Deutsche Bank Trust Co. v. Newble , 2013 Ohio 5019 ( 2013 )


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  • [Cite as Deutsche Bank Trust Co. v. Newble, 
    2013-Ohio-5019
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 99372
    DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    IRA R. NEWBLE, ET AL.
    DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Civil Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CV-689687
    BEFORE:          Blackmon, J., Boyle, P.J., and Jones, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:                          November 14, 2013
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS
    James R. Douglass
    James R. Douglass Co. L.P.A.
    4600 Prospect Avenue
    Cleveland, Ohio 44103
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    David M. Gauntner
    Felty & Lembright
    1500 West Third Street, Suite 400
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    Jeffrey A. Tobe
    Lerner Sampson & Rothfuss
    P.O. Box 5480
    Cincinnati, Ohio 45201
    PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J.:
    {¶1} Appellant Ira R. Newble appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to
    vacate a judgment entry in foreclosure in favor of Deutsche Bank Trust Company
    Americas, as Indenture Trustee for Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2005-3 (“Deutsche
    Bank”). Newble assigns the following error for our review:
    I. The trial court erred when it denied a common law motion for relief from
    void judgment because it was not timely filed.
    {¶2} Having reviewed the record and pertinent law, we affirm the trial court’s
    decision. The apposite facts follow.
    {¶3} On April 9, 2009, Deutsche Bank filed a complaint in foreclosure. In the
    first count, Deutsche Bank alleged it held a note of indebtedness secured by a mortgage
    on property, that Newble defaulted under the terms of the note, and now owed
    $455,548.93 on the note.
    {¶4} Deutsche Bank alleged in the second count that the mortgage constituted a
    valid first lien upon the subject property. Deutsche Bank alleged in the third count that
    the mortgage was filed for record on September 13, 2005, and was subsequently assigned
    to them by virtue of an assignment of mortgage.
    {¶5} Deutsche Bank attached three exhibits to its complaint. The first exhibit is a
    copy of the note; it names Ira R. Newble as the “Borrower” and Saxon Mortgage, Inc.
    (“Saxon Mortgage”) as the “Lender” of a principal sum in the amount of $469,760.00 for
    the purchase of a property located at 10 Astor Place in Rocky River, Ohio. The second
    exhibit attached to Deutsche Bank’s complaint is a copy of a mortgage dated September
    9, 2005. It indicates it is a “security instrument,” with Newble as the borrower.
    {¶6} The next exhibit Deutsche Bank attached to its complaint is a copy of an
    “Assignment of Mortgage.” The first page of the document indicates “the undersigned
    Saxon Mortgage transferred Newble’s mortgage to Deutsche Bank as Indenture Trustee
    for Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2005-3.” John Cottrell signed the document on April 2,
    2009, as “Assistant Vice President” of Saxon Mortgage.
    {¶7} On May 7, 2009, Astor Place Home Owners Association (“Astor Place
    HOA”) answered Deutsche Bank’s complaint and also filed a cross-complaint against
    Newble. In its cross-complaint, Astor Place HOA alleged that it had filed a lien against
    Newble for unpaid maintenance fees and assessments totaling $1,660 plus interest.
    {¶8} On October 13, 2009, after service had been perfected on all parties,
    Deutsche Bank filed a motion for summary judgment. On May 6, 2010, the trial court
    granted Deutsche Bank’s motion for summary judgment. On October 25, 2010, the
    subject property was sold at a sheriff’s sale.
    {¶9} On August 25, 2011, Newble filed a motion for relief from judgment. In the
    motion, Newble argued that Deutsche Bank had not proven it was the real party in
    interest, that it lacked standing, and that the assignment of the note and mortgage were
    invalid.    Deutsche Bank opposed the motion.           On March 9, 2012, a magistrate
    conducted a hearing and later issued a decision denying Newble’s motion. On December
    12, 2012, the trial court issued an order adopting the magistrate’s decision.
    Motion to Vacate
    {¶10} In the sole assigned error, Newble argues the trial court erred in denying
    the motion to vacate the foreclosure judgment.
    {¶11} The decision of a trial court regarding a motion to vacate a judgment will
    not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. C & W Inv. Co. v. Midwest
    Vending, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP-40, 
    2003-Ohio-4688
    .               An abuse of
    discretion connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it entails a decision that is
    unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 
    5 Ohio St.3d 217
    ,
    219, 
    450 N.E.2d 1140
     (1983).
    {¶12} In the instant case, Newble specifically alleges that Deutsche Bank had not
    proven that it was the real party in interest.
    {¶13} Initially, we note, the case law in the Eighth District is simple and clear; the
    putative mortgagee must own the mortgage at the time of the filing of the complaint,
    otherwise it lacks standing.       Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Triplett, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 94924, 
    2011-Ohio-478
    , citing Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jordan, 8th
    Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91675, 
    2009-Ohio-1092
    .
    {¶14} Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.
    Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Pagani, 5th Dist. Knox No. 09CA000013,
    
    2009-Ohio-5665
    ; Civ.R. 17(A). A real party in interest is one who is directly benefitted
    or injured by the outcome of the case. U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. Marcino, 
    181 Ohio App.3d 328
    , 
    2009-Ohio-1178
    , 
    908 N.E.2d 1032
     (7th Dist.), citing Shealy v. Campbell, 
    20 Ohio St.3d 23
    , 24, 
    485 N.E.2d 701
     (1985).
    {¶15} The real-party-in-interest requirement, enables the defendant to avail
    himself of evidence and defenses that the defendant has against the real party in interest,
    and to assure him finality of the judgment, and that he will be protected against another
    suit brought by the real party at interest on the same matter. 
    Id.,
     Shealy at 24-25, citing
    In re Highland Holiday Subdivision, 
    27 Ohio App.2d 237
    , 
    273 N.E.2d 903
     (4th
    Dist.1971).
    {¶16} The current holder of the note and mortgage is the real party in interest in a
    foreclosure action. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Stovall, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91802,
    
    2010-Ohio-236
    , citing Chase Manhattan Mtge. Corp. v. Smith, 1st Dist. Hamilton No.
    C061069, 
    2007-Ohio-5874
    .       A party that fails to establish an interest in a note or
    mortgage at the time it files suit has no standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court.
    ABN Amro Mtge. Group, Inc. v. Evans, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98777, 
    2013-Ohio-1557
    ,
    citing Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 
    134 Ohio St.3d 13
    ,
    
    2012-Ohio-5017
    , 
    979 N.E.2d 1214
    , ¶ 28.
    {¶17} Here, the record established that Deutsche Bank was the real party in
    interest at the time the complaint for foreclosure was filed.       As previously noted,
    Deutsche Bank filed the foreclosure complaint on April 9, 2009.           Deutsche Bank
    attached, as exhibit C, an “Assignment of Mortgage” dated April 2, 2009.               The
    assignment reflects that Saxon Mortgage assigned and transferred all interest in the note
    and mortgage to Deutsche Bank.         As such, Deutsche Bank had standing to bring the
    foreclosure action against Newble. Consequently, we find Newble’s assertion without
    merit.
    {¶18} Nonetheless, Newble broadly contends the assignment to Deutsche Bank
    was invalid because the assignment was not transferred in accordance with the terms of
    the Pooling and Service Agreement (“PSA”). First, Newble points to no Ohio authority,
    nor could any be located, which states the failure to follow the terms of a PSA renders an
    assignment to a subsequent assignee, who was not involved in the agreement, invalid
    such that the assignee has no standing to enforce the otherwise valid interests in the
    assignment.
    {¶19} Even if such a failure was established, we cannot say it left the trial court
    without jurisdiction to proceed with the foreclosure. Waterfall Victoria Master Fund v.
    Yeager, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2012-L-071, 
    2013-Ohio-3206
    .               As previously stated,
    Deutsche Bank established standing by virtue of the copy of the assignment of the
    complaint. If there was a prior defect in the chain of acquisition of the assignment, that
    is a defense that must have been timely established at the trial court. 
    Id.
     Therefore,
    insomuch as this issue does not affect Deutsche Bank’s standing to bring the suit and
    invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court, it is barred by res judicata because it is an
    argument that should have and could have been previously raised. 
    Id.
    {¶20} Further, in addressing the identical argument, we have held in a line of cases
    that Newble and other similarly situated appellants lack standing to make this argument.
    Specifically, when a mortgagor, such as Newble, is not a party to the transfer agreement,
    and his contractual obligations under the mortgage are not affected in any way by the
    assignment, the mortgagor lacks standing to challenge the validity of the assignment.
    Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Rudolph, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98383,
    
    2012-Ohio-6141
    , ¶ 25. See also Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co. v. Unger, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 97315, 
    2012-Ohio-1950
    , relying upon Bridge v. Aames Capital Corp.,
    Case No. 1:09 CV 2947, 
    2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103154
     (N.D.Ohio 2010); Deutsche
    Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Najar, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98502, 
    2013-Ohio-1657
    .
    {¶21} Like us, other districts have held the same.       See LSF6 Mercury REO
    Investments Trust Series 2008-1 v. Locke, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-757,
    
    2012-Ohio-4499
    ; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Whiteman, 10th Dist. Franklin No.
    12AP-536, 
    2013-Ohio-1636
    ; Waterfall Victoria Master Fund v. Yeager, 11th Dist. Lake
    No. 2012-L-071, 
    2013-Ohio-3206
    .
    {¶22} Our holding is rooted in the recognition that an assignment does not alter
    the mortgagor-debtor’s obligations under the note or mortgage and that the foreclosure
    complaint is based on the mortgagor’s default under the note and mortgage, not because
    of the mortgage assignment. Thus, a subsequent assignment of the mortgagee’s interest
    does not change the nature of the interest of the mortgagor or someone claiming under the
    mortgagor.
    {¶23} Here, the mortgage assignment did not alter Newble’s obligations under
    the note or mortgage. Deutsche Bank filed the foreclosure complaint based on Newble’s
    default under the note and mortgage, not because of the mortgage assignments. Rudolph
    at ¶ 26; Ungner at ¶35; see also Locke, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-757,
    
    2012-Ohio-4499
    , ¶ 29.
    {¶24} It is undisputed that Newble defaulted on his loan.        Deutsche Bank filed
    the foreclosure complaint based upon Newble’s default under the note and mortgage, not
    because of the mortgage assignment. Thus, Newble’s default would have exposed him
    to foreclosure proceeding whether the note and mortgage had remained with Saxon
    Mortgage, or as in the present case, assigned to Deutsche Bank.
    {¶25} Consequently, based on our prior decisions addressing the identical issues
    that other districts have found persuasive, we are compelled to find that Newble also
    lacked standing to challenge the mortgage assignment in the instant matter. As such, the
    trial court properly denied the motion to vacate. Accordingly, we overrule the sole
    assigned error.
    {¶26} Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellants costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into
    execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, JUDGE
    LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCURS;
    MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., CONCURS IN
    JUDGMENT ONLY