Hawkins v. State , 2011 Ohio 3393 ( 2011 )

[Cite as Hawkins v. State, 2011-Ohio-3393.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
Nos. 96080, 96081, 96082, 96083, 96084, 96085, 96086, 96087, 96088,
96089, 96090, 96091 and 96092
LURAY CHARDONNAY HAWKINS, ET AL.
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
vs.
STATE OF OHIO
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case Nos. CV-646869, CV-661234, CV-648556, CV-648638, CV-648877,
CV- 646844, CV-669146, CV-648446, CV-649223, CV-647872, CV-649140,
CV-648317 and CV-648405
BEFORE: Sweeney, P.J., Keough, J., and E. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 7, 2011
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
William D. Mason, Esq.
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Daniel T. Van, Esq.
Assistant County Prosecutor
Eighth Floor, Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Robert L. Tobik, Esq.
Cuyahoga County Public Defender
By: Cullen Sweeney, Esq.
Assistant Public Defender
310 lakeside Avenue, Suite 400
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
Michael Baker, Pro Se
472 E. 110th Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44108
Norbert Briggs, Pro Se
19024 Hunser Pointer Road
Strongsville, Ohio 44136
Rafail T. Musalih, Pro Se
822 Alhambra
Cleveland, Ohio 44110
Matthew A.Rankin, Pro Se
17599 Whitney Road, Apartment 120
Strongsville, Ohio 44136
Don M. Williams, Pro Se
873 Helmdale
Cleveland, Ohio 44112
Lloyd Williams, Pro Se
1761 Wymore Ave., #205
E. Cleveland, Ohio 44126
JAMES J. SWEENEY, P.J.:
{¶ 1} The State of Ohio appeals from the trial court’s decisions in these
consolidated matters which granted appellees’ petitions that contested the
application of the Adam Walsh Act (“AWA”) to them because they were
previously classified under Ohio’s Megan’s Law. We affirm.
{¶ 2} The State’s position is that the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in
State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753 is not
applicable to individuals who were classified under Megan’s Law by operation
of law, including individuals who were classified under Megan’s Law as a
result of out of state convictions.
{¶ 3} All of the appellees herein were initially classified and subject to
the registration and reporting requirements under Ohio’s Megan’s Law as
either sexually oriented offenders or habitual sexual offenders by operation of
law. Some of the appellees were classified by operation of law as a result of
their convictions in Ohio. The other appellees were convicted of offenses in
other states, but upon moving to Ohio were subject to Megan’s Law.
{¶ 4} After Ohio enacted the AWA provisions, appellees were subject to
reclassification and any new reporting, registration and notification
requirements that would result from a new classification. All of the
appellees filed petitions contesting the application of the AWA to them and
objecting to being reclassified under it. Pursuant to Bodyke, the trial court
granted the appellees’ petitions and the State appealed, presenting the
following errors for our review:
{¶ 5} “I. The trial court erred in applying State v. Bodkye, 126 Ohio
St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, to a petitioner who was not classified under
Megan’s Law by an Ohio Court because under these circumstances there is no
violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine.”
{¶ 6} “II. The trial court erred in applying State v. Bodkye, 126 Ohio
St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, to a petitioner who did not demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence that they were previously classified by an Ohio
court.”
{¶ 7} This court has recently addressed and overruled the same
arguments and issues that the State raises in this instant appeal. See,
Willie Speight, III v. State, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 96041, 96042, 96043, 96044,
and 96405, 2011-Ohio- ; see also, Hannah v. State,
Cuyahoga App. Nos. 95883, 95884, 95885, 95886, 95887, 95888, and 95889.
Adhering to this authority, we find that the trial court did not err by granting
appellees’ petitions. The state’s assignments of error are overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this
judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
JAMES J. SWEENEY, PRESIDING JUDGE
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., and
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR