State v. Jones , 2011 Ohio 6633 ( 2011 )

[Cite as State v. Jones, 2011-Ohio-6633.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-110059
TRIAL NO. B-0902585
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
O P I N I O N.
vs. :
JERRY JONES, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: December 23, 2011
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Rachel Lipman
Curran, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
The Farrish Law Firm and Michaela M. Stagnaro, for Defendant-Appellant.
Please note: This case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
SYLVIA S. HENDON, Judge.
{¶1} Following a jury trial, defendant-appellant Jerry Jones was found
guilty of murder under R.C. 2903.02(A) and an accompanying weapon specification.
At the close of the trial, the trial court separately found Jones guilty of the offense of
having a weapon while under a disability, under R.C. 2923.13(A)(3). The trial court
imposed an aggregate sentence of 25 years’ to life imprisonment.
{¶2} Jones appeals, raising five assignments of error for our review. We
find no merit to Jones’ assignments of error, and we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
Statement of Facts
{¶3} On December 31, 2002, Gregory Beauchamp was shot as he stood
downtown at the corner of Vine and Liberty streets with friends. Joshua Bumpus, an
acquaintance of Beauchamp’s who had witnessed the murder, testified that he,
Beauchamp, and several others had been downtown standing around talking, when a
car full of people drove past. The car’s occupants started shouting the word “fags” at
Bumpus and Beauchamp, who were homosexuals, and someone in the car threw a
can of “pop” out of a window. Beauchamp began to throw the “pop” can back. But
the back rear passenger put his arm out of the front passenger’s window and fired a
gun at Beauchamp approximately three or four times. Bumpus heard Beauchamp
state that his chest hurt, and then saw his friend fall to the ground covered in blood.
{¶4} Ade Oba had been driving the vehicle involved in the shooting. Oba
testified that, on the evening of December 31, 2002, he had been driving around with
Lorenzo Hudson, Antonio Harmon, and Jones. Jones had been seated in the rear
2
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
passenger seat of the vehicle. Oba had stopped the vehicle at a traffic light at the
intersection of Vine and Liberty streets, when Hudson had thrown a Mountain Dew
can out of the window at the group of people on the corner, whom Oba described as
“transsexuals.” Oba testified that as one of the “transsexuals” had begun to throw the
can back at the car, Jones had used Hudson’s weapon to fire two shots at him. After
the shooting, Oba had burned the vehicle that he had been driving to prevent it from
leading to his identification.
{¶5} In addition to Bumpus and Oba, the state presented testimony from
two witnesses to whom Jones had confessed his guilt in these offenses. Adrian Smith
testified that he and Jones had grown up together. In 2007, Smith and Jones had
been selling heroin together when, in Smith’s terms, a “fag” had attempted to “score”
some drugs from them. Jones had refused to sell drugs to the man; he had called the
man numerous derogatory terms and had talked about his hatred of “fags.” Jones
then told Smith that he had “bodied” a “fag” back in 2002. Smith explained to the
jury that to “body” someone meant to kill them. According to Smith, Jones had
revealed that he had been driving around with Oba, Hudson, and Harmon, when a
“fag” had flagged them down. Jones told Smith that he had thrown a can of “pop” at
the “fag,” who had then thrown the can back at the car. After the car in which Jones
had been riding drove around the block, it came back to that scene and Jones had
fired out of the window at the man.
{¶6} Michael Matthews additionally testified that Jones had confessed to
Beauchamp’s murder while the two had been incarcerated together in the Hamilton
County Justice Center. Matthews testified that, prior to their incarceration, he and
Jones had “hustled” together. While in the Justice Center, Jones told Matthews that
3
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
he had been transported back to Hamilton County for charges involving the murder
of a “fag” on Vine Street back in 2001. According to Matthews, Jones had admitted
that he had committed the murder, and he additionally had expressed surprise that
charges had been brought because the crime had occurred so many years prior.
Other-Acts Evidence
{¶7} In his first assignment of error, Jones argues that the trial court erred
in admitting other-acts testimony into evidence. Jones first argues that Adrian
Smith’s testimony that he and Jones had sold heroin together was improperly
admitted. He further argues that Michael Matthews’ testimony that he and Jones
used to “hustle” together, as well as Matthews’ testimony that Jones had been
brought back to Hamilton County to stand trial for these charges, was impermissible
other-acts testimony.
{¶8} Under Evid.R. 404(B), “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.” Generally, we review a trial court’s admission of
relevant evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Truitt, 1st Dist. No. C-050188,
2011-Ohio-1885, ¶8, citing State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 264-265, 473
N.E.2d 768. But here, Jones failed to object to this testimony during trial.
Consequently, he has waived all put plain error. Crim.R. 52(B); State v. Griffin, 1st
Dist. No. C-020084, 2003-Ohio-3196, ¶34. Plain error is an error so extreme that it
affected the outcome of the proceedings and must be corrected to prevent a manifest
4
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
miscarriage of justice. State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804,
paragraphs two and three of the syllabus.
{¶9} We find no error in the admission of the cited testimony from Smith
and Matthews under Evid.R. 404(B). Contrary to Jones’ assertion, the testimony
was not offered to show that he is a drug dealer and a violent person. Rather, the
testimony was offered to establish Jones’ identity and relationship to the witnesses.
{¶10} Smith’s testimony that he and Jones had sold heroin together was
relevant; Jones had admitted to Beauchamp’s murder while selling drugs with Smith,
and this testimony was key to establishing Jones’ identity as the person who had
admitted this crime. The same holds true for Matthews’ testimony. Matthews’
reference to “hustling” established that these two men had had a prior relationship,
which gave credence to Matthews’ testimony that Jones had confessed this crime to
him. And Matthews’ brief mention that Jones had been transported from Butler
County to the Hamilton County Justice Center was offered to establish how the two
men had been reacquainted. It set the stage for their later conversation, in which
Jones had confessed to Beauchamp’s murder.
{¶11} The trial court properly admitted this testimony under Evid.R. 404(B).
The first assignment of error is overruled.
Hearsay
{¶12} In his second assignment of error, Jones argues that the trial court
erred by admitting impermissible hearsay evidence at trial.
{¶13} During trial, Detective John Horn, a member of the Cincinnati Police
Department’s cold case unit, testified about his investigation of Beauchamp’s
murder. With respect to this assignment of error, Jones takes issue with Horn’s
5
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
testimony that Lorenzo Hudson and Antonio Harmon, two of the occupants in Jones’
vehicle when Beauchamp was shot, had provided statements to him in connection
with this offense. Jones argues that this statement, when considered in conjunction
with Horn’s testimony that he had been unable to locate Hudson and Harmon to
testify at trial, was hearsay because it invited the jury to speculate that these men had
placed the blame for Beauchamp’s murder on Jones in their statements.
{¶14} Jones’ argument is tenuous. Under Evid.R. 801(C), hearsay “is a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Horn’s
testimony that Hudson and Harmon had provided statements during the
investigation was not hearsay. Horn merely stated that these men had given
statements; he made no mention of the statements’ contents. His testimony was
offered to explain the course of his investigation, not to prove the truth of the content
of these statements, which, notably, was never provided to the jury. We decline
Jones’ invitation to label Horn’s testimony as hearsay, and we find that no error
occurred in the admission of this testimony. The second assignment of error is
overruled.
Prosecutorial Misconduct
{¶15} In his third assignment of error, Jones argues that the trial court erred
by permitting the prosecutor to make improper remarks to the jury and introduce
improper evidence. Prosecutorial misconduct will only be grounds for reversal if it
deprived the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Truitt, supra, at ¶13; see State v.
Jackson, 92 Ohio St.3d 436, 443, 2001-Ohio-1266, 751 N.E.2d 946.
6
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶16} Jones first argues that the prosecutor improperly questioned Detective
Horn about statements obtained during his investigation from Lorenzo Hudson,
Antonio Harmon, and Ade Oba. We have already found that the prosecutor’s
questions, along with Detective Horn’s corresponding testimony, regarding
statements given by Hudson and Harmon were not improper. So we now solely
consider the propriety of the prosecutor’s questions with respect to pretrial
statements given by Ade Oba. During trial, Oba testified prior to Detective Horn.
During Detective Horn’s testimony, the prosecutor first established that Oba had
given a pretrial statement at some point in the course of the investigation. The
prosecutor then asked Detective Horn if Oba’s pretrial statement had been consistent
with his trial testimony. Detective Horn answered affirmatively, and counsel for
Jones objected immediately. The trial court sustained the objection and instructed
the jury to disregard that question and answer. Prior to the prosecutor engaging in
this line of questioning, the trial court had cautioned him against bolstering the
credibility of his witnesses through Detective Horn’s testimony.
{¶17} This question was improper. The trial court had instructed the
prosecutor to avoid bolstering the credibility of a witness through Detective Horn.
But in light of the other evidence adduced at trial, this lone question did not deprive
Jones of a fair trial. Further, the trial court sustained Jones’ objection and instructed
the jury to disregard both the question and answer. A jury is presumed to follow the
trial court’s curative instructions. State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 59, 1995-Ohio-
168, 656 N.E.2d 623.
{¶18} Jones next argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct during
closing argument by contending that Jones should have produced a neutral witness
7
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
to verify the relationship between Jones and the prosecutor’s testifying witnesses.
Jones argues that this statement improperly shifted the burden of proof from the
state to Jones. Generally, prosecutors are entitled to a wide degree of latitude in
closing arguments. State v. Smith (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 470 N.E.2d 883. All
statements made must be evaluated not in isolation, but rather in light of the entire
closing argument. State v. Keenan (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 402, 410, 613 N.E.2d 203.
{¶19} This statement by the prosecutor was not improper and has been taken
out of context by Jones. During closing arguments, counsel for Jones discussed in
detail the motives that Oba, Smith, and Matthews had for testifying, and he
insinuated that these witnesses had lied during their testimony in return for case
consideration. Defense counsel stated to the jury, “How hard—is there any other
proof that they know—even know each other? How hard would it be to bring in some
independent witness to say, hey, you know Jerry Jones? Yes. Do you know [Adrian
Smith]? Yes. Are they best friends? Yea. If that was true, how hard would it be to
get a witness to come in?” In response to these statements by defense counsel, the
prosecutor stated in his rebuttal portion of closing argument “He says, well, why
didn’t [the prosecutor] bring in a witness, a neutral witness, that could testify that * *
* they know each other. I didn’t need that witness * * * Why didn’t they bring in a
witness to say he didn’t know?”
{¶20} When viewed in the proper context, it is clear that the prosecutor was
responding to defense counsel’s insinuation that the state should have produced a
neutral witness to verify the relationship between all these parties. The prosecutor’s
comment was an appropriate response. And, as noted by the trial court, defense
8
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
counsel “opened the door” for this statement. The prosecutor’s comment was not
improper, and the assignment of error is overruled.
Sufficiency and Weight
{¶21} In his fourth assignment of error, Jones argues that his convictions for
murder and having a weapon while under a disability were not supported by
sufficient evidence and were against the manifest weight of the evidence. A
conviction is supported by sufficient evidence when, after viewing all evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found all of
the elements of the offenses proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Martin
(1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717. When reviewing the manifest
weight of the evidence, this court must weigh all evidence, along with reasonable
inferences, and consider the credibility of the witnesses to determine if the trier of
fact lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice requiring reversal of the
conviction. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d
541.
{¶22} Jones was convicted of murder under R.C. 2903.02(A), which provides
that “[n]o person shall purposely cause the death of another.” Jones was additionally
found guilty of having a weapon while under a disability under R.C. 2923.13(A)(3).
This statute states, in relevant part, that “[u]nless relieved from disability * * *, no
person shall knowingly, acquire, have, carry, or use any firearm or dangerous
ordnance if * * * the person is under indictment for or has been convicted of any
felony offense involving the illegal possession, use, sale, administration, distribution,
or trafficking in any drug of abuse.”
9
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶23} Jones’ convictions were supported by sufficient evidence. Joshua
Bumpus testified that Beauchamp was shot by the person sitting in the rear
passenger seat of the vehicle. Ade Oba confirmed that Jones had been seated in that
position, and that Jones had shot Beauchamp. And Jones admitted his culpability to
both Adrian Smith and Michael Matthews.
{¶24} We further find that Jones’ convictions were not against the manifest
weight of the evidence. As the triers of fact, the jury and the trial court were in the
best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Oba had admitted during his
testimony that he was currently incarcerated on federal weapons charges, and that it
was a possibility that he would receive a lesser sentence as a result of his testimony in
this case. Smith had testified that he was currently incarcerated in South Carolina on
drug and weapon charges, and he also revealed his lengthy prior criminal history.
And Matthews admitted that the prosecutor had agreed to “take up” his current
charges with his attorney after his testimony. Defense counsel vigorously cross-
examined the state’s witnesses on these issues. The jury and trial court were aware
of the witnesses’ motivations and desire for case consideration, and they were able to
determine what weight to give their testimony with these considerations in mind.
{¶25} Jones additionally highlights various discrepancies in the testimony of
Smith and Oba to argue that they had fabricated their stories. But these
discrepancies concerned minor details about the crime’s execution. Smith and Oba
did not waiver or differ in their testimony that Jones had been the perpetrator of
these offenses. Further, the jury had the opportunity to weigh their testimony and to
resolve any inconsistencies. See State v. Hughes, 1st Dist. No. C-030489, 2005-
Ohio-2453, ¶19.
10
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶26} Jones’ convictions for murder and having a weapon while under a
disability were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest
weight of the evidence. The fourth assignment of error is overruled.
Allied Offenses
{¶27} In his fifth assignment of error, Jones argues that the trial court erred
by improperly sentencing him on both the offenses of murder and having a weapon
while under a disability because the offenses were allied offenses of similar import.
{¶28} Under R.C. 2941.25, Ohio’s multiple-count statute, a trial court may
convict and sentence a defendant for two or more offenses that arose out of the same
criminal transaction if the offenses (1) were not allied offenses of similar import, (2)
were committed separately, or (3) were committed with a separate animus as to each
offense. State v. Bickerstaff (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 62, 65-66, 461 N.E.2d 892; see,
also, State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, ¶51;
State v. Evans, 1st Dist. No. C-100028, 2011-Ohio-2356, ¶6. The Ohio Supreme
Court has recently clarified that, when determining whether two offenses are allied
offenses of similar import subject to merger under R.C. 2941.25, the conduct of the
accused must be considered. State v. Johnson, supra, syllabus.
{¶29} This court recently considered an identical argument in State v.
Baron, 1st Dist. No. C-100474, 2011-Ohio-3204. In Baron, we held that the offenses
of murder and having a weapon while under a disability were not allied offenses of
similar import subject to merger because, in that case, the offenses had been
committed both separately and with a separate animus. Id. at ¶19. Jones urges this
court to distinguish Baron from the case at hand. In support of his argument, Jones
notes that, in Baron, the defendant had possessed the firearm for a significant
11
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
amount of time before the murder took place. In contrast, Jones argues, the murder
in this case occurred simultaneously to his possession of the weapon.
{¶30} Jones’ argument fails. Like Baron, the offenses of murder and having
a weapon while under a disability in this case were committed with a separate
animus. The offense of murder required that Jones have the specific purpose to kill.
The offense of having a weapon while under disability does not require a similar
purposeful intent. After possessing the weapon, Jones purposely fired at
Beauchamp, carrying out a motive and intent that was not present in his commission
of the offense of having a weapon while under a disability. Because these offenses
were committed with a separate animus, they were not allied offenses of similar
import and were separately punishable. The fifth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶31} Having overruled Jones’ assignments of error, we accordingly affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.
DINKELACKER, P.J., and CUNNINGHAM, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
12