Price v. Sanders , 339 F. App'x 339 ( 2009 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-6118
JAMES PRICE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
GAYLEN SANDERS, in official and private capacity; SOUTH
CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, for declatory judgment
and injunctive relief; FREDERICK PAUER; JOHN DOE; JANE DOE,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District
Judge. (3:07-cv-03924-CMC-PJG)
Submitted: July 7, 2009 Decided: July 20, 2009
Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Price, Appellant Pro Se. James E. Parham, Jr., Irmo, South
Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
James Price appeals the district court’s order
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint in part and
granting summary judgment to the defendants in part. We have
reviewed the record and find no reversible error.
Price argues the district court erred by dismissing
the case against John and Jane Doe without first ordering the
defendants to identify them. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(m) requires dismissal if the “defendant is not served within
120 days after a complaint is filed,” unless the court grants an
extension for good cause. Price did not serve the summons and
amended complaint upon the unknown defendants within 120 days
after filing the amended complaint or move the district court to
extend the 120-day period. Consequently, the district court
properly dismissed John and Jane Doe from the suit.
Price alleges, for the first time on appeal, that the
overcrowded living conditions are dangerous because the rooms
are designed for only a single occupant. This court generally
declines to address claims raised for the first time on appeal,
unless such a refusal would result in a fundamental miscarriage
of justice. United States Dep’t of Labor v. Wolf Run Mining
Co., 452 F.3d 275, 283 (4th Cir. 2006). Price has not advanced
any reason why he did not present this argument below, nor has
he argued that any exceptional circumstances justify departing
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from the general rule. Based upon our review of the record,
there are no exceptional circumstances warranting such a
departure.
Finally, Price argues that the district court erred by
deciding whether he could prove he was assaulted and by relying
on defendants’ evidence where there were material factual issues
in dispute. Price misinterprets the district court opinion,
because the district court did not make any finding on whether
Price could prove the assault, nor did it rely on defendants’
evidence to resolve a material factual issue. Thus, these
issues are without merit.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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