Patterson v. Church , 2013 Ohio 1906 ( 2013 )

[Cite as Patterson v. Church, 2013-Ohio-1906.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 99159
SHARON PATTERSON
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
vs.
DAVID CHURCH, ET AL.
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-768575
BEFORE: Jones, P.J., Kilbane, J., and McCormack, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 9, 2013
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Alexander R. Folk
P.O. Box 67128
Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio 44222
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES
John F. Hersch
8536 Crow Drive
Suite 240
Macedonia, Ohio 44056
LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J.:
{¶1} This cause came to be heard upon the accelerated calendar pursuant to App.R.
11.1 and Loc.R. 11.1.
{¶2} In this accelerated appeal, plaintiff-appellant, Sharon Patterson, appeals from
the trial court’s judgment granting the motion to dismiss of defendants-appellees, David
Church and Joyce Church. We affirm, but remand with instructions for the trial court to
enter the dismissal without prejudice.
I. Procedural History
{¶3} In November 2011, Patterson filed this action against the Churches, asserting
claims for (1) a declaratory judgment, (2) unjust enrichment, and (3) tortious interference
with expectancy of inheritance. The action was filed in the general division of the
common pleas court.
{¶4} The Churches filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under Civ.R. 12(B)(1). A brief in opposition was filed by Patterson, and the Churches
filed a reply brief. The trial court granted the Churches’ motion, and dismissed the case
with prejudice. Patterson now appeals, raising the following assignment of error for our
review: “The trial court erred by dismissing the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.”
II. Facts
{¶5} Patterson alleged the following in her complaint. She and David Church are
brother and sister, and their parents are deceased. Joyce Church is David’s wife.
Patterson alleged that during the last years of the parents’ lives, she provided daily care to
them, including, but not limited to, managing their finances.
{¶6} After their mother passed away in 2005, the Churches moved into the parents’
home, and to the exclusion of Patterson, substantially altered the father’s then-existing
estate planning from an “equal division of his property between his children to making an
inter-vivos transfer of [the] father’s assets.” Specifically, Patterson alleged that the
Churches had the father transfer ownership of his residence to David, with the father
retaining only a life estate. Ownership of two other properties located in West Virginia
were transferred from the father to the Churches. According to Patterson, David also
opened joint accounts with their father.
{¶7} Patterson alleged that her father was “frail and vulnerable during the time
frame in which he executed these deeds and bank documents * * *.” According to
Patterson, David “purposefully and with prior intent sequestered [their father] from [her],
so that he could diminish the assets to which she would have been entitled upon his death.”
{¶8} During the same time frame as these transfers, the father executed a will
which equally divided his assets between David and Patterson, so long as they survived
him by 30 days.
{¶9} Patterson alleged that after their father passed away in 2010, David removed
the funds from the joint accounts and did not divide them with her.
{¶10} Based on these allegations, Patterson sought a declaratory judgment and
recovery for unjust enrichment and tortious interference with expectancy of inheritance.
III. Law and Analysis
{¶11} In ruling on a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, the trial court determines whether the claim raises any action cognizable in
that court. Robinson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-550,
2011-Ohio-713, ¶ 5. Subject-matter jurisdiction involves “‘a court’s power to hear and
decide a case on the merits and does not relate to the rights of the parties.’” Id., quoting
Vedder v. Warrensville Hts., 8th Dist. No. 81005, 2002-Ohio-5567, ¶ 14. An appellate
court reviews de novo a trial court’s order granting or denying a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to
dismiss. Robinson at ¶ 5, citing Hudson v. Petrosurance, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-1030,
2009-Ohio-4307, ¶ 12.
{¶12} In their motion to dismiss, the Churches contended that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over this case because exclusive jurisdiction rests with the
probate court. In support of their contention, the Churches relied primarily on Grimes v.
Grimes, 173 Ohio App.3d 537, 2007-Ohio-5653, 879 N.E.2d 247 (4th Dist.), and Sayer v.
Epler, 121 Ohio App.3d 329, 699 N.E.2d 1000 (5th Dist.1997).
{¶13} In Grimes, the plaintiff son of the decedent sued the decedent’s other son (the
plaintiff’s brother) in the general division of the common pleas court. The plaintiff son
contested inter vivos transfers of property from the father to the other son a couple of
months before the father died. The father had a will that left his entire estate to the two
sons. One of the plaintiff’s claims was for the intentional interference with an expected
inheritance.
{¶14} The defendant son moved for summary judgment, and without addressing the
issue of subject-matter jurisdiction, the court granted the motion. The plaintiff son then
refiled his claims regarding the inter vivos transfers in the probate court; the probate court
dismissed the case.
{¶15} On appeal, the Fourth Appellate District found that (1) the general division
should have dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, and (2) the
probate court erred by failing to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction over the claims.
{¶16} In so holding, the court noted that Ohio probate courts are courts of “‘limited
jurisdiction’” and the proceedings of those courts are limited to actions permitted by either
statute or the Constitution. Grimes at ¶ 17, quoting State ex rel. Lipinski v. Cuyahoga
Cty. Common Pleas Court, Probate Div., 74 Ohio St.3d 19, 22, 1995-Ohio-96, 655 N.E.2d
1303. The court cited R.C. 2102.24(A)(1)(c), which states in part that the probate court
has “exclusive jurisdiction” to “direct and control the conduct and settle the accounts of
executors and administrators and order the distribution of estates.” Under that section,
the Fourth District found that any matter relating to the administration of an estate and the
distribution of its assets is within the exclusive jurisdiction of probate court. Grimes at ¶
17.
{¶17} The Fourth District further found that probate court has the exclusive
jurisdiction to “‘render declaratory judgments, including, but not limited to, those rendered
pursuant to section 2107.084 of the Revised Code.’” Id. at ¶ 18, quoting R.C.
2101.24(A)(1)(l).
{¶18} R.C. 2721.05, governing declaratory judgments, provides in part that
[a]ny person interested as or through an executor, administrator, trustee,
guardian, or other fiduciary, creditor, devisee, legatee, heir, next of kin, or
cestui que trust, in the * * * estate of a decedent * * * may have a declaration
of rights or legal relations in respect * * * [t]o determine any question
arising in the administration of the estate or trust, including questions of
construction of wills and other writings.
R.C. 2721.05(C)
{¶19} Reading R.C. 2101.24(A)(1)(l) and 2721.05(C) together, the Fourth District
held that probate court has the exclusive jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions
relating to the administration of an estate. Grimes at ¶ 18.
{¶20} Likewise, the Fifth Appellate District reached the same result in Sayer, 121
Ohio App.3d 329, 121 Ohio App.3d 329. There, a grandson sued his mother, who had
been the fiduciary of his deceased grandmother. The grandson contended that under his
grandmother’s last will and testament, her assets were to be distributed upon her death to
the mother, grandson, and two other grandsons. After the grandmother’s death, however,
the mother informed the boys that the grandmother did not have any assets and they would,
therefore, not be receiving anything.
{¶21} The mother told the boys that their grandmother, prior to her death, had given
her (the mother) her house as a gift. The grandson contended that, in addition to the
house, the grandmother had also owned a substantial value of stock and other assets. The
grandson’s action was filed in probate court and contained two counts: concealment and
declaratory judgment. The probate court dismissed the complaint for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction.
{¶22} The Fifth Appellate District, citing R.C. 2101.24(A)(1)(l) and 2751.05(C),
found that jurisdiction for the grandson’s claims (except for his claims for relief for fraud
and money damages) lay with the probate court.
{¶23} Thus, on the authority of Grimes and Sayer and the statutes they relied on,
we find that the probate court is the court vested with jurisdiction to hear Patterson’s
claims.
{¶24} In light of the above, Patterson’s sole assignment of error is overruled and
the trial court’s judgment is affirmed, but the case is remanded so that the trial court can
enter the dismissal without prejudice.
It is ordered that appellant recover of appellees costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
LARRY A. JONES, SR., PRESIDING JUDGE
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., and
TIM McCORMACK, J., CONCUR