State v. Jones , 2014 Ohio 29 ( 2014 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Jones, 
    2014-Ohio-29
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 99759
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    DARRICK JONES
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    REVERSED AND REMANDED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case Nos. CR-555501, CR-555628, and CR-556053
    BEFORE: S. Gallagher, P.J., Kilbane, J., and Blackmon, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 9, 2014
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Joseph Vincent Pagano
    P.O. Box 16869
    Rocky River, OH 44116
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Timothy J. McGinty
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    By: Denise J. Salerno
    Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
    Justice Center - 8th Floor
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, OH 44113
    SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J.:
    {¶1} Appellant Darrick Jones appeals from the sentence imposed upon his
    resentencing. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse his sentence and remand for
    another resentencing.
    {¶2} Appellant was indicted in three separate cases, Cuyahoga C.P. Nos.
    CR-555501, CR-556053, CR-555628, which were combined for plea proceedings and
    sentencing, with various offenses arising from a string of burglaries and related crimes.
    After pleading guilty to multiple counts, and the dismissal of the remaining charges,
    appellant was sentenced to a total prison term of 32 years.
    {¶3} On appeal in State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98371, 
    2013-Ohio-489
    (“Jones I”), the court affirmed appellant’s conviction but reversed the original sentence
    that was imposed because the trial court failed to make the statutorily required findings
    required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) before imposing consecutive sentences. 
    Id.
    {¶4} Upon remand, the trial court imposed an aggregate prison term of 24 years.
    The court reasoned, “I think it’s a more reasonable response to this string of very serious
    crimes. But I think a lower sentence does reflect your youth and your lack of significant
    prior criminal activity.”
    {¶5} In addressing statutory findings for imposing consecutive sentences, the trial
    court stated:
    I have re-read the presentence report in these cases. I have re-read
    the Court of Appeals’ opinion. I continue to believe that the sentences that
    I imposed were reasonable under the circumstances.
    I will note for the record that the offenses were part of a course of
    conduct, and the harm caused by them was so great that no single term
    adequately reflects the seriousness of your conduct, Mr. Jones.
    At the same time, looking at the three cases and the lengthy
    sentences on each, I have concluded that the imposing of three consecutive
    sentences is, while justified, perhaps longer than is necessary to adequately
    punish you or to protect the public.
    Accordingly, the sentence will remain the same, except that in
    555501 it will be ordered to be served concurrently with the sentences in the
    other two cases.
    So that means that the eleven-year sentence will be served
    concurrently with sentences of ten years and eleven years on Case Nos.
    555628 and 556053. In other words, you are going to be doing a combined
    sentence of 21 years, rather than 32 years in prison.
    Given your age, lack of any significant prior history, I think this is
    probably a more reasonable resolution, looking at this eleven months later.
    Although the trial court stated it was imposing a combined sentence of 21 years, it later
    indicated that it was a 24-year prison term.
    {¶6} Appellant timely appealed.         He raises two assignments of error for our
    review. Under his first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court failed to
    make the required proportionality finding under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), that the record fails
    to reflect that the trial court considered proportionality and consistency as required by
    R.C. 2929.11(B), and that the 24-year prison sentence is well beyond the mainstream of
    local judicial practice.
    {¶7} Appellate courts review consecutive sentences using the standard set forth in
    R.C. 2953.08. State v. Venes, 
    2013-Ohio-1891
    , 
    992 N.E.2d 453
    , ¶ 10 (8th Dist.). R.C.
    2953.08(G)(2) provides two grounds for an appellate court to overturn the imposition of
    consecutive sentences: (1) the appellate court, upon its review, clearly and convincingly
    finds that “the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings” under R.C.
    2929.14(C)(4), or (2) the sentence is “otherwise contrary to law.” See also Venes at ¶ 11.
    The appellate court’s standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its
    discretion. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).
    {¶8} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires a trial court to make three separate and distinct
    findings before imposing consecutive sentences. The statute requires the court to find
    (1) “that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to
    punish the offender[,]” (2) “that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the
    seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public,”
    and (3) that any of the following applies:
    (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the
    offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed
    pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or
    was under post-release control for a prior offense.
    (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or
    more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the
    multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single
    prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses
    of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
    (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
    consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime
    by the offender.
    {¶9} Compliance with this statute “requires separate and distinct findings in
    addition to any findings relating to purposes and goals of criminal sentencing.” Venes at
    ¶ 17. A trial court’s failure to make these findings is “contrary to law.” Id. at ¶ 12, citing
    State v. Jones, 
    93 Ohio St.3d 391
    , 399, 
    754 N.E.2d 1252
     (2001).
    {¶10} Our review of the resentencing transcript reflects that the trial court did not
    make the required finding “that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the
    seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public.”
    While the state references statements made by the trial court as to the reasonableness of
    the sentence, the seriousness of the conduct, and justification for consecutive sentences,
    those statements are not tantamount to the specific finding required upon the imposition
    of consecutive sentences. Furthermore, although the use of “talismanic words” is not
    necessary, it must be clear from the record that the trial court actually made the required
    statutory findings. State v. Davila, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99683, 
    2013-Ohio-4922
    , ¶ 9.
    Because the trial court did not make the proportionality finding required by R.C.
    2929.14(C)(4), the sentence is contrary to law.
    {¶11} Appellant also argues that the record fails to reflect that the trial court
    considered proportionality and consistency in fashioning the prison sentence and that his
    sentence is outside the mainstream of local judicial practice. Because we are remanding
    the case for resentencing, we need not address these arguments. However, for purposes
    of remand, we note that the court must consider the principles and purposes of sentencing
    in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing guidelines contained in R.C. 2929.12.
    {¶12} R.C. 2929.11 provides that a sentence imposed for a felony shall be
    reasonably calculated to achieve the two overriding purposes of felony sentencing: (1)
    “to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others,” and (2) “to punish
    the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those
    purposes.” The sentence imposed also shall be “commensurate with and not demeaning
    to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact on the victim, and consistent
    with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.”           R.C.
    2929.11(B). In determining the most effective way to comply with the purposes and
    principles of sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11, the sentencing court must consider the
    seriousness and recidivism factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12, and additionally may
    consider any other relevant factors to achieving those purposes and principles of
    sentencing. R.C. 2929.12(A).
    {¶13} The court is not required to make specific findings of its consideration of
    these factors. State v. Carman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99463, 
    2013-Ohio-4910
    , ¶ 14;
    see also State v. Wilson, 
    129 Ohio St.3d 214
    , 
    2011-Ohio-2669
    , 
    951 N.E.2d 381
    , ¶ 31.
    Indeed, R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 are not fact-finding statutes, and consideration of the
    appropriate factors can be presumed unless the defendant affirmatively shows to the
    contrary. State v. Stevens, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-130278, 
    2013-Ohio-5218
    , ¶ 12.
    {¶14} Because the trial court failed to make the required proportionality finding
    under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), we sustain the first assignment of error.
    {¶15} Under his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court
    erred by failing to merge the firearm specifications in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-555501 into
    a single term pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b).         The state concedes the error.
    However, the assigned error is now moot, and the matter may be rectified upon
    resentencing.
    {¶16} Appellant’s sentence is reversed, and this case is remanded pursuant to R.C.
    2953.08(G)(2) with instructions to the trial court to conduct a resentencing hearing and
    “to state, on the record, the required findings.” We recognize the trial court attempted to
    comply with our mandate in Jones I. However, without having made all the necessary
    findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), we again must remand the matter for resentencing.
    {¶17} To ensure compliance with H.B. 86, we would encourage trial courts to
    utilize a sentencing-findings worksheet and memorialize the required findings from that
    worksheet on both the record and in the court’s journal entry.
    Because a trial court speaks only through its journal, we have long
    approved the use of a sentencing-findings worksheet to document that the
    trial court has made the required findings. E.g., State v. Phillips, 1st Dist.
    No. C-960898, 
    1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2615
     (June 18, 1997); see also State
    v. Meister, 
    76 Ohio App.3d 15
    , 19, 
    600 N.E.2d 1103
     (1st Dist.1991). Use
    of the sentencing-findings worksheet ensures that the trial court has adhered
    to the applicable statutory mandate. See R.C. 2929.14(C); see also [State
    v.] Kalish, 
    120 Ohio St.3d 23
    , 
    2008 Ohio 4912
    , 
    896 N.E.2d 124
    , at ¶ 15.
    And by documenting the findings in the court’s journal, the use of a
    worksheet also ensures meaningful review of the trial court’s sentencing
    decisions.
    State v. Alexander, 1st Dist. Nos. C-110828 and C-110829, 
    2012-Ohio-3349
    , ¶ 17.
    {¶18} Judgment reversed; case remanded.
    This cause is reversed and remanded to the lower court for further proceedings
    consistent with this opinion.
    It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
    pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    SEAN C. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., and
    PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR