People v. Blume , 443 Mich. 476 ( 1993 )

Cavanagh, C.J.

We must decide today whether Michigan may punish acts allegedly committed in Florida by a Florida resident. We hold that Michigan may exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts committed outside Michigan when the acts are intended to and do have a detrimental effect within the state. Here, the prosecutor claims that defendant was involved in a conspiracy and aided and abetted the commission of a crime in Michigan because he knew that the person to whom he sold cocaine was from Michigan. We disagree. The "knowledge” to which the prosecutor refers only is part of the evidence necessary to support a conviction for conspiracy or aiding and abetting. But knowledge alone is not enough to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction.¹ The prosecutor must present evidence that defendant intended to commit an act with the intent to have a detrimental effect within this state. That intent does not exist in this case. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals decision,² and reinstate the district court’s dismissal of the charges.

I

Defendant, Michael Blume, is a Florida resident who is charged in Michigan with conspiracy to deliver or possession with intent to deliver more than 650 grams of cocaine³ and with aiding and abetting the manufacture or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver 650 grams of cocaine.⁴ The complaint alleges that in June, 1988, defendant sold cocaine to Randall Hoyt, a Michigan resident. The entire transaction took place in Florida.

After purchasing cocaine from defendant, Hoyt returned to Michigan. The Michigan State Police subsequently arrested Hoyt upon discovering a kilo of cocaine during a search of Hoyt’s apartment. Hoyt informed the police that he purchased the cocaine from defendant while in Florida. The prosecutor filed a complaint charging defendant. After being arraigned, defendant moved to quash the complaint and charges for lack of jurisdiction.

Officer Palenick was the only prosecution witness who testified at the hearing on the motion to quash for lack of jurisdiction. He explained that Hoyt told him that he traveled to Florida intending to purchase cocaine from a prearranged supplier. Unable to find his connection, Hoyt began looking for a new supplier. Hoyt met up with defendant. Apparently, the two had met each other previously through a gym at which both exercised. Hoyt and defendant made arrangements for the sale of cocaine. The entire transaction took place in Florida. Defendant did not have any contact with Hoyt while Hoyt was in Michigan before the sale. Officer Palenick testified that Hoyt said that defendant was aware that he was from Michigan.

After Officer Palenick and defendant testified at the hearing, the trial court dismissed the charges for lack of jurisdiction, finding that if any conspiracy occurred involving defendant, it occurred in Florida, and that defendant did not give aid or encouragement in Michigan. The circuit court reversed and ordered reinstatement of the charges upon finding that defendant’s acts were intended to and actually did produce detrimental effects in Michigan. The Court of Appeals affirmed.⁵ We granted leave to appeal, and, upon finding the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in this case inappropriate, we reverse and order reinstatement of the trial court’s dismissal of the charges.

II

The general rule is that jurisdiction is proper only over "offenses as may be committed within its jurisdiction.” People v Devine, 185 Mich 50, 52-53; 151 NW 646 (1915). The authority to exercise jurisdiction over acts that occur outside the state’s physical borders developed⁶ as an exception to the rule against extraterritorial jurisdiction. That exception, however, is "limited to those acts that are intended to have, and that actually do have, a detrimental effect within the state.” Strassheim v Daily, 221 US 280, 285; 31 S Ct 558; 55 L Ed 735 (1911); Deur v Newaygo Sheriff, 420 Mich 440, 446-447; 362 NW2d 698 (1984).

This state has not defined the boundaries of the exception,⁷ but consistently has required a finding that the actor intended a detrimental effect to occur in this state. See, e.g., Deur, supra. The two key elements of that requirement are specific intent to act and the intent that the harm occur in Michigan.⁸

A proper analysis for this Court is to determine whether a conspiracy or aiding and abetting charge could be established by the evidence. Then, the Court must determine whether the conspiracy or crime that was aided and abetted was intended to occur in Michigan.⁹

III

" 'A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes.’ ” People v Atley, 392 Mich 298, 310; 220 NW2d 465 (1974) (quoting United States v Kissel, 218 US 601, 608; 31 S Ct 124; 54 L Ed 1168 (1910). "The gist of the offense of conspiracy lies in the unlawful agreement between two or more persons.” Atley at 311.¹⁰ Establishing a conspiracy requires evidence of specific intent to combine with others to accomplish an illegal objective. Atley at 310.

A

First, the intent to combine with others for an unlawful purpose must exist. Even if one party intends to combine to pursue an unlawful purpose, " '[t]o prove the crime of conspiracy, ... it must further be proven that that intent, including that knowledge, was possessed by more than one individual since there can be no conspiracy without a combination of two or more[¹¹] persons.’ ” People v Sutherlin, 116 Mich App 494, 500; 323 NW2d 456 (1982) (emphasis added).¹²

In Atley, this Court held that there was insufficient evidence to support convicting the defendant of conspiracy to deliver an illegal substance because there was insufficient evidence that two or more parties agreed to sell the marijuana. Atley, along with two other defendants, was arrested for possession of 127 pounds of raw marijuana. He was charged with conspiracy to sell a narcotic drug. The prosecutor alleged that the defendants were going to harvest a marijuana field in Kansas and sell the marijuana in Michigan.

Regarding the evidence, the trial judge explained:

"I have some difficulty in bridging the gap between being hired [to] harvest a crop for delivery to a person who has expressed an intention that he was going to dry it and sell it, but without any agreement or any conversation as to participation in the actual sale, being sufficient to establish a conspiracy, which is an agreement or an understanding to make a sale.” [Id. at 313.]

This Court explained that the evidence was not "strong enough to sustain[¹³] the conviction for conspiracy to sell marijuana.” Id.

The "prior combination and agreement” to harvest plus the testimony that defendant Atley intended to sell the marijuana do not directly establish in logic that the defendant and Eaton or any other person agreed to sell the marijuana. There was, in fact, no testimony . . . that Eaton agreed with defendant to sell the marijuana.

. . . From the established fact of acquisition of 127 pounds of marijuana, we can infer an intent to sell, but that is as far as inference may take us.

It is not "a fair inference,” [People v Beller, 294 Mich 464; 293 NW 720 (1940)]; People v Sobczak, 344 Mich 465; 73 NW2d 921 (1955), to infer the ultimate fact of conspiracy to sell from the fact of joint acquisition. The ultimate fact of intent to sell might be inferred, but not agreement to sell. What they actually intended to do insofar as payment was concerned, or insofar as where the marijuana was to be sold, whether in Michigan or elsewhere, is on this record a matter of conjecture. [Id. at 314.]

B

A defendant may become a member of an already existing conspiracy if he " 'cooperates knowingly to further the object of the conspiracy People v Huey, 345 Mich 120, 125; 75 NW2d 893 (1956) (emphasis added). The "knowledge” is a part of the crime only because "[w]ithout the knowledge, the intent cannot exist. United States v Falcone [311 US 205; 61 S Ct 204; 85 L Ed 128 (1940)].” Direct Sales Co v United States, 319 US 703, 711; 63 S Ct 1265; 87 L Ed 1674 (1943). Mere knowledge that someone proposes unlawful action alone is not enough to find involvement in a conspiracy, however. "Those having no knowledge of the conspiracy are not conspirators, United States v Hirsch, 100 US 33, 34 [25 L Ed 539 (1879)]; Weniger v United States, 47 F2d 692, 693 [CA 9, (1931)]; and one who without more furnishes supplies to an illicit distiller is not guilty of conspiracy even though his sale may have furthered the object of a conspiracy to which the distiller was a party but of which the supplier had no knowledge.” Falcone at 210-211.

The dissent cites Direct Sales to support the proposition that defendant can become involved in the conspiracy through informed or interested cooperation. But the dissent relies on one short sentence of that opinion in so holding. In Direct Sales, the United States Supreme Court also recognized that "[t]here may be circumstances in which the evidence of knowledge is clear, yet the further step of finding the required intent cannot be taken. Concededly, not every instance of sale of restricted goods, harmful as are opiates, in which the seller knows the buyer intends to use them unlawfully, will support a charge of conspiracy.” Id. at 712.

There are circumstances, however, such as in Direct Sales, that jurisdiction is appropriate. For example, if "the evidence discloses such a [distribution] system, working in prolonged cooperation with a physician’s unlawful purpose to supply him with his stock in trade for his illicit enterprise, there is no legal obstacle to finding that the supplier not only knows and acquiesces, but joins both mind and hand with him to make its accomplishment possible.” Id. at 713. It was under those circumstances that the United States Supreme Court said there was "informed and interested cooperation, stimulation, instigation [of the conspiracy] [a]nd there is also a 'stake in the venture’ . . . .” Id.

The United States Supreme Court also provided additional guidance about what amount of evidence is required by explaining Falcone:

That decision comes down merely to this, that one does not become a party to a conspiracy by aiding and abetting it, through sales of supplies or otherwise, unless he knows of the conspiracy; and the inference of such knowledge cannot be drawn merely from knowledge the buyer will use the goods illegally. [Id. at 709.]

Clearly, the prosecutor must present more evidence than the seller’s knowledge of the buyer’s proposed illegal purpose. For intent to exist, the defendant must know of the conspiracy, must know of the objective of the conspiracy, and must intend to participate cooperatively to further that objective. " '[T]o establish the intent, the evidence of knowledge must be clear, not equivocal . . . because charges of conspiracy are not to be made out by piling inference upon inference ....’” Atley at 310, quoting Direct Sales Co, supra.¹⁴_

C

Because of the jurisdictional dispute, the prosecutor also must establish an intent to combine with others for the unlawful purpose of possessing cocaine or possessing with the intent to deliver the cocaine in Michigan. The "threshold question for assertion of the state’s jurisdiction is whether there is a showing sufficient to permit the court to conclude that the defendant intended to produce a detrimental effect in the forum state.” Post at 510.

In United States v Baker, 609 F2d 134 (CA 5, 1980), the court applied extraterritorial jurisdiction to a case involving conspiracy and illegal possession with intent to distribute narcotics. But the Baker court specifically held that if "it is clear that the intended distribution would occur within” the jurisdiction attempting to punish the defendant, then "jurisdiction may be maintained . . . .” Id. at 139.

This state will not surrender a person charged with a crime in another state unless the defendant clearly committed a crime with the intent that the crime occur in the demanding state.¹⁵ In Deur, supra at 449, this Court refused to surrender the defendant because he "did not commit any act in the State of Michigan intentionally resulting in the crime with which he is charged in the State of Maryland.”¹⁶ Thus, this Court should not approve the exercise of jurisdiction over a person who committed a crime outside Michigan when this state cannot prove that the person intended the crime to occur in this state.

IV

A thorough review of the testimony fails to disclose evidence sufficient to support exercising jurisdiction over this defendant.¹⁷ The prosecutor did not present evidence that defendant¹⁸ acted with the intent to have a detrimental effect in Michigan. Conversely, defense counsel introduced testimony that negated the existence of such intent. Similarly, the prosecutor did not present sufficient evidence that defendant knew of or cooperated knowingly to further the objectives of a conspiracy.

This case involves defendant’s sale of cocaine to Randy Hoyt. Hoyt traveled to Florida, intending to purchase cocaine from someone other than defendant,¹⁹ and defendant’s only prior contact with Hoyt was through a gym.²⁰ Although defendant knew that Hoyt was from Michigan and that Hoyt eventually would return to Michigan, defendant only was involved in the initial delivery of cocaine to Hoyt.²¹ The transaction was completed in Florida as evidenced by the fact that delivery was complete and the financial aspects of the sale were concluded.²²

Although we may infer from the amount of the cocaine purchased that the buyer intended to possess or sell the cocaine somewhere, Atley, supra, the prosecution’s only witness, Officer Palenick, was unable to testify that Hoyt told defendant that the drugs would be distributed in Michigan.²³ The officer did testify that Hoyt could have disposed of the cocaine in any manner and no agreement would have been breached.²⁴ For that to be true, there must not have been an agreement regarding what Hoyt would do with the cocaine.

Also relevant is that the defendant did not have an interest in the cocaine beyond the initial sale. Defendant was not concerned with Hoyt’s use of the cocaine, and was not concerned with where Hoyt took the cocaine. More importantly, defendant did not intend that the cocaine go to Michigan, and did not intend that the drugs be sold in Michigan.²⁵ Mere knowledge that Hoyt would return to Michigan sometime after completing the transaction with defendant is insufficient to support finding that defendant specifically intended to have a detrimental effect in this state.²⁶

Although an inference may be drawn, and in some cases knowledge and the surrounding circumstances may be sufficient to support a finding of intent, Direct Sales, supra, the dissent’s conclusion²⁷ here violates the principle that inference is not to be created upon inference to support a conspiracy charge. Direct Sales Co, supra. The inference upon inference the dissent built includes an inference that defendant knew Hoyt was going to sell the drugs, an inference that Hoyt had a plan to sell the drugs, an inference that the plan involved another person so as to create a conspiracy, an inference that Hoyt’s plan or conspiracy was to sell the drugs in Michigan, and an inference that defendant, by the mere delivery of the cocaine to Hoyt and knowledge that Hoyt was from Michigan, knew of and cooperated knowingly with these inferred states of mind.

But the prosecutor failed to introduce evidence that defendant and Hoyt agreed, or even discussed, that the cocaine would be distributed in Michigan.²⁸ The prosecutor also failed to introduce evidence that defendant was aware that Hoyt was involved in a conspiracy.²⁹ There is no evidence that defendant knew Hoyt had a plan. It is questionable whether Hoyt knew he had a plan. There is no evidence that defendant knew Hoyt was going to sell the cocaine in Michigan.

After reviewing Direct Sales, Falcone, Deur, Atley, and Huey, we can only conclude that the facts do not provide a sufficient basis for concluding that defendant knew of or cooperated knowingly with a conspiracy to further its objectives.³⁰

V

The reasoning used in the conspiracy discussion applies to the substantive charge brought under the aiding and abetting theory. Consistent with Strassheim, supra, the defendant must have intended a detrimental effect to occur in Michigan and the effect actually must have occurred in Michigan before this Court can exercise jurisdiction over a defendant who aided and abetted outside Michigan.

One who aids and abets the commission of a substantive crime that occurs in Michigan is not automatically subject to trial in Michigan. Defendant must have intended to aid and abet a crime in Michigan. Mere knowledge is not enough to exercise jurisdiction.³¹

VI

Because there is an insufficient factual basis to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over this defendant, we reverse the Court of Appeals decision, and reinstate the district court’s dismissal of the charges.

Levin, Brickley, and Griffin, JJ., concurred with Cavanagh, C.J.

1 As discussed below, knowledge alone in this case similarly is not enough to convict defendant of conspiracy or aiding and abetting.

2 It must be noted that the Court of Appeals misstated the facts, which it found "sufficient to establish that defendant’s conduct in Florida was done with intent to produce and did produce detrimental effects within Michigan.” Unpublished opinion per curiam, decided January 15, 1992 (Docket No. 129818), p 1. The Court of Appeals stated “Hoyt testified that defendant knew that Hoyt was from Michigan and that Hoyt would be going back in several days. Hoyt explained to defendant that he was splitting up the cocaine with another individual in Michigan.” Id. First, Hoyt never testified. Furthermore, the officer also admitted that Hoyt may have dumped the cocaine in the ocean. Apparently, Hoyt was unsure himself of where the cocaine would be distributed.

3 MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1).

4 MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(i).

5 See n 2.

6 See Sexton v Ryder Truck Rental, Inc, 413 Mich 406, 434; 320 NW2d 843 (1982). Perhaps more pragmatically, we recognize that "[mjodern criminals have little concern for political boundaries except as such boundaries are an aid in effecting a criminal purpose.” Berge, Criminal jurisdiction and the territorial principle, 30 Mich L R 238 (1931). Moreover, "[i]n a broader sense, the factors of interstate population centers, organized crime, mobility, and recidivism reveal that each state has an interest in crimes committed in other states.” Rotenberg, Extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction and the state criminal law, 38 Tex L R 763, 766-767 (1960). Thus, blind adherence to a purely territorial concept of jurisdiction inadequately addresses the state’s interest in protecting its citizens from the results of criminal activity.

7 The common law is the law of the state unless abrogated or changed by the constitution, the Legislature, or the Court. Const 1963, art 3, § 7; People v Stevenson, 416 Mich 383, 389; 331 NW2d 143 (1982). Unlike some states, Michigan has not enacted legislation generally defining the reach of its criminal statutes. But see MCL 762.6; MSA 28.849 (allowing prosecution in Michigan for mortal wound inflicted by one "within or without the limits of this state”); MCL 767.64; MSA 28.1004 (allowing prosecution in Michigan for property stolen in "any other state or country” and brought into Michigan).

8 The dissent asks us to ignore the intent requirement and create a less stringent standard by holding that the intent and the detrimental effect in this case are established because defendant knew that the cocaine purchaser was from Michigan and therefore, defendant intended a detrimental effect to occur in Michigan. We must reject the dissent’s conclusion that the knowledge was sufficient in this case to support finding intent.

9 The dissent attempts to base its conclusion on the case’s procedural disposition. The dissent argues that the issue here is whether a warrant shall issue, and the factors to consider are "whether the warrant was supported by sufficient probable cause to believe that '(1) an offense has been perpetrated; (2) defendant has committed it; and (3) the magistrate has jurisdiction to act in the case.’ ” Post at 497. But the dissent fails to realize that regardless of when jurisdiction is challenged, the Strassheim test must be met.

10 See also People v Asta, 337 Mich 590, 611; 60 NW2d 472 (1953); People v Smith, 296 Mich 176; 295 NW 605 (1941).

11 An agreement to commit a particular crime cannot be prosecuted as a conspiracy where the number of alleged conspirators do not exceed the minimum number of persons logically necessary to complete the substantive offense. People v Hamp, 110 Mich App 92; 312 NW2d 175 (1981). Conspiracy to deliver controlled substances is one of those crimes. In People v Puig, 85 Misc 2d 228, 232; 378 NYS2d 925 (1976), the court explained "an agreement solely between seller and buyer to transfer narcotics is not sufficient to establish conspiracy to commit the sale, as the consummated crime necessarily involved the co-operation of the two persons (People v Potwora, 44 AD2d 207 [354 NYS2d 492 (1974)]).”

12 See also People v Atley, supra at 310; People v Di Laura, 259 Mich 260; 243 NW 49 (1932).

13 The Court of Appeals held that a " jury could infer the existence of the agreement necessary to the charge from the prior preparation and planning engaged in by the parties and disregard the denials of defendant’s alleged coconspirators. While it may have been designed that only defendant would sell the marijuana, the prior combination and agreement to receive proceeds by those involved was reasonably established and certainly points to the existence of the charged conspiracy.’ ” Id. at 313.

14 This Court stated in Atley at 314-316, that a conspiracy may be established by circumstantial evidence or an inference, provided that the evidence and circumstances are " 'within safe bounds of relevancy and be such as to warrant a fair inference of the ultimate facts.’ (Emphasis added.)” Id. at 311, quoting People v Beller, supra at 469. Although the agreement does not have to be established by direct proof, creating an inference upon an inference clearly is impermissible.

15 Deur at 444-446, interpreting MCL 780.3a; MSA 28.1285(3-1/2), which provides:

The governor of this state may also surrender, on demand of the executive authority of any other state, any person in this state charged in such other state in the manner provided in section 3 with committing an act in this state, or in a third state, intentionally resulting in a crime in the state whose executive authority is making the demand, and the provisions of this act not otherwise inconsistent shall apply to such cases, even though the accused was not in that state at the time of the commission of the crime, and has not fled therefrom, and the requirements contained in subdivisions (d) and (e) of section 3 of this act shall not apply to such cases.

16 Not only must the Court find an intentional act, but the Court must find the intention to commit an act that would result in a crime in the demanding state.

17 We review the district court’s assumption of jurisdiction de novo .... [United States v Hill, 719 F2d 1402, 1404 (CA 9, 1983).]

18 Because this case did not reach trial, it only is alleged that defendant committed a crime. For purposes of determining if jurisdiction over defendant is appropriate, we must start with the premise that defendant made the initial sale of cocaine to Hoyt. There is testimony to support that assumption.

19 During the hearing on the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which took place on October 5, 1988, the only witnesses to testify were defendant and Officer Palenick. Regarding Mr. Hoyt’s intentions when he traveled to Florida, the officer testified:

[Prosecutor]: [D]id [Mr. Hoyt] tell you who he went down there [Florida] initially to meet?

[Officer]: Yes, he advised that he initially went down to make contact with a subject that he described as Little Mike.

[Prosecutor]: And what did he tell you with respect to his search for Little Mike and the intention of purchasing cocaine from him?

[Officer]: He was not able to locate Little Mike.

[Prosecutor]: What did he tell you he did instead?

[Officer]: He went to a restaurant, after which he was able to make contact with another subject.

[Prosecutor]: Did he tell you how he knew this other subject?

[Officer]: He said that he has worked out with him at the gym and he was aware that he could also make a contact with this individual, possibly to obtain a product that he needed.

20 The transcript continues:

[Defense Counsel]: Did you meet a man by the name of Mr. Hoyt in Florida?

.[Defendant]: Well, he came to Florida where I was at and he walked in and he met me there. That is, you know, how I met him.

I met him through a friend that I work with named Alfred Fricke at J. W. House of Rock.

[Defense Counsel]: Did you have occasion to call Hoyt at any time when Hoyt was located in Michigan?

[Defendant]: No.

[Defense Counsel]: Would you have any reason to know where he [Hoyt] would be calling from if he did call you?

[Defendant]: No, sir.

[Defense Counsel]: Did you have any idea in advance of running into him, that he was coming to Florida?

[Defendant]: No idea, I had not seen him for maybe a year before that.

[Defense Counsel]: Now, did you ever make a plan with Hoyt to come up here to Michigan?

[Defendant]: No.

[Prosecutor]: How did you come to see Mr. Hoyt in the Whale’s Rib Restaurant in June of this year?

[Defendant]: This year, I was just sitting there eating and he walked in and he was, you know, in a muscle shirt and we were both body builders and we started talking about body building. That is how we started speaking.

[Prosecutor]: You say that you first met him how many years ago?

[Defendant]: I am not exactly sure. Between two and three years ago I met him.

[Prosecutor]: How many times have you met him?

[Defendant]: Met him?

[Prosecutor]: Face-to-face.

[Defendant]: Three to four times.

[Prosecutor]: Other than this time in June, when was the last time before that, how long had it been?

[Defendant]: Probably about maybe two years prior, before that, that is all.

[Prosecutor]: You saw him mostly in ’85 and ’86 and not again until June of ’88?

[Defendant]: Yes.

[Prosecutor]: At that point you immediately recognized who he was?

[Defendant]: Yes.

[Prosecutor]: Did you agree to meet him at all as you were at Whale’s Rib Restaurant? Did you meet again the next day, or . . .

[Defendant]: No.

21 It must be noted that the only evidence supporting this fact is the hearsay testimony of Officer Palenick, who testified that Hoyt told him that he purchased the cocaine from defendant. The officer admits, however, that there is no evidence to "contradict that possibility that Mr. Hoyt left Florida with a quantity of cocaine and unloaded it somewhere along the way and picked up some more before he came back to Michigan?” That possibility is feasible in light of the officer’s testimony that Hoyt told defendant he would be in Florida several days before returning to Michigan.

22 This testimony was introduced on cross-examination of Officer Palenick.

[.Defense Counsel]: So there isn’t reason there to assume, is there, that he had more money coming?

[Officer]: You are referring to?

[Defense Counsel]: The Defendant. There is no reason to assume that Hoyt . . .

[Officer]: . . . Still owes him money for the drugs?

[Defense Counsel]: Yes.

[Officer]: No, I would think not.

23 The only testimony regarding distribution came on direct examination.

[Prosecutor]: Did Randy Hoyt indicate to you whether or not he had explained to the Defendant that the cocaine was to be delivered and distributed in Michigan?

[Officer]: I don’t recall if Mr. Hoyt advised that he was going to be distributing in Michigan. He did advise that he lived in Michigan and he had another person that he may be splitting it with when he got back to Michigan. [Emphasis added.]

Thus, the district judge erroneously stated that defendant and Hoyt "did discuss the sale of cocaine by Defendant to Randy Hoyt for the purpose of transporting it to Michigan to be delivered, sold . . . .” There is no testimony on the record supporting the judge’s statement. A judge’s finding may be overruled for want of any evidence. Because there is no evidence, we cannot affirm the district court’s finding of fact.

24 On cross-examination defense counsel asked:

[Defense Counsel]: . . . would it be contrary to any agreement that Hoyt had with his purchaser if Hoyt had taken it and dumped it into the ocean, so to speak?

[Officer]: . . . yes, it would be possible.

[Defense Counsel]: My point is it would not have violated any agreements that he had with the person that he got it from?

[Officer]: Not that I know of.

Although the officer testified that the defendant "knew” Hoyt was from Michigan and that he "knew” that Hoyt would eventually return to Michigan, the officer was unable to testify or affirm that the defendant made an agreement regarding where the cocaine would be distributed. The officer made it clear that there was no agreement between defendant and Hoyt that the drugs would be taken to and sold in Michigan.

25 This does not mean that in every case involving the distribution of cocaine the court is unable to exercise jurisdiction. It only means that the prosecutor failed to present evidence sufficient to establish the requisite intent in this case. See Direct Sales, supra.

26 The prosecutor admitted in his closing argument that defendant, at most, only "knew” that the cocaine would be taken to Michigan. Nonetheless, the officer’s testimony is inconsistent regarding whether defendant knew Hoyt was taking the cocaine back to Michigan.

27 The dissent concludes that defendant knew that Hoyt later intended to possess and sell the cocaine in Michigan and, thus, that defendant provided informed and interested cooperation in Hoyt’s plan. Therefore, this state may prosecute Blume for conspiracy. The dissent confuses the evidence necessary to support exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction with the evidence necessary to support a conviction for conspiracy. Post at 506. The dissent relies on discussions between defendant and Hoyt regarding potential future sales of cocaine to establish the existence of facts contributing to the conspiracy. This reliance is inappropriate, however, because the officer admitted that "[tjhere was not any firm commitment according to Mr. Hoyt. He said that I have got somebody coming up here for some other business; if at that time we can work it out, I will have him drop off two kilos close by and maybe you can pick him up.”

28 Although the dissent correctly states that a formal agreement does not have to be shown, the only prosecution witness in this case clearly negated the existence of an agreement. Furthermore, the dissent consistently repeats that defendant knew that the cocaine would be distributed in Michigan, but there is no evidence that Hoyt intended to distribute the cocaine in Michigan, let alone that defendant knew of such intention.

29 It is true that the defendant does not have to know all the potential ramifications of the conspiracy, but the defendant does have to know that there is a conspiracy and the objective of that conspiracy before this Court can hold that he "cooperates knowingly to further the object of the conspiracy.” People v Huey, supra at 125. The dissent’s conclusion, therefore, is inconsistent with the principles of law on which it relies. The dissent states that intent is required, and although " 'knowledge is the foundation of intent,’ . . . mere knowledge of a conspiracy or its illegal objective, without more, is not enough to prove intent . . . .” Post at 507. The dissent should have stopped right there because the defendant did not have knowledge of the conspiracy or its illegal objective; therefore, it is irrelevant and unnecessary to "examine the defendant’s conduct to determine whether the defendant provided 'informed and interested cooperation, stimulation, [or] instigation.’ ” Post at 507-508.

30 We do not seek to limit the ability to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction in illegal drug sale cases or in other types of cases. The problem here, which bars jurisdiction, is that the defendant did not act alone, but the involvement with Hoyt was not enough to permit transferring Hoyt’s intentions, whatever they were, to this defendant. Quite simply, neither conspiracy nor aiding and abetting can be made out here. This does not mean jurisdiction will never be obtained in such unique circumstances. For example, if someone stood blindfolded at the point connecting Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, and Colorado, and fired a machine gun while making a 360 degree turn, then whatever state in which the defendant may murder a person, that state should have jurisdiction over defendant. In that case, the defendant’s intent is sufficient under criminal laws addressing murder. But here, the defendant’s sale of cocaine is insufficient under criminal law regarding conspiracy or aiding and abetting. Defendant’s intent was to sell cocaine in Florida. He did not commit an act that forced or encouraged the cocaine to leave Florida, did not encourage Hoyt to take the cocaine outside Florida, and did not engage in a continuous distribution network with Hoyt. The facts here indicate that defendant was a fill-in seller for Hoyt’s regular scheme, about which defendant had no knowledge. Without additional facts, jurisdiction is inappropriate. The outcome certainly would be different if defendant was Hoyt’s regular supplier, was involved beyond this one transaction, or had discussed Hoyt’s conspiracy.

31 Interestingly, the record is devoid of evidence that the drugs actually were sold in Michigan, which directly confronts the prosecutor’s statement that "anybody that intentionally sends drugs to Michigan, have them sold here, is just as liable for having the drugs in our State as those that bring them here and those that sell them . . . .”