Mason v. State , 430 S.W.3d 759 ( 2013 )

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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CR-12-218
FREDERICK DWAYNE MASON Opinion Delivered December 5, 2013
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
V. COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
SEVENTH DIVISION,
[NO. CR-07-1780]
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE HONORABLE BARRY SIMS, JUDGE
AFFIRMED.
JIM HANNAH, Chief Justice
Appellant, Frederick Dwayne Mason, appeals from the denial of his petition for
postconviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37. Appellant was
convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of theft of property, and one
count of second-degree battery, and he was sentenced to a total of 660 months in the
Arkansas Department of Correction. The court of appeals affirmed on direct appeal. See Mason
v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 794. Appellant then filed a petition for postconviction relief, which
the circuit court denied following a hearing. Appellant alleges the following errors on appeal:
(1) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict, (2) that trial
counsel was ineffective for “opening the door” to prejudicial testimony, and (3) that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and prepare for trial. We affirm the circuit
court’s order.
On appeal from a circuit court’s ruling on a petitioner’s request for Rule 37 relief, this
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court will not reverse the circuit court’s decision granting or denying postconviction relief
unless it is clearly erroneous. E.g., Prater v. State, 2012 Ark. 164, at 8, 402 S.W.3d 68, 74. A
finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court
after reviewing the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed. Id., 402 S.W.3d at 74.
The criteria for assessing the effectiveness of counsel were enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In asserting ineffective
assistance of counsel under Strickland, the petitioner must first show that counsel’s performance
was deficient. Williams v. State, 2011 Ark. 489, at 4, 385 S.W.3d 228, 232. This requires a
showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel”
guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment. Id., 385 S.W.3d at 232. The reviewing
court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance. Id., 385 S.W.3d at 232. Second, the petitioner must show
that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires showing that
counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the petitioner of a fair trial. Id., 385 S.W.3d at
232. In doing so, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, the fact-finder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt, which
means that the decision reached would have been different absent the errors. Id., 385 S.W.3d
at 232. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome of the trial. Id., 385 S.W.3d at 232–33. Unless a petitioner makes both Strickland
showings, it cannot be said that the conviction resulted from a breakdown in the adversarial
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process that renders the result unreliable. Id., 385 S.W.3d at 233.
In his first point on appeal, appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective because
he failed to move for a directed verdict at trial. He claims that the proof presented at trial was
insufficient to support a conviction because there was no direct evidence of his involvement
in the crimes. Specifically, he contends that victim Lionel Hampton’s identification of him
as a perpetrator was unreliable because Hampton could testify only that he saw appellant
exiting a residence some distance away from the crime scene and driving away in a vehicle
that resembled the dark Taurus that he saw on his street after he had been robbed. According
to appellant, Hampton’s cousin told Hampton that appellant was the culprit and that
Hampton did not actually see appellant during the commission of the crimes.
At trial, Hampton testified that after he had been robbed in his home, he looked out
the window and saw a dark-colored, or black, Taurus exiting his street. Hampton stated that
he then called his cousin for a ride, and they drove around for about an hour looking for the
vehicle. Hampton testified that they located the vehicle parked at a nearby house and saw
appellant walk out of the house and toward the vehicle. Hampton said that his cousin “pretty
much identified him for me.” Little Rock Police Detective Robert Martin testified that
Hampton contacted him the day after the robbery and told him that he had been robbed by
a man in his neighborhood named “Pig.” Martin contacted several officers who worked in
that neighborhood, and one of the officers told him that “Pig” was known to police as Fred
Mason. Martin included a photo of appellant in a lineup shown to Hampton, and according
to Martin, Hampton “immediately and positively identified Mr. Mason as . . . one of the
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three that robbed him.” Hampton also testified that he picked appellant from a photo lineup
as one of the three men who had robbed him. According to Hampton, appellant put a gun
to his chest, held him down on a couch, and asked him for his keys.
Appellant’s trial counsel, John May, testified at the postconviction hearing that he did
not move for a directed verdict because appellant had been identified as one of the robbers,
and it was for the jury to decide if that identification was credible. The State contends that
trial counsel was correct, that the circuit court could not have granted a directed verdict even
if trial counsel had moved for one, and that the appellate court could not have reversed
appellant’s conviction based on insufficient evidence. We agree. When a witness makes a
positive identification of a suspect, any challenge to the reliability of the identification
becomes a matter of credibility for the fact-finder to determine. E.g., Stipes v. State, 315 Ark.
719, 721, 870 S.W.2d 388, 389 (1994). The circuit court is not to assess credibility or resolve
conflicts in the testimony in considering a directed-verdict motion. E.g., Smith v. State, 337
Ark. 239, 245, 988 S.W.2d 492, 495 (1999); see also State v. Long, 311 Ark. 248, 251, 844
S.W.2d 302, 304 (1992) (“[W]hen a trial court exceeds its duty to determine the sufficiency
of the evidence by judging the credibility of the evidence, it commits an error that requires
correction.”). Any inconsistencies in testimony are for the jury to resolve, and the weight to
be given to witness-identification testimony is for the jury to decide. See, e.g., Davenport v.
State, 373 Ark. 71, 78, 281 S.W.3d 268, 273 (2008). Here, because a directed-verdict motion
would not have been successful, appellant cannot demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to make that motion. See Lowe v. State, 2012 Ark. 185, at 7, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___
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(per curiam) (stating that trial counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make an argument
or objection that is without merit). Accordingly, he is not entitled to postconviction relief on
that basis.
Appellant next contends that trial counsel was ineffective for “opening the door” to
prejudicial testimony when he asked Hampton on cross-examination if he had once reported
to the police that he had been robbed by appellant and appellant’s brother, Nicholas Mason.
Hampton stated that he thought the Mason brothers had previously robbed him, but he was
not sure. When trial counsel presented evidence that appellant’s brother had been incarcerated
at the time of the previous robbery, Hampton testified that one of the men who had
previously robbed him resembled appellant’s brother. Appellant argues that there was “no
possible benefit to be gained here, and no fathomable, let alone reasonable, strategic or tactical
basis” for trial counsel’s line of questioning.
At the postconviction hearing, trial counsel testified that he was trying to show that
Hampton was biased against the Mason brothers because of his belief that they had previously
robbed him and that he was also trying to “create confusion of which brother did it.” Trial
counsel testified, “It was my intention to make the jury think about was it the brother, which
brother. It might’ve been his brother that did it instead of . . . Frederick himself. . . . I was
trying to suggest to the jury that it was Frederick’s brother that did it, was my trial strategy.”
Trial counsel stated that he did not tell the jury that appellant had previously robbed
Hampton. Rather, he stated, “I[t] was my strategy to plant the seed in the jury’s mind that
it was possibly the brother that did it and how did they know the difference.” Trial counsel
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also stated that the evidence suggested that Hampton held a grudge against the Mason
brothers because of the previous robbery and that he was trying to “name these guys again.”
The manner of questioning by a witness is by and large a very subjective issue about
which different attorneys could have many different approaches. E.g., Nelson v. State, 344 Ark.
407, 414, 39 S.W.3d 791, 796 (2001). When a decision by counsel is a matter of trial tactics
or strategy, and that decision is supported by reasonable professional judgment, then counsel’s
decision is not a basis for postconviction relief under Rule 37.1. E.g., Croy v. State, 2011 Ark.
284, at 5, 383 S.W.3d 367, 371 (2011) (per curiam). A court must indulge in a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance, and a claimant has the burden of overcoming this presumption by identifying
specific acts or omissions of counsel, which, when viewed from counsel’s perspective at the
time of the trial, could not have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. Id., 383
S.W.3d at 371.
In the instant case, Hampton identified appellant as the perpetrator who held a gun on
him and demanded his keys during the robbery. Trial counsel attempted to discredit
Hampton’s testimony by showing that Hampton had earlier misidentified the Mason brothers,
that he had a grudge against them, and that he may have been mistaken about who robbed
him this time. We conclude that trial counsel’s tactical decision about how to cross-examine
Hampton was supported by reasonable professional judgment. As such, appellant is not
entitled to postconviction relief on this point.
In his final point on appeal, appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for
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failing to investigate and prepare for trial. Specifically, appellant contends that trial counsel was
ineffective because he did not review the State’s case file prior to trial. In support of this claim,
appellant asserts that, on the day before trial, trial counsel asked for a continuance so he could
interview appellant’s brother, even though the State had already informed trial counsel that
appellant’s brother was a “key player” in the case.1 Appellant further asserts that trial counsel
was not adequately prepared to cross-examine victim Dettrus Johnson because he did not
receive a transcript of Johnson’s interview with the police until after the trial had begun.2
According to appellant, if trial counsel had read the case file, he would have interviewed
appellant’s brother and he would have realized that he did not have a transcript of Johnson’s
statement. For his part, trial counsel testified at the postconviction hearing that he reviewed
the case file prior to trial “probably 20-plus times at least.”
To prevail on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately
investigate and prepare for trial, the petitioner must show how a more searching pretrial
investigation or better preparation would have changed the results of the trial. See, e.g., Bond
v. State, 2013 Ark. 298, at 9, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (per curiam). Specifically, the petitioner
1
The record reflects that on the day before trial, trial counsel sought a continuance so
appellant’s brother could be extradited from South Carolina, where he was incarcerated.
2
On the day of trial, trial counsel moved to compel the State to produce a transcript
of Johnson’s statement. The prosecutor informed the circuit court that the transcript had
been “lost in the shuffle at the police department” and would be provided to trial counsel
before Johnson testified. The circuit court told counsel that it would take a break before
Johnson testified to allow trial counsel time to review the transcript. Trial counsel testified
at the postconviction hearing that, after he received the transcript, he “read it as many times
as I could.” He also testified that the circuit court called a break before Johnson testified.
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must delineate the actual prejudice that arose from the alleged failure to investigate and
prepare for trial and demonstrate a reasonable probability that additional preparation and the
information that would have been uncovered with further investigation could have changed
the outcome of the trial. See, e.g., Bryant v. State, 2013 Ark. 305, at 9, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___
(per curiam).
Here, however, appellant does not state the relevant facts that trial counsel would have
discovered had he adequately investigated and prepared the case. As such, his allegations are
conclusory and will not provide a basis for postconviction relief. This court has stated that,
as with any other claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner cannot succeed merely
by alleging that counsel was not prepared or did not spend enough time on his or her case.
Camargo v. State, 346 Ark. 118, 129, 55 S.W.3d 255, 263 (2001). Rather, the petitioner still
must show the evidence or witnesses that would have been discovered had counsel properly
investigated the case and that, but for counsel’s lack of preparation, there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of his trial or sentence would have been different. Id., 55 S.W.3d
at 263. Because appellant has failed to make such a showing, he is not entitled to
postconviction relief on this point.
The circuit court did not clearly err in denying appellant’s petition for postconviction
relief. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
John Wesley Hall, for appellant.
Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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