State v. Bryant , 2012 Ohio 3189 ( 2012 )

[Cite as State v. Bryant, 2012-Ohio-3189.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MEIGS COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 11CA19
:
vs. : Released: July 5, 2012
:
LEWIS G. BRYANT, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT
: ENTRY
Defendant-Appellant. :
_____________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Jeremy J. Masters, Assistant
State Public Defender, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant.
Colleen S. Williams, Meigs County Prosecutor, and Amanda Bizub-
Franzmann, Assistant County Prosecutor, Pomeroy, Ohio, for Appellee.
_____________________________________________________________
McFarland, J.:
{¶1} Appellant, Lewis Bryant, appeals his conviction and sentence
entered in the Meigs County Court of Common Pleas after he pled guilty to
two felony counts of trafficking in crack cocaine. On appeal, Appellant
contends that 1) the trial court imposed sentences that are both contrary to
law and not authorized by law when it ordered that his sentences for
violations of R.C. 2925.03 were partially mandatory, and that he would be
eligible for judicial release after serving the mandatory portion of those
Meigs App. No. 11CA19 2
sentences; and 2) that his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary.
{¶2} In light of our conclusion under Appellant’s second assignment
of error that the misrepresentation of Appellant’s eligibility for judicial
release rendered the plea unknowing and unintelligent, and therefore
unenforceable, Appellant’s second assignment of error is sustained.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, vacate the
Appellant’s plea, and remand the cause for further proceedings. Further, as
our decision to sustain Appellant’s second assignment of error is dispositive
of Appellant’s appeal, Appellant’s first assignment of error has been
rendered moot and we do not address it.
FACTS
{¶3} On November 4, 2010, Appellant pled guilty to one count of
trafficking in crack cocaine, in violation of R.C. 2925.03, a felony of the
second degree, and one count of trafficking in crack cocaine, in violation of
R.C. 2925.03, a felony of the third degree. As part of his plea agreement,
Appellant was advised by both his counsel as well as the State that the
recommended sentence would be six years for the second degree felony and
four years for the third degree felony, to be served consecutively. During
the plea hearing there was extensive discussion between counsel, the State
Meigs App. No. 11CA19 3
and the trial court regarding the way in which Appellant’s sentence would be
structured. Ultimately, it was agreed by all that Appellant would be
sentenced to a combined term of ten years, five of which would be
mandatory, and that Appellant would be eligible to apply for judicial release
after serving the five mandatory years.1 A review of the transcript reveals
that Appellant agreed to enter guilty pleas with the understanding he would
be eligible for judicial release after five years.
{¶4} Appellant was sentenced the same day he entered his pleas, on
November 4, 2010, and a sentencing entry was filed on March 7, 2011. It is
from this sentencing entry that Appellant now brings his timely appeal,
assigning the following errors for our review.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
“I. THE TRIAL COURT IMPOSED SENTENCES THAT ARE BOTH
CONTRARY TO LAW AND NOT AUTHORIZED BY LAW
WHEN IT ORDERED THAT LEWIS BRYANT’S SENTENCES
FOR VIOLATIONS OF R.C. 2925.03 WERE PARTIALLY
MANDATORY, AND THAT MR. BRYANT WOULD BE
ELIGIBLE FOR JUDICIAL RELEASE AFTER SERVING THE
MANDATORY PORTION OF THOSE SENTENCES.
II. LEWIS BRYANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT KNOWING,
INTELLIGENT, AND VOLUNTARY.”
1
Specifically, Appellant was sentenced to six years on the second degree felony, with a provision that three
of the years would be mandatory, and he was sentenced to four years on the third degree felony, with the
provision that two of the years would be mandatory. Apparently it was the intention that the mandatory
portions of each sentence were to be served first and consecutively to one another, in order that Appellant
could apply for judicial release after five years, although this was not expressly set forth in the transcript.
Meigs App. No. 11CA19 4
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
{¶5} As Appellant’s second assignment of error is dispositive of
Appellant’s appeal, we address it first, out of order. In his second
assignment of error, Appellant contends that there was a mutual mistake
regarding Appellant’s eligibility for judicial release, resulting in Appellant’s
pleas not being knowing, intelligent or voluntary, and ultimately rendering
Appellant’s pleas void. The State candidly concedes that Appellant’s pleas
are invalid due to the “improper explanation of judicial release.” Based
upon the following, we agree and therefore sustain Appellant’s second
assignment of error.
{¶6} A plea of guilty or no contest in a criminal case “must be made
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points
renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United
States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.” State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d
525, 527, 1996-Ohio-179, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996) ( Internal citations
omitted). Crim.R. 11(C)(2) provides that “felony defendants are entitled to
be informed of various constitutional and nonconstitutional rights, prior to
entering a plea.” State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, 814
N.E.2d 51 (2004), ¶ 6. The failure to adequately inform a defendant of his
Meigs App. No. 11CA19 5
constitutional rights invalidates a guilty plea “under a presumption that it
was entered involuntarily and unknowingly.” Id. at ¶ 12.
{¶7} However, the failure to accurately explain nonconstitutional
rights is reviewed under the substantial compliance standard. Id. “Substantial
compliance means that under the totality of the circumstances the defendant
subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is
waiving.” State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990)
(Internal citation omitted). Under Crim.R. 11(C)(2), a trial court is not
required to advise a defendant regarding eligibility for judicial release. See
State v. Sherman, 5th Dist. No. 2009-CA-132, 2010-Ohio-3959, (Aug. 19,
2010), ¶ 17; State v. Smith, 5th Dist. No. CT2007-0073, 2008-Ohio-3306,
(June 30, 2008), ¶ 17. Therefore, the failure to include such information in
the court's colloquy does not violate a defendant's Crim.R. 11 rights.
{¶8} Nevertheless, an “incorrect recitation of the law fails to meet the
substantial-compliance standard. If a trial judge chooses to offer an
expanded explanation of the law in a Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy, the
information conveyed must be accurate.” State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239,
2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, (July 31, 2008), ¶ 39. See, also, State v.
Sherman, supra, ¶ 41 (although trial court is not obligated to discuss a
defendant's eligibility for judicial release during a plea colloquy, such
Meigs App. No. 11CA19 6
information, if conveyed, must be accurate). When a defendant's guilty plea
is induced by erroneous representations as to the applicable law, including
eligibility for judicial release, the plea is not knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily made. Sherman, supra, at ¶ 38-41; State v. Mitchell, 11th Dist.
No. 2004-T-0139, 2006-Ohio-618, (Feb. 10, 2006), ¶ 15. See, also, Engle,
supra, at 528 (allowing withdrawal of no-contest plea that was predicated on
inaccurate representations as to defendant's right to appeal the trial court's
ruling on a motion in limine).
{¶9} However, in addition to the demonstration that the court has not
substantially complied with the requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2), “there
must be some showing of prejudicial effect before a guilty plea may be
vacated.” State v. Stewart (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 93, 364 N.E.2d 1163(1977). The test for determining prejudice is whether the plea would
otherwise have been made. Nero, supra, at 108, citing Stewart, supra, at 93,
and Crim.R. 52(A). Thus, in cases involving misstatements as to judicial
release, an appellant “must demonstrate * * * that but for the
misrepresentation regarding judicial release, he would not have entered the
plea.” Mitchell, supra, at ¶ 15.
{¶10} Here, Appellant pled guilty to two counts of felony trafficking
in crack cocaine. Count one was a second degree felony, in violation of
Meigs App. No. 11CA19 7
former R.C. 2925.03(C)(4)(e)2, which required the trial court to “impose as a
mandatory prison term one of the prison terms prescribed for a felony of the
second degree.” Count two was a third degree felony, in violation of former
R.C. 2925.03(C)(4)(d), which also required that the court impose as a
mandatory prison term, “one of the prison terms prescribed for a felony of
the third degree.” Thus, both of the offenses to which Appellant pleaded
guilty required mandatory prison terms. As such, the trial court sentenced
Appellant to a six year mandatory term of imprisonment for the second
degree felony and a four year mandatory term of imprisonment for the third
degree felony, which as will be more fully explained infra, were both within
the permissible sentencing range. However, despite R.C. 2925.03’s
directive that the trial court impose mandatory sentences within the
permissible ranges, the trial court inexplicably decided to make only five
years of Appellant’s total ten year sentence mandatory, and informed
Appellant that he would be eligible to apply for judicial release in five years.
The parties and the court stipulated to this structuring of Appellant’s
sentences and agreed that Appellant would be eligible to apply for judicial
release after serving five years.
2
We apply a former version of R.C. 2925.03, which had an effective date of September 30, 2008.
Meigs App. No. 11CA19 8
{¶11} Former R.C. 2929.01, which sets forth definitions, provides in
section (X)3 as follows:
“Mandatory prison term” means any of the following:
(1) Subject to division (X)(2)4 of this section, the term in prison
that must be imposed for the offenses or circumstances set forth
in divisions (F)(1) to (8) or (F)(12) to (14) of section 2929.13
and division (D) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code.
Except as provided in sections 2925.02, 2925.03, 2925.04,
2925.05, and 2925.11 of the Revised Code, unless the
maximum or another specific term is required under section
2929.14 or 2929.142 of the Revised Code, a mandatory prison
term described in this division may be any prison term
authorized for the level of offense.
The pertinent provision of R.C. 2929.135, as referenced in R.C. 2929.01(X)
above, provides as follows:
(F) Notwithstanding divisions (A) to (E) of this section, the
court shall impose a prison term or terms under sections
2929.02 to 2929.06, section 2929.146, section 2929.142, or
3
We apply a former version of R.C. 2929.01, which had an effective date of April 7, 2009.
4
(X)(2) is inapplicable as it only applies to certain third or fourth degree felony OVI offenses.
5
Again, we apply a prior version of R.C. 2929.13, with an effective date of April 7, 2009.
6
R.C. 2929.14 is the only pertinent provision to the matter herein.
Meigs App. No. 11CA19 9
section 2971.03 of the Revised Code and except as specifically
provided in section 2929.20 or 2967.191 of the Revised Code
or when parole is authorized for the offense under section
2967.13 of the Revised Code shall not reduce the term or terms
pursuant to section 2929.20, section 2967.193, or any other
provision of Chapter 2967, or Chapter 5120. of the Revised
Code for any of the following offenses:
***
(5) A first, second, or third degree felony drug offense for
which section * * * 2925.03 * * * of the Revised Code, * * *
requires the imposition of a mandatory prison term[.]
(Emphasis added).
{¶12} Former R.C. 2929.147 provides in section (A)(2) that “[f]or a
felony of the second degree, the prison term shall be two, three, four, five,
six, seven, or eight years.” It further provides in (A)(3) that “[f]or a felony
of the third degree, the prison term shall be one, two, three, for, or five
years.” Finally, R.C. 2929.20 governs judicial release. The version of the
statute that was in effect at the time Appellant committed his offense had an
effective date of April 7, 2009, and provided as follows:
7
We apply a former version of R.C. 2929.14, which has an effective date of April 7, 2009.
Meigs App. No. 11CA19 10
(A) As used in this section, “eligible offender” means any
person serving a stated prison term of ten years or less when
either of the following applies:
(1) The stated prison term does not include a mandatory prison
term.
(2) The stated prison term includes a mandatory prison term,
and the person has served the mandatory prison term.
Former R.C. 2929.20 further provides as follows:
(C)(3) If the stated prison term is five years or more but not
more than ten years, the eligible offender may file the motion
not earlier than five years after the eligible offender is delivered
to a state correctional institution or, if the prison term includes
a mandatory prison term or terms, not earlier than five years
after the expiration of all mandatory prison terms. (Emphasis
added).
Thus, under this version of the statute, because Appellant was sentenced to a
six year mandatory term of imprisonment, as well as a four year mandatory
term of imprisonment, he does not meet the definition of an eligible
offender. Even characterizing Appellant’s sentences as the parties
stiplulated during the plea hearing, as five years of mandatory time, with an
Meigs App. No. 11CA19 11
additional five years, under R.C. 2929.20(C)(3), Appellant would not be
eligible to apply for judicial release until five years after he completed his
five years of mandatory sentences, which would be ten years. Clearly this is
five years later than what was represented to him by his counsel, the State,
and the trial court during his plea hearing.
{¶13} We note however, that R.C. 2929.20 was revised after
Appellant was sentenced. While the current version of R.C. 2929.20 has an
effective date of September 30, 2011, it purports to apply retroactively.
Specifically, the current version of R.C. 2929.20 provides as follows:
(A) As used in this section:
(1)(a) Except as provided in division (A)(1)(b) of this section,
“eligible offender” means any person who, on or after April 7,
2009, is serving a stated prison term that includes one or more
nonmandatory prison terms.
The current statute further provides in section (C)(3) as follows:
If the aggregated nonmandatory prison term or terms is five
years, the eligible offender may file the motion not earlier than
four years after the eligible offender is delivered to a state
correctional institution or, if the prison term includes a
mandatory prison term or terms, not earlier than four years
Meigs App. No. 11CA19 12
after the expiration of all mandatory prison terms. (Emphasis
added).
We recognize that the trial court could not have applied the current version
of the judicial release statute, which was not even effective at the time
Appellant was sentenced. However, even characterizing Appellant’s
sentences as stipulated in the plea agreement, as five years mandatory and
five years nonmandatory, Appellant would not have been eligible for judicial
release for nine years, which is four years longer than what was represented
to him during his plea negotiations.
{¶14} In State v. Johnson, 182 Ohio App.3d 628, 2009-Ohio-1871,
914 N.E.2d 429 (4th Dist. 2009), ¶ 16, we concluded that we could “not
allow a plea agreement to stand when it was obtained on the basis of a
misrepresentation to the accused that he would be released from prison
earlier than what the law permits.” In reaching this conclusion, we
determined that such a misunderstanding could not “form the basis of a valid
plea agreement.” Id. at ¶ 17. As a result, we reversed Johnson’s conviction
and sentence, vacated the plea agreement and remanded the matter. Id.
{¶15} This Court was faced with a similar fact pattern in State v.
Persons, 4th Dist. No. 02CA6, 2003-Ohio-4213, (Aug. 1, 2003). Much like
the facts sub judice, Persons was incorrectly advised as to his eligibility for
Meigs App. No. 11CA19 13
judicial release by his counsel, the State and the trial court. Id. at ¶ 10. In
that case, we noted as follows:
When an erroneous understanding of the applicable law induces
a defendant’s guilty plea, the plea generally is not entered
knowingly and intelligently. See State v. Engle (1996), 74 Ohio
St.3d 525, 527-28, 660 N.E.2d 450; State v. Cook, Putnam App.
No. 12-01-15, 2002-Ohio-2846; State v. Bush, Union App. No.
14-2000-44, 2002-Ohio-6146. Id. at ¶ 12.
In Persons, we ultimately concluded that “[b]ecause appellant was
misinformed as to a material term of the plea agreement,” he “did not enter
his guilty pleas knowingly or intelligently,” Id. at ¶ 16. As a result, we held
Person’s guilty pleas were void. Id.
{¶16} We conclude that the facts sub judice require the same result as
Johnson and Persons. All parties involved herein were misinformed as to
Appellant’s eligibility for judicial release, which hardly constitutes
substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11. Further, we conclude that
Appellant suffered prejudice as a result when he was induced to enter into
pleas of guilt on two felony charges with the understanding that 1) only five
years of his combined sentences were mandatory; 2) he was an eligible
offender for judicial release; and 3) he would be eligible to apply for judicial
Meigs App. No. 11CA19 14
release after serving five years of his ten year sentence. Clearly this was not
an accurate understanding on Appellant’s part.
{¶17} In light of the foregoing, we cannot conclude that Appellant’s
pleas were entered into knowingly or intelligently and as such, Appellant’s
guilty pleas are void. Accordingly, Appellant’s second assignment of error
is sustained, the decision of the trial court is reversed, Appellant’s guilty
pleas are vacated, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
{¶18} In his first assignment of error, Appellant contends that the trial
court imposed sentences that are both contrary to law and not authorized by
law when it ordered that his sentences for violation of R.C. 2925.03 were
partially mandatory, and he would be eligible for judicial release after
serving the mandatory portion of those sentences. In light of our disposition
of Appellant’s second assignment of error, which reversed the decision of
the trial court and vacated Appellant’s guilty pleas, this assignment of error
has been rendered moot. As such, we decline to address it. See App.R.
12(A)(1)(c).
JUDGMENT VACATED AND REMANDED.
Meigs App. No. 11CA19 15
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE VACATED AND
REMANDED and that the Appellant recover of Appellee costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing
the Meigs County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into
execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE
UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL
COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to
exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a
continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio
an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If
a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the
expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a
notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal
period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme
Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the
appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date
of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Exceptions.
Harsha, J. and Kline, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: _________________________
Matthew W. McFarland, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from
the date of filing with the clerk.