.

‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

Rule 5-403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”

19 . We note that there are courts that have held that a trial court can not allow a witness to testify if the witness is only going to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in the presence of the jury. United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613, 624 (9th Cir.1979); Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 541-42 (D.C.Cir.1970); People v. Fletcher, 193 Colo. 314, 316-17, 566 P.2d 345, 347 (1977); Apfel v. State, 429 So.2d 85, 86-87 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983); State v. Cvetich, 73 Ill.App.3d 580, 584, 29 Ill.Dec. 418, 391 N.E.2d 1101, 1105 (1979); State v. Lashley, 233 Kan. 620, 625-27, 664 P.2d 1358, 1364-65 (1983); People v. Dyer, 425 Mich. 572, 390 N.W.2d 645 (1986); State v. Nunez, 209 N.J.Super. 127, 131-33, 506 A.2d 1295, 1297-99 (1986); Commonwealth v. Pritchard, 270 Pa.Super. 461, 468, 411 A.2d 810, 814 (1979); State v. Hughes, 328 S.C. 146, 152-55, 493 S.E.2d 821,823-25 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1097, 118 S.Ct. 1674, 140 L.Ed.2d 798, cert. denied, sub nom., Washington v. United States, 524 U.S. 940, 118 S.Ct. 2348, 141 L.Ed.2d 718 (1998); Chambliss v. State, 633 S.W.2d 678, 683-84 (Tex.App.1982), aff'd, 647 S.W.2d 257 (Tex.Crim.App.1983).