In re A.S. , 2013 Ohio 4018 ( 2013 )


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  • [Cite as In re A.S., 
    2013-Ohio-4018
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    IN THE MATTER OF:                            :       JUDGES:
    :       Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
    A.S., V.S., and Z.S.                         :       Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J.
    :       Hon. John W. Wise, J.
    :
    :       Case No. 13 CAF 05 0040
    :
    :       OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                             Appeal from the Court of Common
    Pleas, Juvenile Divison, Case Nos.
    11-01-0070AB, 11-01-0071AB, and
    11-01-0072AB
    JUDGMENT:                                            Affirmed
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                                    September 11, 2013
    APPEARANCES:
    For Kitty Slaven                                     For DCDJFS
    PAMELLA A. LAMMON                                    KATHERYN L. MUNGER
    103 North Union Street, Suite D                      140 North Sandusky St., 3rd Floor
    Delaware, OH 43015                                   Delaware, OH 43015
    For Oral Slaven                                      Guardian ad Litem
    O. ROSS LONG                                         CELESTE M. BRAMMER
    125 North Sandusky Street                            13290 Centerburg Road
    Delaware, OH 43015                                   Sunbury, OH 43074
    Delaware County, Case No. 13 CAF 05 0040                                              2
    Farmer, J.
    {¶1}   On January 19, 2011, appellee, the Delaware County Department of Job
    & Family Services, filed a complaint for temporary custody of A.S. born May 24, 2006,
    V.S. born May 24, 2006, and Z.S. born April 14, 2009, alleging the children to be
    neglected and dependent. Mother of the children is appellant, Kitty Slaven; father is
    Oral Slaven. Following a shelter care hearing, the trial court placed the children in
    appellee's temporary custody on January 24, 2011. By judgment entry filed April 15,
    2011, the trial court adjudicated the children dependent and granted temporary custody
    to relatives. The children were eventually returned to appellee's temporary custody in
    July 2011 (A.S. and V.S.) and December 2012 (Z.S.).
    {¶2}   On July 26, 2012 (A.S. and V.S.) and January 16, 2013 (Z.S.), appellee
    filed motions for permanent custody of the children based upon the parents' failure to
    comply with the case plan. A hearing commenced on March 26, 2013. By judgment
    entry filed April 12, 2013, the trial court granted permanent custody of the children to
    appellee.
    {¶3}   Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for
    consideration. Assignments of error are as follows:
    I
    {¶4}   "THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS' (SIC) DISCRETION AND VIOLATED
    APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WHEN IT DENIED HER REQUEST FOR A
    CONTINUANCE OF THE TRIAL ON THE DELAWARE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
    JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES (HEREINAFTER DCDJFS) MOTION OF PERMANENT
    CUSTODY."
    Delaware County, Case No. 13 CAF 05 0040                                             3
    II
    {¶5}   "THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS' (SIC) DISCRETION WHEN IT DID
    NOT ADDRESS WHETHER THE DCDJFS HAD MADE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO
    RETURN THE CHILDREN SAFELY HOME WITH EITHER PARENT."
    III
    {¶6}   "THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS' (SIC) DISCRETION WHEN IT
    DETERMINED THAT THE CHILDREN COULD NOT BE PLACED WITH THEIR
    MOTHER WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME AFTER THE TRIAL ON THE
    DCDJFS'S MOTION FOR PERMANENT CUSTODY."
    IV
    {¶7}   "THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS' (SIC) DISCRETION WHEN THE
    WHEN (SIC) IT DETERMINED THAT THE CHILD, [Z.] S., DID NOT NEED TO BE IN
    THE CUSTODY OF THE DCDJFS FOR 12 OUT OF 22 CONSECUTIVE MONTHS
    PRIOR TO THE DCDJFS FILING A MOTION FOR PERMANENT CUSTODY
    RELATED TO [Z.] S."
    I
    {¶8}   Appellant claims the trial court erred in denying her motion for a
    continuance of the permanent custody hearing. We disagree.
    {¶9}   The grant or denial of a continuance rests in the trial court's sound
    discretion. State v. Unger, 
    67 Ohio St.2d 65
     (1981). In order to find an abuse of that
    discretion, we must determine the trial court's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary or
    unconscionable and not merely an error of law or judgment. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 
    5 Ohio St.3d 217
     (1983).
    Delaware County, Case No. 13 CAF 05 0040                                                4
    {¶10} We note appellant's request was not done via a formal written motion, but
    was a "me too" argument advanced at the commencement of the hearing in relation to
    father's filed motion for a continuance. T. at 7. Father had requested a continuance
    based upon the uncertainty of appellant's criminal status. Without stating reasons, the
    trial court denied the motion. T. at 10.
    {¶11} In July 2010, appellant was sentenced to intervention in lieu of conviction
    after pleading guilty to nine counts of deception to obtain a dangerous drug. T. at 45.
    Appellant was non-compliant. T. at 48. As a result, appellant was going to be arrested
    so she voluntarily relinquished custody of her children to appellee in December of 2010.
    T. at 105-106. Michelle Leighty, an intake investigator involved with the family, tried to
    convince appellant to go into a community-based correctional facility (hereinafter
    "CBCF") for the sake of the children, but appellant rejected the suggestion and opted for
    a prison sentence in Marysville instead, away from her children.         T. at 113, 116.
    Consequently, in January 2011, appellant received a split sentence whereby she
    received some prison time and some community control time. T. at 51-52. Appellant
    was granted judicial release in June of 2012. T. at 52. However, she violated the terms
    of her judicial release and was ordered to successfully complete a CBCF program. T. at
    53.   Because appellant was unsuccessfully terminated from the CBCF program, a
    violation was filed and she was awaiting disposition set for April 24, 2013. T. at 54. We
    note father was incarcerated, serving a fifty-eight year prison term.
    {¶12} Appellee received temporary custody of the children in January 2011.
    Following relative placement, A.S. and V.S. were returned to appellee's temporary
    custody in July 2011 and Z.S. was returned in December 2012.            The motions for
    Delaware County, Case No. 13 CAF 05 0040                                                5
    permanent custody were filed on July 26, 2012 (A.S. and V.S.) and January 16, 2013
    (Z.S.). A joint motion for a continuance based on judicial economy was granted on
    January 23, 2013. The permanent custody hearing was set for March 7, 2013. On
    January 29, 2013, appellee filed a motion for a continuance due to the unavailability of
    counsel. The trial court granted the motion and reset the hearing for March 27, 2013.
    Appellant was to have had a criminal hearing on March 18, 2013 to address the
    aforementioned violation, but it was rescheduled to April 24, 2013. The permanent
    custody hearing commenced on March 26, 2013.             The continuance requested by
    appellant and father based upon the outcome of appellant's criminal hearing would have
    had to have been for thirty days at least. Appellant was hoping for no further prison
    time so she could work on the case plan.
    {¶13} In order to accommodate the parties, the trial court continued the case on
    the two occasions, causing the permanent custody motions to be pending at the time of
    trial for two hundred and forty-three/sixty-nine days, respectively. As a result of the
    rescheduling of appellant's criminal hearing, the trial court at the time of the permanent
    custody hearing did not know what appellant's disposition would be.
    {¶14} However, under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), appellant's criminal disposition
    would have no effect given the lapse of some twelve months between appellee's
    temporary custody of A.S. and V.S. to the filing of their permanent custody motion:
    (B)(1) Except as provided in division (B)(2) of this section, the court
    may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court
    determines at the hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section, by
    Delaware County, Case No. 13 CAF 05 0040                                               6
    clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to
    grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for
    permanent custody and that any of the following apply:
    (d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more
    public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for
    twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the
    child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children
    services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more
    months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in
    division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was
    previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another
    state.
    {¶15} As for Z.S., appellant's own actions and decisions contributed to her
    progress on the case plan. The case plan was filed on February 14, 2011. At the time,
    appellant was in prison, opting-out of CBCF. Appellant was granted judicial release in
    June 2012, but violated the terms and was ordered to CBCF.                 Appellant was
    unsuccessfully discharged from CBCF and was awaiting sentencing. At the time of the
    hearing, the case had been open for twenty-six months.
    {¶16} Upon review, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
    appellant's request for a continuance.
    {¶17} Assignment of Error I is denied.
    Delaware County, Case No. 13 CAF 05 0040                                                  7
    II, III
    {¶18} Appellant claims the trial court erred in granting permanent custody to
    appellee without addressing reasonable efforts. We disagree.
    {¶19} A trial court may grant an agency permanent custody of a child upon clear
    and convincing evidence of certain factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414.           Clear and
    convincing evidence is that evidence "which will provide in the mind of the trier of facts a
    firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established." Cross v. Ledford, 
    161 Ohio St. 469
     (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.        See also, In re Adoption of
    Holcomb, 
    18 Ohio St.3d 361
     (1985). "Where the degree of proof required to sustain an
    issue must be clear and convincing, a reviewing court will examine the record to
    determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the
    requisite degree of proof." Cross, at 477.
    {¶20} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) cited above specifically applies to A.S. and V.S. as
    they had been in appellee's custody for some twelve months at the time of the filing of
    their motion for permanent custody. Therefore, it is not necessary to find that these
    children cannot reasonably be placed with appellant another year forward.
    {¶21} As for Z.S., the trial court found the child "cannot be placed with either
    parent within a reasonable time" under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) which states:
    (B)(1) Except as provided in division (B)(2) of this section, the court
    may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court
    determines at the hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section, by
    clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to
    Delaware County, Case No. 13 CAF 05 0040                                                8
    grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for
    permanent custody and that any of the following apply:
    (a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the
    temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or
    private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive
    twenty-two-month period, or has not been in the temporary custody of one
    or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies
    for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period if, as
    described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the
    child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in
    another state, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child's
    parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's
    parents.
    {¶22} The record establishes appellee's efforts at reunifying appellant and all
    three children. Ms. Leightly first became involved with the family in October 2010. T. at
    100. Ms. Leightly helped appellant with diapers, food, housing issues, and schooling for
    the children. T. at 102-104. At the time, appellant was on probation. T. at 101. The
    case was closed in the middle of November 2010. T. at 105, 115. Ms. Leighty became
    involved with the family again in December of 2010 after appellant called because she
    was going to be arrested for violating her probation. T. at 105-106. Ms. Leighty helped
    to find relative placement for the children, but was unsuccessful. T. at 106. As a result,
    appellant signed a voluntary agreement to surrender the children to appellee with the
    Delaware County, Case No. 13 CAF 05 0040                                             9
    knowledge that she could have the children returned within thirty days. 
    Id.
     Ms. Leighty
    tried to convince appellant to go into a CBCF program for the sake of the children, but
    appellant rejected the suggestion and opted for a prison sentence instead. T. at 113,
    116. She was granted judicial release in June of 2012 and was ordered to successfully
    complete CBCF. T. at 52-53. While at CBCF, appellant received counseling and an
    assessment, but did not complete the program because she was unsuccessfully
    discharged. T. at 53, 144. Because of the discharge, appellant's intensive supervision
    officer, Kara Clark, filed a violation. T. at 54. At the time of the permanent custody
    hearing, appellant was awaiting sentencing and had over 2000 days left on her original
    sentence. T. at 68. Ms. Clark was going to recommend returning appellant to prison to
    fully complete the remainder of her prison term as she was not amenable to community
    control. T. at 57.
    {¶23} Ashley Keller, the family's ongoing caseworker, testified to the following
    supportive services offered to the family (T. at 156):
    Many referrals for the boys. They're involved with the Delaware
    County Board of Disabilities. COMH made referrals. IEP, keeping up with
    meetings.     We would attend those meetings if our schedules allowed.
    Attended meetings at COMH, made our visits to the foster home, signed
    off on any type of paperwork that services were needed for the boys,
    especially recently with [V.] needing his weighted vest, blanket, his
    compression shirts, things like that, made visits to both Kitty and Dennis,
    Delaware County, Case No. 13 CAF 05 0040                                            10
    spoke with them about the case, any type of advice or recommendations
    for the foster parents, as well.
    {¶24} Caseworkers conducted supervised visitations with the children with each
    parent while they were in prison. T. at 148-150, 164.
    {¶25} As explained by our brethren from the Twelfth District in In re K.M., 12th
    Dist. Butler No. CA2004-02-052, 
    2004-Ohio-4152
    , ¶ 23:
    In determining whether the agency made reasonable efforts to
    prevent the removal of the child from the home, the issue is not whether
    the agency could have done more, but whether it did enough to satisfy the
    reasonableness standard under the statute.          In re Hughley (Oct. 26,
    2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 77052, citing In re Tirado (Jan. 22, 1998),
    Mahoning App. No. 97 CA 26; In re Brewer (Feb. 12, 1996), Belmont App.
    No. 94–B–28. "Reasonable efforts" does not mean all available efforts.
    Otherwise, there would always be an argument that one more additional
    service, no matter how remote, may have made reunification possible. In
    re Fast (Mar. 25, 1992), Summit App. No. 15282.
    {¶26} Upon review, we find the trial court did not err in granting permanent
    custody of the children to appellee on the issue of reasonable efforts.
    {¶27} Assignments of Error II and III are denied.
    Delaware County, Case No. 13 CAF 05 0040                                              11
    IV
    {¶28} Appellant claims it was error to include Z.S. in the permanent custody
    hearing when he had not been in appellee's custody for twelve of the last twenty-two
    months. We disagree.
    {¶29} As we concluded in Assignments of Error II and III, there was ample
    evidence in the record to support the award of permanent custody of all three children to
    appellee apart from R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) alone. As Z.S. had not been in appellee's
    temporary custody for twelve of the last twenty-two months prior to the filing of the
    motion for permanent custody, we find R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), cited above, applies.
    {¶30} Z.S. was removed from appellant's custody at her request and placed in
    appellee's temporary custody from December 2010 to March 2011, and then placed in
    relative placement. T. at 80, 105-106. All relative placements failed with Z.S. and the
    child was once again placed in appellee's temporary custody in December 2012. T. at
    80. Because of her criminal troubles, appellant was not available to complete a case
    plan from January 2011, and she was facing at the time of the hearing the possibility of
    2000 more days in prison. T. at 47-48, 51-55, 57, 68.
    {¶31} Upon review, we find the trial court did not err in including Z.S. in the
    permanent custody hearing.
    {¶32} Assignment of Error IV is denied.
    Delaware County, Case No. 13 CAF 05 0040                                     12
    {¶33} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, Ohio,
    Juvenile Division, is hereby affirmed.
    By Farmer, J.
    Hoffman, P.J. and
    Wise, J. concur.
    _______________________________
    Hon. Sheila G. Farmer
    _______________________________
    Hon. William B. Hoffman
    _______________________________
    Hon. John W. Wise
    SGF/sg 8/19
    [Cite as In re A.S., 
    2013-Ohio-4018
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    IN THE MATTER OF:                              :
    :
    A.S., V.S., and Z.S.                           :       JUDGMENT ENTRY
    :
    :
    :
    :       CASE NO. 13 CAF 05 0040
    For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the
    judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, Ohio, Juvenile Division is
    affirmed. Costs to appellant.
    _______________________________
    Hon. Sheila G. Farmer
    _______________________________
    Hon. William B. Hoffman
    _______________________________
    Hon. John W. Wise