State v. Draper , 2011 Ohio 773 ( 2011 )


Menu:
  • [Cite as State v. Draper, 
    2011-Ohio-773
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
    PUTNAM COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO,                                            CASE NO. 12-10-07
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
    v.
    BARTLEY DRAPER,                                             OPINION
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    Appeal from Putnam County Common Pleas Court
    Trial Court No. 06 CR 73
    Judgment Affirmed
    Date of Decision: February 22, 2011
    APPEARANCES:
    Kelly J. Rauch for Appellant
    Todd C. Schroder for Appellee
    Case No. 12-10-07
    WILLAMOWSKI, J.,
    {¶1} Defendant-appellant Bartley Draper (“Draper”) appeals the Putnam
    County Court of Common Pleas’ decisions overruling his “Motion for
    ‘Sentencing’” and “Motion for Vacation of Void Sentence and ‘Sentencing.’” For
    the reasons set forth below, the judgments are affirmed.
    {¶2} Ted Diller (“Diller”) operated a classic vehicle restoration business
    out of Pandora, Ohio. Diller hired Draper to paint a vehicle. At auction, the
    vehicle sold for $500,000. Draper, seeing the high sales price, wanted more
    money than was offered to him as a bonus and became angry when he was only
    offered a $2,000.00 bonus.
    {¶3} On August 15, 2006, Draper broke into Diller’s garage used by the
    business. Draper proceeded to inflict damage on windows, doors, eleven vehicles
    being restored, trucks, wreckers, and two Harley Davidson motorcycles. Draper
    also ransacked the office space within the garage. As he left, Draper put a note in
    Diller’s mailbox stating, “I will get you.” That same night, Draper was stopped by
    law enforcement and cited for speeding, lanes of travel, and operating a vehicle
    while under the influence (O.V.I.). Law enforcement discovered Diller’s mail, a
    crowbar, and a mallet hammer in the vehicle.
    {¶4} On October 13, 2006, the Putnam County Grand Jury indicted Draper
    on count one of breaking and entering in violation of R.C. 2911.13(A), a felony of
    -2-
    Case No. 12-10-07
    the fifth degree, and count two of vandalism in violation of R.C. 2909.05(B)(1)(a),
    a felony of the third degree. The indictment specified in Count II that the amount
    of damage was more than $100,000. (Doc. No. 1). Draper entered pleas of not
    guilty to both counts on October 20, 2006. (Oct. 20, 2006 Tr. at 2). On January
    29, 2007, a change of plea hearing was held. (Doc. No. 17). Pursuant to a plea
    agreement, Draper entered a plea of guilty to Count II, vandalism, and Count I,
    breaking and entering, was dismissed. (Doc. No. 19). A sentencing hearing was
    held on March 13, 2007. The trial court sentenced Draper to three years in prison
    and journalized its judgment on March 16, 2007. (Doc. No. 24). No appeal was
    taken from this judgment.
    {¶5} On September 20, 2007, Draper filed a motion for judicial release.
    (Doc. No. 29). A hearing was held on the motion on October 10, 2007. (Doc. No.
    30). On October 22, 2007, the motion was granted and Draper was placed on
    supervision. (Doc. No. 35). On June 4, 2009, the State filed a motion to revoke
    supervision alleging that Draper violated the terms of his release by consuming
    alcohol. (Doc. No. 40). A hearing was held on this motion on August 3, 2009.
    (Doc. No. 46). Draper admitted to the violation, his supervision was revoked on
    August 4, 2009, and Draper was returned to prison to complete his sentence. (Doc.
    No. 49). No appeal was taken from this judgment.
    -3-
    Case No. 12-10-07
    {¶6} On November 17, 2009, Draper filed a “Motion For ‘Sentencing’”
    alleging that his sentence was void under State v. Bezak, State v. Jordan, and State
    v. Simpkins, because the trial court failed to properly notify him of post-release
    control at the August 3, 2009 sentencing hearing. 
    114 Ohio St.3d 94
    , 2007-Ohio-
    3250, 
    868 N.E.2d 961
    ; 
    104 Ohio St.3d 21
    , 
    2004-Ohio-6085
    , 
    817 N.E.2d 864
    ; 
    117 Ohio St.3d 420
    , 
    2008-Ohio-1197
    , 
    884 N.E.2d 868
    ; (Doc. No. 57). Draper filed a
    “Supplemental Motion For Vacation Of Void Sentence and ‘Sentencing’” on April
    27, 2010, alleging that the trial court also erred in ordering the amount of
    restitution without considering the actual economic loss suffered by the victim.
    (Doc. No. 58). The trial court overruled these motions on May 3, 2010. (Doc.
    Nos. 59-60).
    {¶7} On May 18, 2010, Draper filed a notice of appeal. (Doc. No. 61).
    Draper now appeals from these judgments raising seven assignments of error. We
    will address Draper’s assignments of error out of the order they appear in his brief,
    combining assignments of error where beneficial for discussion.
    Fourth Assignment of Error
    The trial court erred in denying [Draper’s] motion to vacate his
    sentence on the grounds that his sentence is void as a result of
    the court’s failure to notify him of post-release control.
    Seventh Assignment of Error
    The trial court erred when it imposed more than the minimum
    sentence.
    -4-
    Case No. 12-10-07
    {¶8} Draper argues in his fourth assignment of error that his sentence is
    void because the trial court failed to notify him of whether post-release control
    was discretionary or mandatory. Additionally, Draper argues that his guilty plea is
    void by virtue of his void sentence. Finally, Draper argues that the trial court
    failed to properly notify him of his post-release control at the August 3, 2009
    sentencing hearing after his violation of supervision. In his seventh assignment of
    error, Draper argues that the trial court erred by imposing more than the minimum
    sentence.
    {¶9} As an initial matter, Draper has never filed a motion to withdraw his
    guilty plea in the trial court, and therefore, we need not consider his argument for
    vacation of his guilty plea. Additionally, Draper’s argument relating to the trial
    court’s failure to properly advise him of his post-release control is moot, because
    Draper has already been released from prison and was not placed upon post-
    release control by the Adult Parole Authority.1 State v. Beleford, 3d Dist. No. 13-
    06-32, 
    2007-Ohio-1912
    , ¶8; State v. Bostic, 8th Dist. No. 84842, 
    2005-Ohio-2184
    ,
    ¶¶24-34; State v. Stewart, 8th Dist. No. 86411, 
    2006-Ohio-813
    , ¶50. Aside from
    that, Draper has suffered no prejudice by the trial court’s failure to properly
    1
    The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections website, of which we take judicial notice, does
    not list Draper as an inmate or indicate that Draper is on post-release control. See, e.g., State v. Money, 2nd
    Dist. No. 2009 CA 119, 
    2010-Ohio-6225
    , ¶25. The State has also indicated in its brief that Draper was
    released from prison on July 25, 2010 without being subject to post-release control. (State’s Brief at 8).
    -5-
    Case No. 12-10-07
    impose post-release control. Draper should have actually been sentenced to three
    years of mandatory post-release control pursuant to R.C. 2967.28(B)(3), instead of
    discretionary post-release control, because he was convicted of a third degree
    felony during the commission of which he threatened physical harm against a
    person. (See Aug. 13, 2007 Tr. at 8, 13).           Draper’s proposed remedy of
    resentencing, which he sought in the trial court, would be inappropriate at this
    juncture since he has already served his term of imprisonment. State v. Bezak, 
    114 Ohio App.3d 94
    , 
    2007-Ohio-3250
    , 
    868 N.E.2d 961
    , ¶18; Hernandez v. Kelly, 
    108 Ohio St.3d 395
    , 
    2006-Ohio-126
    , 
    844 N.E.2d 301
    ; State v. Harrison, 
    122 Ohio St.3d 512
    , 
    2009-Ohio-3547
    , 
    912 N.E.2d 1106
    , ¶35, citing State v. Simpkins, 
    117 Ohio St.3d 420
    , 
    2008-Ohio-1197
    , 
    884 N.E.2d 568
    , ¶6. Finally, Draper’s argument
    concerning the trial court’s imposition of sentence is also moot in light of the fact
    that he is no longer incarcerated. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 
    166 Ohio App.3d 363
    , 
    2006-Ohio-2294
    , 
    850 N.E.2d 799
    .
    {¶10} Draper’s fourth and seventh assignments of error are, therefore,
    overruled.
    First Assignment of Error
    The trial court committed error in denying [Draper’s] motion to
    vacate his sentence as being void on the grounds that [Draper’s]
    guilty plea was not freely voluntarily and knowingly made.
    -6-
    Case No. 12-10-07
    Second Assignment of Error
    The trial court erred in denying [Draper’s] motion to vacate his
    sentence as being void on the grounds that [Draper’s] sentence is
    contrary to law.
    Third Assignment of Error
    The trial court erred in denying [Draper’s] motion to vacate his
    sentence on the grounds that his conviction is void due to a
    defective indictment.
    Fifth Assignment of Error
    The trial court erred in denying [Draper’s] motion to vacate his
    sentence on the grounds that his sentence is void as a result of
    the courts improper imposition of restitution.
    Sixth Assignment of Error
    The trial court erred in denying [Draper’s] motion to vacate his
    sentence on the ground that he was denied the right to effective
    assistance of counsel.
    {¶11} In his first and second assignments of error, Draper argues that his
    sentence should be vacated as void, because his plea was not freely, voluntarily,
    and knowingly made when the State failed to amend the indictment as promised
    during the plea negotiations. In his third assignment of error, Draper argues that
    his sentence should be vacated as void because his conviction rests upon a
    defective indictment. In his fifth assignment of error, Draper argues that his
    sentence is void because the trial court failed to properly impose restitution. In his
    -7-
    Case No. 12-10-07
    sixth assignment of error, Draper argues that his sentence should be vacated due to
    ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
    {¶12} As a procedural matter, we must first observe that Draper’s motion in
    the trial court was filed after the time for a direct appeal had passed, although none
    was taken, and his arguments seek vacation of his sentence on the basis that his
    constitutional rights have been violated. Thus, these arguments should have been
    raised in a petition for post-conviction relief. State v. Reynolds (1997), 
    79 Ohio St.3d 158
    , 
    679 N.E.2d 1131
    , syllabus. R.C. 2953.21(A)(2) requires, in pertinent
    part, that a post-conviction petition be filed within one hundred eighty (180) days
    after the expiration of the time for filing a direct appeal. Additionally, “R.C.
    2953.23(A) divests a court of jurisdiction to hear an appeal after the expiration of
    the one-hundred eighty day period set by R.C. 2953.21(A)(2) unless an exception
    under R.C. 2953.23(A)(1) or (2) is met.” State v. King, 3d Dist. No. 2-07-24,
    
    2007-Ohio-6233
    , ¶17.
    {¶13} Draper’s sentence was journalized on March 16, 2007; and thus,
    Draper had until April 15, 2007, to file his notice of appeal. (Doc. No. 24); App.R.
    4. Since Draper did not file a direct appeal, the time for the petition for post-
    conviction relief to be filed began running on April 16, 2007, and expired on
    October 12, 2007. See R.C. 2953.21.              The first petition was not filed until
    November 17, 2009, more than two years after the deadline. Thus, Draper’s
    -8-
    Case No. 12-10-07
    petition could only be considered if it met one of the two exceptions in R.C.
    2953.23(A), neither of which applies in this case. As such, this Court is without
    jurisdiction to consider these post-conviction arguments. See King, 2007-Ohio-
    6233, at ¶17, citing R.C. 2953.23(A).       Even if this Court had jurisdiction to
    consider these post-conviction arguments, Draper’s arguments would be barred by
    res judicata. State v. Schwieterman, 3d Dist. No. 10-09-12, 
    2010-Ohio-102
    , ¶23.
    {¶14} Draper’s first, second, third, fifth, and sixth assignments of error are,
    therefore, overruled.
    {¶15} Having found no error prejudicial to Draper, the judgment of the
    Court of Common Pleas of Putnam County is affirmed.
    Judgment Affirmed
    PRESTON, J., concurs.
    ROGERS, P.J., concurs in Judgment Only.
    /jnc
    -9-