Com. v. Lawrence, B , 99 A.3d 116 ( 2014 )

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2014 Pa. Super. 182
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
BYSHERE LAWRENCE
Appellant No. 2684 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 24, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0010239-2011
BEFORE: BOWES, J., DONOHUE, J., and MUNDY, J.
OPINION BY MUNDY, J.: FILED AUGUST 27, 2014
Appellant, Byshere Lawrence, appeals from the May 24, 2013
aggregate judgment of sentence1 of 45 years to life imprisonment after he
was found guilty of first-degree murder, firearms not to be carried without a
license, and possession of an instrument of a crime (PIC).2 After careful
review, we affirm.
We summarize the relevant facts and procedural history of this case as
follows. On September 26, 2011, the Commonwealth filed an information
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1
September 18, 2013 order denying his post-sentence motion. However, a
direct appeal in a criminal case can only lie from the judgment of sentence.
Commonwealth v. Kuykendall, 2 A.3d 559, 560 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(citation omitted). We have therefore amended the caption accordingly.
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 6106(a)(1), and 907(a), respectively.
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charging Appellant with the above-mentioned offenses as well as one count
each of criminal conspiracy, possession of a firearm by a minor, carrying
firearms in public in Philadelphia, and recklessly endangering another person
(REAP).3 On July 31, 2012, Appellant proceeded to a jury trial at the
conclusion of which, the jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder,
firearms not to be carried without a license, and PIC. The jury acquitted
Appellant of criminal conspiracy. The Commonwealth nolle prossed the
possession of a firearm by a minor, carrying firearms in public in
Philadelphia, and REAP charges. On May 24, 2013, the trial court imposed
an aggregate sentence of 45 years to life imprisonment.4 On June 3, 2013,
Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion. Relevant to this appeal,
tutional issue in his post-sentence motion argued that
the application of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(a)(1) to his case violated the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution. See -Sentence Motion, 6/3/13, at ¶¶ 7-10. On
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3
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903(c), 6110.1(c), 6108 and 2705, respectively.
4
The trial court imposed 45 years to life imprisonment for first-degree
without
sentences were to run concurrently to each other.
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post-sentence motion. On September 24, 2013, Appellant filed a timely
notice of appeal.5
On appeal, Appellant raises three issues for our review.
A. Is 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1 unconstitutional under
the United States Constitution because it
violates its Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause?
B. Is 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1 unconstitutional under
the United States Constitution because it
violates the Equal Protection Clause in that it
treats juveniles convicted of first or second
degree murder after its passage differently
than juveniles convicted of the identical crimes
prior to its passage?
C. Was the sentence imposed on Appellant under
18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1 unconstitutional under the
United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions
because it violates their Ex Post Facto Clauses?
We note that duly enacted legislation
Commonwealth
v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754, 759 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).
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5
Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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Commonwealth v. Baker, 78 A.3d 1044, 1050
(Pa. 2013), quoting 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922(3).
In conducting our review, we are guided by the
principle that acts passed by the General Assembly
are strongly presumed to be constitutional, including
the manner in which they were passed. Thus, a
statute will not be found unconstitutional unless it
clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the
Constitution. If there is any doubt as to whether a
challenger has met this high burden, then we will
constitutionality.
Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603, 611 (Pa. 2013) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). As the constitutionality of a statute
presents a pure question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our
scope of review is plenary. Turner, supra.
In his first issue, Appellant avers that Section 1102.1 is
minimum sentence of thirty-
fifteen years or older convicted of first-
consideration of the factors set forth in Miller v. Alabama, [] 132 S. Ct.
The Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution states that
[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
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6
cruel and unusual punishments U.S. Const. amend. viii. The
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1956)
punishment for [a] crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the]
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008), quoting
Weems v. United States
those convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty
Hall v. Florida,
134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014) (citation omitted).
Appellant argues that Section 1102.1 violates the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause because the statute imposes a mandatory minimum
at 15. The statute provides in relevant part as follows.
§ 1102.1. Sentence of persons under the age of
18 for murder, murder of an unborn child and
murder of a law enforcement officer
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6
The Eighth Amendment is incorporated to the States via the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hall, supra.
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(a) First degree murder.--A person who has been
convicted after June 24, 2012, of a murder of the
first degree, first degree murder of an unborn child
or murder of a law enforcement officer of the first
degree and who was under the age of 18 at the time
of the commission of the offense shall be sentenced
as follows:
(1) A person who at the time of the
commission of the offense was 15 years of age
or older shall be sentenced to a term of life
imprisonment without parole, or a term of
imprisonment, the minimum of which shall be
at least 35 years to life.
(2) A person who at the time of the
commission of the offense was under 15 years
of age shall be sentenced to a term of life
imprisonment without parole, or a term of
imprisonment, the minimum of which shall be
at least 25 years to life.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(a). Appellant is correct insofar that, by its text, the
statute requires the trial court to impose a sentence of not less than 35
Id. § 1102.1(a)(1). The trial court
is divested of any discretion to impose a lesser minimum sentence. See,
e.g.
apply this section where applicable, the Commonwealth shall have the right
to appellat
Within the last ten years, the Supreme Court has on three occasions
2005, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment categorically
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prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for those under 18 years of age
at the time of the offense.7 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
In 2010, the Court concluded a juvenile convicted of non-homicide crime
could not be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
consistent with the Eighth Amendment. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,
82 (2010). Finally, in Miller, the question was whether the Eighth
Amendment barred a state from imposing a mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole upon a juvenile, even for a
homicide offense. As with Roper and Graham, the Court noted that
juveniles differ from adults in three distinct ways.
recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.
Roper, 543 U.S., at 569.
more vulnerable ... to negative influences and
themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.
Ibid.
Id., at 570.
Id. at 2464 (parallel citations omitted); see also Graham, supra at 68-69;
Roper, supra the mandatory
penalty schemes at issue here prevent the sentencer from taking account of
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7
The Supreme Court had previously rejected this argument in 1989. See
generally Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
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Id.
balance by subjecting a juvenile to the same life-without-parole sentence
applicable to an adult these laws prohibit a sentencing authority from
Id. In
not be reconciled with the considerations espoused in Roper and Graham.
Id. at 2469.
Graham, Roper, and our individualized
sentencing decisions make clear that a judge or jury
must have the opportunity to consider mitigating
circumstances before imposing the harshest possible
penalty for juveniles. By requiring that all children
convicted of homicide receive lifetime incarceration
without possibility of parole, regardless of their age
and age-related characteristics and the nature of
their crimes, the mandatory sentencing schemes
before us violate this principle of proportionality, and
punishment.
Id. at 2475. As a result, Miller was entitled to resentencing, taking into
account considerations involving his age.8
Turning to the case sub judice, Appellant argues that Section
le in the
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8
In Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d 286 (Pa. 2013), our Supreme Court
held t the imposition of a minimum sentence taking such [age-related]
factors into account is the most appropriate remedy for the federal
constitutional violation that occurred when a life-without-parole sentence
Id. at 297.
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crime, whether he posed a danger to society, and the familial and peer
preclusive effect of Section 1102.1 is that it divests the judge of discretion,
imprisonment. We decline to extend Miller beyond the mandatory schemes
that it considered. Miller is limited to legislative schemes which
require[ed] that all children convicted of homicide receive lifetime
incarceration without possibility of parole, regardless of their age and age-
Miller, supra.
Section 1102.1 does not contain such a sentencing scheme. In fact, Section
1102.1(d) does require the trial court to consider various age-related
factors before the trial court may impose a sentence of life without parole.
See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(d).9
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9
Specifically, Section 1102.1(d) requires, among other factors, the following
findings by the trial court.
§ 1102.1. Sentence of persons under the age of
18 for murder, murder of an unborn child and
murder of a law enforcement officer
(d) Findings.--In determining whether to impose a
sentence of life without parole under subsection (a),
the court shall consider and make findings on the
record regarding the following:
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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We do not read Miller to mean that the Eighth Amendment
categorically prohibits a state from imposing a mandatory minimum
imprisonment sentence upon a juvenile convicted of a crime as serious as
first-degree murder.10
of 35 years presents the same concerns as would a mandatory minimum of
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
(7) Age-related characteristics of the defendant,
including:
(i) Age.
(ii) Mental capacity.
(iii) Maturity.
(iv) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited
by the defendant.
(v) The nature and extent of any prior delinquent or
criminal history, including the success or failure of
any previous attempts by the court to rehabilitate
the defendant.
(vi) Probation or institutional reports.
(vii) Other relevant factors.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(d)(7).
10
Appellant does not argue that a national consensus exists against
imposing a sentence of 35 years to life imprisonment upon a juvenile so as
to render it unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. See generally
Hall, supra at 1996, 1999; Miller, supra at 2470; Graham, supra at 61;
Kennedy, supra at 426; Roper, supra at 563; Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
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requires us to conclude that open-ended minimum sentencing is
constitutionally required by the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. We
decline to announce such a rule.
If we were to agree with
contrary to the cases that the Supreme Court has already decided. See
Graham, supra
Graham held that the Eighth
Amendment required juveniles convicted of non-homicide offense to have
Id. Miller does not contain this requirement
for juveniles convicted of first-degree murder, such as Appellant. Even
under Miller, a state still may impose life without parole for homicide
offenses, preventing a juvenile like Appellant, from ever obtaining any hope
of release from confinement. Based on these considerations, we conclude
that Section 1102.1 does not offend the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment. See Turner, supra.
Appellant argues Section 1102.1 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and the Ex Post Facto
Clauses found at Article I, Section 10 of the Federal Constitution and Article
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The trial court noted that neither of these grounds were raised in his post-
sentence motion and concluded that Appellant has waived them. Trial Court
Opinion, 12/17/13, at 9; see also ssues not
raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time
these claims below
n.5.
a challenge to the
application of a mandatory minimum sentence is a non-waiveable challenge
Commonwealth v. Delvalle, 74 A.3d
1081 (Pa. Super. 2013). However, we also take notice of the competing
Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 117 (Pa. Super.
2013) (en banc). The question then becomes whether a constitutional
attack on a statute that authorizes a mandatory minimum sentence may
also be considered a non-waivable challenge to the legality of the sentence
actually imposed, and if so, to what extent.
[T]his Court has grappled with the illegal sentencing doctrine as
jurisprudence on such issues as constitutional sentencing challenges and the
difference between legal sentencing questions and an illegal sentence have
Id. en banc cases, we have
established the principle that the term illegal sentence is a term of art that
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Commonwealth v. Robinson, 931 A.2d 15, 21 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en
banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court has
consistently enunciated three distinct categories of legality of sentence
involving merger/double jeopardy; and (3) claims implicating the rule in
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) Id. (internal parallel
citations omitted). This Court has also held that claims pertaining to the
the legality of the sentence and cannot be waived. See Commonwealth v.
Brown, 71 A.3d 1009, 1015-
punishment is a challenge to the legality of the sentence, rendering the
Watley, supra
at 118; accord Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 900 A.2d 368, 373 n.6 (Pa.
Super. 2006) (en banc), appeal denied, 917 A.2d 313 (Pa. 2007). It makes
sense that an Apprendi
involves sentencing a defendant in excess of the statutory maximum, the
classic illegal sentence paradigm, based on facts not presented to and/or
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Watley, supra at 118 n.7.11 In addition, if a
sentence is unconstitutional as cruel and unusual under the Eighth
Amendment, a fortiori, it must also be an illegal sentence. With regard to
the doctrine of merger and the Double Jeopardy Clauses, our Supreme Court
for the same offense serves to prevent the sentencing court from prescribing
greater punishment Commonwealth v.
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11
In addition, the Supreme Court recently added Alleyne v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) to the Apprendi line of cases. In Alleyne, the
Court overruled Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), and held
Alleyne, supra at 2155
(internal quotation marks omitted). Although Alleyne, like all of the
Apprendi line, is grounded in the Jury Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment,
authority to engage in judicial fact-finding in order to impose a higher
In this case, the trial court correctly noted that Section 1102.1 does
present an Alleyne problem. Section 1102.1 prescribes a mandatory
offense. See [a] person who at the
time of the commission of the offense was 15 years of age or older shall
be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without parole, or a term of
(emphasis added). However, the trial court also noted that at sentencing
Appellant conceded that he was 15 years old at the time of the offense.
N.T., 5/24/13, at 11. Since Appellant conceded the fact required for the
mandatory minimum, any Alleyne error in this case was rendered harmless.
See United States v. Hunt, 656 F.3d 906, 913 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that
an Apprendi error can
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Andrews, 768 A.2d 309, 329 (Pa. 2001) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution states that
isdiction the equal
Id. at Art. I, § 10. Likewise, Article I, Section 17 of the
Pennsylvania [n]o ex post facto law, nor any law
impairing the obligation of contracts, or making irrevocable any grant of
In our view, there is a meaningful difference between the remaining
two arguments Appellant raises in this case and issues pertaining to the
Eighth Amendment, merger, Apprendi and Alleyne. The Eighth
Amendment, merger, Apprendi, and even Alleyne all directly circumscribe
encing process and sentencing authority. Stated
another way, the goal of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the
merger doctrine, Apprendi and Alleyne is to protect defendants from the
imposition of punishments by trial judges that are unconstitutional,
Andrews, supra. However, as is relevant
in this case, the Equal Protection Clause and the Ex Post Facto Clauses serve
to restrict legislative power. Appellant does not argue that the trial court did
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sentencing function. Nor does Appellant argue that any part of the
sentencing process was unconstitutional. Rather, Appellant argues that the
General Assembly passed a statute that, in his view, unconstitutionally
treats some juveniles differently than others, and retroactively changes the
33-34. These arguments do not address the same concerns as the Eighth
Amendment, the merger doctrine, Apprendi and Alleyne. Because
Ex Post Facto Clause arguments directly
seek protection from legislatures, not judges, we hold that these arguments
Commonwealth v.
Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1036 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (citation
omitted).
It does not alter our conclusion that the constitutional argument here
involves a mandatory minimum sentence. Appellant has not cited to any
case where we have allowed a constitutionally-based legality of sentencing
claim regarding mandatory minimum sentencing to be raised for the first
time on appeal, leaving aside cases involving Alleyne. If we were to hold
that an Equal Protection and Ex Post Facto challenge is non-waivable
because a mandatory minimum sentence is involved, than any state or
federal constitutional provision that could serve as a basis to challenge a
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mandatory minimum sentence must also be non-waivable as well.12 Further,
if we did not require preservation in the trial court, all of these constitutional
challenges could also be raised by this Court sua sponte as well. See
generally Commonwealth v. Ornella, 86 A.3d 877, 883 n.7 (Pa. Super.
illegality of sentence sua sponte
conclude that the trial court was correct that Appellant waived his arguments
under the Equal Protection and Ex Post Facto Clauses by not raising them in
his post-sentence motion below.
eit
judgment of sentence is affirmed.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Donohue files a Concurring Opinion.
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12
For example, a defendant could challenge Section 1102.1 under the
Original Purpose and Single Subject Clauses of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. We point out that these arguments also directly accuse the
legislature, not the trial court, of acting unconstitutionally regarding Section
1102.1.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/27/2014
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