In re N.C.W. , 2014 Ohio 3381 ( 2014 )


Menu:
  • [Cite as In re N.C.W., 2014-Ohio-3381.]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
    BUTLER COUNTY
    IN THE MATTER OF:                               :
    N.C.W.                                  :      CASE NO. CA2013-12-229
    :             OPINION
    8/4/2014
    :
    :
    APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
    JUVENILE DIVISION
    Case No. JS2010-1332
    M. Lynn Lampe, 1248 Nilles Road, Suite 7, Fairfield, Ohio 45014, for appellant, B.W.
    Jacqueline M. Handorf-Rugani, 5740 Gateway Blvd., Suite 202, Mason, Ohio 45040, for
    appellees, M.N. and C.N.
    Andrew P. Meier, 140 North Main Street, Suite B, Springboro, Ohio 45066, for A.N.
    PIPER, J.
    {¶ 1} Appellant-Mother (Mother), appeals a decision of the Butler County Court of
    Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, overruling her motion to terminate the visitation rights of
    her child's paternal grandparents (Grandmother and Grandfather or Grandparents).
    {¶ 2} Mother had a child with Grandparents' son (Father). Mother and Father never
    married, and Father initiated parenting proceedings within the Butler County Juvenile Court
    Butler CA2013-12-229
    (trial court) to establish paternity. While paternity was established, Father was never granted
    visitation rights with the child because of his history of mental illness, which included multiple
    institutionalizations. Father's mental illness manifests itself in various ways, such as carving
    satanic symbols into his body and then sending Mother a picture of the carvings through her
    cell phone.
    {¶ 3} In January 2012, Grandparents filed a motion for visitation rights with the child
    based upon R.C. 3109.12, which permits relatives of a child born to an unwed mother to seek
    visitation with that child. In March 2012, Mother and Grandparents entered into an agreed
    entry that set forth a schedule for Grandparents to visit with the child. Mother agreed to the
    visitation after Grandparents assured her that Father would not have contact with the child.
    Within a week of agreeing to visitation between the child and Grandparents, Mother filed a
    Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order (CPO) in the Butler County Domestic Relations
    Court when Father threatened to kill both her and the child. The CPO was granted and was
    in effect to protect Mother and the child from Father and his death threats.
    {¶ 4} Mother and Father later entered into a domestic violence consent agreement,
    which was adopted in the trial court. However, Father violated that consent agreement when
    he left Grandparents' residence where he had been staying, and broke into Mother's home
    when she and the child were there. Mother tried to call the police, but Father threatened her
    and would not leave until Mother convinced Father that she would not call the police. Mother
    then filed a contempt motion against Father, and Father stipulated to a contempt finding.
    Because of Father's breaking into her home, Mother entered into a second CPO in January
    2013. Father also began texting, stalking, and harassing Mother, including sending her
    photographs of the satanic symbols he had carved into his body. However, Mother did not
    try to terminate visitation between Grandparents and the child because they assured her that
    Father would no longer be residing with them, and that Father would be placed in a mental
    -2-
    Butler CA2013-12-229
    health institution in Florida.
    {¶ 5} While the domestic violence issue was pending in the Domestic Relations
    Court, Grandparents filed at least two contempt motions in the trial court. One such motion
    moved the court to find Mother in contempt for not providing visitation pursuant to the March
    2012 entry. Specifically, Grandparents contended that Mother was supposed to permit
    visitation every other Sunday, and argued that they were having their visitation on the wrong
    Sunday. Mother works every other Sunday, so that the court ordered Grandparents to have
    visitation with the child on alternating Sundays. However, Grandparents wanted visitation
    with the child on the day that Mother does not have to work to accommodate play tickets they
    had purchased. Grandparents dismissed their contempt motion on the day of the motion
    hearing.
    {¶ 6} Grandparents later filed another contempt motion against Mother for not
    permitting the child to visit with Grandparents until they agreed not to bring the child around
    their cat. The child has several significant health concerns, including asthma and allergies,
    which require both constant medication and the child to carry an injectable epinephrine pen in
    case of emergency.       These health ailments include Eosiniphilic Esophagitis, which is
    essentially a physical manifestation of the child's allergic reactions that results in the
    narrowing, scarring, and inflammation of the esophagus. The condition requires oral steroids
    and other medications, as well as several endoscopies per year in order to track the effects
    of the condition. The child is also prescribed inhaled steroids and a Nebulizer for asthma,
    and the child has severe allergies to foods (including peanuts, dairy, soy, wheat, fish, eggs,
    rye, mustard, and barley), animals (including cat and dog dander), and natural elements
    (such as tree and grass pollen).
    {¶ 7} Mother asked Grandparents, who owned a cat, to have their visits with the child
    outside the presence of the cat, but Grandparents did not comply with the request. When
    -3-
    Butler CA2013-12-229
    Grandparents continued to visit with the child around the cat for an additional two months
    after learning of the risk to the child's health, Mother refused a visit until Grandparents would
    assure her that they were taking action to have visitation outside the presence of the cat.
    Grandparents, instead of arranging visitation outside the home, required Mother to provide
    proof of the child's allergic reaction to cats, and then opted to remove the cat from their home
    once Mother provided a letter to Grandparents from the child's doctors regarding the child's
    severe allergy to cats. Mother offered to allow Grandparents to make up the visit, but
    Grandparents refused and instead filed a contempt motion against Mother. This motion was
    also dismissed prior to disposition.
    {¶ 8} Mother provided Grandparents with extensive information about the child's
    multiple diagnoses, as well as copies of the child's medical records so that they could
    appreciate the severity of the medical conditions and allergy concerns. Mother also signed a
    release so that Grandparents could discuss the child's health matters with the child's doctors.
    Mother detailed the child's eating habits and other issues surrounding the medical conditions,
    such as the child's medications and breathing treatments. Instead of communicating openly
    with Mother about the child's conditions, Grandparents would turn their back on Mother as
    she tried to talk to them at visitation exchanges, and freely admit that they do not
    communicate with Mother unless it is through attorneys.
    {¶ 9} During the time of the domestic violence issues with Father and Grandparents'
    contempt motions over visitation issues, Mother began to notice that the child's behavior was
    changing for the worse.      For example, the child suffered from night terrors and was
    uncharacteristically fussy. During a visitation exchange, Mother asked Grandparents if
    Father was somehow having contact with the child, and whether Father was back residing
    with Grandparents. Grandmother answered that her son is the child's father and then moved
    toward Mother (who was holding the child at the time) with her hands raised in what Mother
    -4-
    Butler CA2013-12-229
    believed was a threatening and intimidating manner. Grandmother had to be restrained and
    Mother's mother (the child's maternal grandmother) stepped in between Mother and
    Grandmother to ensure that Grandmother could not physically contact Mother or the child.
    When Mother would ask where Father was during the visits, Grandparents would either not
    answer Mother or tell her to talk to her attorney. Grandfather admitted to his belief that
    Mother does not need to know where Father is at the time of visitation because such
    information is "irrelevant."
    {¶ 10} Given the child's change in behavior, coupled with Grandparents' unwillingness
    to inform Mother as to Father's whereabouts, Mother enlisted the services of a private
    investigator. During a visit between the child and Grandparents, Grandmother placed the
    child in her car and drove to an unknown location. The investigator followed Grandmother
    until Grandmother stopped. Unbeknownst to the investigator or Mother, Father had moved
    from Grandparents' residence into an apartment building that was within one block, and
    within sight, of where the investigator had followed Grandmother.
    {¶ 11} Mother moved to terminate visitation between the child and Grandparents
    given (1) Father's threat to kill the child, (2) Father's dangerous behavior, (3) Mother's belief
    that Grandparents facilitate visitation between the child and Father despite the existence of
    the CPO, (4) Grandparents' lack of concern for the child's health issues, as well as (5)
    Grandparent's refusal to communicate with Mother about the child.
    {¶ 12} The matter proceeded to a two-day hearing in front of a magistrate. During the
    hearing, Mother testified, and also called as witnesses her mother, the private investigator
    she hired, as well as Father and Grandmother, as if on cross-examination. However, neither
    Grandmother nor Father testified on direct examination, and only Grandfather testified in
    support of continued visitation. The magistrate issued an opinion that recognized Mother's
    concerns but denied Mother's request to terminate visitation. Mother filed objections to the
    -5-
    Butler CA2013-12-229
    magistrate's order, which were later overruled by the trial court. Mother now appeals the trial
    court's ruling, raising the following assignments of error, which we will discuss together as
    they are interrelated.
    {¶ 13} Assignment of Error No. 1:
    {¶ 14} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO [SIC] PREJUDICE OF MOTHER BY NOT
    AFFORDING MOTHER'S WISHES EXTREME DEFERENCE, ESPECIALLY WHEN NO
    COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST EXISTS TO OVERCOME THIS EXTREME
    DEFERENCE.
    {¶ 15} Assignment of Error No. 2:
    {¶ 16} THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION NOT TO TERMINATE GRANDPARENT
    VISITATION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE WHEN THE
    EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWED THE GRANDPARENTS REFUSED TO COMMUNICATE
    WITH MOTHER, THE GRANDPARENTS WERE HOSTILE TOWARD MOTHER, AND THE
    GRANDPARENTS USED CONTEMPT MOTIONS AS A MEANS TO FINANCIALLY BREAK
    MOTHER.
    {¶ 17} Mother argues in her two assignments of error that the trial court erred by not
    granting her motion to terminate Grandparents' visitation.
    {¶ 18} It is undisputed that a parent has a fundamental right to raise her own child.
    As stated by the Ohio Supreme Court, "[t]he United States Supreme Court has stated that
    the right to raise one's children is an 'essential' and 'basic civil right.' Parents have a
    'fundamental liberty interest' in the care, custody, and management of the child. Further, it
    has been deemed 'cardinal' that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside, first, in the
    parents." Anderson v. Anderson, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2009-03-033, 2009-Ohio-5636, ¶
    16, citing In re Murray, 
    52 Ohio St. 3d 155
    (1990).
    {¶ 19} Conversely, "the law does not provide grandparents with inherent legal rights
    -6-
    Butler CA2013-12-229
    based simply on the family relationship." In re H.W., 
    114 Ohio St. 3d 65
    , 2007-Ohio-2879, ¶
    9. Further, the Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that grandparents' "legal rights may be
    limited." 
    Id. A grandparents'
    "visitation privilege cannot reasonably be construed as an
    absolute or constitutionally protected 'right' of association." In re Schmidt, 
    25 Ohio St. 3d 331
    ,
    336 (1986). The standards of legal review "are not different for reviewing a motion for
    termination of grandparents' visitation as they are for reviewing an original complaint for
    establishment of grandparents' visitation. In both cases, the parents' fundamental right of
    exclusive control over their child is at stake." In re Kaiser, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 0
    4 CO 9
    ,
    2004-Ohio-7208, ¶ 48.
    {¶ 20} R.C. 3109.051(B) provides that a trial court may grant reasonable visitation
    rights to grandparents if the court determines that such visitation is in the child's best
    interests. The trial court has discretion as to visitation issues, and its decision will not be
    reversed absent an abuse of discretion, such that the decision is unreasonable, arbitrary or
    unconscionable. In re S.K.G., 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2008-11-105, 2009-Ohio-4673, ¶
    21. When determining whether to grant visitation rights to a grandparent, the trial court is
    required to consider the 16 factors listed in R.C. 3109.051(D).
    (1) The prior interaction and interrelationships of the child with
    the child's parents, siblings, and other persons related by
    consanguinity or affinity, and with the person who requested
    companionship or visitation if that person is not a parent, sibling,
    or relative of the child;
    (2) The geographical location of the residence of each parent
    and the distance between those residences, and if the person is
    not a parent, the geographical location of that person's residence
    and the distance between that person's residence and the child's
    residence;
    (3) The child's and parents' available time, including, but not
    limited to, each parent's employment schedule, the child's school
    schedule, and the child's and the parents' holiday and vacation
    schedule;
    -7-
    Butler CA2013-12-229
    (4) The age of the child;
    (5) The child's adjustment to home, school, and community;
    (6) If the court has interviewed the child in chambers, pursuant to
    division (C) of this section, regarding the wishes and concerns of
    the child as to parenting time by the parent who is not the
    residential parent or companionship or visitation by the
    grandparent, relative, or other person who requested
    companionship or visitation, as to a specific parenting time or
    visitation schedule, or as to other parenting time or visitation
    matters, the wishes and concerns of the child, as expressed to
    the court;
    (7) The health and safety of the child;
    (8) The amount of time that will be available for the child to
    spend with siblings;
    (9) The mental and physical health of all parties;
    (10) Each parent's willingness to reschedule missed parenting
    time and to facilitate the other parent's parenting time rights, and
    with respect to a person who requested companionship or
    visitation, the willingness of that person to reschedule missed
    visitation;
    (11) In relation to parenting time, whether either parent
    previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any criminal
    offense involving any act that resulted in a child being an abused
    child or a neglected child* * *;
    (12) In relation to requested companionship or visitation by a
    person other than a parent, whether the person previously has
    been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any criminal offense
    involving any act that resulted in a child being an abused child or
    a neglected child * * *;
    (13) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents subject
    to a shared parenting decree has continuously and willfully
    denied the other parent's right to parenting time in accordance
    with an order of the court;
    (14) Whether either parent has established a residence or is
    planning to establish a residence outside this state;
    (15) In relation to requested companionship or visitation by a
    person other than a parent, the wishes and concerns of the
    child's parents, as expressed by them to the court;
    -8-
    Butler CA2013-12-229
    (16) Any other factor in the best interest of the child.
    {¶ 21} As especially pertinent to this case, and pursuant to the 15th factor, a trial
    court must consider "the wishes and concerns of the child's parents, as expressed by them to
    the court." R.C. 3109.051(D)(15). There is a presumption that "fit parents act in the best
    interests of their children." Troxel v. Granville, 
    530 U.S. 57
    , 68, 
    120 S. Ct. 2054
    (2000).
    Accordingly, "a fit parent's decision regarding visitation should be afforded great deference."
    (Emphasis added.) Baker v. Baker, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2002-04-008, 2003-Ohio-731, ¶
    10. In other words, absent an allegation of parental unfitness, the parents' determination of
    their child's best interest must be afforded "special weight." (Emphasis added.) Troxel at
    69.1 "'Special weight' has been described as 'extreme deference.'" In re Kaiser, 2004-Ohio-
    7208, ¶ 15, quoting Oliver v. Feldner, 
    149 Ohio App. 3d 114
    , 2002-Ohio-3209, ¶ 59 (7th
    Dist.).
    {¶ 22} In Troxel, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a Washington state nonparent
    visitation statute and found that the wishes of a parent who is considered a "fit" parent should
    be given "special weight" by the trial court and acknowledged that there is a traditional
    presumption that a fit parent acts in the best interests of his child. The Ohio Supreme Court
    adopted the Troxel court's reasoning in Harrold v. Collier, 
    107 Ohio St. 3d 44
    , 2005-Ohio-
    5334. In Harrold, the court held that "Ohio courts are obligated to afford some special weight
    to the wishes of parents of minor children when considering petitions for nonparental
    visitation." (Emphasis added.) 
    Id. at ¶
    12.
    1. As discussed by the Seventh District Court of Appeals, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
    Amendment protects a parent's fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of
    their children. "Accordingly, so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will
    normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability
    of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children." Oliver v. Feldner, 
    149 Ohio App. 3d 114
    , 2002-Ohio-3209, ¶ 19 (7th Dist.).
    -9-
    Butler CA2013-12-229
    {¶ 23} The Harrold Court specifically addressed Ohio's statutes that afford visitation
    rights to nonparents and held that such are constitutional in the face of a parent's
    fundamental right to parent his child. "The state has a compelling interest in protecting a
    child's best interest, * * * and Ohio's nonparental-visitation statutes are narrowly tailored to
    serve that compelling interest." 2005-Ohio-5334 at ¶ 44. While statutes granting visitation
    rights to nonparents have provided a means for grandparents to seek visitation rights, such
    was not always the case.
    {¶ 24} Until codification of a nonparent's ability to seek visitation through the Ohio
    Revised Code, nonparents were not permitted to seek visitation rights. However, various
    statutes were promulgated by the legislature to give standing to nonparents when seeking
    visitation. These statutes include R.C. 3109.12, which permits relatives of a child born to an
    unwed mother to seek visitation with that child; R.C. 3109.11, which permits relatives of a
    minor child to seek visitation with that child when the child's parent has died; R.C.
    3109.051(B)(1), which permits relatives to seek visitation with a child involved in a divorce,
    dissolution of marriage, legal separation, annulment, or a child support proceeding; and R.C.
    3107.15(C), which permits a relative's visitation of an adopted child.
    {¶ 25} Even though the statutes grant standing to a nonparent to request visitation,
    the ability to have visitation awarded is conditional upon a finding that visitation with the
    nonparent is in the best interest of the child. Given that a fit parent has a fundamental right
    to parent whereas the nonparent has only a statutory right to request visitation, the nonparent
    advocating visitation has the burden to prove that visitation will be in the child's best interest.
    Harrold at ¶ 45. Placing the burden on the nonparent, thereby, honors "the traditional
    presumption that a fit parent acts in the best interest of his or her child." Id.2 See also
    2. Grandparents state in their brief that it is "rudimentary that the moving party bears the burden of proof" and
    that when a parent seeks to modify a previous visitation arrangement, the party seeking the change has the
    - 10 -
    Butler CA2013-12-229
    Frazier v. Frazier, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 02CA8, 2003-Ohio-1087, ¶ 26 (finding that the
    parent "is not required to prove that visitation is not in [the child's] best interest. Rather,
    [grandparents] must prove that such visitation is in the child's best interest").
    {¶ 26} After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court abused its discretion by
    unduly placing the burden of proof on Mother during its balancing of the factors, and not
    affording Mother's wishes sufficient deference.
    {¶ 27} First, and in regard to the burden of proof, the trial court adopted the
    magistrate's opinion in full. In that opinion, the court makes improper references to Mother's
    failure to demonstrate that the best interest factors weigh in her favor, or even that Mother
    has not presented enough evidence to substantiate her claims. For example, Mother
    presented evidence regarding the health and safety of the child and how such was impacted
    negatively by the disharmonious exchanges of the child for visitation. After reviewing some
    of the evidence, the court found that Mother "did not demonstrate how the child is being
    negatively affected by the exchanges." The court made this finding despite Mother's
    uncontested testimony that the child suffers from night terrors and had acted fussier than
    normal, and that such behavior did not occur prior to the visitation.
    {¶ 28} The court also reviewed testimony and evidence that Grandparents were in
    favor of facilitating visitation between Father and the child, including circumstantial evidence
    that Grandmother took the child to Father's apartment building during a visit. The court noted
    that the CPO was in place and that Grandparents were aware of the order that Father not
    have contact with the child, a child he had threatened to kill. Even so, Grandmother
    burden of proof. Grandparents cite Pettry v. Pettry, 
    20 Ohio App. 3d 350
    (8th Dist.1984), and Bodine v. Bodine,
    
    38 Ohio App. 3d 173
    (1988), in support of their proposition that Mother had the burden of proof. However, both of
    the cases cited involve parents, not grandparents, who have fundamental rights to parent. Grandparents do not
    have such a right and are treated inherently different than parents by the law. Whether the issue is the
    establishment or modification/termination of visitation rights, the fit parent's fundamental right to parent the child
    is at stake, and the only way to honor the constitutional rights and presumption that a parent acts in the child's
    best interest is to place the burden on the nonparent seeking continued visitation.
    - 11 -
    Butler CA2013-12-229
    insinuated that Father has a right to see the child because Father is the child's father, and
    Grandfather testified at the hearing that he does not believe that Father would actually harm
    the child. Despite this evidence and testimony, the court held that "Mother did not produce
    sufficient evidence for this Court to conclude that Paternal Grandparents have assisted
    Father in violating that order by permitting contact." Such a finding, whether or not the trial
    court believed the evidence to be true, demonstrates that the trial court placed an
    unpermitted burden on Mother to prove that visitation is not in the child's best interest, rather
    than placing the burden correctly upon Grandparents.
    {¶ 29} The court also noted that Mother had failed to provide proof that Grandparents
    were being inflexible with the child's visitation in light of the child's multiple medical
    appointments. Mother testified that Grandparents demonstrated a lack of flexibility in
    accommodating the child's medical appointments that occur during the week when
    Grandparents may be visiting with the child. Despite Mother's testimony, the court found that
    Mother did not provide examples of when this actually occurred, again intimating its belief
    that Mother had the burden to prove these issues.3
    {¶ 30} In its balancing of the factors, the court noted that in some factors, "Paternal
    Grandparents and Mother bear similar fault such that neither side benefits from analysis of
    that factor." This statement, once again, demonstrates that the court was placing a need on
    Mother to prove that her concerns were valid in order to carry her burden to show that
    visitation was not in the best interests of the child. However, that burden belonged solely to
    Grandparents, and the trial court abused its discretion by impermissibly shifting that burden
    3. During Mother’s direct testimony, counsel asked Mother to describe ways that Grandparents were being
    inflexible and Mother stated, “there’s therapy appointments that [the child] had recently that’s had to cancel [sic]
    because of the visit…the visit times.” While Mother may not have provided exact dates, Mother did answer that
    the inflexibility was specific to Grandparents not permitting the child to attend medical appointments because
    such coincided with their visitation. Mother further testified that instead of Grandparents working with her to
    amend visitation to account for the child’s medical appointments, Grandparents chose to file contempt motions
    or to involve their attorneys.
    - 12 -
    Butler CA2013-12-229
    to Mother. If Grandparents failed to carry their burden on a factor (or several factors) the
    court should have held that such factors did not weigh in favor of continued visitation with the
    child, rather than being a "wash" between Mother and Grandparents.
    {¶ 31} In addition to the improper imputation of the burden of proof on Mother, we
    also find that the court abused its discretion by not affording Mother's wishes sufficient
    weight. It is undisputed that the court's written opinion makes reference to giving "special
    weight" to Mother's wishes, as well as an express finding that Mother is a fit parent. The
    court even stated that it was giving "elevated weight" to Mother's wishes. However, the court
    then found Mother's valid concerns insufficient to overcome what it considered were the other
    best interest factors favoring continued visitation without actually giving Mother's wishes the
    elevated weight the court said it would.
    {¶ 32} The court found that Mother's concerns regarding Grandparents' continued
    visitation with the child were valid. In fact, the trial court noted that "this Court has recognizes
    [sic] that Mother has some legitimate concern regarding Paternal Grandparents having the
    ability to adequately protect this child, and she is entitled to be assured that they will enforce
    the no contact order."4 The trial court did not dismiss Mother's concerns as baseless or
    otherwise not founded in reality.
    {¶ 33} Despite the genuine and serious concerns that Mother had, concerns the trial
    court found to be "legitimate," the trial court dismissed such concerns in light of factors it
    determined weighed in favor of continued visitation. The trial court's written decision does
    not demonstrate, however, that the court weighed the balancing factors while giving sufficient
    weight to Mother's wishes. The trial court reviewed factor 15 regarding Mother's wishes and
    4. The trial court ordered that Grandparents permit no contact between Father and the child, and then warned
    Grandparents that if they were to violate the order, they would face contempt of court. We cannot help but
    recognize how unsuitable a remedy a finding of contempt would be if the child is harmed, or worse, should
    Grandparents disobey the court's order.
    - 13 -
    Butler CA2013-12-229
    found that "Mother requests that this Court terminate all contact between the child and
    Paternal Grandparents." The court then moved on without addressing specifically the
    reasons behind Mother's request and without addressing the evidentiary basis upon which
    Mother's valid concerns were based. Nor did the court recognize that Mother's wishes carry
    with it the presumption that she is acting in the best interest of her child by asking that
    visitation be terminated.
    {¶ 34} Later in the trial court's decision, the court reiterated Mother's concern
    regarding Grandparents permitting contact between the child and Father, as well as
    Grandparents being unwilling to shield the child from Father given their belief that Father has
    a right to see the child and the belief that Father would never actually hurt the child. The
    court revisited the communication issues, and the lack of respect Grandparents have shown
    Mother during exchanges.
    {¶ 35} In balancing these reasons as to why Mother wished to terminate
    Grandparents' visitation, the court found the following evidence sufficient to overcome
    Mother's wishes and all of the factors that weighed in favor of terminating visitation:
    Grandparents have visited with the child for a year, they have a close bond with the child,
    Grandparents do not engage in inappropriate activities with the child, the distance between
    residences is conducive to visitation, and the child is familiar with Grandparent's home and
    has toys there. While we have no issue with finding that this evidence is important to the
    decision and overall weighing of the factors, we find it unreasonable that the trial court did not
    weigh this limited basis for why visitation should continue more specifically against the fact
    that Mother wished to terminate visitation and that Mother was acting in the best interest of
    her child by requesting termination.
    {¶ 36} We fully acknowledge that a fit parent's wishes to end visitation with a
    nonparent are not irrebuttable, as nothing in Troxel suggests that a parent's wishes should be
    - 14 -
    Butler CA2013-12-229
    placed before a child's best interest. See Rowell v. Smith, 
    133 Ohio St. 3d 288
    , 293, 2012-
    Ohio-4313. Even so, the well-established law is that a fit parent is presumed to act in the
    best interest of her child. The trial court's decision did not incorporate that presumption into
    its analysis of the factors, and impermissibly placed the burden on Mother to prove that
    visitation was not in the child's best interest. As such, Mother's assignments of error are
    sustained.
    {¶ 37} The factors must be rebalanced, placing the proper burden of proof on
    Grandparents to establish that continued visitation is in the best interest of the child. The
    rebalancing of factors will not require any additional hearings or evidence, as both parties
    were presented with the opportunity to present their case. The remand is specific only to a
    rebalancing of the factors by the trial court based upon evidence already admitted.
    {¶ 38} On remand, the trial court shall give proper weight to Mother's wishes,
    including the presumption that Mother is acting in the best interest of her child by requesting
    that visitation be terminated.    The court shall properly place the burden of proof on
    Grandparents to demonstrate that the evidence they presented through Grandfather's
    testimony has proven that continued visitation with the child is in the child's best interest. In
    doing so, the court must remember that the analysis begins with a tipped scale due to the
    special weight and extreme deference to be given to Mother's wishes and safety concerns
    under the 15th factor set forth in R.C. 3109.051(D).
    {¶ 39} The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the issue is remanded for
    further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    S. POWELL, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.
    - 15 -