United States v. Jason Hill , 750 F.3d 982 ( 2014 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 13-1884
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Jason Hill
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Western District of Missouri - Joplin
    ____________
    Submitted: February 14, 2014
    Filed: May 7, 2014
    ____________
    Before RILEY, Chief Judge, LOKEN and BYE, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    RILEY, Chief Judge.
    A jury convicted Jason Hill of knowingly receiving and distributing child
    pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (b)(1) (Count 1) and knowingly
    possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), (b)(2) (Count
    2). Hill appeals, arguing the district court1 erred in denying, without a hearing, his
    motion to suppress evidence seized from his computer, and denying his motion to
    dismiss a charged count on double jeopardy grounds. Hill further argues the district
    court2 erred in denying his motions for judgment of acquittal on both counts. With
    appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
    I.     BACKGROUND
    On August 3, 2010, James Smith, a Cassville, Missouri, police officer
    participating in a southwest Missouri cyber crimes task force investigating Internet
    crimes against children, used LimeWire, an online “peer-to-peer” file-sharing
    program, to access Hill’s computer. Officer Smith downloaded ten images of what
    he believed to be child pornography from Hill’s shared folder on LimeWire.3 Based
    on the files downloaded from Hill’s computer, Officer Smith, Task Force Officer
    Brian Martin, and Special Agent James D. Holdman Jr. of the U.S. Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS) obtained a federal warrant to search Hill’s residence for
    child pornography.
    The officers executed the warrant on September 28, 2010. When Hill answered
    the door, the officers served the warrant and explained they were looking for evidence
    of child pornography. After waiving, in writing, his rights prescribed by Miranda v.
    Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    (1966), Hill admitted he had been downloading large amounts
    1
    The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, late United States District Judge for the
    Western District of Missouri, adopting two reports and recommendations of the
    Honorable James C. England, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District
    of Missouri.
    2
    The Honorable David Gregory Kays became Chief Judge of the United States
    District Court for the Western District of Missouri on January 4, 2014.
    3
    Installing LimeWire automatically allowed Hill to share files with any other
    LimeWire user in the world.
    -2-
    of adult pornography through LimeWire for about a year, but “initially denied ever
    seeing any child pornography.” Hill told the officers he may have seen a “popup” for
    what “he thought . . . might be child pornography” the night before the search, but
    that “he deleted it immediately” as he always did with such “popups.” Hill’s story
    changed over time.
    As the interview progressed, the officers asked Hill whether he used search
    terms frequently used to obtain child pornography—terms contained in the filenames
    Officer Smith obtained from Hill’s computer. Hill admitted he may have
    “accidentally typed ‘preteen’” as a search term in LimeWire late at night when it was
    dark or when he was drunk. Hill stated he deleted any child pornography he
    accidentally downloaded. When pressed, Hill admitted he intentionally used the
    search term “preteen” and viewed at least one hundred images of child pornography,
    one involving a child as young as five years old. Hill eventually told the officers he
    viewed child pornography “once or twice a month” from March 2010 to the time of
    the search “out of curiosity,” but asserted he did not save it.
    The officers seized Hill’s computers, including the one on which Hill
    admittedly downloaded adult and child pornography. Special Agent James Kanatzar,
    a forensic examiner for DHS, inspected Hill’s computer and found evidence that files
    containing child pornography had been downloaded and stored on Hill’s hard drive.
    Agent Kanatzar found trace evidence that the files Officer Smith downloaded from
    Hill’s computer had been on the hard drive before being deleted. Agent Kanatzar also
    found three videos the jury determined to be child pornography in Hill’s LimeWire
    directory, which made the files accessible to other LimeWire users. Agent Kanatzar
    also found four files containing child pornography in the recycle bin on Hill’s
    computer. Before being moved to the computer’s recycle bin, the files would have
    been saved somewhere else on Hill’s hard drive. One of the images in the recycle bin
    (Exhibit 40) matched one of the images Officer Smith downloaded on August 3, 2010
    (Exhibit 10).
    -3-
    Hill was indicted on November 9, 2010, and arrested the next day. Before trial,
    Hill moved to suppress the evidence seized from his computer, alleging the initial
    contact with his computer was an unreasonable search and anything derived
    therefrom was tainted. The district court denied the motion. Hill then moved to
    dismiss either Count 1 or Count 2, arguing conviction on both counts would violate
    his right against double jeopardy because possession of child pornography is a lesser-
    included offense of receipt. The district court denied the motion, concluding there
    was no double jeopardy issue because the possession and receipt charges “involve[d]
    different files.” The district court denied Hill’s renewed motion to dismiss a count
    at trial.
    Hill’s three day trial began September 25, 2012. The government presented
    testimony from the investigating officers and the forensic examiner describing their
    interviews with Hill and the child pornography they found on his computer. The
    government also showed the still images (Exhibits 4-13, 37-40) and played a portion
    of each of the three videos from Hill’s computer (Exhibits 41-43) for the jury.
    Maintaining his innocence, Hill took the stand in his own defense.
    Unemployed after losing his job in the technical support division of AT&T Mobility,
    Hill explained he supplemented his income rebuilding and repairing broken
    computers with component parts. As to the seized computer containing child
    pornography, Hill testified he had replaced the RAM, the hard drive, the video
    processor, the CD drive, and the power source. Hill also testified he was a “gamer,”
    meaning he played interactive video games with others online. Distinguishing
    between his familiarity with hardware and his purported ignorance of software, Hill
    testified he loaded LimeWire onto his computer to download music and adult
    pornography but, contrary to the officers’ testimony, denied he knew the LimeWire
    files he downloaded were automatically available to other LimeWire users.
    -4-
    Hill’s direct examination took an unexpected turn. For the first time, Hill
    admitted to “knowingly receiving and distributing child pornography involving the
    use of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct,” as charged in the indictment,
    and intentionally obtaining the images shown to the jury. But Hill also stated he only
    viewed the child pornography to protect his children4—Hill explained he was
    intentionally searching for “preteen” images because he thought an unidentified man
    at a party may have taken illicit pictures of his fourteen- and sixteen-year-old
    stepdaughters showering. Though Hill’s teenage stepdaughters were not “preteen,”
    Hill claimed he viewed many images of child pornography and then deleted them
    when he verified they did not include his stepdaughters. When confronted on cross
    examination with timing inconsistencies, Hill testified he had also looked for images
    of a family friend he had helped after she was exploited online. Hill stated he could
    not review all of the 266 suspected child pornography files he downloaded to his
    shared folder because he became “disgusted” and “sickened of what [he] had seen”
    and “could not continue.” Although Hill later resumed his search, he insisted he
    deleted or attempted to delete all the child pornography he downloaded and viewed.
    After deliberating for approximately four hours, the jury convicted Hill on both
    counts. In separate verdict forms, the jury found Hill (1) received all ten still images
    and all three videos found in his shared folder and distributed the images all as
    alleged in Count 1, and (2) possessed all four images found in his computer’s recycle
    bin as alleged in Count 2. The district court denied Hill’s timely motions for
    judgment of acquittal. The district court sentenced Hill to concurrent terms of 144
    months for Count 1 and 120 months for Count 2. Hill appeals his convictions.
    4
    Hill also admitted to downloading and viewing one of the videos (Exhibit 43)
    before deleting it but denied viewing the other two (Exhibits 41 and 42), the first of
    which involved a child victim who was known to be only ten or eleven years old
    when the video was produced.
    -5-
    II.    DISCUSSION
    A.     Motion to Suppress
    Hill first contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
    without a hearing because, in Hill’s view, Officer Smith violated Hill’s Fourth
    Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by accessing
    Hill’s computer using peer-to-peer software and downloading files from Hill’s
    LimeWire shared folder. We review the district court’s denial of Hill’s “motion to
    suppress de novo, and the underlying factual determinations for clear error.” United
    States v. Barker, 
    437 F.3d 787
    , 789 (8th Cir. 2006). “We review a district court’s
    decision whether to hold an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion.” United
    States v. Yielding, 
    657 F.3d 688
    , 705 (8th Cir. 2011).
    Hill’s Fourth Amendment arguments completely ignore the holding of United
    States v. Stults, 
    575 F.3d 834
    , 843 (8th Cir. 2009). In Stults, we held a defendant has
    “no reasonable expectation of privacy in files . . . retrieved from his personal
    computer where [the defendant] admittedly installed and used LimeWire to make his
    files accessible to others for file sharing.” 
    Id. It did
    not matter that the defendant
    denied knowing others would be able to access his files because the defendant knew
    “‘he had file-sharing software on his computer’” and admittedly downloaded music
    and pornography to his shared folder where other users, including law enforcement
    officers, had access. 
    Id. (quoting United
    States v. Ganoe, 
    538 F.3d 1117
    , 1127 (9th
    Cir. 2008)).
    The same is true here. Hill admittedly downloaded and actively used
    LimeWire—file-sharing software that made the scores of pornography files in Hill’s
    shared folder accessible to any LimeWire user in the world, including Officer Smith.
    LimeWire itself was a publicly accessible program available for free download by
    anyone with a computer and an internet connection. Hill had no reasonable
    expectation of privacy in such publicly shared files and “‘cannot invoke the
    protections of the Fourth Amendment.’” 
    Id. (quoting Ganoe,
    538 F.3d at 1127). The
    -6-
    district court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err in denying Hill’s motion to
    suppress without a hearing. See 
    Yielding, 657 F.3d at 705
    (“A district court
    presented with a motion to suppress need not hold an evidentiary hearing as a matter
    of course, and a hearing is unnecessary if the district court can determine that
    suppression is unwarranted as a matter of law.”).
    B.     Double Jeopardy
    Hill next contends the district court erred in refusing to dismiss one count of
    the indictment on double jeopardy grounds. See United States v. Muhlenbruch, 
    634 F.3d 987
    , 1003-04 (8th Cir. 2011) (concluding possessing child pornography under
    18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) is a lesser-included offense of receiving child pornography
    under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) when “based on the ‘same act or transaction’” (quoting
    Blockburger v. United States, 
    284 U.S. 299
    , 304 (1932))). The Double Jeopardy
    Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects a criminal defendant from “multiple
    punishments for the same criminal offense.” United States v. Bennett, 
    44 F.3d 1364
    ,
    1368 (8th Cir. 1995). We review de novo the denial of a motion to dismiss one count
    of the indictment “on the grounds of double jeopardy.” 
    Id. To establish
    his double
    jeopardy claim, Hill must show Count 1 and Count 2 “are in law and fact the same
    offense.” 
    Id. This he
    cannot do.
    With just one exception, the jury’s guilty verdicts for Count 1 and Count 2
    were based on different visual depictions of child pornography. On Count 1, the jury
    found Hill received the ten images and three videos found in Hill’s LimeWire shared
    folder and distributed the same ten images. On Count 2, the jury found Hill possessed
    the four images found in Hill’s recycle bin, three of which were different from the
    images charged in Count 1. Because the jury specifically found Hill guilty based on
    different facts and images for each count, the jury did not convict Hill “‘of receiving
    [and distributing] the same images that he was also found to have possessed,’ and
    -7-
    thus no double jeopardy violation occurred.”5 United States v. Manning, 
    738 F.3d 937
    , 947 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Huether, 
    673 F.3d 789
    , 798 (8th
    Cir. 2012)).
    C.      Sufficiency of the Evidence
    Finally, Hill asserts the district court erred in denying his motions for judgment
    of acquittal on both counts, arguing the evidence was insufficient to convict him. See
    Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). We review de novo the denial of Hill’s motions for judgment
    of acquittal. See United States v. Landsdown, 
    735 F.3d 805
    , 806 (8th Cir. 2013).
    “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, resolving
    evidentiary conflicts in favor of the government, and accepting all reasonable
    inferences drawn from the evidence that support the jury’s verdict.” United States v.
    Cook, 
    603 F.3d 434
    , 437 (8th Cir. 2010). “We may reverse only if no reasonable jury
    could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.
    Washington, 
    318 F.3d 845
    , 852 (8th Cir. 2003).
    1.    Possession
    In Hill’s view, the government failed to prove Hill knowingly possessed the
    four images found in his computer’s recycle bin (Exhibits 37-40). Hill’s argument
    is based on his mistaken belief that the images found in his recycle bin were found
    in “unallocated space” on his hard drive and Hill could not access or control those
    files without special tools Hill did not have. Hill’s belief is belied by the record.
    Agent Kanatzar testified the four images entered into evidence as Exhibits 37,
    38, 39, and 40, and found by the jury to support convicting Hill of possessing child
    5
    To the extent Hill might have argued the same image charged as Exhibit 10
    in Count 1 and Exhibit 40 in Count 2 created an issue, we conclude any overlap “does
    not affect [Hill’s] substantial rights” and is harmless given the jury’s specific guilty
    verdicts with respect to all of the other distinct images and videos charged in Count
    1 and Count 2, respectively. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a).
    -8-
    pornography as charged in Count 2, were still in Hill’s recycle bin when the officers
    seized Hill’s computer. Unlike “unallocated space,” the recycle bin is an accessible
    folder on the computer’s hard drive “in which a user places files to be deleted.”6
    United States v. Tucker, 
    305 F.3d 1193
    , 1198 n.8 (10th Cir. 2002). “Placement in the
    bin does not automatically delete files, however.” United States v. Walser, 
    275 F.3d 981
    , 984 n.4 (10th Cir. 2001). “[R]emoval of files from the recycle bin generally
    requires manual steps to be taken by the user.” United States v. Romm, 
    455 F.3d 990
    ,
    993 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006). In other words, a file in the recycle bin could have been
    either permanently deleted or restored to its original location, at Hill’s discretion.
    Hill may have “tried to get rid of” the child pornography he downloaded to his
    hard drive, but he never emptied the four files from his recycle bin and thus never
    relegated them to unallocated space. The images remained in his recycle bin,
    accessible to Hill and subject to his dominion and control without any special tools.
    The jury could reasonably infer Hill’s “intentional attempt to delete child
    pornography files, such as by placing them in [his] computer’s recycle bin,
    . . . suggest[ed] he was aware of the files and their contents.” United States v. Breton,
    
    740 F.3d 1
    , 17 (1st Cir. 2014). Indeed, Hill—no stranger to computers—admitted he
    actively sought child pornography on LimeWire using very specific search terms,
    intentionally downloaded images of child pornography, viewed those illegal images,
    and eventually deleted some of them, before searching for more images. Four of
    those illegal images remained in his recycle bin when officers seized his computer.
    A reasonable jury could convict Hill of knowingly possessing child pornography.7
    6
    “Unallocated space is space on a hard drive that contains deleted data, usually
    emptied from the operating system’s trash or recycle bin folder, that cannot be seen
    or accessed by the user without the use of forensic software. Such space is available
    to be written over to store new information.” United States v. Flyer, 
    633 F.3d 911
    ,
    918 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added).
    7
    Because the illegal images were in Hill’s recycle bin, we need not decide
    whether images of child pornography found in unallocated space or the browser cache
    -9-
    See, e.g., United States v. Worthey, 
    716 F.3d 1107
    , 1113-14 (8th Cir. 2013); United
    States v. Koch, 
    625 F.3d 470
    , 478-79 (8th Cir. 2010).
    2.     Receipt and Distribution
    The evidence presented at trial was also more than sufficient to convict Hill of
    knowingly receiving and distributing child pornography.8 At trial, Hill unequivocally
    confessed to “knowingly receiving and distributing child pornography” as charged
    in the indictment and intentionally using LimeWire to download and view the images
    and one of the videos for which he was convicted. Hill claimed he searched for and
    downloaded child pornography in an ill-conceived plan to protect his stepdaughters,
    not knowing the files in his LimeWire shared folder would be accessible to other
    users. But the jury was not obligated to accept Hill’s admittedly irrational
    justifications and belated claims of ignorance. “[Q]uestions concerning the
    credibility of witnesses, where their testimony is not incredible on its face, are for the
    jury to decide.” United States v. Samuels, 
    543 F.3d 1013
    , 1019 (8th Cir. 2008).
    Hill’s explicit description of his own considerable computer abilities and disturbing
    search habits, combined with the investigating officers’ detailed testimony regarding
    Hill’s inculpatory statements, would allow a reasonable jury to dismiss Hill’s dubious
    claims of innocence.
    Even without Hill’s damning witness-stand confession, the evidence of
    knowing receipt and distribution was overwhelming. Hill told the investigating
    would support a verdict of knowingly possessing child pornography under the
    circumstances of this case. See United States v. McArthur, 
    573 F.3d 608
    , 614-15 (8th
    Cir. 2009) (determining, on the case facts, images found in unallocated space
    supported conviction).
    8
    Hill’s arguments primarily focus on distribution, but a defendant can violate
    18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) by “knowingly receiv[ing], or distribut[ing]” child
    pornography. (Emphasis added). Here, the jury reasonably found the evidence
    sufficient to find Hill guilty of violating § 2252(a)(2) both ways.
    -10-
    officers he intentionally searched for and downloaded at least one hundred images of
    child pornography from other LimeWire users’ shared folders for months. On August
    3, 2010, Officer Smith downloaded ten such files from Hill’s public LimeWire folder.
    During his forensic examination, Agent Kanatzar found three more videos of child
    pornography in Hill’s shared folder. The jury reasonably convicted Hill of knowingly
    receiving and distributing child pornography. See United States v. Collins, 
    642 F.3d 654
    , 656-57 (8th Cir. 2011) (recognizing use of file-sharing program and knowledge
    of computers supported guilty verdict).
    III.   CONCLUSION
    We affirm.
    ______________________________
    -11-