State v. Kendrick , 2014 Ohio 2816 ( 2014 )

[Cite as State v. Kendrick, 2014-Ohio-2816.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
: Appellate Case No. 26042
Plaintiff-Appellee :
: Trial Court Case No. 2003-CR-4234
v. :
: (Criminal Appeal from
SHAUN D. KENDRICK : (Common Pleas Court)
:
Defendant-Appellant :
...........
OPINION
Rendered on the 27th day of June, 2014.
...........
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by MICHELE D. PHIPPS, Atty. Reg. #0069829, Montgomery
County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, P.O. Box
972, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45402
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
SHAUN D. KENDRICK, SR., #A489-082, Pickaway Correctional Institution, Post Office
Box 209, Orient, Ohio 43146
Defendant-Appellant, pro se
.............
HALL, J.,
{¶ 1} Shaun Kendrick appeals pro se from the trial court’s denial of his “motion to
request for public records release[.]”
{¶ 2} In his sole assignment of error, Kendrick contends the trial court erred in denying
his motion.
{¶ 3} The record reflects that Kendrick, a prison inmate, made a public-records request
in Dayton Municipal Court. He sought affidavits and other records related to one or more search
warrants in his criminal case, which ended years ago with a guilty plea and sentencing on
multiple counts of rape. The municipal court denied the public-records request because Kendrick
had failed to comply with R.C. 149.43(B)(8). That statute requires an inmate seeking records
related to a criminal investigation or prosecution to support his public-records request with a
finding by the sentencing judge that the information sought is necessary to support what appears
to be a justiciable claim.
{¶ 4} After the municipal court denied his request for lack of the required finding by
the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court sentencing judge, Kendrick filed the motion at
issue, asking the judge below to “grant the Dayton Municipal Court Clerk of Courts Mark E.
Owens, to release the requested records that fall up under the public records act.” (Doc. #4). In a
memorandum accompanying his motion, Kendrick cited R.C. 149.43(B)(8). He also moved to
proceed in forma pauperis. The trial court overruled the motions, reasoning:
* * * It appears the defendant is requesting that this court order the Dayton
Municipal Court Clerk of Court Mark E. Owens to release records to him and that
this court order Dayton Municipal Court to do so without cost. This court does not
have jurisdiction to order the Dayton Municipal Court to release the records or to
order that such release [be] without cost to Mr. Kendrick. Therefore, Defendant’s
motions must be overruled by this Court.
3
(Doc. #6).
{¶ 5} On appeal, Kendrick argues that the trial court did have jurisdiction “to make the
determination to release the records.” (Appellant’s brief at 3). He asks us to remand the cause to
the trial court with an order to release the records. (Id. at 4). For its part, the State does not
address the trial court’s jurisdiction to order the Dayton Municipal Court to release the records.
Instead, the State argues that the trial court’s decision was correct because Kendrick undeniably
has no justiciable claim for the public records at issue to support. In reply, Kendrick insists the
only issue before us is the trial court’s jurisdiction to act.
{¶ 6} Upon review, we believe the trial court arguably, albeit understandably, may have
misinterpreted Kendrick’s motion. Although the motion could have been worded more clearly, he
appears to have been seeking a finding from the sentencing judge, as required by R.C.
149.43(B)(8), “that the information sought in the public record is necessary to support what
appears to be a justiciable claim[.]” We believe the trial court had jurisdiction to make such a
finding, if appropriate, which then could have been taken to the Dayton Municipal Court to
obtain the records at issue.
{¶ 7} But even if the trial court misinterpreted the nature of Kendrick’s request, we see
no error in its denial of his motion. In short, we find no basis for reversal where, as here,
Kendrick plainly does not have any justiciable claim pertaining to the affidavits and other
search-warrant-related records at issue. This court has found that an inmate is not entitled to
public records under R.C. 149.43(B)(8) where he does not “identify any pending proceeding with
respect to which the requested documents would be material[.]” State v. Atakpu, 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 25232, 2013-Ohio-4392, ¶ 9; see also State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery
4
No. 23247, 2009-Ohio-7035, ¶ 5, citing State v. Gibson, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 06CA37,
2007-Ohio-7161, ¶ 13.
{¶ 8} Here Kendrick did not identify any pending proceeding, and we are unaware of
one. He originally entered his pleas and was sentenced in 2005. After his initial appeal, he was
resentenced in August 2006.We affirmed the resentencing in 2007 and the Ohio Supreme Court
declined to review that decision in 2008. Kendrick’s convictions are final, and post-conviction
actions have been completed. Moreover, as the State points out, his guilty pleas constitute
complete admissions of guilt that would preclude him from raising any suppression issues related
to affidavits or search warrants. Under these circumstances, we cannot conceive of Kendrick
having any justiciable claim pertaining to the affidavits and other search-warrant-related records
at issue. His motion in the trial court certainly did not establish the existence of any such claim.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the motion.
{¶ 9} Kendrick’s assignment of error is overruled, and the judgment of the
Montgomery County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
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FAIN and WELBAUM, JJ., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Mathias H. Heck
Michele D. Phipps
Shaun D. Kendrick, Sr.
Hon. Michael Tucker