Bingxu Jin v. Eric Holder, Jr. , 748 F.3d 959 ( 2014 )


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  •                 FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    BINGXU JIN,                              No. 10-72413
    Petitioner,
    Agency No.
    v.                      A099-062-080
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney
    General,                                  OPINION
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted
    February 6, 2014—Seattle, Washington
    Filed April 14, 2014
    Before: Raymond C. Fisher, Ronald M. Gould,
    and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Gould
    2                          JIN V. HOLDER
    SUMMARY*
    Immigration
    The panel denied a petition for review of the Board of
    Immigration Appeals’ denial of asylum and withholding of
    removal on adverse credibility grounds.
    The panel held that substantial evidence supported the
    agency’s reasonable determination that petitioner was not
    credible under the totality of the circumstances based on his
    non-responsive demeanor during cross-examination, his
    affirmative misrepresentations of his residency for the
    purpose of gaining an advantage in forum, his submission of
    a fraudulent church membership certification for the purpose
    of gaining an advantage in forum, and the lack of detailed
    testimony.
    COUNSEL
    Jisheng Li (argued), Law Office of Jisheng Li, Honolulu,
    Hawaii, for Petitioner.
    Daniel Eric Goldman (argued), Attorney; Tony West,
    Assistant Attorney General; William C. Peachey, Assistant
    Director; Rebecca Hoffberg, Trial Attorney, United States
    Department of Justice, Civil Division, Office of Immigration
    Litigation, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    *
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    JIN V. HOLDER                         3
    OPINION
    GOULD, Circuit Judge:
    Bingxu Jin petitions for review of the Board of
    Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal of an
    immigration judge’s denial of his application for asylum,
    withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
    Against Torture. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.
    § 1252, and we deny the petition for review.
    I
    Jin, a native and citizen of China, entered the United
    States in April 2005 as a non-immigrant visitor authorized to
    stay for a month. In October 2005, Jin filed an application for
    asylum and withholding of removal with the Department of
    Homeland Security. Jin subsequently received a Notice to
    Appear, charging him with failure to comply with the
    conditions of his admission to the United States. Jin
    conceded removability, and appeared in front of a Los
    Angeles immigration judge in January 2006, where he
    confirmed the Los Angeles residence in his application. In
    April 2006, Jin filed an unopposed motion to change venue to
    Tucson, Arizona, and submitted a Tucson address in support
    of his venue change motion. The Los Angeles court granted
    Jin’s motion. In June 2007, Jin filed a second unopposed
    motion to change venue to Las Vegas, Nevada, including a
    declaration that he moved to Las Vegas, and it would be
    inconvenient for him to travel to Tucson for his immigration
    proceedings. The Tucson court granted Jin’s second motion
    to change venue.
    4                       JIN V. HOLDER
    A
    In his asylum application, Jin submitted a two-page
    written affidavit that described Jin’s first encounter with
    Christianity, and an alleged incident with Chinese police at a
    Christian family church. Jin portrayed the events as follows:
    Jin was introduced to Christianity on a trip to Malaysia in
    June 2002, where he met Zhao Xiaodong. Zhao “passed the
    Gospel” to Jin and told Jin “the Bible story.” After their
    return to China, Zhao gave Jin a Bible and invited Jin to
    attend Zhao’s family church, which met at Zhao’s home. Jin
    joined Zhao’s family church in September 2002, and was
    baptized on Christmas that year.
    On November 14, 2004, three policemen broke into
    Zhao’s house, confiscated Bibles and Gospel materials, and
    took Jin and other members to the local police station, where
    they interrogated Jin about alleged anti-government activity.
    The police demanded that Jin “confess” the identities of other
    family church agitators. Jin said that he did not know, and
    the police beat him with batons, and then took him to a
    detention center where he was confined until November 23,
    2004. Jin was again interrogated and beaten at the detention
    center. Jin felt dizzy and weak because he was starving. His
    wife paid 9,000 Renminbi to gain his release. Before he
    departed, police told Jin to write a letter of repentance and to
    report weekly. Jin was hospitalized for seven days, during
    which time he learned that he had lost his job. Jin eventually
    obtained a United States visa. After Jin arrived in the United
    States, his wife, who was still in China, told him that police
    came to their house and said that they would punish Jin
    severely if they caught him.
    JIN V. HOLDER                         5
    B
    Jin’s case was heard by a Las Vegas immigration judge in
    July 2009. On direct examination, Jin’s testimony repeated
    the facts from his application affidavit, apart from stating the
    date of arrest as November 23, 2004, which Jin later said was
    November 14, 2004. On cross-examination about his
    introduction to Christianity, Jin testified that Zhao “told me
    some Bible stories and spread Gospel to me” during his five-
    day trip to Malaysia. Jin testified that he did not practice any
    religion before 2002 because he thought there was no
    purpose, but that the Christians in Zhao’s church moved him
    because they were “gentle, kind and gracious.”
    On cross-examination about his contact with the family
    church members after their arrest, Jin testified that he was
    separated from everyone else and did not know what
    happened to Zhao or to the other members. Jin stated that
    neither he nor his family had further contact with the church
    members after his release because he was under surveillance.
    Jin said that he never heard what happened to the other
    members. When asked if he was concerned for them, Jin said
    that he could only think of himself at the time.
    The government also cross-examined Jin about his
    residence since arriving in the United States. Jin said that he
    first lived in Los Angeles, then moved to Tucson. This
    prompted the following exchange:
    Government: Do you remember the address?
    Jin: 3000 West Ina Street – Ina Road, Tucson.
    6                       JIN V. HOLDER
    Government: Isn’t that actually a shopping
    plaza in Tucson?
    Jin: It’s not a shopping plaza.
    Government: Are you sure it’s not a business
    named New China Super Buffet?
    Jin: I don’t quite know because I do not have
    any recollection.
    Jin then testified that he lived in Tucson for “a few days” and
    left when there were no jobs, noting that his life at that time
    was “not stable.” Jin testified that he would stay with friends
    in Tucson. The IJ requested clarification about whether Jin
    lived in Tucson for a few days or for a year, as set out in his
    application, to which Jin responded: “[W]ell, I stay there, for
    about one year but, when there’s no work there, I return to
    Los Angeles.”
    The government submitted a photo of the Tucson address
    Jin had given, as well as documents indicating that the
    address belonged to a commercial shopping center with a
    full-service restaurant. The government returned to the
    question of whether Jin had lived at the Tucson address and
    Jin said that he was not sure.
    Jin then explained that he moved his case to Tucson
    “[b]ecause the attorney’s office said that it’s easier to have a
    lawsuit there.” When asked directly whether he ever lived in
    Arizona, Jin replied that he did not live in Arizona but stayed
    with friends. The government again asked why Jin moved his
    case to Arizona when he was not living there, to which Jin
    responded, “At that time, my friends told me that I could find
    JIN V. HOLDER                           7
    a job there, but I couldn’t.” The IJ interjected that Jin’s
    answer was non-responsive, and Jin then said that he was told
    his immigration case would follow him to Arizona. Jin
    testified that he received the “3000 West Ina Road” address
    in Tucson from a friend. When again asked whether he
    moved his case to get an “easier” immigration judge for his
    asylum claim, Jin conceded, “Well, these kind of thoughts,
    more or less, play as a factor.”
    The government then asked Jin what evidence he had to
    prove that he lived in Las Vegas, to which Jin responded,
    “Well, I live in Las Vegas.” Jin did not have a valid Nevada
    driver’s license, and his expired license showed a California
    address. When asked about the last time he lived in Los
    Angeles, Jin testified: “I live in two places. I’m just coming
    back and forth.” The IJ again questioned Jin about
    transferring his case out of Los Angeles, and Jin confirmed
    that he sought the venue transfer because his attorney told
    him that it would be easier to get his asylum application
    approved in another state.1 The IJ asked Jin where he spent
    most of his time living, to which Jin again responded that he
    went back and forth between Los Angeles and Las Vegas.
    When told his answer was not responsive, Jin said that he
    spent most of his time in Los Angeles, at the address he used
    to get his work authorization and his last driver’s license. Jin
    stated that the percentage was “half and half” because there
    was no work in Los Angeles, but also no work in Las Vegas.
    Jin further testified that if his case was not transferred to Las
    Vegas, he would not come to Las Vegas because he did not
    know the city.
    1
    On redirect, Jin changed his testimony to say that a man in Los
    Angeles, not his current attorney, advised him to move his case.
    8                      JIN V. HOLDER
    Jin had previously testified on direct that he attended
    church in Las Vegas. In support, Jin had submitted a May 24,
    2009 Certificate of Membership in the Korean Evangelical
    Church of America Praise Church of Las Vegas, in which the
    Senior Pastor of the Las Vegas church stated that Jin attended
    worship services on Sundays and had been a member since
    July 2007. Jin testified that he had asked his pastor to come
    to his immigration hearing back in May, but his pastor was
    too busy. Because his pastor could not appear, Jin had
    obtained his pastor’s certification as proof.
    After Jin’s admission that he went back and forth between
    Los Angeles and Las Vegas, the IJ questioned whether Jin
    was a regular member of the Las Vegas church. Jin in answer
    responded, “Well, I told my pastor, I begged her to help me
    out – I begged him to help me out because I told him that’s
    what was said on my materials, that I came here around that
    time period.” The IJ struck the answer as non-responsive,
    and asked again about Jin’s church membership in Las Vegas.
    Jin then said that he went to church in Las Vegas for the last
    two months, but for most of the time he had been at the
    church in Los Angeles.
    The IJ then returned to the police incident in China,
    leading to the following exchange:
    IJ: Now, let’s go back to that incident when
    the police rushed in. Do I understand – did
    they knock on the door before they entered?
    How did they enter? If you can just describe
    it.
    Jin: Is he talking about the day when we were
    arrested?
    JIN V. HOLDER                      9
    IJ: Of course that’s what I’m talking about.
    Jin: Well, it was on November 14, the year
    2004 –
    IJ: Yes, sir. I understand that.
    Jin: – in the morning. I –
    IJ: At 10:00. Yes. You’ve already said that in
    your – it’s in your declaration. I have a
    simple question. How did – sir, please.
    Listen. How did the police gain entry into
    that gathering?
    Jin: Well, at that time, the police just knocked
    on the door.
    IJ: And did someone open the door?
    Jin: Yes.
    IJ: And then they, they came in?
    Jin: Somebody opened the door. Well, so I
    don’t ask who, who it is, then –
    IJ: All right, the answer is not responsive. I’m
    going to ask you – you know, just listen to the
    questions. You are providing information in
    almost every question that you’re being asked
    that we’re not asking you about.
    10                     JIN V. HOLDER
    Jin then confirmed that the police knocked and someone
    opened the door. The IJ revisited Jin’s testimony on his arrest
    and interrogation, then reviewed Jin’s knowledge of
    Christianity. Jin testified that his understanding of the Bible
    was that “if you believe, then you will be saved. Your sin can
    be saved. You will have everlasting life.”
    C
    In an oral decision, the IJ made observations about Jin’s
    poor demeanor and questionable credibility: Jin’s demeanor
    on cross-examination was evasive or non-responsive when
    questioned about his residence. Jin’s demeanor reinforced
    that he had only lived in Los Angeles, not in Tucson or Las
    Vegas, as he had fraudulently represented to the immigration
    courts to obtain changes of venue for his immigration
    proceedings. The address Jin gave for his Tucson residence
    was that of a restaurant. Only after further questioning did
    Jin admit that he had never lived in Tucson and had also
    never lived in Las Vegas. Jin sought changes in venue
    hoping that his application would fare better outside of Los
    Angeles. Jin lacked evidence to show that he had ever lived
    in Las Vegas, and told the truth–that he had continued to live
    in Los Angeles–only when pressed by the government and IJ.
    Jin also admitted that he did not regularly attend church
    services in Las Vegas, and that his certification of
    membership in the Las Vegas church was false.
    The IJ denied relief on three grounds: (1) that Jin lied
    under penalty of perjury in his change of venue documents
    where he fabricated his residences in Tucson and Las Vegas;
    (2) that Jin submitted a fraudulent certification of church
    membership in Las Vegas; and (3) that Jin provided very
    general testimony about the police incident in China,
    JIN V. HOLDER                             11
    including a misstatement of the date of the alleged incident.
    The IJ also noted that Jin had made no attempt to contact the
    other alleged members of the family church after they were
    all arrested. Observing that this was a “clear case of forum
    shopping,” the IJ made an adverse credibility determination
    and denied Jin’s application for asylum and withholding of
    removal.2
    The BIA determined that the totality of the circumstances
    supported the IJ’s adverse credibility finding based on:
    (1) Jin’s non-responsive and evasive testimony; (2) Jin’s lack
    of detail when testifying about his religious beliefs; and
    (3) Jin’s attempt to defraud the immigration courts by lying
    about his residence and place of worship. The BIA noted that
    Jin admitted lying about his residence to obtain a “more
    favorable immigration proceeding” and referred to Jin’s
    non-responsive and evasive demeanor during his testimony.
    Citing Shrestha v. Holder, 
    590 F.3d 1034
    , 1043-44 (9th Cir.
    2010), the BIA observed that Jin’s misrepresentations and
    “other credibility issues” did not have to concern the “heart”
    of Jin’s claims for relief. Accordingly, the BIA affirmed the
    IJ’s denial of Jin’s application for asylum and withholding of
    removal.
    2
    The IJ also found that there was no evidence that Jin would be tortured
    by Chinese officials upon return to China, and rejected Jin’s CAT claim.
    The BIA dismissed Jin’s CAT claim on similar grounds. Jin waived any
    challenge to the agency’s CAT determination because he did not raise
    CAT relief in his opening brief. See Husyev v. Mukasey, 
    528 F.3d 1172
    ,
    1183 (9th Cir. 2008).
    12                     JIN V. HOLDER
    II
    Where the BIA’s “phrasing seems in part to suggest that
    it did conduct an independent review of the record, but the
    BIA’s analysis on the relevant issues is confined to a simple
    statement of a conclusion, we also look to the IJ’s oral
    decision as a guide to what lay behind the BIA’s conclusion.”
    
    Id. at 1039
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    We review the agency’s adverse credibility determination for
    substantial evidence. Id.; Soto-Olarte v. Holder, 
    555 F.3d 1089
    , 1091 (9th Cir. 2009). The REAL ID Act “significantly
    restricted” appellate review of adverse credibility findings,
    whereby “only the most extraordinary circumstances will
    justify overturning an adverse credibility determination.”
    
    Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1041
    (quoting Kaur v. Gonzales,
    
    418 F.3d 1061
    , 1064 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005), and Jibril v.
    Gonzales, 
    423 F.3d 1129
    , 1138 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005)).
    A
    The REAL ID Act directs the agency to make a credibility
    determination based on the “totality of the circumstances”
    and “all relevant factors” in determining credibility. 8 U.S.C.
    § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); 
    Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1040
    ; see
    also Ling Huang v. Holder, No. 09-72837, 
    2014 WL 949118
    ,
    at *2–4 (9th Cir. Mar. 12, 2014). The statute specifies
    the following credibility factors: “demeanor, candor,
    responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent
    plausibility of the applicant or witness’s account, consistency
    between the applicant or witness’s written and oral
    statements, internal consistency of each statement, and
    consistency of statements with other evidence.” 
    Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1040
    ; see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). We have
    observed that these statutory factors are not exhaustive, and
    JIN V. HOLDER                        13
    that the agency can look to relevant pre-REAL ID Act
    factors, such as the “level of detail of the claimant’s
    testimony.” 
    Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1040
    . At the same time,
    the agency cannot be selective in its evaluation of credibility;
    the agency’s analysis must be reasonable as a whole. 
    Id. at 1040–41.
    The REAL ID Act permits the agency to consider
    any inconsistency in the petitioner’s testimony, regardless of
    whether the inconsistency implicates the “heart” of the
    petitioner’s claim for relief. 
    Id. at 1043.
    But utterly “trivial
    inconsistencies” that “have no bearing on the petitioner’s
    veracity” cannot form the basis for an adverse credibility
    determination. 
    Id. at 1043–44.
    The agency is required to give “specific and cogent
    reasons supporting an adverse credibility determination” to
    assist appellate review. 
    Id. at 1042.
    B
    Here, the agency properly considered the totality of the
    circumstances in evaluating Jin’s credibility. See 
    id. at 1040.
    The IJ considered Jin’s non-responsive demeanor, his
    misrepresentations of his residence, his fraudulent church
    membership certification, and his lack of detail in his
    testimony on the alleged police incident in China. The BIA
    similarly considered Jin’s demeanor, misrepresentations and
    fraud, and lack of detail, but on this the BIA focused on Jin’s
    statements about his religious beliefs.
    1. Evasive and Non-Responsive Demeanor
    Jin contends that the agency did not provide specific
    examples of Jin’s non-responsive or evasive testimony. The
    IJ is not required, however, to provide a “pinpoint citation” to
    14                      JIN V. HOLDER
    the record, but rather to identify the instances where the
    petitioner is non-responsive. 
    Id. at 1045.
    Here, the IJ
    explained that Jin was not responsive when he was asked by
    the government about his residence. The record supports the
    agency’s demeanor finding, as there are many instances
    where the IJ explicitly said that Jin’s answer was non-
    responsive, such as: Jin’s responses to the government’s
    questions about the duration and nature of his residence in
    Tucson; Jin’s responses to the IJ’s question about how much
    time Jin spent in Los Angeles as compared to Las Vegas; and
    Jin’s responses to the IJ’s question about the duration of Jin’s
    regular church membership in Las Vegas. The record further
    reflects that Jin evaded questions about subjects other than his
    residence, such as when the IJ questioned Jin about how the
    police entered the family church during the alleged police
    incident. While the IJ’s oral decision and BIA’s order did not
    refer to every example of Jin’s non-responsive testimony, the
    record amply demonstrates a pattern of evasive responses
    that, when pursued by the government and IJ, led to Jin’s
    admissions and the giving of a more accurate answer. See
    
    id. (“[T]he record’s
    demonstration that Shrestha’s
    unresponsiveness was a pattern throughout the hearing is one
    of the circumstances that the REAL ID Act entitles the
    agency to consider in assessing Shrestha’s credibility.”).
    2. Misrepresentations of Residence
    Jin contends that the IJ mischaracterized the record when
    the IJ determined that Jin perpetrated a fraud on the
    immigration courts. We disagree. There is no question that
    Jin misrepresented his residence in both of his motions to
    change venue. Jin’s persistent misrepresentations to the
    immigration courts in Los Angeles, Tucson, and Las Vegas
    are significant because they were made in an attempt to gain
    JIN V. HOLDER                        15
    a better forum for Jin’s application. Jin eventually admitted
    that a friend gave him the Tucson address, which was actually
    that of a Chinese restaurant, and that he never lived in Tucson
    but only stayed with friends. Jin also admitted that he spent
    most of his time in Los Angeles, and did not know Las
    Vegas, despite his declaration to the contrary indicating that
    it would be an inconvenience to keep traveling to Tucson
    from Las Vegas. Jin eventually revealed that if his
    immigration case had not been in Las Vegas, he would have
    been in Los Angeles. Jin may have been looking for work in
    Tucson or Las Vegas, but he also admitted that he submitted
    phony addresses in those locations to gain a better forum.
    Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion
    that Jin never resided in Tucson or Las Vegas, and that his
    motions to change venue to those locations were fraudulent.
    These misrepresentations of residence are relevant to Jin’s
    credibility because they show Jin’s purpose of forum
    shopping, and his dishonesty with the immigration court.
    These false statements to change venue are clearly more than
    typographical errors or utterly trivial inconsistencies. See 
    id. at 1043–44.
    3. Fraudulent Church Certification
    Jin contends that he maintained consistent church
    attendance if the duration specified on the Las Vegas church
    certification includes the time Jin spent at the Los Angeles
    branch of the same Korean church. We reject this argument.
    To the contrary, that contention demonstrates how Jin
    continued to live in Los Angeles and did not in fact live in
    Tucson or Las Vegas. Jin’s testimony revealed that he had
    only attended the church in Las Vegas for the past couple of
    months, not the two years specified in the certification. Jin
    16                      JIN V. HOLDER
    eventually admitted in his testimony that he begged his pastor
    to help him, prompting the fraudulent certification many
    months before his immigration hearing. We are also not
    persuaded that Jin honestly revealed his misrepresentation in
    front of the IJ. The record reflects that Jin continued to make
    false statements in front of the Las Vegas immigration judge
    before admitting falsity when questioned further by the
    government or by the IJ.
    4. Lack of Detail
    Jin contends that the BIA erred in concluding that Jin did
    not give sufficient details of his religious beliefs. The record
    reflects that Jin provided little depth in his description of how
    he was introduced to Christianity and what it means to him to
    be Christian. In the context of this case, the BIA
    appropriately considered Jin’s “lack of detail” about his
    Christian beliefs as one factor in evaluating Jin’s credibility
    under the totality of the circumstances.
    The IJ also cited Jin’s “very general” testimony about the
    alleged incident with police in China, referring to Jin’s
    misstatement of the date of the incident and Jin’s lack of
    contact with other members of the family home church after
    the members’ alleged detention. The record further reflects
    that Jin first said in his affidavit that the police “broke into”
    the family church, but only upon persistent questioning by the
    IJ did Jin change his testimony to say that someone in the
    home church opened the door for the police. Non-trivial
    incongruities in Jin’s account of this key incident
    foundational to Jin’s asylum claim are relevant to evaluating
    Jin’s credibility under the totality of the circumstances.
    JIN V. HOLDER                        17
    As we noted in Shrestha, the REAL ID Act does not
    dictate the weight the agency must give to each relevant
    factor. 
    Id. at 1040.
    Here, the agency cited Jin’s lack of detail
    in his knowledge of Christianity and his account of the police
    incident in China, but gave more weight to Jin’s non-
    responsive demeanor, Jin’s repeated misrepresentations of his
    residence, and Jin’s submission of a fraudulent church
    membership certification.
    We conclude that substantial evidence supports the
    agency’s reasonable determination that Jin was not credible
    under the totality of the circumstances. Those circumstances
    include: (1) Jin’s non-responsive demeanor during cross-
    examination; (2) affirmative misrepresentations of his
    residency for the purpose of gaining an advantage in forum;
    (3) submission of a fraudulent church membership
    certification for the purpose of gaining an advantage in
    forum, and (4) lack of detailed testimony. In the absence of
    credible testimony, the agency properly denied Jin’s asylum
    and withholding of removal claims. See 
    id. at 1048.
    PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.